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According to the U.S. Constitution, the states are prohibited from direct 
involvement in foreign affairs because the federal government is supreme in this area. 
This legal restriction forms the basis for the prevailing concept that states have no 
authority, capability, or even interest in foreign affairs.  
But globalization has transformed the nature of domestic policy, and states’ 
interests have changed. Today, state officials meet regularly with their foreign 
counterparts to discuss matters of mutual concern, ranging from economic 
development to law enforcement. Domestic policy now has international causes and 
effects, and states are expanding their domestic governing responsibilities to include 
foreign relations.  
But in 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned a Massachusetts state law 
infringing on federal supremacy in foreign affairs. This preemption shows there are 
limits to the states’ growing international roles, prompting the question, when can 
 vii 
   
 
 
states develop international roles and when does the federal government  restrict 
them? 
By examining one case across a range of policy areas, patterns emerge that 
have yet to be identified by other scholars. The dissertation examines several venues 
the state of Texas has created to communicate directly with Mexico on matters of 
economic development, border relations, criminal justice, and family law.  
Generalizing from the Texas case, the dissertation finds that states are most 
free to develop an international role when they: 1) can exploit the legal ambiguity 
surrounding domestic responsibilities that have become internationalized; and 2) 
share common policy goals with the federal government. 
Washington is most likely to restrict states when: 1) a politically significant 
complainant challenges a state’s action; and 2) there is a need for a single national 
policy standard. 
It is important to consider the implications of internationally-active states in 
order to understand how both U.S. domestic and foreign policy are evolving. This 
dissertation’s findings offer important insights into this vital and current topic. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
         INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Because responsibility for U.S. foreign affairs is the exclusive domain of the 
federal government, one expects U.S. states to be restricted from any kind of 
international involvement. The U.S. Constitution prohibits states from signing treaties or 
forming compacts with foreign nations. These legal restrictions give rise to the 
prevailing view of states as strictly domestic actors, with no authority, capability, or 
even interest in foreign affairs. 
But today, few domestic policies are still strictly domestic. As the global 
economy has changed, the nature of domestic policy has transformed. The issues 
traditionally the domain of the states – such as economic development, criminal justice, 
and family law, to name a few  – are issues that increasingly have foreign causes and 
effects. Today, states have to forge foreign ties in order to meet their local 
responsibilities. Thus states send trade missions to foreign nations, open trade offices 
overseas; and hold international conferences on law enforcement. States routinely bypass 
Washington, D.C to form their own relations directly with other nations, all in order to 
meet their domestic governing obligations. 
How has Washington responded to these developments? Legally, only the federal 
government can represent the nation in foreign affairs; the states have no authority to do 
so. Throughout the nation’s history, the Supreme Court has restricted the states from 
encroaching on federal supremacy in foreign affairs on the grounds that independent 
action on the part of the states poses a danger to the integrity of the nation. The federal 
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government has the authority to restrict the states from establishing or continuing foreign 
contact, and could exercise that power to restrict the states at any time. And yet, states – 
and even cities – are developing international roles for themselves with surprisingly little 
objection from the federal government – sometimes even with federal encouragement 
and financial support.1  
That the states are developing foreign relations directly with other nations with 
tacit – much less overt – federal support, runs counter to every presumption there is 
about states and the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs. But in 2000, in the most recent court 
case concerning states and foreign affairs, the U.S. Supreme Court preempted a 
Massachusetts law prohibiting the state from purchasing goods or services from 
businesses with a presence in Burma (Myanmar). This case of federal restriction 
substantiates the traditional view that states bold enough to get involved in foreign 
affairs will be stopped by the federal government.2  
And yet, the Burma case is the exception. For the past 40 years or so, the states 
have been expanding into the international arena with no serious federal curtailment. 
Clearly there are conditions under which the states are free to develop an international 
role, and conditions under which the federal government will restrict the states. But 
despite the increasing role of states in international affairs, there is surprisingly little 
empirical research – and no coherent theory – showing the conditions under which states 
are free to assert themselves in the international arena, without inciting federal 
restriction. 
Therefore, this dissertation addresses two questions vital to understanding U.S. 
foreign policy and federalism today: 1) Given the constitutional restrictions on U.S. 
states in foreign affairs, why have states developed relations directly with foreign 
nations? and 2) when does the federal government move to restrict the states from 
international involvement?  
 
                                        
1 While some municipal-level activities are included in this research, the focus is on the U.S. 
states as the federal government’s essential partners in U.S. federalism. 
2 Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000). 
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The Significance of This Project: Exploring Federalism and International 
Relations 
It is crucial to consider how today’s dynamic policy environment affects the 
states, not only in order to understand how domestic policy is evolving, but also in order 
to comprehend global politics.  
According to Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, the new international relations 
agenda is characterized by an agenda of increasingly complex issues that touch all levels 
of government. These issues hold no clear hierarchy, and offer no easy solutions. All 
levels of government are partly responsible – and no level is wholly responsible. Thus 
any possible solution requires unprecedented levels of intergovernmental cooperation. 
“Inadequate policy coordination on these (intermestic) issues involves significant costs,” 
Keohane and Nye write. “Different issues generate different coalitions, both within 
governments and across them, and involve different degrees of conflict. Politics does not 
stop at the waters’ edge.”3 The result is an increasingly narrow distinction between 
foreign and domestic policy, what Bayless Manning termed “intermestic” issues, when 
domestic and foreign concerns converge on the same policy area.4 
Given these dynamic policy demands, it seems states are only being responsible 
by reaching across borders in order to address local problems. But U.S. states 
establishing international intergovernmental relations is contrary to traditional 
presumptions about the operation of U.S. federalism. 
Thomas Dye says a system is truly federal when “both national and subnational 
governments exercise separate and autonomous authority, both elect their own officials, 
and both tax their own citizens for the provision of public services.” 5  
Federalism as a structure is fixed; the Constitution delineates the powers 
possessed by each level of government. The federal government is responsible for 
                                        
3 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 3rd edition (New York: 
Longman, 2001): 21. 
4 Bayless Manning, “The Congress, the Executive, and Intermestic Affairs: Three Proposals,” 
Foreign Affairs 55 (January 1977). 
5 Other federal systems include Australia, Canada, Germany, India, Mexico, and Switzerland. 
Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy, 9th Ed (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1998): 284 – 
290. 
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national security, foreign affairs, and regulating foreign and domestic commerce. By a 
strict constitutional interpretation, Congress cannot directly legislate on domestic issues 
that fall outside of its enumerated powers. The states are constitutionally empowered to 
regulate the public health, safety, and welfare. Within that domain, the states have 
considerable freedom to innovate policies and expand governing capacities. Therefore 
federalism as a practice is dynamic. The balance of power between the federal 
government and the states is determined by politics – by how the states assert themselves 
and expand their capacities, and by the federal government’s response – to restrict the 
states or not. 
Given their considerable autonomy, the states have always been sources of policy 
innovation. 6 The open U.S. federal system, with power distributed over 50 state 
governments and literally thousands of local governments, encourages the development 
of diverse policies to meet specific local needs. Dye writes that the variety of policies 
encouraged by the structure of federalism helps to minimize conflict over policymaking: 
“Federalism permits citizens to decide many things at the state and local levels of 
government and avoid battling over single national policies to be applied uniformly 
throughout the land.” Successful state programs often become the models from which 
federal policies are developed. The description of states as “laboratories of democracy” 
is attributed to the late Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis, who defended policy 
experimentation by the states.7  
States have come to play an important role as implementers of federal policy. As 
the nation has developed, Congress’ influence in domestic politics has gradually 
increased. Congress has used federal funds as incentives to coerce states into 
implementing public policy in accord with federal standards, in such areas as education 
                                        
6 See Jack L. Walker, “The Diffusion of Innovation Among the American States,” American 
Political Science Review 63 (September 1969): 880-899; Virginia Gray, “Innovation in the 
States,” American Political Science Review 67 (December 1973): 1174-1185; John L. Foster, 
“Regionalism and Innovation in the American States,” The Journal of Politics 40 (February 
1978):179-187.  
7 According to Dye, there are some 85,000 subnational governments – states, counties, cities, 
towns, boroughs, villages, special districts, school districts, and authorities, all with some type of 
policy authority. Dye, pp. 285-286. See also David Osborne, Laboratories of Democracy. 
(Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1990). 
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and highway safety. The federal agencies rely on states as necessary resources to meet 
federal policy goals, increasing the incentives for Washington to maintain harmonious 
relations with the states. 
So in practical terms, the states and the federal government are partners in 
meeting public needs. Decades ago, Daniel Elazar described all levels of U.S. 
government as being united “in the common task of serving the American people,” a 
characterization that holds true today. 8 Rosenthal and Hoefler speak of “the achievement 
of common purposes,” and claim that federalism can provide a space for setting and 
achieving common goals.9 Peterson, Rabe, and Wong hypothesize that federalism is at 
its best when all levels of government consciously develop programs to meet a range of 
social needs.10  
In U.S. domestic policy, the states play important roles as policy innovators, as 
governing resources, and as partners in meeting shared policy goals. But what happens 
to the states’ role when domestic policy becomes intermingled with foreign affairs? The 
expectation would be, at the least, increased intergovernmental conflict and, at most, 
federal restriction. But this is not always the case.  
While none of the federalist scholars mentioned above specifically address the 
role of states in international affairs, their conclusions logically support the idea that 
each level of government would continue to play a vital role in meeting needs, especially 
as domestic politics have taken on international aspects. If so, one would expect the 
federal government not to restrict the states, but give the states free rein to innovate 
policies in order to meet mutual governing goals. And yet, the research presented here 
will show there are times the federal government will still restrict an internationally-
active state.  
                                        
8 Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View From the States. (New York: Thomas Y. 
Crowell Company, 1966): 2.  
9 Donald R. Rosenthal and James M. Hoefler, “Competing Approaches to the Study of American 
Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations.” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 19  (Vol 1, 
1989): 1-23.  
10 Paul E. Peterson, Barry G. Rabe, and Kenneth K. Wong, When Federalism Works. 
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1986).  
 6
The study of federalism has not yet been updated to account for how 
globalization affects U.S. domestic policy, or to show how the states’ roles are affected 
by changes in the nature of domestic policy, and the subsequent federal response. This 
dissertation is a first step in that direction. 
 
 
The Argument  
The dissertation argues that since World War II, even when states were 
supposedly bound by constitutional, conceptual, and political limits, an evolving global 
economic and social order was pushing states onto the world stage. As globalization 
transformed the nature of domestic issues, U.S. state governments responded by 
becoming players in the global economy. As trade barriers fell and investment capital 
became increasingly and rapidly mobile, subnational governments began to compete for 
foreign investment dollars and to develop new strategies to adapt to the changing 
economy. 
The term globalization is overused and under-defined. But that term more than 
any other describes in general the phenomenon explored in more detail in Chapter Three 
of this document, that of the rapid global economic integration that developed after 
World War II. The focus here is on economic globalization (as opposed to social or 
cultural globalization) as a force driving the internationalization of domestic policy and 
the development of international intergovernmental relations. 
In order to address domestic problems that were changed by global 
developments, states found it in their interests to develop the capacity to interact with 
foreign nations. As the states struggled to meet domestic challenges that now had 
international significance, the openness of the U.S. federal system allowed states to 
develop mechanisms to confer directly with foreign nations.  
The dissertation argues that states are continuing to play the same role they have 
always played in U.S. domestic politics. As sovereign governing entities, states are still 
innovating policy and striving to meet policy goals, and will continue to do so until 
restricted by the federal government. 
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What remains unexplored is how far the states can develop their international 
roles before the federal government acts to restrict them.  
Chapter Two will explain in more detail the means by which the federal 
government may restrict the states.  U.S. Supreme Court case law shows that in the past, 
the Court has preempted the states for two primary reasons. The first is when state 
actions are seen as encroaching on federal supremacy. The second is when state actions 
are seen as posing a danger to the national interest.  
Congress and the Executive Branch have preempted state regulations when 
Washington sees a need to standardize policies across the states. This basis for 
restricting the states is already evident; under the 1992 Uruguay Round of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), the states were required to yield some areas of regulatory 
authority to comply with the international standards endorsed by the treaties.  
Federal restriction may also result from a challenge to a state’s actions by a 
politically significant complainant. The challenge to the 1997 Massachusetts law 
restricting the use of state funds to purchase goods from businesses with a presence in 
Burma was initiated by a well-organized group of multinational corporations, who 
objected to an anticipated loss of business resulting from the state’s action. This case and 
its implications will be discussed further in Chapter Two.  
 Thus the federal government has restricted the states when the states were seen 
as encroaching on federal supremacy; or posing a threat to the national interest; when the 
federal government sees a need to standardize policy across the states, or following a 
challenge by a significant complainant. 
But what has not been deeply explored in the existing literature is which of these 
restrictive conditions apply in what conditions. In other words, how far can the states go 
in developing their international roles before the federal government moves to restrict 
them? 
The best way to consider these questions is by looking closely at one state and 
how its international role has evolved over time and across a variety of policy areas, and 
how the federal government responded. 
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The Project 
In order to examine the federal response to the increasing international role of the 
states, this dissertation will focus on the dynamics of one case: that of Texas-Mexico 
relations. Looking closely at one case offers the opportunity for a deeper understanding 
of the conditions under which a state seeks an international role and how federal officials 
respond.  
The opening of the U.S. economy to global economic forces has exposed all the 
states to the same dynamic pressures; however, each state is affected in unique ways and 
responds in unique ways, contingent upon each state’s internal politics, resources, and 
culture. But while the states may experience and respond to globalization individually, 
when it comes to foreign affairs, the states share a legally subordinate position to the 
federal government. Thus if any of the federal branches curtailed a single state from 
developing its international role, that restriction would likely apply equally to all the 
states. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to look at the federal response to Texas’ wide-
ranging international efforts and draw at least tentative conclusions as to the conditions 
under which all states might be restricted from international involvement.  
Because Texas was a pioneer in developing an international role vis-à-vis 
Mexico, the case offers a longer span of time in which to observe the federal response to 
a variety of state- level international initiatives. This is not to say that insights could not 
be gained by examining other states’ foreign mechanisms with Mexico and beyond, 
indeed, California’s criminal justice relationship with Mexico in some areas preceded 
the development of Texas-Mexico relations in this area. But Texas was the first U.S. 
state to open a trade office in Mexico, and for eighteen years was the only U.S. state 
permitted to have a trade office there.11 A Texas official was the first to argue why states 
should pursue child support cases in foreign courts; and Texas Governor Bill Clements 
was the first to aggressively pursue relations with governors in Mexico and create a 
                                        
11 California opened the second U.S. office in Mexico in 1989. Email communication with 
Douglas Smurr, Managing Director of the Americas, California Office of Trade and Investment, 
4 November 2003. 
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regional policy-coordination mechanism bringing together governors from the United 
States and Mexico.12 When considering the extent to which the federal government will 
allow states to develop international roles, the fact that Texas was the first to develop its 
international capacities across a range of issues means this case offers the best 
opportunity to observe how the federal government has responded to Texas’ growing 
international role, and by logical extension, the types of state- level activities the federal 
government would seek to curtail across the board.  
While Texas’ geographical position means that it arguably has a greater degree 
of interest in developing international intergovernmental relations with Mexico, so-
called globalizing forces have so penetrated the United States as a whole that other states 
are no longer insulated from the same concerns that led Texas to become a global actor. 
If Texas and Mexico have not found it necessary or worthwhile to develop international 
intergovernmental relations on a given issue, then other U.S. states likely have not either. 
And if Texas has developed ties with Mexico over a certain issue, it is likely that other 
U.S. states will need to develop their own such mechanisms in the future. Texas is at the 
crest of a wave of accelerating international concerns involving the United States and 
Mexico, but other state governments will eventually be swept along by the same waters, 
involving other nations as well. Other states are learning a lot from the Texas 
experience.  
In the past, state officials managed sporadic cooperative interactions with 
counterparts in Mexico, but such relations depended on personal friendships between 
Texans and Mexicans and had little continuity. While personal relationships still matter 
today, the acceleration of contact in recent years has led to the development of more 
reliable means of communication. These institutionalized venues, albeit on shaky 
constitutional ground, are likely to endure despite future changes in personnel.  
The implications for state- federal relations and U.S. foreign policy need to be 
explored. Theory-building is not the immediate goal of this dissertation. Tracing the 
historical development of internationally-active states and how they function in this 
                                        
12 Chapter Five will examine regional policy-coordination mechanisms, and Chapter Seven will 
explain how states became involved in international child support cases. 
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capacity is, and this project should provide a sounder empirical basis for future theory 
construction than currently exists in the literature. 
 
 
The Method 
The dissertation takes an historical case study approach. Research for this project 
was done through archival research and through interviews with federal, state, and local 
officials from the United States as well as Mexican federal officials.13 
The Texas-Mexico case comprises several “miniature case studies” studied in 
detail here – several of the venues Texas has created to communicate directly with 
Mexico in selected policy areas, including two venues created along with other 
Southwestern states to promote good relations with Mexican state officials. The 
emphasis here is on trade, criminal justice, and family law because these are the is sue-
areas most affected by global integration and therefore most likely to be of concern to 
other U.S. states. The border relations mechanisms are also studied, although this area is 
less generalizable to the other forty-six.14  
Studying the creation of each venue affords an opportunity to see the 
international, national, and local conditions that inspired Texas to create the international 
venue – and to see if there are discernible patterns to the federal response. 
Understanding what happens to the traditional state and federal roles when 
domestic policy becomes internationalized is of utmost importance in a world where 
there is an increasingly narrow functional separation between domestic and international 
policy. These issues have implications for domestic governance as well as the practice of 
foreign policy. 
                                        
13 While some officials are identified by name, most interviews – particularly with law 
enforcement personnel – were conducted with the assurance of anonymity. However, most 
quoted sources are identified by their nationality, the level of government at which they work, 
the agency or issue-area they represent, and the date and location of the interview.  
14 Though even this area would likely be of interest to the U.S. states forming the Northern 
border with Canada. 
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The dissertation examines the state-generated venues to communicate with 
Mexico in four issue-areas, to see why each was created and the subsequent federal 
response. 
Trade: The project looks at the specific ways the state of Texas responded to 
global economic pressures by establishing a place for itself in the global political 
economy, including the opening of the Texas Trade Office in Mexico City in 1971, the 
Mexico-Texas- Agricultural Exchange Commission, started in 1984, and a variety of 
other initiatives to increase economic ties with Mexico. 
Relations : Two venues are examined that involve not only Texas but also the 
nine other U.S. and Mexican states along the border: the Border Governors’ Conference 
was created in 1979-80 and the Border States Attorneys’ General Conference in 1986. In 
each of these venues, U.S. state actors confer with Mexican state actors on issues of 
common concern such as economic development and public safety but also issues under 
federal jurisdiction such as immigration and illegal drug traffic. 
Criminal Justice: The criminal justice venues studied are the informal and formal 
methods of fugitive apprehension and recovery between Texas and Mexico. 
Child Support: Texas opened an international child support office in 1992 to 
negotiate with Mexico as well as other nations on how child support payments ordered 
by a U.S. court can be enforced in another nation and vice versa. Since then, the U.S. 
federal government has recognized the value of such an endeavor and has adopted the 
Texas model for its own international negotiations that will eventually preempt state-
level efforts. 
 
 
Means of Analysis 
For each venue studied, a triangle of three “relationship axes” can be conceived 
of as existing between Texas, Mexico, and the United States. The relationship axes serve 
as a tool to ask questions about why Texas reached out to Mexico. The three axes 
address the international, national, and state- level forces driving the changes in the 
Texas-Mexico relationship. These conditions are: the changing world economy 
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(international causes), the openness of the U.S. federal system (national causes), and the 
need for state actors to govern effectively (state causes). 
1) The U.S.–Mexico axis (international causes): what were the international 
political and economic conditions that contributed to or prevented the state’s 
effort to reach across the Rio Grande?  
2) The Texas-U.S. axis (national causes): was the problem Texas sought to address 
under state or federal jurisdiction? What was the corresponding federal 
response: did the federal government support the mechanism, ignore it, or move 
to restrict the mechanism? 
3)  The Texas-Mexico axis (state causes): How was the venue created? Did Texas’ 
interest in and method of contact with Mexico differ from the U.S. 
government’s relations with Mexico?  
 
The three relationship axes help to put the development of international 
intergovernmental relations between Texas and Mexico in the historical context 
necessary to understand why a U.S. state would seek a relationship with a foreign 
government, and to explain the federal government response. Then any pattern to the 
federal response can be determined. 
 
The Understudied Role of States 
The indispensable role U.S. states play in the implementation of federal policy 
has been well documented on the domestic front. But the developing role of U.S. states 
in foreign affairs is understudied.  
This disregard of the developing role of states in international affairs has three 
causes, all of which have kept the analytical focus of foreign relations at the federal level 
only.  
The first is the constitutional order and the subsequent case law limiting states 
from involvement in foreign affairs on the grounds that states pursuing their own 
interests overseas would be dangerous to the nation as a whole. This tradition is 
discussed in the next chapter.  
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The second is the muting effect of the Cold War. During these years, foreign 
affairs and domestic policy were conceived as separate spheres. Following that 
reasoning, states were seen as appropriately active in the domestic sphere and had no 
business interfering in the foreign sphere, where national security concerns 
predominated, despite the fact that states were developing their international roles during 
this period. 
The third is the practice of International Relations theory to portray nation-states 
as unitary actors. The conceptual model of International Relations theory distills all the 
politics and processes internal to a nation-state into a shorthand depiction of the nation-
state as a unitary actor in an anarchic international system. For example, international 
relations are characterized as taking place between “the United States” and “Mexico,” 
rather than “the presidential administration of the United States, acting under pressure 
from Congress, the electorate, and multiple interest groups” as it interacts with “the 
executive branch of the Mexican government, acting within the constraints of its federal 
system and constitutional order.”  
In depicting international politics, simplification is obviously a necessity. But the 
tradeoff has been a tendency to disregard the complexity of forces and pressures 
influencing a nation’s internal politics. Arguably, the cost of simplification has been to 
overlook significant amounts of activity occurring at both the national and subnational 
levels of politics, particularly “low politics” activity, such as trade, in which subnational 
actors are active. The focus on governments rather than governance has imposed a 
narrow analytical focus that overlooked changes in the nature of problems and the wide 
variety of responses by different levels of government and interests.  
After the Cold War, the presence of subnational actors in international affairs 
was acknowledged in academic literature, but treated as new, post-Cold War 
phenomena, disregarding the degree to which state and local governments were 
developing international relations during the Cold War. The role of national governments 
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worldwide has been under reconsideration, as subnational, transgovernmental and 
nonstate actors everywhere challenge nation-states on all sides.15 
From the federal and academic viewpoint, states have not been previously 
involved in foreign affairs. But from the subnational perspective, states have been 
willing for decades to commit significant resources towards cultivating relationships 
with foreign actors in order to govern more effectively. Subnational governments have 
long been aware, perhaps more than federal actors, how international politics affects 
domestic governance. 
In 1984, John Kline wrote, “the federal nature of the American political system 
gives a twist to this adaptation (to global change) process, however, which requires a 
sorting-out of overlapping authorities where foreign economic factors intersect state and 
local government prerogatives.”16 This adaptation process has not yet been empirically 
studied in detail. This dissertation offers a detailed examination of Texas-Mexico 
relations in order to shed light on why states began forming their own foreign relations, 
and to explore the conditions under which the federal government will act to restrict the 
states. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                        
15 See Michael Clough, “Grass-roots Policymaking: Say Goodbye to the ‘Wise Men.’” Foreign 
Affairs 73 (January-February 1994): 2; Anne-Marie Slaughter, “The Real New World Order,” 
Foreign Affairs 76 (September/October 1997): 183-197. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Erosion of 
National Interests,” Foreign Affairs 76 (September/October 1997): 40. See also James Rosenau, 
Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity  (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1990); and James N. Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: 
Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).  
16 John M. Kline, “The International Economic Interests of U.S. States,” Publius: The Journal of 
Federalism 14 (Fall 1984): 94. 
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THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
The phenomena of internationally-active states exists at the intersection of 
several different theoretical traditions, none of which fully describes or explains how 
U.S. states have become international actors across a spectrum of issues. Although the 
phenomenon is now a fact of domestic and global politics, surprisingly little theory has 
been developed to account specifically for it, although there is at least a recognition of a 
need to move in that direction. 
This section briefly examines two areas of Political Science literature, 
International Relations and Federalism, and finds that neither offers a satisfying theory 
for explaining why states have become global actors. 
 
International Relations 
While International Relations theory has much to offer in analyzing relations 
between central governments, the field in general does not recognize activity at the 
subnational government level.  
Two articles, published soon after the Cold War’s end, took notice of the 
increasing role of subnational governments in U.S. foreign affairs, one article by 
Michael Clough, and the other by Samuel Huntington. Both attribute the increasing role 
of U.S. states in foreign relations to the end of the Cold War, arguing that after 1989, the 
U.S. foreign policy agenda broadened from its Cold War focus on anticommunism, 
thereby allowing more actors into the foreign policy process. Clough celebrated this 
change as a much-needed democratization of foreign policy while Huntington, keeping 
alive the concept that states should be only domestic actors, claimed it would decimate 
the national interest and work only ill for the country. 17  
While each author reaches different conclusions about the effect of active states, 
each assumes that during the Cold War subnational actors were restricted in their 
international involvement. However, research shows that the states’ presence on the 
world scene predated the end of the Cold War by decades. 
                                        
17 Clough, p. 2-8; Samuel P. Huntington, “The Erosion of National Interests,” Foreign Affairs 76 
(September/October 1997): 28-50. 
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James Rosenau writes:  
It is tempting to treat (the Cold War’s end) as an epochal turning-
point. Such an interpretation, however, is misleading…and does not allow for 
the possibility that the end of the Cold War was the culmination of 
underlying and long-standing processes of change which…ushered in a 
common sense of dynamics and structures that amounted to a new epoch. 18  
 
Huntington’s and Clough’s assumptions that states were active only domestically 
during the Cold War show the limitations of the state-centric viewpoint offered by 
International Relations theory. 
The existing literature in International Political Economy (IPE) suffers from the 
same shortcomings as does the International Relations literature, in that it is state-
centered, system-centered, or society-centered, but typically not concerned with the role 
of substates. To the extent that states are considered, they are assumed to be subordinate 
to the federal government. The possibility that subnational governments could play an 
independent or innovative role is not addressed. 
The IPE literature draws from the field of international economics. The classic 
theories of Smith and Ricardo that form the basis of this field do not consider the state in 
its complexity. At the time these theories were developed, subnational governments were 
subordinate to central governments, which were then the predominant actors in world 
trade. Today, many subnational governments the world over are taking a more active 
role in trade, but economic theories have yet to develop models to explain the many 
developing dimensions of international commerce.19 
There is some literature that addresses subnational governments and their 
international roles, and builds off the work of International Relations theorists Robert 
Keohane and Joseph Nye. The Complex Interdependence Approach confronts the topic 
most directly, as evidenced by the work of Ivo Duchacek, John M. Kline, John Kincaid, 
                                        
18 Rosenau (1997): p. 7.  
19 Michelle Sager, Cooperation Without Borders: Federalism and International Trade (Ph.D. 
dissertation, George Mason University, Fall 1998). Sager’s research concerns state-federal 
relations on international trade issues. 
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Earl Fry, and Soldatos Panayotis. Most of these authors were represented in a special 
issue of the journal Publius in 1984, published long before the end of the Cold War.20  
Taken in toto, this literature has had little influence in the field of International 
Relations or International Political Economy. As Darel Paul observes, the literature’s 
“goals of describing a previously uncharted terrain and of explaining the causes of 
subnational state foreign policy wholly failed to capture the imagination of scholars in 
these disciplines.”21  
Taken individually, these scholars do offer perspective on some of the concerns 
of the phenomena, and their work appears in a supporting role throughout the 
dissertation. But the Complex Interdependence approach is not sufficient to explain why 
the U.S. states have developed their international roles without federal interference. 
 
 
The Study of Federalist Systems 
The dynamics of U.S. federalism are at the crux of this project, examining when 
states are free to reach across borders and when such action might be deemed as an 
encroachment on federal supremacy.  
But there is no model of federalism that addresses how the different levels of 
government interact when domestic policy takes on international aspects. One 
explanation for this is offered by Joseph Pattison, “…public policy and management 
concepts have remained static, rooted in a world that no longer exists.”22  
The three models of federalism are: dual federalism, cooperative federalism, and 
coercive federalism.  
Dual federalism depicts two governments that operate in the same territory, yet 
each has distinct responsibilities within its separate sphere of authority. Cooperative 
federalism describes instances when the federal government encourages subnational 
                                        
20 Publius: The Journal of Federalism 14 (Fall 1984). 
21 Darel Paul, Rescaling IPE: Subnational States and the Regulation of the Global Political 
Economy (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, July 2001): 7. Paul’s research concerns 
how best to analyze state roles in international trade relations. 
22 Joseph E. Pattison, Breaking Boundaries: Public Policy vs. American Business in the World 
Economy. (Princeton, N.J.: Petersons’/Pacesetter Books, 1996): vi. 
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actors to help achieve national goals and provides funding towards that purpose. 
Coercive federalism occurs when the federal government mandates the states implement 
certain policies.  
John Kincaid explains that these three phases of federalism have followed the 
growing role of the federal government in domestic politics. The conception of dual 
federalism was the accepted model of distribution of governmental power from 1789 to 
1932. Each level of government was conceived of as having its own sphere of 
responsibilities. During this time, the federal government’s involvement in domestic 
politics was much less then its role today. But dual federalism as a practice proved an 
inadequate distribution of power after the Great Depression of 1929. Kincaid writes, 
“The industrial economy generated numerous negative externalities that were 
increasingly seen as beyond the reach of state regulation and amelioration. Reformers 
urged the federal government to behave more like a central government in order to 
manage the new national economy.”23  
Dual federalism as a descriptive concept was discredited by Morton Grodzins, 
who wrote: “it is difficult to find any level of governmental activity which does not 
involve all three of the so-called ‘levels’ of the federal system.”24 Grodzins developed 
the concept of “marble-cake” federalism, which depicts the functions of government not 
as restricted to separate layers or spheres but intermingled. This is an accurate image for 
the overlapping authority relations of U.S. government today, including foreign affairs, 
although Grodzins was addressing domestic politics and not intentionally including the 
international relations of subnational actors. 
Cooperative federalism, usually given the dates 1932 to 1968, was distinguished 
by mechanisms such as grants- in-aid, used to encourage the states to pursue federal 
                                        
23 John Kincaid, “From Dual to Coercive Federalism in American Intergovernmental Relations,” 
in Globalization & Decentralization: Institutional Contexts, Policy Issues, and 
Intergovernmental Relations in Japan and the United States, Jong S. Jun and Deil S. Wright, 
eds. (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1996): 34. 
24 Morton Grodzins, “The Federal System,” in Goals for Americans: The Report of the 
President’s Commission on National Goals and Chapters Submitted for the Consideration of the 
Commission (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1960.) Quoted in Deil S. Wright, 
Understanding Intergovernmental Relations (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing, 1988): 
72. 
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goals and implement federal policy. But during the social unrest of the 1960s, many 
pushed again for reform of the federal government to ensure the rights of all citizens 
were honored by all levels of government. The federal government increased its 
regulation of state politics, in what is termed coercive federalism.  
During the period of coercive federalism, the federal presence in domestic 
politics has enlarged. The mechanisms of coercive federalism increased during the 1970s 
and 1980s, as the economic effects of globalization began to be evident within U.S. 
borders. Coercive federalism is characterized by reduced federal aid to state and local 
governments, the attachment of conditions to certain types of federal aid, and federally-
mandated policy goals the states must meet. Coercive federalism implies increased 
levels of intergovernmental conflict.  
While dual federalism as a model of the distribution of government power has 
been discredited, today’s intergovernmental relations evidences elements of both 
coercive and cooperative models. As Deil S. Wright writes, “The presence of conflict 
does not indicate the absence of cooperation.”25 In fact, Wright says, state and federal 
agencies may be simultaneously in conflict over one policy area even while cooperating 
in another. The fact that both coexist makes it irrelevant to ask which overshadows the 
other, he says – but he fails to address the realm of intergovernmental relations in 
foreign policy, where the expectation is that subnational involvement leads to conflict 
and a virtually automatic federal response to restrict the offending state action. 
However, neither the coercive nor the cooperative model has been updated to 
explain how states are establishing an international role for themselves and how this 
affects intergovernmental relations. The presumption is that internationally-active states 
necessarily produce conflict, as will be shown in Chapter Two. But this dissertation will 
show that conflict is not necessarily the result of direct links between states and foreign 
nations. Because globalization has changed the nature of domestic policy, the existing 
models of authority relations must be reexamined. There are no current models of 
federalism that include international activity on the part of states. Legally, the states’ 
                                        
25 Deil S. Wright, Understanding Intergovernmental Relations. (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole 
Publishing Company. 1988): 458.  
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roles are still evolving and in flux. This fact makes developing a suitable model more 
difficult, given that if attitudes of a particular presidential administration changed, the 
result could be changes throughout the entire system. 
Another important point to consider is whether or not significant shifts in the 
distribution of governmental power follow periods of economic upheaval. If the 
industrialization of the 1930s led to a period of increasing nationalization and greater 
cooperation between levels of government, and the beginning of globalization in the 
1970s led to an even larger role for the federal government and the imposition of 
coercive measures and an increase in intergovernmental conflict, then it might be logical 
to assume that globalization will lead to an even larger federal role and a new 
configuration of the governmental power distribution. The question becomes, do periods 
of economic growth and policy change result in a change in federalism? Answering this 
question is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but the first step in determining the 
relationship between globalization and federalism is to look closely at how states are 
forming their international roles and the federal response, as this dissertation does. 
 
 
OTHER LITERATURE  
While there is no coherent body of literature that fully addresses why U.S. states 
have become global actors, there are valuable scholarly works that consider aspects of 
the question at hand. In order to show the state of current research, the following section 
synthesizes these disparate contributions into an overview to show both how others have 
approached the role of U.S. states in foreign affairs, as well as the gaps in current 
research where this dissertation can make a valuable contribution. 
 
 
How Do U.S. States Influence Federal Foreign Policymaking?  
Most federal systems allow their subnational units a voice in the development of 
federal foreign policy. In the United States, the constitutional pathway for states to 
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express their preferences on foreign policy issues is through their Congressional 
representatives.  
How states influence the development of federal foreign policy is at the center of 
sectionalism research, such as that of Richard Bensel and Peter Trubowitz. Bensel 
illustrates how U.S. national interests have been shaped by regional competition over 
foreign economic policy in his book Sectionalism and American Political Development: 
1880-1980.26 Trubowitz examines how the different geographical regions influence U.S. 
defense policy via the voting patterns of state representatives in Congress. Trubowitz 
further develops the link between sectional economic interests and foreign policy in his 
book Defining the National Interest.27  
The sectionalism literature argues that states and regions can have interests that 
differ from the federal government’s, indeed, that the national interest itself is the sum of 
the interests of the states, as derived from their resources and combined with their 
political clout in Washington.  
Sectionalism illustrates what could be termed the “advocacy” approach, whereby 
states express their particular foreign policy interests by exerting pressure at the federal 
level. But the idea that states might act independently and engage directly in negotiations 
with foreign nations is not usually part of the sectionalism analysis. While states still 
exert influence on foreign policy at the federal level, states have moved beyond 
advocacy to engaging foreign actors directly.  
John Kline has also examined how U.S. states have increased their influence in 
U.S. economic policy. The roles Kline examines include state economic-development 
agencies, interstate organizations such as the National Governors’ Association, and the 
ways states seek foreign direct investment and promote exports. He also writes about 
how state governors have developed international agendas. Kline’s astute observations 
provide support for many aspects of this dissertation, although his work is primarily 
                                        
26 Richard Franklin Bensel, Sectionalism and American Political Development: 1880-1980 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984). 
27 See Peter Trubowitz, “Sectionalism and American Foreign Policy: The Political Geography of 
Consensus and Conflict,” International Studies Quarterly  36, (1992): 173-190, and Peter 
Trubowitz, Defining the National Interest: Conflict and Change in American Foreign Policy, 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998).  
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concerned with economics, and this dissertation endeavors to show that states are 
internationally active in policy realms beyond economics, such as criminal justice and 
family law.  
Kline acknowledges the conceptual limits of his own research and that of others 
who look at states as just one of many transnational actors active in U.S. foreign affairs, 
such as multinational corporations and international organization. A transnational focus 
is on the state’s activity and its overseas effects. But states are crucial components in 
federalism, and because they are a source of authority, their involvement in international 
affairs is of more significance than other economic actors because states are 
policymaking actors. Therefore states need to be researched separately from other non-
federal or transnational actors who now play a part in the policy process. Kline writes:  
    Such a transnational actor approach to the international interests of the 
American states may have inadvertently caused many observers to overlook 
what may, in fact, be more immediate and substantial effects from these new 
state actions within the country’s borders…small notice has been given to 
the political policy aspects of many new state actions.28  
 
This dissertation looks exclusively at how one state has developed its interna tional 
mechanisms, and the resulting effect on intergovernmental relations, thus filling a gap 
identified by Kline. 
 
 
How Has Globalization Affected U.S. Politics? 
The field of International Relations postulates the preservation of autonomy and 
the pursuit of power as the primary goals of the nation-state. Keohane and Nye were 
among the first to question the unitary-actor model of international politics, 
acknowledging that world politics develops in a more complex world of formal and 
informal interdependent relationships that develop not only between nation-states but 
private corporations and international organizations. 
The Complex Interdependence articles pay homage to Power and 
Interdependence by Keohane and Nye as the “conceptual basis for analyzing the impact 
                                        
28 Kline (1984): 88. 
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of interdependence” between nation-states.29 But several of the authors are quick to point 
out that Keohane and Nye “did not specifically address the application of such 
considerations to subnational entities, such as the states and localities in the U.S. federal 
system.”30  
Even in the third edition of Power and Interdependence, published in 2001, the 
authors take on the concept of globalization, but there is no mention of the significance 
of subnational actors. Even works that look at how domestic politics has been affected 
by changes in the international system have yet to recognize the significant activity 
occurring at the lower levels. In other works that examine how national politics have 
been affected by global economic change, such as Keohane and Milner’s 
Internationalization and Domestic Politics, “states” still are nation-states and “domestic 
institutions” are found at the federal level only. 31 
Changes in the international economy have raised questions about the future 
shape of governing structures. A burgeoning number of questions have been raised about 
the future of the nation-state in a globalized era, particularly the capacity of the nation-
state to retain its sovereignty in the face of empowered actors, including subnational 
governments in addition to nongovernmental actors, political interest groups, and 
citizens with access to virtually unlimited information.  
James Rosenau developed turbulence theory to explain the recent rapid changes 
in world politics. Technology plays a central role in Roseau’s theory, as it allows 
individuals to “locate their own interests more clearly in the flow of events…the analytic 
skills of individuals have increased to a point where they now play a different and 
significant role in world politics.” Rosenau argues that the greater number of actors in 
the process means federal governments across the globe are “more decentralized, less 
coherent and effective” and that their authority is “more diffuse,” and “hierarchy (is) 
                                        
29 Keohane and Nye. The term “interdependence” has largely yielded to the terms globalization 
or globalism. 
30 Kline (1984): 82-3. 
31 Keohane, Robert O., and Helen V. Milner, Internationalization and Domestic Politics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
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weakened.” This opens his focus to include an array of subnational actors, what he calls 
“subgroups.”32  
Decentralization occurs when non-federal actors are empowered to act without 
assistance from the federal government. Darel Paul writes about how a shift in focus 
from the national level to the subnational level can reveal how globalization has changed 
the sources and location of authority. 33 When state and local governments can work 
directly with the business sector, the federal government is less relevant. When 
information is accessible through the Internet, the federal government is less relevant. 
When technology is reliable enough that intergovernmental relations can develop 
between actors in different nations, the federal government is less relevant and arguably 
loses a part of its traditional role as intermediary between subnational governments, 
business, and foreign governments.  
“Globalization affects sovereignty by redefining the nature of various policy 
realms,” writes Keith Boeckelman. 34 In much of the International Relations theory, 
power is treated as a “zero-sum” game in which one nation’s gain in power is another 
nation’s loss. In the literature that explores the effect of globalization on domestic 
politics, the power of the nation-state is assumed to be zero-sum, and that non-federal 
actors gain strength and influence at the expense of the nation-state.  
But there is no way to measure the supposed decline of central governments. If 
subnational governments are conferring directly with foreign governments for the 
purpose of meeting policy goals that are common to both the subnational and federal 
levels of government, the federal government may in fact not suffer a loss of power, but 
an increase in legitimacy as policy goals are achieved and the quality of governance 
improves. More empirical research on why state level foreign mechanisms develop and 
whether or not their goals are comparable to those of the federal government’s is needed; 
one contribution this dissertation will make is a close examination of one state’s foreign 
mechanisms, how they developed, and the federal response. 
                                        
32 Rosenau (1990):15, 119, 13. 
33 Paul.  
34 Keith Boeckelman, “Federal Systems in the Global Economy: Research Issues,” Publius: The 
Journal of Federalism 26 (Winter 1996): 1-10.  
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In 1976, Peter Katzenstein argued that decentralized states such as the United 
States were more responsive to domestic political concerns.35 If so, then the further 
decentralization that globalization brings could increase U.S. democracy and the 
efficiency of governance. This has yet to be addressed fully. 
From a constitutional law perspective, Mark C. Gordon considers extensively 
how globalization affects the states in a 2001 report.36 He finds that states can act as 
“laboratories” on responding to and shaping globalization, as states do in domestic 
politics. “Globalization is a reality that is susceptible to being shaped,” Gordon 
concludes. The states have opportunities to influence the course of globalization by 
acting to increase citizen participation, shaping the national discourse, and pioneering 
new forms of governance such as multistate policy or regulatory agreements. But he 
cautions that states will also be challenged by the federal government’s entry into 
international trade agreements that seek a harmonization of standards and erode areas of 
traditional state regulatory authority. 
Apart from concerns about how globalization affects national sovereignty, others 
are also concerned that the United States’ entry into international agreements such as 
NAFTA and the WTO will compromise state authority. “The national role in enforcing 
various economic agreements protects national viability and sovereignty. National 
officials, such as the president or the U.S. Trade Representative, are able to overrule 
state laws that conflict with these agreements,” writes Boeckelman. 37  
Barry Friedman explores the implications of international trade agreements on 
state regulatory power in an issue of the Vanderbilt Law Review, and finds that 
globalization will undoubtedly limit the traditional regulatory authority of the states. A 
more significant question, though, is how democratic processes may be weakened. 
                                        
35 Peter Katzenstein, “International Relations and Domestic Structures: Foreign Economic 
Policies of Advanced Industrial States,” International Organization 30 (Winter 1976). 
36 Mark C. Gordon, Democracy’s New Challenge: Globalization, Governance, and the Future of 
American Federalism. (New York: Demos: A Network for Ideas and Action, 2001). 
37 Boeckelman, pp. 1-10. 
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“Concerns about democratic accountability are heightened when domestic regulation is 
structured according to international standards,” Friedman writes.38   
The concern is that other nations could challenge state subsidies to local 
businesses, procurement processes, and other economic development practices as unfair 
trade practices. Thus international agreements will increasingly force states to yield 
sovereignty in areas of traditional state regulatory power. Or that multinational 
corporations and other private interests will use their considerable influence to craft 
trade agreements in ways that favor them, particularly when democratic pathways do not 
yield to their interests. “In effect, the various international negotiations are becoming an 
alternate forum for investors to limit law-making or law enforcement power in ways that 
Congress and state or local governments have rejected,” writes Robert Stumberg. 39 Thus 
even while states and the federal government may share policy goals in the short term, in 
the long term, globalization could cause shared goals to diverge. 
 
 
Why Have States Developed International Roles? 
Most scholars acknowledge that globalization has turned domestic issues into 
international ones, and therefore domestic actors such as states must become 
internationally savvy. Globalization has also affected the capacity of central 
governments worldwide to be effective in handling a widening array of policy problems 
with increasingly non-specific causes. 
Earl Fry writes that the “foreign affairs landscape” is evolving, so that “many 
issues that today affect the American people on Main Street or in the suburbs are simply 
beyond the capacity of Washington to solve single-handedly.” Environmental issues in 
particular, “cannot be solved unilaterally within the borders of the United States,” and 
neither can other challenges such as resource supply and use, organized crime, and 
                                        
38 Barry Friedman, “Federalism’s Future in the Global Village,” Vanderbilt Law Review 47 
(October 1994): 1477. See also Jack L. Goldsmith, “Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and 
Federalism,” Virginia Law Review  83 (November 1997). 
39 Robert Stumberg, Local Meets Global in International Practices, (Updated May 1999, 
Retrieved 16 October 2003.) Available from: 
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illegal immigration. Fry argues that as citizens see the link between their own lives and 
foreign developments, “citizens demand that their interests be protected and enhanced 
not only by their national governments but also increasingly by the subnational 
governments closest to where they live.”40 
John Kline argues that globalization has eroded the distinction between foreign 
and domestic issues, changing the interests of state and local governments. “Political 
decision makers at the state level must view foreign economic policy as increasingly 
relevant and important to their public responsibility for the economic growth and well-
being of their own states.”41  
While Fry and Kline write about the United States, Federalist scholar Ivo 
Duchacek, editor of the special Publius issue, strives to explain why the subnational 
governments in all federal systems are establishing an international presence. He writes 
that “awareness of universal interdependence is the major cause of global micro-
diplomacy,” his term for subnational actors’ involvement in international relations. In 
order to maintain living standards and employment opportunities, “not only nations but 
also subnational territorial communities have ‘to go it with others’ across national 
boundaries so as to be able to ‘go it alone’ more successfully within their own borders,” 
Duchacek writes.42  
To explain the states’ activities, Duchacek acknowledges that domestic features 
of federalist systems play a part, such as an independent culture among subnational 
units, what he calls “opposition to bigness and distance (of the federal government).” 
Federal systems also promote competition between subnational units for economic 
advantage, what he calls “me-too- ism.”  
Duchacek develops a complicated model of direct relationship-building between 
subnational units in federated systems and foreign nations, what he calls 
“paradiplomacy.” One look at the paradiplomacy model explains why the Complex 
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(New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1998): 3, 15.  
41 Kline (1983): 35.  
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Interdependence literature has not had much influence in the field.43 Suffice it to say that 
the increasingly significant international role of unit governments worldwide is still in 
need of an elegant theory. The goal of this dissertation is not theory development, but the 
research presented here should provide an empirical building-block towards the goal of 
theory-building. 
 
 
Do the States’ Actions Really Qualify as “Foreign Policy”? 
While few domestic policies are still exclusively domestic, the federal 
government is still supreme in certain areas of federal policy. States may innovate ways 
of working within the limits of U.S. trade policy, but still cannot sign treaties or change 
the terms of trade. Trade policy, immigration policy, and security policy are still the 
province of the federal government, although subnational governments have a much 
larger stake in those policies than before.  
There are legal limits to how states are capable of acting in foreign relations. 
States cannot form treaties; any state- level relationship is informal. So technically, a 
purist could argue that the states are not in the business of making legally-binding 
foreign policy. But dismissing the activity of the states as less than foreign policy does 
nothing to address the reality that states are increasingly active in relating directly to 
other nations. Daniel Halberstam writes,  
Any project of defining a particular subcategory of this vast range 
of activity as being the stuff of ‘real’ foreign relations is likely to be highly 
elusive. In one way or another, all these actions, from the promotion of 
trade and investment opportunities to the more explicitly ‘political’ 
initiatives, may implicate the foreign relations interests of the Nation as a 
whole.44  
 
                                        
43 Ivo D. Duchacek, “Perforated Sovereignties: Towards a Typology of New Actors in 
International Relations,” in Federalism and International Relations: The Role of Subnational 
Units. Hans J. Michelmann and Panayotis Soldatos, eds. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) 19. 
44 Halberstam, Daniel, "The Foreign Affairs of Federal Systems: A National Perspective on the 
Benefits of State Participation (Symposium: New Voices on the New Federalism)." Villanova 
Law Review 46, no. 5 (2001): 1015-68. 
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Although what the states and cities are doing may not rise to the level of federal 
law, many of these policy initiatives are in harmony with domestic policy goals. 
Collectively, it can be argued, they serve to shape the foreign relations of the nation as a 
whole. 
Ivo Duchacek sees no difference in relations conducted by federal actors and by 
subnational actors. “If by diplomatic negotiation we mean processes by which 
governments relate their conflicting interest to the common ones, there is, conceptually, 
no real difference between the goals of paradiplomacy and traditional diplomacy: the 
aim is to negotiate and implement an agreement based on conditional mutuality.”45 
Brian Hocking objects to treating the foreign relations of subnational 
governments as if they were something distinct from the federal level. Hocking studies 
what happens in federal systems when foreign policy issues become local concerns. He 
sets his approach apart from the complex interdependence crowd, such as Duchacek, 
saying that ideas such as “paradiplomacy” places subnational activities outside of 
traditional diplomatic patterns. Hocking sees non-central governments as integrated into 
a dense web of diplomatic interactions, in which they serve more as “allies and agents” 
in pursuit of national objectives rather than as flies in the ointment. “The nature of 
contemporary public policy with its dual domestic- international features, creates a 
mutual dependency between the levels of government and an interest in devising 
cooperative mechanisms and strategies to promote the interests of each level.”46 Rather 
than separating the activities of non-central governments from those of central 
governments, Hocking’s goal is to “locate” subnational governments in the traditional 
diplomatic and foreign policy processes initiated and carried through by the federal 
government.  
But what Hocking does not look at as closely are the ways in which subnational 
governments initiate relations directly with foreign governments. Looking at why states 
initiate their own foreign relations is the way to determine to what degree the states, in 
pursuit of their own goals, can be “allies and agents” of the federal government. This 
                                        
45 Duchacek (1990): 16. 
46 Brian Hocking, Localizing Foreign Policy: Non-Central Governments and Multilayered 
Diplomacy. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993): 4.  
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dissertation addresses state- initiated relations with foreign governments to see whether 
the states are acting as de facto agents of the federal government, in pursuit of shared 
goals or distinct state interests.  
But one point to consider is that the development of state roles is not a matter of 
devolution. Many of the developments at the subnational level are state and local 
responsibilities to begin with. While the federal government is responsible for trade 
policy, states have the primary role in economic development, and criminal justice is a 
state and local concern, albeit state and local governments share responsibility with the 
federal government for public safety. But the states are active in the policy areas 
examined here not so much because the federal government has mandated they be so, 
but because globalization has changed the nature of governing at the subnational level. 
These developments signify not a transfer of power from the federal level to the states 
but an expansion of traditional state- level powers. 
 
 
What are the Constitutional Implications of International States? 
Because of the constitutional ban on state involvement on foreign policy, lega l 
scholars are quite interested in how globalization will affect relations between the states 
and the federal government. While there is no real theoretical framework in law-review 
literature sufficient to explain the causes and effects of state foreign relations, there are 
important questions raised which should guide further research on the topic.  
The Constitution, the history of case law, and conventional wisdom suggest that 
if states become involved in foreign affairs, the federal branches will take steps to cause 
the state to cease the action in question.  
The research summarized here would indicate that states have successfully 
pursued economic development strategies involving foreign relationships with no federal 
action.  
Few scholars have considered that direct foreign relations between the states and 
other nations might benefit the nation as a whole. Michael Clough argues 
decentralization will make the foreign policy process more democratic, thereby 
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maintaining American values in the development of foreign policy. 47 Daniel Halberstam 
considers the benefits of state participation that would challenge “the previously 
dominant view that States have no place in foreign affairs.” The inspiration for 
Halberstam’s consideration of the states’ roles was the U.S. Supreme Court decision 
striking down the state of Massachusetts’ purchasing restrictions.48 In 1996, the state of 
Massachusetts passed a law prohibiting the state from purchasing goods or services from 
businesses with a presence in the nation of Burma, also called Myanmar. A private 
business group sued; and in 2000, the law was unanimously struck down by the U.S. 
Supreme Court because of the federal government’s preeminence in foreign affairs.49  
The Massachusetts Burma case resonates with all the popular notions of why 
states should be restricted from involvement in foreign affairs: that states, by pursuing 
their own selfish interests, will act contrary to the national interest and erode national 
influence or embarrass the nation.  50 But Halberstam argues that the Court, in striking 
down the state’s law, failed to consider what the proper role of states in foreign affairs 
should be, and therefore “avoided confronting a consistent theme that emerges from the 
doctrinal thicket of its prior decisions on federalism in foreign affairs, i.e., that state 
participation in foreign affairs can be only harmful to the Nation.”51  
Halberstam then considers that direct state involvement may have national 
benefits, particularly in promoting economic development, raising national awareness of 
certain issues, and spurring the federal government to action. Halberstam also argues 
that states will devote resources to issues when the federal government will not. He 
concludes that state involvement is beneficial up to the point that the federal government 
“has spoken to the issues raised and has chosen to exclude the States” as the Court did in 
the Massachusetts case.   
                                        
47 Clough. 
48 Halberstam, 1015-68. 
49 Crosby 530 U.S. 363 (2000). 
50 David Schmahmann and James Finch, "The Unconstitutionality of State and Local Enactments 
in the United States Restricting Business Ties with Burma (Myanmar)," Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 30 (March 1997): 184-202. 
51 Halberstam, 1021. 
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But this dissertation will show that the Massachusetts case is the exception rather 
than the rule. While subnational governments are increasingly vocal when they disagree 
with federal policies, the overwhelming majority of state-foreign activity involves direct 
contact with foreign governments for the purposes of governance, of handling domestic 
challenges. This is the activity that has not been fully explored, aside from previously-
mentioned works that focus on states’ international economic relations.  
Overall, there is a lack of attention in the literature to the possible benefits of 
active states. The lack of conflict with the federal government indicates there may be 
benefits to these developments. And yet, there may be other reasons the federal 
government has not moved to restrict states from forming direct foreign relations, such 
as ignorance of subnational developments, a lack of concern or organization on the part 
of affected groups, inertia among the federal agencies, and a lack of clarity on who is 
responsible for domestic policy when it takes on international aspects.  
In order to know why the federal government has not acted to restrict the 
formation of links directly between U.S. states and foreign nations, much more detailed 
empirical research is needed. While the literature surveyed here has value for its 
exploration of the topic, as a whole the empirical basis on which the observations rest is 
not substantial enough to fully explain how the direct relations have formed and what the 
federal response has been.  
This dissertation will fill a gap in the literature by looking closely at one state, 
Texas, and how it developed its international ties with Mexico over a range of policy 
areas, not only trade relations, and why the federal government has not acted to restrict 
Texas from developing its own foreign relations with Mexico. 
 
 
OUTLINE OF THE BOOK 
Chapter Two explains the constitutional role U.S. states play in the federal 
system, and how the notion that states are strictly domestic actors has evolved through 
decades of Supreme Court decisions. Then the chapter details the ways states can 
become internationally active, and the subsequent debate over the states’ developing 
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international roles. The last section looks at the ways the three federal branches – the 
Executive, Congress, and the Supreme Court – are empowered to rein in the states, but 
only if certain interests are offended. 
Chapter Three explains how changes in the global economy so affected the 
domestic economy that the states, acting within their authority to foster economic 
development, began to pursue interests on the world stage. The states’ roles expand not 
only due to domestic electoral pressures, but also through intense interstate competition, 
which leads to the innovation of new international strategies such as economic 
development agencies, competition for foreign direct investment, and overseas trade 
offices. 
Chapter Four traces the same general timeline as Chapter Three, but this time 
tracing how Texas responded to globalizing forces and interstate competition by 
cultivating a place for itself in the world economy, particularly through increased trade 
relations with Mexico. The specific venues Texas created that are analyzed here are the 
Texas Trade Office, which opened in Mexico City in 1971, and the Texas-Mexico 
Agricultural Exchange, created in 1984.  
Chapter Five tells how Texas and the three other U.S. states along the border 
reached out to their government counterparts in the six neighboring Mexican states via 
the Border Governors Conference, created in 1979, and the Border States Attorneys 
General Conference, which began in 1986. In this case, the state officials took advantage 
of constitutional ambiguity over responsibility for border issues to cultivate mechanisms 
to advance the coordination of policy between the ten states in two countries that form 
an international border.  
Chapter Six elaborates the developing criminal justice cooperation that exists 
between Texas, the United States, and Mexico in general and in the specific area of 
fugitive apprehension. All levels of government share the policy goals of preserving the 
public safety. Local criminal justice is an area of traditional state authority that has been 
changed by increased international immigration to the United States. But international 
criminal justice procedures are regulated by binding international treaties negotiated at 
the federal level. Subnational law enforcement officials often do violate treaties; 
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therefore, one would expect the federal government to restrict state and local law 
enforcement from any international contact. But so far, this has not happened, because 
the federal government simply does not have the resources to monitor all subnational 
activity in this area, indicating that even as domestic policy has become 
internationalized, states continue to fulfill a role as governing resources for the federal 
government, in pursuit of common policy goals. 
Chapter Seven tells the story of how Texas officials developed a legally sound 
means of communicating with Mexico and other nations for purposes of collecting child 
support. Family law is traditionally the responsibility of the states. But as the need for 
uniform standards for effective child support enforcement has grown, the federal 
government has increased its regulation of this area. When the states began working 
international child support cases, the federal government authorized the states to do so, 
even while it put strategies in place to eventually preempt the states. This case indicates 
that the federal government will preempt the states when it can be argued there is a need 
for standardized procedures across the states. 
Chapter Eight concludes the project, and considers what each of the policy areas 
reveals about the conditions under which states are free to pursue direct foreign relations 
and the conditions under which the federal government will act to restrict, and what this 
information indicates will happen in the future, as the nature of domestic policy 
continues to be transformed by globalization.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE U.S. STATES AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS: 
CONSIDERATIONS, DEBATES, AND RESTRICTIONS 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The law governing states and foreign relations is still developing, as is the 
concept of what role states should play in U.S. foreign affairs.  
Since the U.S. Constitution was ratified in 1788, the operation of foreign 
relations in the United States has been conceived of as the exclusive domain of the 
federal government. For the most part, U.S. state and local governments have been 
thought to have no legal authority, capability, or even interest in foreign affairs. Yet 
this dissertation will show how states have realized their interests in the world 
economy and developed what appear to be acceptable, vital roles for themselves as 
actors in the international arena, with a surprising lack of intergovernmental conflict. 
This chapter looks first at the role states play in the U.S. federal system, and the 
structural and political reasons that states are seen as limited in foreign affairs. The 
next section discusses the ways states can involve themselves in U.S. foreign affairs, 
either as foreign policy activists or in the course of meeting governing goals. Following 
this section is a summary of the debate surrounding the role of U.S. states in foreign 
affairs. The final section discusses how the federal government – the U.S. Supreme 
Court, the Executive Branch, or Congress – has or could limit the involvement of states 
in the international arena.1 
                                        
1 While this chapter provides an overview of constitutional issues and the history of case law 
concerning foreign affairs, this is by no means an exhaustive look, as this dissertation is more 
concerned with the conceptual development and policy implications of states and international 
affairs rather than with the nuances of constitutional law. 
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THE ROLE OF STATES IN U.S. FEDERALISM 
The structure of U.S. federalism is fixed; the U.S. Constitution divides power 
between the federal government and the states. But federalism as a practice is dynamic. 
The line dividing power between the state and federal governments constantly shifts 
according to how the actors within the constitutional order exercise their powers.  
The structure and culture of U.S. federalism intentionally grants states many 
areas of autonomy. Structurally, the open federal system allows states the freedom to 
act until stopped – stopped through political pressure, legal action, or congressional 
preemption. In practice, the federal government is often slow to act, giving states ample 
practical room in which to maneuver without challenge. Within their sovereign areas, 
states are free to be policy innovators. 
The U.S. Constitution grants the federal government exclusive control over 
foreign affairs. Article I, section 8 gives Congress the power to regulate foreign and 
domestic commerce and declare war. Article I, Section 10 prohibits states from making 
treaties with other nations or making compacts with other states without congressional 
consent. 
But the states are constitutionally authorized to regulate citizens in such a way 
as to protect their health, welfare, and morals. Such authority is reserved to the States 
by the 10th Amendment and is referred to as the police power.2  
Regulating the welfare of citizens has come to mean that state and local 
officials are responsible for promoting economic growth. While the federal government 
sets trade and tariff policy, state and local governments are free to pursue their own 
economic development goals. States as well as local governments have a vested 
interest in promoting business in order to maintain a stable base from which to collect 
tax revenues and to keep voting citizens gainfully employed. Thus state governments 
                                        
2 The 10th Amendment states: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.” U.S. Constitution, amend. 10. 
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are under a political mandate to promote growth as a part of maintaining the public 
welfare.  
States are also responsible for maintaining the public safety. State legislatures 
pass laws defining crime and empower law enforcement and the courts to enforce those 
laws.  
In the past, states were largely able to fulfill their responsibilities for economic 
development and maintaining public safety while acting within U.S. borders. But as 
rapid international developments have changed domestic economies and social 
conditions, states have found themselves developing interests in other nations even 
while still within the bounds of their constitutional responsibilities. The international 
arena is supposed to be the jurisdiction of the federal government only. But today, 
states need to export to maintain a healthy economy; state and local law enforcement 
want to know how to legally pursue a fugitive across international lines. As the nature 
of domestic problems has changed to include international components, the open U.S. 
federal system has allowed U.S. states to push that conceptual dividing line and claim 
authority in the new intermestic policy environment. 
Even so, there is no clear constitutional pathway for states to take in order to act 
on domestic interests that now have interna tional components. The full implications of 
internationally-active subnational governments for U.S. foreign policy and 
constitutional law remain to be seen and will no doubt be further developed by other 
scholars.3  The following chapters of this dissertation consider the conditions under 
which states develop their international roles and the conditions under which the 
federal government will restrict them. 
                                        
3  See Jack L. Goldsmith, “Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism,” Virginia Law 
Review 83 (November 1997); Barry Friedman, “Federalism’s Future in the Global Village ,” 
Vanderbilt Law Review 47 (October 1994); and Earl H. Fry, The Expanding Role of State and 
Local Governments in U.S. Foreign Affairs (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998); 
Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Constitution, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1996): Chapter VI; William Schweke and Robert K. Stumberg, Could Economic Development 
Become Illegal in the New Global Policy Environment?  (Corporation for Enterprise 
Development, July 1999); and Balancing Democracy and Trade: Roles for State and Local 
Government in the Global Trade Debate  (Washington, D.C.: Harrison Institute for Public Law, 
Georgetown University Law Center, September 2000).  
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The States, the Constitution and Foreign Affairs Powers  
Before the current U.S. Constitution was passed, the original U.S. states ratified 
the Articles of Confederation in 1781. Article II allowed each state to “retain its 
sovereignty, freedom and independence.” Article III bound the states to assist one 
another against attacks on their sovereignty because of trade disputes, among other 
possible causes.4 
But the confederate structure did not achieve its goal of “creating a perpetual 
union of sovereign states.”5 Rather than offering assistance, states were often hostile to 
one another and competed aggressively against one another for trade advantages. States 
raised their own troops and entered into foreign treaties, all contrary to the Articles. 
Soon momentum built in favor of a new government structure, a federal 
structure with a stronger central government and limited responsibilities designated to 
the states. The new U.S. Constitution, ratified in 1788, gave the central government 
more power, and reserved foreign affairs powers for the federal government, balancing 
duties between the Executive Branch and the Congress. The president was made the 
commander-in-chief of the armed forces, with the power to negotiate treaties and to 
appoint and receive ambassadors, with the advice and consent of the Senate. Congress 
was given the power to approve treaties, to declare war, and to regulate commerce with 
foreign nations as well as between the states.   
The formation of the Union required that states cease representing themselves 
directly overseas in favor of the Union representing itself as one entity. But the 
                                        
4 Article II states: “Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every Power, 
Jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in 
Congress assembled.”   
Article III reads: “The said states hereby severally enter into a firm league of friendship with 
each other, for their common defence, the security of their Liberties, and their mutual and 
general welfare, binding themselves to assist each other, against all force offered to, or attacks 
made upon them, or any of them, on account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other 
pretence whatever.” Articles of Confederation, sec. II and III. Text available at 
http://odur.let.rug.nl/usanew/D/1776-1800/constitution/confart.htm.  
5 Earl Fry, The Expanding Role of State and Local Governments in U.S. Foreign Affairs (New 
York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1998): 56.  
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constitutional order does not cut the states out of the foreign policy process entirely. 
The Constitution does provide a means for the interests of state governments to be 
represented at the federal level, “an activity that must occur in some form if our system 
of government is to merit the label ‘federal,’” writes John Nugent.6 Simply put, the 
Framers of the U.S. Constitution saw a state’s congressional delegation as the means 
by which a state’s interests would be represented at the federal level.  
Thus the House of Representatives and, more particularly, the Senate, is 
intended to be the venue for states to express their preferences on foreign affairs 
through votes on specific international policies such as approving treaties and 
ambassadors and waging war. And with the House’s power of the purse, the House can 
deny funding to any foreign affairs initiative of which the Representatives do not 
approve, and can show support for U.S. foreign policy by approving appropriations for 
military programs and foreign aid.7 
Although foreign affairs powers are given to both the Executive and legislative 
branches, the idea took hold early in the nation’s development that the new nation 
should, in matters of foreign affairs, be represented by “one voice”  –– that of the U.S. 
President. Laurence Tribe writes: “In an era that could quite sharply distinguish action 
abroad from action at home, the unique posture of the President with regard to foreign 
affairs was proclaimed by then-Representative John Marshall, on 7 March 1800: ‘The 
President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole 
representative with foreign nations.’”8  
This concept of presidential supremacy has been upheld in multiple Supreme 
Court cases. In 1936, the Court restated Marshall’s words in U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright 
Corporation when it asserted that the President is the “sole organ of the federal 
government in the field of international relations.”9 
                                        
6 John Nugent, Federalism Attained: Gubernatorial Lobbying in Washington as a 
Constitutional Function (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, May 1998).  
7 Peter Trubowitz and Brian E. Roberts, “Regional Interests and the Reagan Military Buildup,” 
Regional Studies 26 (October 1992). 
8 Quoted in Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 2nd edition, (New York: The 
Foundation Press, 1988): 219. 
9  United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
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Curtiss-Wright and other Supreme Court decisions substantiate the concept of 
national leadership on the world stage as unitary, rather than composite, in nature. 
However, Tribe explains: “while it may be symbolically correct to say that the 
President is the sole national ‘actor’ in foreign affairs, it is not accurate to label the 
President the sole national policy maker.”10 Indeed, while the President is granted the 
power to initiate diplomatic moves and military action, the Congress acts as a check on 
the President through ratification of international treaties and declaration of war against 
other nations. This structural tension between the President and the Congress has been 
dubbed an “invitation to struggle” over the formation of foreign policy. 11  
Arguably, the Congress’ broad and exclusive powers, derived from Article I, 
mean that the people’s representatives have more influence on foreign policy than does 
the president. Writes David Gray Adler: “The president’s constitutional authority pales 
in comparison to that of Congress.” 12 According to the U.S. Constitution, the U.S. 
president must consult Congress on treaties, ambassadorial appointments, and 
warmaking. 
But the idea of presidential superiority has in recent years caused the line 
dividing foreign affairs powers between the Congress and the President to shift. 
Although Congress is given the authority to regulate foreign commerce, as the U.S. 
role in the world economy has increased, Congress has yielded much of its regulatory 
authority to the Executive Branch to negotiate international trade treaties. So-called 
“fast-track” authority gives Congress the opportunity to either approve or disapprove, 
but not to alter, trade agreements negotiated by the Executive Branch. 13 
Whether or not there is a link between the increase in presidential power in 
trade negotiations and the rise of states forging their own international trade relations 
has yet to be thoroughly examined, but arguably, a stronger presidential role in trade 
                                        
10 Tribe, p. 219. 
11 See Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. and Pat M. Holt, Invitation to Struggle: Congress, the President, and 
Foreign Policy, 4th edition (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc, 1992). 
12 David Gray Adler, “Court, Constitution, and Foreign Affairs,” in The Constitution and the 
Conduct of American Foreign Policy, David Gray Alder and Larry N. George, eds (Lawrence, 
Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1996). 
13 Philip A. Mundo, National Politics in a Global Economy: The Domestic Sources of U.S. 
Trade Policy. (Washington, D.C.:Georgetown University Press, 1999). 
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relations reduces the influence of states by reducing the input of their congressional 
representatives. This is a topic for future research. 
This dynamic tension between the Executive and legislative branches over 
foreign policy formation have led to several foreign affairs cases before the Supreme 
Court. Yet most of these cases concern how foreign affairs powers should be divided 
between the two federal branches, not between the federal government and any 
subnational level of government. Tribe writes that the constitutional restriction 
prohibiting a state’s entrance into “any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation” (Article I, 
section 10) rests on the constitutional principle that “whatever the division of foreign 
policy responsibility within the national government, all such responsibility is reposed 
at the national level rather than dispersed among the states and localities.” 14 (Emphasis 
original.) 
But there are cases where the Court found the action of the states encroaching; 
some of these cases will be reviewed in an upcoming section of this chapter. 
 
 
TYPES OF INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT: GOVERNANCE AND 
ACTIVISM 
There are two extra-constitutional ways that subnational governments can 
involve themselves in international affairs. One is a form of political protest, where 
states and city governments express opposition to federal policy, in what might best be 
called foreign policy activism, which will be explored in a moment.  
The other way in which states are active in foreign affairs occurs when the 
state’s normal governing concerns expand to include a foreign component. In attempts 
to govern effectively, states initiate policies that reach out directly to foreign actors and 
these contacts become regular and institutionalized. It is this type of activity that will 
be examined in this project, through the Texas-Mexico case study. When states are 
reaching out in order to meet domestic tasks, states seem to be most free to act without 
inciting protest. 
                                        
14 Tribe, p. 230. 
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Yet even in the course of international outreach for purposes of daily 
governance, states’ actions can still cause problems for the nation as a whole. U.S. 
relations with other nations have been troubled when a U.S. state has executed a 
foreign national, pressed for the extradition of a fugitive, or levied taxes which foreign 
corporations found objectionable. 
Municipal governments have for some time cultivated “sister-city” 
relationships with foreign jurisdictions.15  U.S. states have “Sister States” with states 
and provinces in other nations, even China.16 These “citizen diplomacy networks” 
emphasize cultural and social exchange more than they affect governance, but it may 
well be that sister-city and “good neighbor”-type organizations have laid a foundation 
for communication strategies developing at the subnational government level. The U.S. 
state of Arizona and the Mexican state of Sonora have institutionalized the concept of 
being good neighbors into the Arizona-Mexico Commission, a binational group 
concerned with improving the economic and environmental well-being of the two 
entities.17 
States have for some time now been signing international “agreements” with 
foreign nations – the Arizona-Sonora Commission is one such development, but there 
are countless others. The state of Massachusetts signed a trade agreement with the 
Chinese Province of Guangdong in 1983.18 The state of Alabama has an agreement to 
sell Cuba lumber, dairy cattle, and other agricultural products.19 These documents are 
intended to be a non-binding summary of points of agreements between officials for 
the purposes of policy coordination, or at least the intent of coordination. Sometimes 
the documents are little more than a summary of the proceedings. The question about 
                                        
15 See http://www.sister-cities.org/, “a non-profit citizen diplomacy network.” 
16 See http://www.odod.state.oh.us/itd/SisterStates.htm 
17 See the Arizona-Mexico Commission, at 
http://www.azmc.org/index.asp?from=environment; Retrieved 28 August 2003. 
18 Peter K. Eisinger, The Rise of the Entrepreneurial State: State and Local Economic 
Development Policy in the United States. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988): 
302. 
19 WSFA.com, Alabama-Cuba Agree to Trade and China Gets Mill Equipment 
http://www.wsfa.com/Global/story.asp?S=1416385&nav=0RdEHeDl; 25 August 2003; 
Retrieved 2 September 2003. 
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such agreements is whether or not they could violate Article I, Section 10 of the 
Constitution. Article I states, “No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or 
confederation.”  
Often at the conclusion of their meetings, Texas and Mexican officials sign 
such a document. A Texas official says they are careful to ensure such a document is 
never worded like a treaty nor called a treaty. 20 A treaty would contain legally binding 
language.  
There is no systematic process of reporting state- foreign agreements to the U.S. 
federal government. Peter Eisinger writes,  
…as more and more states have entered into trade agreements with 
foreign national and provincial governments, federal officials have had to 
struggle with the question of whether such accords violate the 
constitutional prohibition in Article I, Section 10…These memoranda of 
understanding, as well as the stationing of state trade representatives in 
foreign capitals, have been regarded by the Department of State as 
constitutionally permissible actions.21  
 
But the issue has yet to be litigated in the courts, as of 2003.  
The subsequent case study chapters examine these instances of how states 
expand their capacities to deal with these internationalized areas of domestic 
governance with no clear constitutional violation, in areas that are no longer strictly 
domestic but are not quite federal responsibilities. 
 
Foreign Policy Activism 
Sometimes subnational governments vocally oppose a federal foreign or 
security policy. This foreign policy activism is the type of activity most likely to be 
challenged by Congress or through the court system, and yet only the Massachusetts 
Burma law has been challenged so far. 
Most of the time, foreign policy activism on the part of subnational 
governments has acted as a source of political pressure on Congress, leading to 
                                        
20 Telephone interview with Paco Felici at the Texas Office of the Attorney General, 11 
February 1998.  
21 Eisinger, pp. 301-302. 
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changes in national policy. For example, in the early 1980s, more than 120 cities 
refused to cooperate with the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s nuclear war 
civil defense program, which led to the federal government’s cancellation of the 
program. 22 
In the 1980s, more than 800 local governments approved nuclear- freeze 
resolutions, prompting U.S. President Ronald Reagan to begin the Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty in Geneva.23 
Also in the 1980s, more than 65 cities and 19 states divested more than $20 
billion from firms with a commercial presence in South Africa, inspiring Congress to 
override a presidential veto and impose limited economic sanctions rather than 
continue the Reagan Administration’s policy of “constructive engagement” with South 
Africa.24 
But subnational governments have protested other federal foreign policies and 
found themselves under fire for doing so. In 1996, the state of Massachusetts, as well 
as several local governments throughout the nation, expressed their dissatisfaction with 
U.S. ties with the repressive government of Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, by 
boycotting U.S. companies with a presence there. Responding to public pressure, 
Congress passed its own sanctions law against Burma. But the state of Massachusetts 
continued to follow its own, more stringent law that forbade the state from procuring 
goods or services from companies with a presence in Burma. Massachusetts’ law was 
challenged by a private business group and the case made its way to the Supreme 
Court. In the Fall of 2000, a unanimous Court found the state law unconstitutional on 
the grounds that the federal government alone is responsible for foreign affairs. 25  
                                        
22 “Civil Defense Plan on Relocation Out,” The New York Times, March 4, 1985.  
23 Strobe Talbott, “Buildup and Breakdown,” Foreign Affairs 62:3 (1983): 605. 
24 Peter J. Spiro, “State and Local Anti-South Africa Action as an Intrusion upon the Federal 
Power in Foreign Affairs,” Virginia Law Review 72 (May 1986) 824-27.  
25 Peter J. Spiro, U.S. Supreme Court Knocks Down State Burma Law, American Society of 
International Law (June 2000; Retrieved 13 March 2003). Available from 
http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh46.htm . See also See David Schmahmann and James Finch, 
“The Unconstitutionality of State and Local Enactments in the United States Restricting 
Business Ties with Burma (Myanmar),” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 30 (May 
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By 4 July 2003, more than 130 local governments and three U.S. states had 
passed resolutions opposing the Patriot Act, the controversial legislation passed by the 
U.S. Congress after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Most of the resolutions 
acknowledge that all levels of government need to be involved in protecting the nation 
from terrorism, but object to the Patriot Act’s provision for tactics such as surveillance, 
secret searches, and interrogation that can be seen as violating civil rights.26 The 
outcome of this phase of foreign policy activism has yet to unfold.  
Whether subnational governments’ opposition to federal foreign policies results 
in a change in federal policy or a court challenge merits further study. Given the 
inconsistency of outcomes, one may conclude that such “activism” on the part of 
subnational governments appears to be an extra-Constitutional means for states to 
involve themselves in the U.S. foreign policy process, which in the open federal system 
cannot be automatically considered illegal, but requires legal or political action to stop. 
In the Massachusetts case, a politically powerful group opposed the action, indicating 
one condition under which states will be preempted.  
 
 
DEBATE OVER THE STATES’ ROLE IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 
The effects of internationally-active states was the topic of a debate between 
Michael Shuman and Peter Spiro, published in a 1990 issue of Intergovernmental 
Perspective. 
Shuman argues that if the Founders had wanted to restrict states entirely from 
contact with foreign nations, the Constitution would have explicitly restricted such 
contact. Rather, argues Shuman, the Framers anticipated that states would have contact 
with foreign countries and would have interests in U.S. foreign policy.  
                                        
26 MSNBC, “Lane County (OR) Joins Governments Opposed to Patriot Act,” 3 July 2003, 
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Washington Post, Friday, 29 August 2003, Available at: 
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The Constitution gave states numerous powers that underscored 
from the outset that they too have some role in national foreign policy,” 
Shuman argues. “The First Amendment guaranteed the right of all 
citizens, including governors and mayors, to speak out on foreign policy. 
The Compact Clause anticipated that state and local governments would 
meet and negotiate with foreign jurisdictions, even without congressional 
approval. Likewise, federal courts were granted jurisdiction over 
controversies between states and foreign countries precisely because 
communications, relations, and deal making between the two entities were 
expected.27  
 
Shuman implies that the Founders were not so naïve as to think that subnational 
governmental officials would always agree with federal policies. Shuman sees no real 
threat to the Constitution when state and local officials disagree with federal foreign 
policies, viewing such disagreement as a natural part of the political process in a 
federal system.  
Peter J. Spiro, on the other hand, disagrees with Shuman over the significance 
of active states. He sees the decade of the 1980s, when subnational governments 
expressed their dissatisfaction with federal policies on nuclear weapons, South African 
apartheid, and the Nicaraguan contras, as a dangerous trend. He argues that foreign 
policy activism “threatens the institutional integrity of our foreign policymaking.” He 
acknowledges that subnational governments have an appropriate role to play in, for 
example, attracting foreign investment. But Spiro’s concern is that subnational 
governments walk a fine line between attending to “genuinely local responsibilities” 
and action that threatens to fragment foreign policy. “The only question is where the 
line should be drawn between acceptable and unacceptable local foreign policies, and 
how those actions which cross it can be prevented. The U.S. Constitution sets the line. 
It is Washington’s responsibility to enforce it.” He laments that “the federal 
government has been slow to protect its primacy in the area,” and recommends the 
                                        
27 Michael Shuman, “What the Framers Really Said About Foreign Policy Powers,” 
Intergovernmental Perspective 16 (Washington, D.C.: Advisory Council on Intergovernmental 
Relations, Spring 1990): 28. Article III, section 2, clause 1 of the Constitution gives U.S. courts 
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federal government set up oversight structures to monitor the activities of state and 
local governments.28  
Part of the disagreement between Shuman and Spiro could stem from the fact 
that there is no clear link between expanded governance and foreign policy activism. 
Even Spiro acknowledges there are “beneficial forms of local participation in 
international affairs,” such as cultural exchange, trade promotion, and the attraction of 
foreign direct investment; states are appropriately involved in such “low-politics” 
activities, says Spiro. What he is objecting to is when states become foreign policy 
activists, opposing federal positions on foreign economic and security policy. 
The question, then, is whether the efforts of subnational governments to handle 
internationa lized domestic issues automatically open the door to foreign policy 
activism.  
It is arguable that as domestic policy has become globalized, subnational 
governments have become more internationally savvy. A characteristic of increasing 
interdependence is that domestic politics anywhere are less and less insulated from 
international politics everywhere. As subnational government officials realize the stake 
they have in international developments, and how U.S. foreign policy influences those 
developments, officials could feel increasingly justified in taking positions opposing 
federal policy.  
Already state and local officials have held the federal government responsible 
for the effects of U.S. immigration policy. The federal government is responsible for 
immigration policy – setting the numbers of legal immigrants allowed and patrolling 
the borders. But state and local governments handle immigrant policy – because the 
states are responsible for the health, welfare, and education of its population.  
Whether or not states must care for non-citizens is hotly debated. State actors 
argue that the presence of an illegal immigrant population is the result of failures at the 
federal level to adequately control the border. California has already taken issue with 
federal immigration policy as it affects the state’s welfare and education spending. For 
                                        
28 Peter J. Spiro, “The Limits of Federalism in Foreign Policymaking,” Intergovernmental 
Perspective 16 (Washington, D.C.: Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations, Spring 
1990): 32-34. 
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several years now, the states have demanded that the federal government reimburse 
them for the costs of incarcerating criminal aliens.  
Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, many have argued for increased monitoring 
of illegal immigrants. The Mexican government has urged authorities in the United 
States to accept a Mexican-issued identification card as a valid form of identity in the 
United States. Some jurisdictions in the United States have endorsed the cards even 
while the Federal Bureau of Intelligence has not.29  
Likewise, controlling the flow of illegal drugs into the United States is primarily 
a federal responsibility, but states and cities must cope with the effects of illegal drugs 
in the form of local crime and addiction. Subnational medical marijuana initiatives 
dispute federal drug laws.  
As states are more and more aware of the how federal policies affect them, 
exactly where Spiro would “draw the line” between reasonable and dangerous state 
involvement is less and less clear, making it all the more important to understand when 
the federal government allow the states latitude and when the federal government acts 
to restrict the states. 
But as local interests are increasingly affected by international developments, 
subnational governments will likely continue to feel justified in opposing federal policy 
when they feel their interests are at stake. And as the United States enters into more 
international trade treaties, states will likely find more domestic interests affected by 
the treaty terms. Traditional state authority in areas such as state contracts and 
procurement, land use, insurance, and transportation of goods could be forced to yield 
to standards of international treaties, likely increasing intergovernmental conflict, 
affecting governance in the United States.  
 
                                        
29 Nathaëla Budoc, Rising Popularity, Rising Opposition--The Matricula Consular 
Identification Card, email report issued by Frontera NorteSur, an outreach program of the 
Center for Latin American and Border Studies 
New Mexico State University, Las Cruces, New Mexico (16 July 2003); Maria Peña, “Grupo 
Pide Más Restricción Contra Inmigrantes,” El Norte (de Austin), (August 2003): 1. See also 
http://www.fairus.org/html/911report_2003.html.  
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States’ Interests and the National Interest: Conflictual or Mutual? 
The prospect of continued differences between the federal government and 
subnational governments raises the other concern underlying the debate: what effect do 
internationally-active states have on the national interest?  
The concept of the national interest is notoriously underdefined and subject to 
change as political need arises. Samuel Huntington’s definition is quite specific: “A 
national interest is a public good of concern to all or most Americans; a vital national 
interest is one which they are willing to expend blood and treasure to defend…” 
During the Cold War, the idea that states could have interests in foreign affairs 
separate from the national interest was not seriously considered. A political consensus 
reigned that the U.S. national interest comprised containing communism and 
supporting the spread of democracy. While there was dissent on the means to those 
ends, particularly during U.S. involvement in Vietnam, there was little debate over the 
United States’ security goals. 
But since the Cold War’s end, Huntington explains, there is no consensus on 
what the national interest is. He writes: “The most striking feature of the search for 
national interests has been its failure to generate purposes that command anything 
remotely resembling broad support and to which people are willing to commit 
significant resources.” 30   
Huntington laments how the “domesticization” of foreign policy has resulted in 
“the displacement of national interests by commercial and ethnic interests.”31 The role 
of federal governments in the “new world order” is increasingly the subject of debate, 
as subnational, transgovernmental and nonstate actors become increasingly active in 
foreign affairs.32 
States pursuing “their own” foreign interests means the national interest is 
reduced to “economic particularism,” Huntington calls it, which fragments the United 
States. Huntington writes: “Without a sure sense of national identity, Americans have 
                                        
30 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Erosion of National Interests,” Foreign Affairs 76  
(September/October 1997): 40. 
31 Huntington, p. 40.  
32 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, “The Real New World Order,” Foreign Affairs 76 
(September/October 1997): 183-197. 
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become unable to define their national interests, and as a result subnational commercial 
interests and transnational and nonnational ethnic interests have come to dominate 
foreign policy.”33 
After 11 September 2001, national security concerns once again dominate the 
U.S. foreign policy agenda. Does the War on Terror translate into a national interest 
strong enough to unify the nation?  Likely yes. But this time around, state and local 
governments are being asked to play a larger role in national security than ever before, 
and some are not hesitating to express their disagreement with measures such as the 
Patriot Act. And states are continuing to pursue foreign relations in order to fulfill their 
local interests.  
While there may be no such “interest” which manifests itself at the national 
level, U.S. states are committing significant resources, albeit short of blood, to local 
issues, particularly matters of foreign trade and economic development. Chapter Three 
will show how willing states have been to commit resources in order to compete 
against one another for economic gain in a globalized economy.   
The question then becomes whether or not the nation as a whole can have a 
national interest that commands loyalty even while states pursue their own overseas 
interests. Those who research sectionalism in U.S. politics would argue that throughout 
the nation’s history, the sum of subnational interests has equaled the national interest. 
Peter Trubowitz has illustrated that even during the Cold War, a time when there was 
supposedly a “national interest” which was superior to just the sum of subnational 
interests, support for national security policies rested on regional domestic support. The 
national interest was actually the product of domestic political struggle between 
subnational actors with specific interests based on regional resources and capabilities. 
Trubowitz’ analysis upholds the concept that the national interest is the culmination of 
regional interests. He also illustrates that the national interest is multifaceted, 
comprising economic as well as military issues, quality of life as well as security. 
Trubowitz shows how economic gains and losses – the effect of the developing global 
                                        
33 Huntington, p. 29.  
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economy on domestic actors – were deciding factors in the regions’ support of Cold 
War power policies.34  
David Clinton affirms that the national interest has in the past been defined as 
the sum of subnational interests. He quotes Arthur Bentley: “‘We shall never find a 
group interest of the society as a whole…(T)he society itself is nothing other than the 
complex of the groups that compose it.’” Clinton also outlines Charles Beard’s 
argument that any “‘particularities’” which succeeded in “imposing themselves on the 
political system meant by definition that they were a part of the common good.”35 Thus 
it can be argued the states’ international linkages, yet unchallenged by the federal 
government, have insinuated themselves into a national practice and are thus a 
component of the common good.  
 
 
WHO REGULATES THE STATES? 
 
This section elaborates how each of the federal branches could act to limit the 
states, but how they likely will not because the interests of each branch are not 
necessarily threatened by current developments in state-foreign relations.  
 
The Courts  
Throughout the case law restricting states from international involvement runs 
the theme that states, in pursuing their own interests with other nations, risk 
undermining the national interest. The Court consistently has reasoned that states 
should be limited in foreign affairs because their involvement in the international arena 
could be harmful, even dangerous, to the nation as a whole.  
                                        
34 See Peter Trubowitz, Defining the National Interest: Conflict and Change in American 
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Underlying this assumption is that states might have interests that the federal 
government does not adequately represent, but this assumption has not explored by the 
Court.  
Holmes v. Jennison, heard in 1840, was one of the first cases to establish the 
idea that a states’ entry into international affairs could only work ill for the nation. The 
case involved the state of Vermont’s plan to return Holmes, a suspected murderer, to 
Canadian authorities seeking his arrest. Chief Justice Roger Taney objected to a U.S. 
state claiming the authority to perform (or deny) an extradition request from a foreign 
nation. If states had that power, he wrote, “then every state of the Union must 
determine for itself the principles on which they will exercise it; and there will be no 
restriction upon the power, but the discretion and good feeling of each particular 
state.”36 Taney wrote, “Any intercourse between a state and a foreign nation was 
dangerous to the Union” (emphasis added) because such contact might “open a door of 
which foreign powers would avail themselves to obtain influence in several states.”37 
Taney feared other nations might use a good relationship with a state government as a 
back door to influence U.S. policy.  
In an 1875 case, Chy Lung v. Freeman, the Court ruled against a California 
state law requiring bond payments be made by foreign nationals arriving by ship. The 
court acknowledged that while some state laws were “necessary and proper” to protect 
states against “paupers and convicted criminals from abroad,” regulating entry of 
foreign nationals into the United States is a federal, not a state, function, just as the 
regulation of foreign commerce belongs to the federal government. The Court added, 
“If it be otherwise, a single State can, at her pleasure, embroil us in disastrous quarrels 
with other nations.”38 This case explicitly placed responsibility for immigration policy 
with the federal government, and not the states, at a time when states were even then 
internationally active seeking to attract immigrant labor to their states.39 Immigration 
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remains one area in which federal and state concerns converge in a dynamic flux of 
neither strictly domestic nor strictly foreign policy. 
In writing the opinion of the court in the Curtiss-Wright case in 1936, Justice 
Sutherland made it clear that states did not have the capacity or role to have direct 
relations with foreign governments. He recalled the intentions of the Framers of the 
Constitution: “though the states were several their people in respect of foreign affairs 
were one (sic) …In that convention the entire absence of state power to deal with 
foreign affairs was thus forcefully stated by (signer of the Constitution) Rufus King: 
‘Considering (the states) as political beings, they were dumb, for they could not speak 
to any foreign sovereign whatever.’”40  
In U.S. v. Belmont (1937) the Court upheld the concept that the United States is 
a unitary actor in foreign affairs:  
In respect of all international negotiations and compacts, and in 
respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear…Within 
the field of its powers, whatever the United States rightfully undertakes, it 
necessarily has warrant to consummate. And when judicial authority is 
invoked in aid of such consummation, State Constitutions, state laws, and 
state policies are irrelevant to the inquiry and decision.41  
 
Continuing this theme, a few years later, in U.S. v. Pink in 1942, the Court 
wrote, “Power over external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the 
national government exclusively.” 42 
A 1968 case, Zschernig v. Miller, 43 involved an Oregon state allowing U.S. 
citizens to inherit funds from foreign estates, and for foreign heirs to inherit the 
proceeds of Oregon estates “without confiscation.” The constitutionality of the law was 
challenged by heirs in East Germany. The Court felled the state law because it intruded 
into the field of foreign affairs, even though the U.S. Department of Justice, appearing 
as amicus, testified the state law did not interfere with the conduct of U.S. foreign 
relations. 
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Thus the Court has developed a view of the states as subordinate to the federal 
government in foreign affairs not only on a constitutional basis, but because 
independent relations with foreign nations would prove dangerous to the national unity. 
Taney implied that the states’ tendency to compete with one another would overrule 
their “good feeling” towards one another and towards other nations and lead them 
towards actions that would jeopardize the nation as a whole. 
This is not an exhaustive list of Supreme Court decisions, but enough to show 
the legal basis upon which the concept that states should be restricted from foreign 
affairs rests. But as Tribe suggests, all these cases were decided during a time when 
state action abroad could be conceived of as separate from state action at home, and 
therefore that subnational governments could be limited to one sphere, that of domestic 
policy. Although this was not an unreasonable assumption for the time, even then it 
was challenged by reality. That these cases rose to the Supreme Court level show that 
subnational governments were already crossing that imaginary line separating domestic 
from foreign affairs, and offending a politically significant complainant capable of 
challenging the state effectively. Even subnational governments of the past were not 
completely insulated from the foreign “sphere,” and the developments of the past thirty 
years have only accelerated the exposure of domestic politics to international influence.  
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, popularly known as the 
Massachusetts Burma case, is the most recent case in which the Court could have 
explored what the states’ constitutional role in foreign affairs should be. Even though 
the Court preempted the state law on the grounds of federal supremacy in foreign 
affairs, the Court did not address how far the states can go in developing their 
international roles.44 So the doctrinal theme stands, that according to the Court, 
internationally-active states threaten the objectives of federal foreign policy. 45    
But because U.S. states have so many governing responsibilities, many 
subnational government activities now fall into a grey area: while no longer 
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45  See Daniel Halberstam, "The Foreign Affairs of Federal Systems: A National Perspective on 
the Benefits of State Participation (Symposium: New Voices on the New Federalism)." 
Villanova. Law Review 46, no. 5 (2001): 1015-68. 
 55
exclusively domestic actions in either cause or effect, nor are they federal 
responsibilities. Jack Goldsmith writes, “Sometimes, states act in ways that adversely 
affect U.S. foreign relations but that do not violate any provision of the Constitution 
and that are not preempted by federal statute or treaty. For example, states execute 
aliens, tax multinational corporations, declare themselves refugee sanctuaries, and 
violate customary international law.”46 
Can the courts be relied upon to rein in subnational governments? The U.S. 
Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to hear cases filed by one state against another 
state or between the federal government and a state. While Congress or the Executive 
Branch could challenge any action by a U.S. state, the following sections will explain 
why that is unlikely to happen.  
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over cases that originate in a 
lower court, either federal or state. In the U.S. adversarial legal system, a lawsuit 
begins with an injured party deemed by a judge to have standing in the case, a 
significant enough interest in stopping the activity to sue. When states, in exercising 
routine governing authority, establish international ties for purposes of governance, 
there are not likely to be many injured parties. Even if there were a critical mass of 
injured parties, a protest against the state would likely not proceed.  
Certainly in trade matters, there are winners and losers created by U.S. trade 
policy. But because the federal government is primarily responsible for setting trade, 
immigration, and foreign policy, the states, at least in theory, enjoy a layer of insulation 
from responsibility. The trade policy decisions that result in certain sectors suffering 
and workers being dislocated – the creation of “winners and losers” – emanate from the 
federal level. While local businesses might complain about certain initiatives or actions 
taken by a state, the negative effects by trade policy are the outcome of federal actions, 
and would most likely result in a challenge to the federal policy, not a state’s 
commercial efforts.  
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Were there a challenge to the connections between a U.S. state and a foreign 
nation, a court would likely let stand an arrangement that did not implicate an 
important federal interest, says Jack Goldsmith of the University of Chicago School of 
Law.47 But separating domestic from foreign interests is not as simple as it once was. 
For some 200 years “foreign relations” has been primarily defined in terms of military 
and diplomatic affairs, unquestionably federal responsibilities. Yet today, U.S. foreign 
policy covers a wide range of issues far beyond military affairs 
So while the courts have historically been the venue through which questions 
about U.S. foreign affairs are considered, but many obstacles must be overcome for 
courts to consider the increasing international role of the U.S. states. 
 
                                        
47 Telephone interview with Jack L. Goldsmith in Chicago, 29 April 1999.  
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The Executive Branch 
While the Executive Branch agencies could respond in ways that restrict 
internationally-active states, this is not likely to happen. One reason is that the 
Executive agencies spend few resources monitoring the profusion of activity at the 
subnational government level, and certainly will not know every time a subnational 
official meets with a foreign counterpart. The agencies may not even be particularly 
concerned with how state and local governments meet their governing goals. For the 
most part, agency relations with the states are constructive, and the federal agencies 
rely on the states to implement many federal policies. Even mild interference with 
routine state functions by federal officials could be politically sensitive.  
If a federal agency were serious about restricting a state’s action, the federal 
agency would threaten to withhold or delay federal funds, threaten a lawsuit to preempt 
state law, or threaten adverse publicity. But constitutionally, the federal government is 
not supposed to encroach on the states in their areas of authority. The melding of 
foreign and domestic policy means there is less clarity on the distribution of authority, 
but the threatened state could respond by protesting that its actions are within its 
jurisdiction.  
But the Constitution prohibits states from making treaties without congressional 
consent, and this aspect of the law is indisputable.48 Even so, U.S. states frequently 
conclude meetings with foreign governments by drawing up documents summarizing 
the meeting. In the case of Texas-Mexico relations, Texas officials say they are careful 
to ensure such a document is never worded like a treaty nor called a treaty or compact. 
In the past, such papers were called “agreements” or “accords,” or a “memorandum of 
the proceedings,” a “joint statement,” or a “statement of intent.” Currently the most 
popular term, which also sounds the least binding, is “arrangements.”  
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The Treaty Office of the U.S. Department of State (U.S. DOS) is responsible 
for reviewing the language of every agreement entered into by the U.S. government. 
The Treaty Office’s goal is to preserve the prerogative of the Executive Branch and 
Congress in foreign affairs, to prevent any erosion of the federal government’s treaty 
power. The U.S. DOS is generally aware that states keep written documentation of 
their meetings with representatives of foreign governments, but sometimes, the Office 
is not aware of specific developments. A Treaty Office representative says the office 
checks about one state-foreign document a month, but admits there is likely a fair 
amount of state-level international activity of which the office is not aware. Because 
the Office does not monitor the states’ activities directly, it is up to the states to inform 
the Treaty Office when they negotiate relations directly with a foreign government. If 
the states don’t tell, the federal government likely will not know. A state may, either 
deliberately, out of negligence, or out of ignorance, fail to inform the federal 
government of the existence of an international document.  
In some cases, the foreign government, and not the U.S. state, will request a 
review of the wording of a state-foreign “memo,” because the foreign power wants to 
ensure it is not about to make a legal commitment to a U.S. state. If the language of a 
state- foreign document sounds too much like a promise – for example, if it contains 
words like “will” or “shall,” – then the Treaty Office will advise the state and the 
foreign nation to change the wording of the memo to make it nonbinding. If a state-
foreign arrangement were found to be legally binding under international law, the U.S. 
federal government could be held responsible for the failing of a U.S. state. This is one 
reason why states are prohibited from signing treaties.49 
And, the Treaty Office must make sure that even a nonbinding arrangement does 
not run afoul of the compact clause and allow a U.S. state to tip the balance of power 
towards the state and away from the federal government.  
In the past, the U.S. Department of State has acted to restrict states from 
forming international relationships. When Florida considered a trade promotion 
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agreement with Cuba in 1937, U.S. DOS declared that its “policy in regard to 
promotion of commerce with foreign countries and the negotiation of commercial 
treaties does not contemplate the conclusion of special agreements or pacts between 
separate states and foreign governments even if the consent of the Congress to such 
special agreements could be obtained.”50  
But things changed. In 1984, Kincaid writes: “The Department of State now sees 
the Constitution as giving the states considerable freedom in foreign trade matters; the 
department provides the governors with briefings, including some from the secretary of 
state; it facilitates state activities abroad through its embassies and consulates.”51 
The Executive agencies are not likely to act to restrict states because they work 
cooperatively with state agencies in many areas of federal regulation. The U.S. 
Department of Commerce (U.S. DOC) has for decades enlisted the help of state and 
municipal governments in export support and in attracting foreign investment, and has 
vigorously supported the capacity of states in this regard. U.S. DOC supports states in 
overseas trade missions and fairs; a U.S. DOC commercial attaché is even housed in 
the Texas economic development agency. Similarly, the Environmental Protection 
Agency utilizes the Texas Natural Resources Conservation Commission to implement 
border environment policy.  
The Executive Branch agencies are not likely to seek to restrict states because: 
1) agencies do not monitor all state- level activity; 2) states will not always inform the 
agencies of their actions; and 3) federal agencies rely on state agencies to implement 
U.S. policy and therefore want to maintain good relations. 
 
Congress 
There are many areas in which the states and federal government are both 
legally able to legislate; this is called concurrent jurisdiction. If the states legislate in a 
manner that Congress finds objectionable, the burden is on Congress to either prohibit 
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or preempt state law, as long as there is a constitutional basis for Congress to do so. 
The doctrine of "foreign affairs preemption" allows courts to invalidate state actions 
that impinge on federal foreign relations interests. But if Congress has not acted in a 
certain legislative area, does this mean the states are free to act until preempted by 
Congress? And if the states are acting and Congress does not stop them, does this mean 
Congress has given tacit consent to the states’ actions? Not necessarily – in either case.  
Sometimes Congress will not preempt or prohibit a state action because of a 
lack of political will. In the 1980s, several states levied “unitary” taxes on 
multinational corporations (MNCs), by calculating a corporation’s tax base on its 
profits as a worldwide entity, not taxing only profits made in that particular state. Many 
MNCs objected and began lobbying Congress to end the practice. However, state 
congressional delegations were reluctant to restric t the state’s practice. Thus Congress 
considered outlawing the state practice, but failed to do so. Unsatisfied with the 
political inaction, Barclays Bank of London pursued a court case against California, the 
largest state to employ the unitary tax calculation. The case went to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, and in June 1994, the Court ruled California had the right to levy a unitary tax 
and that Congress should make such a tax illegal if it did not like the practice.  
There are two interpretations of this case. One is that California’s actions – in 
the absence of U.S. policy – caused a foreign relations controversy and thus the states’ 
use of the unitary tax should have been preempted, given federal preeminence in 
foreign affairs. But, Congress could not agree whether or not to preempt the state. Thus 
another interpretation of the case holds that congressional failure to act can be 
construed as de facto consent for the states to act in the absence of congressional 
action. The Supreme Court ruling in Barclay’s case upheld the notion that states are 
free to act in the absence of congressional action. 
In the future, congressional inaction of the type seen in the unitary tax case 
could become more common; after all, Congress is composed of state delegations with 
a strong interest in the domestic welfare of their states, states whose well being is now 
inextricably intertwined with that of foreign actors. 
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In a more recent case, the U.S. Supreme Court found the state of 
Massachusetts’ sanctions against Myanmar (Burma) unconstitutional on the basis of 
interference in federal authority to regulate foreign affairs, discussed above.52 
The scope of preemption doctrine is unsettled, as the two very different 
outcomes in the Barclays Bank case and the Myanmar case attest.  
How would Congress handle the issue of states signing “memos” with a foreign 
government? The Constitution states: “No State shall, without the Consent of 
Congress… enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign 
Power…” Does this mean Texas should seek congressional consent every time state 
officials sign a “memo” with Mexican officials? No. Congress has declared that not all 
compacts require congressional consent; what matters is the state’s intent behind the 
documents. The 74th and 88th Congresses53 issued the following statement on the 
constitutional prohibition: 
 
The terms ‘compact’ and ‘agreement’…do not apply to every 
compact or agreement…but the prohibition is directed to the formation of 
any combination tending to the increase of political power in the States 
which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the 
United States. The terms cover all stipulations affecting the conduct or 
claims of states, whether verbal or written, formal or informal, positive or 
implied with each other or with foreign powers.54 
 
Clause 3 of Article 1, section 10, allows for Congress to oversee lower-level 
external relations between states and foreign powers, writes Greg Craven. “The basic 
effect is that the Constitution permits ‘non-political’ external relations by a state, 
subject to the supervision of Congress.”55 But as in the case of the Executive Branch 
                                        
52 Spiro (June 2000).  
53  The 74th Congress met from 1935-1936; the 88th from 1963-1964. 
54 Senate Document 39, 88th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 416-419, Quoted in Roger Frank 
Swanson, State/Provincial Interaction: A Study of Relations Between US States and Canadian 
Provinces Prepared for the US Dept. of State (Washington, DC: Canus Research Institute, 
1974): 52. 
55 Greg Craven, “Federal Constitutions and External Relations,” in Brian Hocking, ed., Foreign 
Relations and Federal States. (London: Leicester University Press, 1993): 16. 
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agencies discussed above, Congress would have to be aware of a state- foreign action in 
order to either block it or grant permission for it.  
Congress could restrict a state’s actions through control of federal funds, 
specifying that such funds cannot be used for overseas activities that Congress felt was 
encroaching on federal supremacy. Yet, denying funds in many cases would be 
ineffective – as the Texas-Mexico case study will show, that there is very little federal 
funding that goes into the state’s international intergovernmental relations. 
 
 
 CONCLUSION  
It appears as though a challenge to the states from either of the federal political 
branches or the courts is unlikely as long as the nature of the states’ activities remain 
focused on finding non-binding, cooperative solutions to what are essentially domestic 
problems involving foreign actors. But as the nature of foreign relations becomes more 
state-oriented, the laws and practices governing state- foreign relationships are bound to 
evolve in unforeseen ways.56 
The Massachusetts case shows that the federal government might restrict the 
state if the state’s action is challenged by a politically significant complainant. But if 
states are furthering or implementing U.S. federal goals, then the federal government is 
unlikely to challenge or constrain the states.  
What are the policy areas in which there are is likely to be an organized 
significant complainant? And in what policy areas are the mutual goals of the states 
and federal government not likely to produce an injured group to complain? These 
questions will be considered in the upcoming case study chapters.  
But first, the next chapter explains how U.S. states within the open federal 
system developed interests in international politics as changes in global economics 
transformed U.S. domestic politics.  
                                        
56 Federal officials did object to the Southwestern border governors discussing issues of federal 
jurisdiction with Mexican governors in 1980. More on that coming up in Chapter 5 on 
Relations.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 HOW U.S. STATES BECAME GLOBAL ACTORS 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Now that the legal and political context has been laid out in Chapter Two, we can 
turn to the story of how U.S. states became global actors. This is also the story of how 
worldwide economic forces reshaped the U.S. economy as trade became integral to U.S. 
foreign policy.  
This chapter addresses part one of the research question: given the constitutional 
restrictions on U.S. states, why have states developed relations directly with foreign 
nations?  
This chapter argues that U.S. states developed interests overseas as the U.S. 
economy integrated itself into the world economy. The openness of the U.S. federal 
system gives states the freedom to pursue local economic development needs. As states 
competed against one another for international economic advantage, the results were 
state- level policy initiatives such as economic development agencies, overseas trade 
offices, and export support programs.  
Trade is one area in which the states and the federal government share policy 
goals. National economic goals are met as subnational governments meet their own 
policy goals. Therefore the federal government has encouraged the states’ endeavors to 
promote international trade, and has put federal programs in place to assist the states. 
But the states’ trade promotion mechanisms were developed more through state- level 
innovation and competition than through federal incentive. 
The first part of this chapter explains how the roles the federal government and 
the states play in economic development have developed over the course of the nation’s 
history, focusing on how the development of economic globalization following World 
War II affected the U.S. economy. Then the strategies the states developed to adjust to 
the changing world economy are explored: competing for foreign direct investment, 
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opening overseas trade promotion offices, and increasing the capacity of local businesses 
to export goods. The general historical development this chapter offers then leads into 
Chapter Four, which looks at the specific ways Texas responded to the changing global 
economy by employing these same international outreach strategies. 
 
 
THE STATES AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
The economic development of the U.S. states, while geographically and 
regionally uneven, has not occurred separately from the concurrent development of the 
U.S. and world economies. Since World War II, the forces that have reshaped the global 
economy are the same forces that have caused the states to establish a place for 
themselves in the world economy. John Kline writes, “The potential for a contemporary 
state role (in foreign affairs) did not arise until international economic forces penetrated 
the U.S. economy sufficiently to intersect traditional state economic-regulation interests 
and prerogatives.”1 
The traditional roles each level plays in economics are as follows: 
constitutionally, the U.S. Congress has the authority to regulate both domestic and 
foreign commerce as it flows between U.S. states and between the United States and 
foreign nations.2 The federal political branches create economic development policy and 
trade policy, set tariffs, negotiate and approve international treaties, and set certain 
standards for how goods are to be processed, contained, and transported. But the states 
are sovereign in several areas of commercial activity including but not limited to 
transportation, safety, and sanitary standards. As the U.S. federal government enters into 
more international trade treaties, the momentum is towards a single international 
standard that subnational governments in signatory countries must implement. The states 
are finding some areas of traditional regulatory authority overtaken by the federal 
                                        
1 John M. Kline, State Government Influence in U.S. International Economic Policy. (Lexington, 
MA: Lexington Books, 1983): 7. 
2 Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution authorizes Congress to regulate commerce with foreign 
nations and among the states.  
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government. The effect is that the regulation of commercial goods is now more than ever 
shared between the U.S. state and federal governments.  
For federal economic policy to be successful, subnational governments must 
implement it. As Peter Eisinger puts it, “In the United States, economic development 
involves efforts to foster subnational economies…the national economy is to some 
degree the sum of its subnational parts, some developed and prosperous, some not, and 
all in mutual competition for private investment and resources.” 3  
Alberta Sbragia explains that U.S. subnational governments have the autonomy 
to make their own investment decisions, so states take the lead in fostering their own 
economic development, including acquiring investment from foreign sources. 
Structurally then, in the United States “the federal government (plays) an investment role 
subordinate to that of state and local government.”4  
Both the federal and state governments can spend tax dollars on economic 
development programs. “Unlike congressional regulatory legislation, federal spending 
for economic development does not preempt state development spending,” writes Robert 
Stumberg. “Congress may attach conditions for states that want to take the federal 
money, but states have a choice to turn down the federal money and do what they 
want.”5 
 
 
 
 
 
                                        
3 Peter K. Eisinger, The Rise of the Entrepreneurial State: State and Local Economic 
Development Policy in the United States (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988): 3-4. 
Eisinger defines economic development as “those efforts by government to encourage new 
business investment in particular locales in the hopes of directly creating or retaining jobs, 
setting into motion the secondary employment multiplier, and enhancing and diversifying the tax 
base.” 
4 Alberta M. Sbragia, Debt Wish: Entrepreneurial Cities, U.S. Federalism, and Economic Development 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996): 25. 
5 Robert Stumberg, of the Harrison Institute at Georgetown Law Center, personal email, “Re: a 
question and a schedule problem,” 8 July 2002. 
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The Role of Business 
In order to have resources with which to govern, governments at all levels 
develop a special relationship with the business sector. Kenneth Thomas writes,  
Governments rely on business for economic activity to tax, as 
well as for job creation. Without these factors, they have neither the 
funds to carry out their jobs nor an economic performance that is likely 
to get them reelected…Because business performance is so crucial to 
governments, its status is far more central than that of a special interest 
group…in other words, government negotiates with business over the 
conditions of investment.6  
 
Thus government in the United States emphasizes policies and regulations that 
support business development. Almost all investment and production decisions in the 
United States are made by the private sector, unlike European and Japanese systems with 
a much higher degree of public intervention in business.7  
U.S. national trade policy historically has rested on two principles: that of non-
discriminatory “national treatment,” in which foreign investors are treated the same as 
domestic investors, with some national security exceptions for technology and strategic 
minerals. The other principle is of a general “open door” policy, which means the 
national government neither discourages nor encourages foreign investment in the 
United States, “but rather provides a framework within which investment flows can be 
determined as much as possible by free market forces.”8 
The U.S. Department of Commerce describes itself as being “in partnership with 
U.S. business…to maintain a prosperous, productive America, committed to consumer 
safety, protective of natural resources and militarily strong.”9 
The following sections will show that as the domestic business climate was 
changed by exposure to international market forces, the struggle to maintain a viable tax 
base and gainful employment pushed state governments to reach outside the United 
                                        
6  Kenneth Thomas, Competing for Capital: Europe and North America in a Global Era. 
(Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press, 2000): 24-25. 
7 Eisinger, p.5. 
8 Kline (1983): 89. 
9 From Lighthouses to Laserbeams: A History of the U.S. Department of Commerce 
(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary Ronald H. Brown, 1995): 33. 
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States in search of economic development opportunities. After this historical 
development is outlined, a closer look will be taken at the mechanisms the states 
developed, such as overseas offices and means of supporting exports. 
 
 
From the Beginning: National Economic Development and the States 
The integration of the United States into the world economy has taken place 
perhaps more slowly than in other nations because of the vast resources and wealth of 
this nation. For so long, domestic businesses thrived on the strength of the internal 
market without needing foreign expansion. With some exceptions, the U.S. economy 
was relatively insulated until the 1970s. At that point, the U.S. market opened at a 
dizzying pace, and it became unmistakably clear that international political and 
economic developments now affected the most basic level of domestic economics and 
politics in the United States.  
But to varying degrees, U.S. states have pursued clearly identifiable interests 
with other nations from the moment the states were formed. The original thirteen 
colonies, from whence the United States grew, pursued their own international economic 
interests with abandon. Even Founding Father and signer of the Constitution Benjamin 
Franklin represented the mercantile interests of Pennsylvania and three other colonies 
while in Paris and London. 10        
Under the Articles of Confederation, the power of state governments far 
outweighed the authority of the central government. Article II granted each state its 
“sovereignty, freedom, and independence” and entitled the states to “every power, 
jurisdiction, and right” not assigned to the national government. Congress was permitted 
to make war and peace, to send and receive ambassadors, to enter into treaties and 
alliances, to coin money, establish a post office and administer Indian affairs, but was 
not permitted to raise taxes or regulate commerce.  
                                        
10 John Kincaid, “The American Governors in International Affairs,” Publius: The Journal of 
Federalism 14 (Fall 1984): 97. 
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With no overarching authority governing commerce, the states engaged in 
competitive trade wars against one another. States treated goods from other states as if 
they were goods from foreign countries. For example, Rhode Island would place special 
duties on “imports” from Connecticut or New York; those states in turn would slap 
charges on goods from Rhode Island. States also routinely ignored provisions of the 
treaties negotiated by Congress. Meanwhile, the central government, with no taxing 
authority, was perpetually bankrupt.11 
It soon became clear the confederate design was not meeting the needs of the 
growing nation. A new constitutional convention was assembled in Philadelphia; the 
Articles were thrown out and the delegates began the process of negotiating a new 
constitution. The 1788 Constitut ion gave Congress the power to levy and collect taxes 
and duties and to regulate commerce with foreign nations as well as between the states. 
The states were prohibited from forming treaties or international agreements, but 
ensured influence in foreign affairs through votes on treaties and ambassadors and 
through the House of Representatives’ control of the federal government’s newly-gotten 
funds. 12 
During the 1800s, rapid population growth and Westward expansion meant that 
most businesses were satisfied with domestic market opportunities, so state governments 
were not under pressure to support their commercial sectors in international expansion. 13 
But early on in the nation’s development, states forged international relationships 
with bankers as they financed internal developments to support domestic economic 
expansion. Alberta Sbragia examines how U.S. states, not the federal government, 
mobilized financial resources for building the crucial transportation infrastructure 
necessary for development to take place in the 1800s. In the industrializing years before 
the Civil War, state governments actively pursued their own economic development by 
establishing banks and granting corporate charters and franchises. States developed the 
                                        
11 Earl Fry, The Expanding Role of State and Local Governments in U.S. Foreign Affairs. (New 
York: Council on Foreign Relations): 56. 
12 Ibid. 
13 John Kincaid, “American Governors in International Affairs,” in Publius: The Journal of 
Federalism 14 (Fall 1984): 98. 
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legal right of eminent domain in order to lay claim to property as needed for internal 
developments such as railroads.14  
States competed fiercely against one another even then. At this point in time, the 
incentive was to develop the infrastructure necessary to establish and control trade routes 
to the rapidly growing country’s interior. “To lose in the transportation race was, at best, 
to lose regional economic supremacy and, at worst, to suffer dramatic economic losses,” 
Sbragia writes. As transportation routes went, so went urbanization: the towns of Utica, 
Syracuse, and Rochester flourished after New York state built the Erie Canal in 1825. 
New York State’s plans spurred other states to begin their own transportation projects. 
Pennsylvania was first to respond; then Ohio began building canals in 1825; in 1827, 
South Carolina began constructing the Charleston and Hamburg Railroad; Maryland and 
Virginia broke ground on canals in 1828; and in 1836, Indiana planned canals and 
railroads for the entire state.15  
States clearly embraced their role as forces of economic development. When 
Michigan gained statehood in 1835, its state constitution even declared outright “internal 
improvements shall be encouraged by the government of the state.” State politicians 
nationwide took to this idea. Political battles took place within state legislatures about 
where to locate infrastructure projects, but few questioned that internal improvements 
were an appropriate activity for state governments to pursue.16 
To fund these projects, states borrowed substantial amounts of capital, often from 
foreign banks. Some states accumulated more debt than they could repay. As some states 
began to default on their loans, foreign lenders shunned all U.S. states as high-risk. State 
legislatures in the states that defaulted or nearly defaulted quickly passed mandatory 
debt limits for their states, often in the form of constitutional amendments. These 
restrictions, says Sbragia, “established a norm of limited rather than expansive public 
investment. The acceptance of restrictions preempted any potential federal role in 
regulating state investment” because the states showed themselves capable of self-
regulating without federal intervention. Whereas subnational governments in European 
                                        
14 Sbragia, pp.20; 25-26. 
15 Ibid, p. 28. 
16 Sbragia, pp. 29-31. 
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federal systems have their levels of borrowing and investment controlled by their federal 
governments, U.S. subnational governments remain autonomous when it comes to 
capital investment levels.17 This structural feature sets the stage for states to develop the 
global roles they play today, courting foreign direct investment and promoting local 
business expansion.  
The passage of the Fourteenth Amendment restricted the states’ capacity to 
exercise eminent domain and lay claim to privately-owned lands for government 
purposes without adequately compensating the owner. Later, states imposed debt limits 
and withdrew somewhat from building canals and railroads; local governments took up 
some of the slack. The U.S. federal government subsequently became more active in 
funding capital projects, such as the transcontinental railroad and later the interstate 
highway system. 
The nation’s development was temporarily sidetracked by the Civil War. 
Relatively steady growth ensued during Reconstruction.   
At the end of World War I, the U.S. economy was still healthy enough that there 
were few pressures for domestic businesses to venture into exports. This was just as 
well, as the War had also led the federal government to develop greater interests in 
foreign affairs, “which inclined it to protect its prerogatives,” writes John Kincaid.18 At 
the same time, an isolationist mood evidenced itself as the United States rejected 
membership in the League of Nations. 
In domestic economic matters, the federal government took a step towards 
increasing its role when the U.S. Department of Commerce opened a Division of 
Domestic Commerce in July of 1923, to “coordinate domestic commerce studies and to 
conduct research on such general problems as plant location, warehousing and 
distribution.”19 
 
 
 
                                        
17 Ibid, pp. 40-43. 
18 Kincaid (1984): 99. 
19 From Lighthouses to Laserbeams, p. 37. 
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Freer Trade Policies Develop 
The Great Depression of 1929 proved a tremendous turning point in the nation’s 
development, and government at all levels began to take a more active role in U.S. 
economic matters. States were required to establish economic development agencies in 
order to receive public-works funds from the federal government. Every state but 
Delaware did so, although these agencies were neither sophisticated nor durable. Their 
activities consisted mostly of “taking inventories and coordinating the location of public 
works facilities with industrial development needs,” writes Peter Eisinger. The state 
planning agencies were closed after the National Resources Planning Board was shut 
down in 1943. Eisinger explains, “State bureaus designed to implement efforts to 
stimulate industrial and other economic development spread after the war but did not 
become a universal element of state government machinery until recently (the 1980s).”20 
Trade policy also began to take on a new shape in the 1930s. The Smoot-Hawley 
Tariff was intended to protect the U.S. agricultural sector and other industries damaged 
by the 1929 stock market crash. The legislation raised tariffs on more then 20,000 items 
by an overall average of 53 percent. But the new tariffs dampened the faltering economy 
even further. From 1929 to 1933, global trade fell approximately 70 percent in volume 
and 35 percent in dollars. U.S. exports fell from $5.2 billion to $1.4 billion, while 
imports declined from $4.4 billion to $1.4 billion. 21 
The disastrous results of the Smoot-Hawley tariffs led to an overhaul of U.S. 
trade policy in both practice and content. In passing the Reciprocal Trade Agreements 
Act of 1934 (RTAA), Congress yielded significant power to craft foreign trade policy to 
the executive branch. The presidency was given the discretion to negotiate reciprocal 
trade agreements by executive order and to change tariff rates without congressional 
approval. In less than ten years, from 1934 to the start of WWII in 1941, the executive 
branch had negotiated twenty reciprocal agreements, lowering the average tariff from the 
52 percent set by Smoot-Hawley down to an average of 35 percent.22  
                                        
20 Eisinger, p. 16. 
21 Philip A. Mundo, National Politics in a Global Economy: The Domestic Sources of U.S. Trade 
Policy. (Washington, D.C.:Georgetown University Press, 1999):  43-45. 
22 Ibid, p. 45. 
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After World War II, the United States’ economy had prospered while other 
nations’ economies had been decimated. Now the undisputed political hegemon, the 
United States took the lead in establishing an international economic system to nurture 
worldwide trade liberalization. The Bretton Woods Agreement provided a framework for 
international investment flows and established rules for exchange rates and liquidity.23 
The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank were created to support 
developing nations as they moved to freer trade. The General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade began lowering barriers to trade, and decreasing costs of transportation and 
communication began to increase the mobility of capital both within and between 
nations, a trend that would accelerate and lead to the eventual fraying of the Bretton 
Woods agreement.24  
Yet even while the United States supported the opening of other economies, the 
sheer size and strength of the postwar U.S. economy insulated it from growing world 
interdependence by its position of “aberrant economic dominance.”25  
 
The States Fight the Cold War   
Politically, U.S. foreign policy was dominated by the concept of containing the 
spread of communism from the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba into other nations. The 
nation’s politicians showed unusual unity of purpose, forming what came to be known as 
the “Cold War consensus” – the agreement that maintaining national security was the 
highest purpose of federal government and that all other policy concerns, domestic and 
international, were subordinate to this mission. The concept that domestic and foreign 
policies occupied different spheres relegated states to a conceptual role as purely 
domestic actors. This bifurcated view overlooked the fact that subnational governments 
were already taking small steps towards greater international involvement, as the U.S. 
federal government began to rely on economics as a means of achieving foreign policy 
goals. 
                                        
23 Joanne Gowa, Closing the Gold Window: Domestic Politics and the End of Bretton Woods 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983): 34. 
24 Thomas, pp. 28-29. 
25  John Kline, “The International Economic Interests of U.S. States,” Publius: The Journal of 
Federalism vol. 14, no. 4 (1984): p. 82.  
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But policymakers at the state level saw they had a role to play in protecting the 
homeland from the threat of international communism. State governments developed 
their own policies to ferret out communists from institutions of government and public 
education. In 1949, the Texas Legislature passed a law permitting the firing of any 
faculty member at state educational institutions who advocated any form of “totalitarian 
State doctrine, which is the antithesis of the American ideal…”26 
Texas also prohibited any official election ballot from printing the name of any 
political party advocating the forceful overthrow of the U.S. constitutional government. 
The quickly-passed legislation reasoned, “Communism threatens the peace, prosperity, 
and happiness of this country.” The act was unanimously approved by both legislative 
chambers and went into effect immediately after its passage on 10 May 1949.  
A few days later, Texas lawmakers approved a lengthy resolution denouncing 
Stalin’s communist threat to the United States as “far more dangerous than the combined 
threat of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperialistic Japan ever was.” The resolution 
criticized the U.S. Department of State for apparently employing those disloyal to the 
American way of life and urged the federal government to use all its influence to create a 
European Federation to “increase Europe’s chances to survive” the communist threat. 
The resolution passed both chambers unanimously. 27 
In 1951, during the next Texas legislative session two years later, Texas 
lawmakers unanimously approved the Communist Control Law, requiring members of 
any communist organization to register with the state or face either fines of up to 
$10,000 or prison time. The law laid out punishment for sabotage or destruction of state 
property and barred any communist from being employed by the state of Texas. The 
preamble to the bill states,  
There exists a world Communist movement…which has as its 
declared objective world control…to be accomplished (by)…the use of 
fraud, espionage, sabotage, terrorism and treachery. Since the state of 
Texas is the location of many of the Nation’s largest and most vital 
military establishments, and since it is a producer of many of the most 
essential products for national defense, the State of Texas is a most 
                                        
26General and Special Laws of the State of Texas (51st Legislature, Regular Session, 1949): 234. 
27  Ibid, 1457-1459. 
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probable target for those who seek by force and violence to overthrow 
Constitutional Government, and is in imminent danger of Communist 
espionage and sabotage…the world Communist movement, temporarily 
halted by American dead, constitutes a clear and present danger to the 
citizens of the State of Texas.28 
 
The viewpoint at the federal level – and in academia – saw foreign and domestic 
politics as distinct. But at the state level, the line separating international from domestic 
politics was blurred even in 1951.  
The trend during the Cold War was for the federal government’s power in foreign 
affairs to grow. The Presidency in particular asserted itself across several 
administrations, solidifying in popular thought the view of foreign affairs as the 
exclusive domain of the federal government, and of the executive in particular. John 
Kincaid explains that “with the rise of the modern Presidency in the twentieth century, 
the expanded use of executive agreements rather than treaties as a foreign policy 
mechanism, the U.S. Supreme Court’s willingness to interpret federal powers over 
foreign affairs and commerce quite broadly, and the emergence of a bipartisan foreign 
policy during World War II, the role of the states as states in foreign affairs became 
nearly invisible.”29 
Thus the role the states were making for themselves during the Cold War went 
largely unnoticed. 
 
 
The Domestic Effects of Linking Trade and Containment 
Economics mattered to containment politics. During the Eisenhower 
Administration, trade policy was used as a tool to contain communism – and certain 
domestic sectors began to feel the effects of free trade for the first time, to their 
detriment.  
In order to curry favor with foreign governments, the United States imported 
more products from Cold War allies. Thus some U.S. industries began feeling pressure 
                                        
28 General and Special Laws of the State of Texas (52nd Legislature, Regular Session, 1951):10-
13. 
29 Kincaid (1984): 99 
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from foreign competition as early as the mid-1950s. This pressure was acknowledged by 
the U.S. Tariff Commission, which unanimously ruled that tariff concessions on lead and 
zinc from Mexico, Canada, Peru, and Bolivia had “seriously injured” the U.S. mining 
industry. The Commission urged corrective action. But U.S. Secretary of State John 
Foster Dulles would not restore the tariffs on these goods, warning that to do so would 
have “grave consequences…(t)here would be strong popular resentment in Canada and 
Mexico, which will make our borders less secure. The great opportunity to combat 
Communism in this hemisphere, won by the success of Guatemala, would be more than 
canceled out. Soviet Communist leaders would be elated and would redouble their 
efforts to divide the free world.”30 
The Tariff Commission also found the U.S. fishing industry was being hurt by 
imports from Canada, Iceland, and Norway. But if the United States restric ted imported 
fish, “adverse effects on vital United States political, economic and security interests” in 
these countries might result. Import duties, it was thought, would aid “those elements in 
Iceland which wish to drive out U.S. NATO troops. As fish goes so goes Iceland.”31 
Concessions were also made on Japanese imports in 1954. Patrick Buchanan 
argues that during the Cold War, “National security became the ultima ratio, the final 
argument, in every trade dispute. As the free world leader, America needed allies in the 
Cold War. The way to bind those allies to the United States and strengthen them for the 
struggle was through ‘trade, not aid.’ In truth President Eisenhower had his priorities 
straight. National security was a compelling – indeed, a conclusive – argument in the 
early years of the Cold War. But our European and Asian allies did not need to be bribed 
to enlist in America’s cause. They were in far greater and more immediate danger than 
we were from Communist aggression or subversion.”32  
The move to freer trade had some industries feeling pressure from foreign 
competition as early as the mid-1950s. As some business sectors began to struggle, some 
in state government began to notice the connection between imports and domestic 
                                        
30 Alfred E. Eckes, Jr., Opening America’s Markets: U.S. Foreign Trade Policy Since 1776 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995):157. 
31 Ibid, p. 328. 
32 Patrick J. Buchanan, The Great Betrayal (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1998): 29. 
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change. “With national foreign policy being generally oriented toward free trade, the 
states and their governors were being increasingly affected by international economic 
events,” writes John Kincaid.33 
At the federal level, the U.S. Department of Commerce (U.S. DOC) was making 
its own efforts to encourage U.S. business to move into the international economy. In 
1955, the U.S. Department of Commerce established the Office of International Trade 
Fairs.34 
As the world economy’s significance to the United States became evident, the 
U.S. Congress was granting the presidency more control over international trade 
negotiations. In 1962, the Trade Expansion Act (TEA) authorized the presidency, rather 
than Congress, to enter into GATT negotiations over the next four years, from 1963 to 
1967. The so-called Kennedy Round produced major cuts in tariffs. The TEA also 
established the Trade Adjustment Assistance program, designed to provide financial 
assistance and retraining to workers and companies in distress due to increased imports, 
and created the Special Trade Representative, today known as the U.S. Trade 
Representative (USTR).35 
The late 1960s were marked by inflation, which undermined economic stability 
at both the domestic and global levels.36 Robert Gilpin explains, “By mid-1971, the U.S. 
dollar had become seriously out of line with other major currencies and the differential 
rates of inflation between the United States and other market economies had produced a 
fundamental disequilibrium in exchange rates.” Confidence in the dollar plummeted. 
The United States was experiencing its first trade deficit since 1893, prompting pressures 
for protectionism. The surging economies of Europe and Japan were, according to some 
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analysts, already making the Bretton Woods system obsolete and eroding the autonomy 
of the United States.37  
So on 15 August 1971, President Richard M. Nixon announced what Gilpin calls 
“a new U.S. foreign economic policy.” President Nixon ended the convertibility of the 
U.S. dollar into gold, putting the global monetary system on a “pure dollar standard.” 
Surcharges on U.S. imports forced the Europeans and Japanese to link their currencies to 
the dollar. Domestic wage and price controls were enacted as a means of slowing 
inflation within the United States. The dollar was devalued in December of 1971. In 
March of 1973, in a controversial move, floating exchange rates began.38 
Floating exchange rates were intended to force variety in the business cycles 
among industrialized nations to avoid the synchronous pursuit of expansionary or 
restrictive policies, and to stabilize exchange rates. While flexible exchange rates did 
help nations adjust to the economic crises of the 1970s, the goal of monetary stability 
was not reached. 39  
The assumption behind flexible rates was that “domestic economic management 
would not be constrained by international factors,” Gilpin writes. But the removal of 
capital controls beginning in Europe in the late 1950s and the formation of the 
Eurodollar market began a process of economic integration that would make the hope of 
domestic autonomy “increasingly unrealistic.”40 
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Oil and Politics Mix  
“International factors” were now unavoidably influencing the U.S. economy, and 
one of the biggest factors was the dramatic change in the global oil market. This would 
hit U.S. consumers hard, and shatter any sense that the U.S. domestic economy was 
somehow insulated from the pressures of the world market.  
Blessed with abundant oil resources, the U.S. energy sector had never been fully 
exposed to world forces. In 1959, the Eisenhower administration had passed oil import 
quotas that limited imports of foreign oil, thereby protecting domestic oil producers and 
keeping the independent companies, most of them Texans, in business. U.S. companies 
that could afford to went overseas in search of markets.41 
From 1957 to 1963, the United States had enjoyed a surplus of about 4 million 
barrels per day. Thus the nation and its allies had always had secure oil reserves, 
ensuring the capacity to increase output during any time of crisis, such as during World 
War II.  
Domestic U.S. oil output had for decades been controlled by the Texas Railroad 
Commission, the oddly-named state agency responsible for regulating the Texas 
oilfields, and, by extension at the time, the entire domestic oil industry. In order to keep 
prices low and promote conservation, the Commission had controlled production, 
keeping it well below capacity. But the rising economic growth of the 1970s meant that 
demand for oil worldwide suddenly jumped. Seemingly overnight, the United States’ 
domestic production capacity could no longer maintain the surplus enjoyed in previous 
decades. 
By 1970, the nation’s surplus had fallen nearly a million barrels a day. Domestic 
production reached its peak of 11.3 million barrels a day. The Railroad Commission 
allowed 100 percent domestic capacity to be produced in March 1972, but even so, 
demand continued to rise. The Nixon administration established price controls on oil, but 
predictably low prices served to discourage domestic investment while simultaneously 
encouraging increased consumption. 
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Daniel Yergin writes, “Free world petroleum demand rose from almost 19 
million barrels per day in 1960 to more than 44 million barrels per day in 1972. Oil 
consumption surged beyond expectation around the world, as ever-greater amounts of 
petroleum products were burned in factories, power plants, and cars. In America, 
gasoline use increased not only because people were driving more miles but also because 
cars were getting heavier and were carrying more ‘extras,’ such as air conditioning.”  
In April of 1973, the U.S. President for the first time gave a national address 
devoted to energy issues. President Nixon announced the abolishment of the oil import 
quotas, meaning “the United States was now a full- fledged, and very thirsty, member of 
the world oil market.” Just a few months later, the nation was importing 6.2 million 
barrels a day, up from 3.2 million in 1970 and 4.5 million in 1972. Two-thirds of the 
consumption increase was being satisfied by oil imported from the Middle East.42  
On 6 October 1973, Egypt attacked Israel in the fourth of the Arab-Israeli wars. 
The October War had the greatest impact on the United States. The Arab countries used 
their control over oil to cause a global energy crisis. The Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC), dominated by the Arab oil producers, orchestrated cuts in 
production and export restrictions.43 The resulting near-panic buying caused oil prices to 
surge higher. The United States – and the globe – had moved from a comfortable, 
seemingly perpetual oversupply of oil to tensely confronting chronic shortages. The 
Western world was now dependent on Middle Eastern and North African oil. The 
realization that oil supply would likely forever be subject to the political difficulties of 
that troubled region introduced even more economic uncertainty to the U.S. 
consciousness.44 
The integration of the U.S. economy into the world economy was now obvious. 
It was now undeniable that the welfare of U.S. citizens was affected by events and 
decisions in other countries. Oil shocks were the rude announcement that the United 
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States was affected by political decisions made thousands of miles away from the corner 
Texaco station, where suburban Americans in their heavy domestic cars idled in gas 
lines for hours.  
 
Competing in the Global Market 
Beginning in the 1970s, the need for capital among developed nations inspired 
the loosening and removal of restrictions on capital controls, thereby planting the seeds 
of global markets. Robert Gilpin explains, “Although the term ‘globalization’ is now 
used broadly, economic globalization has entailed just a few key developments in trade, 
finance, and foreign direct investment by multinational corporations.”45 
The lifting of restrictions on the international movement of capital is one of the 
key developments leading to economic globalization. By the mid-1970s, advances in 
money-transfer technology and the deregulation of national financial institutions caused 
the volume of the flow of international capital assets to exceed the volume of world trade 
many times over. In 1979, total exports were estimated to be $1.5 trillion while foreign 
exchange trading of money was at $17.5 trillion; by 1984, exports had increased only to 
$1.8 trillion, but foreign exchange trading had mushroomed to $35 trillion. “In a world 
where huge amounts of money and capital overwhelmed trade flows and were free to 
move across national boundaries in search of security and higher interest rates, 
international capital movements and the overall balance of payments became an 
important determinant of international currency values and especially of the exchange 
rate of the dollar.”46 
As money flowed more freely between nations, international trade also boomed. 
From 1913 to 1948, the annual volume of international commerce had grown by only 0.5 
percent; but 1948 to 1973, the volume of international trade grew at an annual rate of 7 
percent. Gilpin writes, “Over the course of the postwar era, trade has grown from 7 
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percent to 21 percent of total world income. The value of world trade has increased from 
$57 billion in 1947 to $6 trillion in the 1990s.”47 
As the world’s largest consumer market, purchases by U.S. consumers accounted 
for a significant chunk of those numbers. Beginning in 1970, imports to the United 
States as a share of gross national product/gross domestic product (GNP/GDP) began to 
increase. While imports constituted only two percent of GNP/GDP in 1945, and were 
still less than 4 percent in 1965, imports grew to almost 6 percent in 1970 and then 
jumped to more than 10 percent in 1980. The percentage of foreign trade as a share of 
GNP/GDP showed similar changes: holding steady at less than 10 percent from 1945 to 
1965, foreign trade rose to ten percent of GNP in 1970 and by 1980 was up to 20 
percent.48 
A paradox of the time was that “(m)any of the world economic conditions which 
made the United States a favorable investment location in the 1970s also rendered 
American products less competitive on the world market,” writes John Kincaid. The 
trade deficit grew from $5.8 billion in 1976 to $28.4 billion in 1978.49  
 
 
Domestic Support for Free Trade Fragments 
The effects of global economic change were not warmly received in the United 
States. There was evident public concern about the influx of foreign products into the 
United States and corresponding job losses. Complaints about rising immigration 
increased. There was a sense that the United States’ position as the world’s economic, 
cultural, and political leader was slipping away.  
Because U.S. trade policy was linked to U.S. national security, the faltering 
economy was seen as synonymous with the erosion of U.S. power worldwide. One critic 
wrote: “As American incomes shrink, Americans will become unable to carry the burden 
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of military defender and political leader of the West. Important consequences will follow 
from that.”50 
Popular resentment took the form of “Buy American” campaigns. By mid-1981, 
more than thirty U.S. states had adopted “Buy American” restrictions, including banning 
the purchase of foreign products as well as other efforts to favor the purchase of U.S. 
over foreign goods.51  
Book titles from the time reflect the rising concerns about what effect global 
changes would have on the American way of life: In 1980, a team of BusinessWeek 
reporters wrote The Decline of U.S. Power (and what we can do about it); and in 1982 a 
book called While the United States Slept was published. More recent titles reflecting 
unease with so-called globalization include The Great Betrayal: How American 
Sovereignty and Social Justice Are Being Sacrificed to the Gods of the Global 
Economy.52 
And yet, U.S. consumers continued to buy foreign products, increasing the 
disjuncture between imports and exports. In 1985, the U.S. trade imbalance with Japan 
alone stood at $33.6 billion, the largest ever between the United States and any single 
country. 53 And despite the unpopularity of foreign ownership of U.S. business, states and 
cities continued to aggressively seek foreign investment, as will be elaborated later in 
this chapter.  
Accelerating economic change and the perception of a loss of hegemony took its 
toll on the Cold War consensus that had supported U.S. foreign policy formation since 
the end of World War II. The consensus was supposed to insulate foreign policy 
formation from the struggles that characterized the domestic policy process. The phrase 
“politics stops at the water’s edge” meant that national security was of such paramount 
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importance that no one would squabble over it; the foreign policy agenda was so 
singular and necessary that foreign policy formation was protected from partisan 
divisiveness.  
But as the consequences of worldwide economic integration for domestic politics 
became obvious, U.S. anticommunist foreign policy was questioned. Conflict in 
Vietnam split the country. By the end of the 1970s, the Vietnam withdrawal and the 
uncertain future of U.S. citizens held hostage in the American Embassy in Iran 
perpetuated the feeling of national powerlessness on the world scene.  
The 1980 election was the culmination of emotions over the changes. In the 
contest between President Jimmy Carter and former California governor Ronald Reagan, 
the domestic effects of U.S. foreign policy were an issue. Polls showed more than 80 
percent of the U.S. population believed the United States had slipped into “deep and 
serious trouble.”54 The Republican Party, led by Ronald Reagan, won the Presidency, the 
control of the Senate for the first time in decades, and made gains in the House of 
Representatives and at the state level. While rising unemployment and double-digit 
inflation made economics the deciding issue, exit polls showed that dissatisfaction with 
the Carter administration’s foreign policy gave an edge to Ronald Reagan and his 
promise to “Make America Great Again.”55 
While Pres. Reagan made national security and increasing military strength the 
basis of his policy, gaining support for such policy goals was not easily done. Peter 
Trubowitz argues there was no consensus on foreign policy during the 1980s. The effect 
of global economic changes on the U.S. domestic business sector was a major cause of 
the lack of support for foreign policy, as different domestic sectors suffered different 
degrees of negative impact caused by the uneven integration of U.S. industry into the 
world economy. 56  
It is questionable exactly what effect the lack of consensus had on subnational 
governments. Certainly at the federal level, trade and security policy were becoming 
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more intertwined, bringing subnational governments into the mix. The Export 
Administration Act of 1979 stated that: “It is important for the national interest of the 
United States that both the private sector and the Federal Government place a high 
priority on exports, consistent with the economic, security, and foreign policy objectives 
of the United States.”57 The means of achieving higher exports being state and local 
governments, states were enlisted in achieving the foreign policy objectives of the 
United States in the new economy. 
 
 
US. States Respond to Global Economic Changes 
As the vulnerability of the U.S. economy to international forces became clear, 
U.S. states and cities were plunged into circumstances for which they were ill-prepared. 
The dizzying changes left subnational government officials at a loss, with no blueprint to 
follow. William Schweke wrote at the time:  “What seemed to work well and make 
sense for most of this century is suddenly obsolete, pushed aside by a rush of new forces 
linked to the internationalization of the U.S. economy and the introduction of 
information technologies into the workplace.” 58  
The lowering of tariffs meant U.S. manufacturers suddenly faced stiff 
competition from foreign-made products. As the United States began importing these 
lower-priced and often more energy-efficient foreign appliances and automobiles, 
consumption of these items rose and domestic products lost market share. Manufacturing 
jobs in the United States dwindled. While layoffs increased, the high price of oil and an 
overall sluggish economy prevented the creation of new jobs. Loss of jobs and 
businesses compromised tax bases, putting state and local bureaucrats under tremendous 
pressure to act to secure sources of tax revenue for the continued operation of 
government, not to mention jobs for dislocated voters. 
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Elected officials who had yet to wake up to the new economy paid the price. In 
August of 1985, a Texas Democrat who made clear the link between imports and local 
unemployment won a close race after his opponent naively questioned, “what trade had 
to do with East Texas.”59 
During the 1970s, state officials took advantage of the open U.S. federal structure 
to compete against other states for economic advantage. Worldwide, developed nations 
were competing against one another for newly mobile capital as it circled the globe, 
searching for investment possibilities. In the United States, although the federal 
government sets the rules for the entrance of capital, the means of competing for it are 
state and local governments. Thus the changes in global capital restrictions introduced 
another generation of subnational actors to the world of competitive global finance. As 
U.S. involvement in foreign trade expanded, “state government officials became alert to 
the possibilities of claiming a larger share of this growing economic pie.”60  
The remainder of this chapter will outline the international outreach mechanisms 
the states developed in order to adjust to the changing domestic economic picture. States 
first created economic development agencies; then competed aga inst one another for 
foreign direct investment; cultivated foreign markets for domestic exports; and opened 
overseas trade offices. These mechanisms gave states an institutionalized means of 
interacting directly with foreign actors, all with the goal of meeting domestic governing 
goals.  
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THE STATES’ INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC STRATEGIES 
Wanted: Direct Investment 
The first sign of adjustment to the new economy was the development of state-
level economic development agencies. Forty-four states responded to a Council of State 
Governments survey in 1982: thirteen of those states had established economic 
development agencies in the 1970s, and eight started such agencies as the 1980s began. 
Cities and urban counties had also joined the trend.61 
These economic development agencies were far more sophisticated than the 
short- lived entities of the Depression era. These agencies aggressively courted foreign 
direct investment by publicizing their states as a favorable place to do business. 62 
Promotional methods included overseas trade missions showcasing the businesses in a 
state, training seminars for exporters, and publishing directories of exporters and 
databases of trade leads. States and even cities began offering corporations 
“development incentives” such as specialized worker training; tax rebates, credits, or 
reductions; infrastructure improvements; or even direct grants offered to entice a 
company to establish a presence in the state or city. 63 A National Governors Association 
(NGA) survey showed that in 1980, states spent more than $18.8 million on international 
promotion efforts, about the same as the U.S. DOC spent on the same activities.64 
One ongoing difficulty in research into state economic development efforts is 
measuring the effectiveness of initiatives such as these. In 1984, John Kline pondered 
whether state promotional efforts influenced business decisions as much as did other 
factors such as labor quality, competition, market share, and so on. “Nevertheless, there 
appears to be enough general confidence in the effective return from state international 
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business promotion efforts that they have become a prominent feature in most states’ 
economic development programs over the last decade (1974-84).”65  
The subnational efforts to attract foreign direct investment had an overall positive 
effect. IMF statistics show that from 1975-1979, the United States’ share of total inward 
direct investment rose from 16.2 percent to 24.3 percent; and in 1980-1982, a two-year 
period, the United States received 35.3 percent of total world direct investment.66 
The U.S. Department of Commerce gave these reasons for the increase in foreign 
direct investment in the United States: “relative U.S. political strength and economic 
stability; the sheer size and strength of the U.S. economy; the emergence of large 
companies based abroad with the resources needed to become active multinational 
corporations; a relatively non-restrictive U.S. policy toward foreign direct investment, 
and the low value of the dollar during the 1978-1980 period.” 
In the United States, manufacturing and real property accounted for three-fifths 
of the recorded foreign direct investment transactions from 1976 to 1983. Real property 
comprises non-agricultural land, hotels, office buildings, shopping centers, apartment 
buildings, and so on, but does not include private residences or farmland. Most of the 
transactions were real estate purchases and mergers and acquisitions.67 Almost half of 
the completed transactions took place in only four states: New York, California, Florida, 
and Texas.68 
The multinational corporation began to develop around this time, as companies 
put resources into acquiring shares of foreign properties or opening overseas 
subsidiaries. For the same reasons that the United States was an attractive place to 
invest, it was also an attractive place to open a plant or office. 
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The Tax and Incentive Wars  
Because the U.S. federal government pays a smaller proportion of subnational 
governments’ expenses than do the central governments in other federal systems, U.S. 
subnational governments have more autonomy to set their own taxing levels and 
generate their own tax revenues than do subnational governments in most other 
advanced industrial nations. Since U.S. states inevitably differ in their taxable resources, 
business tax rates also differ from state to state, furthering rivalries between the states as 
to which state can offer the lowest tax rates in order to attract business. 
But as the competition for capital grew more and more intense, some states and 
cities offered foreign firms so much in the way of tax abatements and subsidies, that the 
ultimate worth of any resulting business relocation was questioned. Southern states in 
particular, hit hard by textile imports, aggressively pursued foreign investment. The 
competition between the states was so fierce that BusinessWeek published a 1976 
special report referring to the U.S. Civil War and called the fierce competition a “second 
war between the states.”69  
The incentives proved costly to some jurisdictions. In the throes of competition, 
governments had difficulty seeing “when widespread competition has eliminated the 
economic return – the point at which the subsidies benefit business alone because the net 
returns to communities as a group have been driven to zero.”70 In 1989, the state of 
Louisiana spent $273 million in business property tax exemptions, the same as giving up 
25 percent of local property tax collections; yet only six percent of all of Louisiana’s 
industrial tax exemptions went towards the building of new plants, indicating that 
Louisiana’s spending did not bring new industries to the state.71  
Competition for foreign automobile manufacturing was characterized by a 
particular trend towards self-defeat. In 1980, the town of Smyrna, Tennessee offered 
Nissan financial incentives that amounted to $11,000 per employee. In 1985, 38 states 
competed for a Saturn automobile plant that landed in Spring Hill, Tennessee, where the 
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incentive package costs rose to more than $26,000 per employee. The next year, 
Lafayette, Indiana paid incentives of more than $50,000 per employee for a Fuji-Isuzu 
plant. In 1992, BMW was paid incentives amounting to $68, 421 per job for a new plant 
in South Carolina, which was expected to produce only 1,500 jobs. In six years, the cost-
per-job paid by state and local governments in financial incentives rose 37 percent.72 
Not surprisingly, some existing businesses in the states did not respond well 
when they saw the overtures made to new businesses, and threatened to relocate in order 
to get a piece of the incentive action. Some communities began to feel they were being 
manipulated by local businesses. Sometimes even incoming companies did not deliver 
the number of jobs promised. In some cases, companies that were lured to one location 
were then lured again to different location, leaving behind unfinished buildings and 
bitter feelings. Adding insult to injury, some corporate officials admitted that the tax 
incentives were not the decisive factors in relocation; geography and workforce 
capabilities were more important. But the incentives were accepted anyway. 73  
State officials began to wise up after some promised relocations fell through 
altogether, even after considerable development incentives were offered. The former 
director of Nevada’s economic development office complained, “Any company that is 
more interested in tax breaks or subsidized financing than trained workers is very likely 
to move on again. It is not a good prospect upon which to build a stable economy.”74 
The cutthroat competition between states eventually prompted Congress to 
restrict how federal economic development funds could be used. For example, funds 
from the federal Small Business Administration, Economic Development Administration 
and Community Development Block Grant programs, among others, are not supposed to 
be used by one state or city to woo the relocation of a business in another state. Some 
states even agreed to self-police and reduce competition among themselves, but those 
efforts did not succeed for long. 75 
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The Move To Exports  
The fierce competition for foreign direct investment took its toll on local 
economies. Following a steep learning curve, state economic development agencies, 
with the assistance of the federal government, soon moved to a more demand-side, 
entrepreneurial approach of supporting local business’ capacity to export and find niches 
in foreign markets.76 Soon the race was on among subnational governments to support 
their local businesses in developing the capacity to export products into foreign markets.  
A 1978 U.S. DOC State Export Series reports: “From 1972-1976 most states at 
least doubled their manufacturing production, with these sales often increasing faster 
than general manufacturing production…almost 80 percent of the country’s new 
manufacturing employment between 1977-1980 was related to production for exports.”77  
U.S. exports more than doubled in value from 1975-1980, creating more than 1.5 
million new jobs and accounting for more than 80 percent of employment growth in the 
manufacturing sector. Approximately 5.5 million jobs in the mid-80s were the direct 
result of growth in exports, and likely twice that number was related indirectly to 
exports. U.S. DOC estimated in the early 1980s that each $1 billion of exports directly 
created 25,000 jobs.78 By 1984, it was estimated that one billion dollars of exports now 
created 40,000 jobs in the United States.79 
Peter Eisinger reports that the Congressional Budget Office reviewed state 
development initiatives in 1984, and found that “whereas during the 1970s most state 
involvement in foreign trade was concentrated on attracting foreign investment, over 
two-thirds of these expenditures are now on export promotion.” In 1976, 25 states spent 
a mere $3.3 million on foreign trade programs; whereas in 1984, 42 states spent $27.5 
million for export promotion. 80  
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Federal support for exports 
By now, all levels of U.S. government are more involved in economic matters 
than ever before. The U.S. federal government unquestionably supports the states’ 
capacity to support exports. Although several states began their overseas promotion 
efforts without significant federal help, several federal programs were created in the 
1970s, although their funding has fluctuated through the years. 
In 1973, District Export Councils (DEC) were created by Presidential Directive in 
order to encourage businesses to increase overall export activity. The U.S. Secretary of 
Commerce appoints DEC members. The Councils comprised representatives from 
universities, government, non-profit organizations, and manufacturers. DECs supported 
the trade initiatives passed by state legislatures. The Councils generally did not receive 
U.S. government aid, but their creation shows the U.S. federal government’s emphasis 
on increasing exports.81  
U.S. President Jimmy Carter openly encouraged states to increase exports. 
During his years as governor of Georgia, Carter had visited ten nations. In October 1978, 
now as President, he asked the National Governors’ Association to establish a new 
standing committee on International Trade and Foreign Relations.82 Carter’s secretary of 
state, Cyrus Vance, vigorously encouraged the states to help expand foreign trade as a 
means of helping the U.S. economy as a whole.83  
During the Reagan administration, the U.S. DOC was empowered to distribute 
funds to public or private actors assisting small businesses in search of export 
opportunities through the 1980 small Business Export Expansion Act. In 1982, Congress 
passed the Export Trading Company Act. An Export Trading Company is a middle-
management organization that will, for a fee, assist small businesses with exports, 
including research, purchasing, transport, and financing.84  
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In 1992, Congress passed the Export Enhancement Act, and in 1993, the 
administration of President Bill Clinton created the Trade Promotion Coordinating 
Committee, in the Department of Commerce, to develop the National Export Strategy. 
By 1997, the number of U.S. firms involved in exports stood at more than 112,000 and 
the dollar value of exports in 1996 was a record $849 billion. The number of jobs created 
by exports was estimated to be more than 11.5 million. 85 
At the federal level, the U.S. DOC’s U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service, part 
of the International Trade Administration of the U.S. DOC, offers assistance to states 
and cities in overseas trade missions. The Export-Import Bank also gives small business 
support and loans. National organizations of state agencies such as the National 
Association of State Development Agencies (NASDA), the National Governor’s 
Association, and the Council of State Governments also developed means to assist states 
in expanding foreign trade.86  
Given that both the federal and state levels work on commercial development, 
some have raised concerns about the duplication of programs. In 1995, the U.S. House 
of Representatives, under the leadership of Newt Gingrich (R-Georgia), proposed 
eliminating the U.S. Department of Commerce. The Senate approved the elimination as 
well, but President Bill Clinton vetoed the Department’s closure.87 
The federal government has at times imposed some restrictions on exports due to 
national security concerns, for example, sales of “dual-use” technology have been 
restricted to some countries, and during the 1990s, encryption technology development 
was hindered by the federal government, much to the chagrin of U.S. computer 
developers. 
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Opening Overseas Offices 
 Even before state economic development agences were a trend, some states were 
opening overseas offices for the purpose of wooing foreign direct investment and 
developing niche markets for local exports.  
The state of New York opened an office in Europe as early as 1954.88 In 1959, 
then-governor Luther Hodges of North Carolina took a delegation to Europe to 
encourage direct investment and also sought business opportunities with the Soviet 
Union. Gov. Hodges later served, fittingly enough, as the Secretary of Commerce in the 
Kennedy Administration. The state of Virginia took a bold step around this time and sent 
a state employee to Brussels, Belgium. Within the year, at least one Belgian company 
opened an office in Virginia.89 
At the federal level, the general level of interest in foreign markets was still so 
low that in 1969, the U.S. Department of Commerce had but one employee in charge of 
foreign direct investment.90 In 1970, only three states had opened foreign offices. But 
only twelve years later, in 1982, nearly forty states had sixty-six overseas offices, an 
indication of how rapidly states reorganized themselves to gain a position on the 
international economic scene.91  
By 1976, 42 states had established domestic offices for the purpose of attracting 
international trade, and 23 states had established trade offices overseas in one or more 
countries.”92 
It is difficult to pin down the numbers of overseas offices; many were not 
continuously open; some states opened offices only to close them later on as budgets or 
gubernatorial priorities changed. During the recession of 1981-82, some states 
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established legislative committees to examine the effectiveness of foreign trade 
initiatives, which likely resulted in the closing of some offices. 
Between 1981 and 1984, the number of states with overseas offices increased 
from 20 to 28, and the total number of foreign offices grew from 40 in 1981 to 66 in 
1982; then down to 55 in 1984. The annual budgets for these offices ranged from 
$94,000 to $901,000; the average staff was 2.4 employees; more than half the employees 
were foreign nationals. 
In 1984, the distribution of offices by country was: 
Western Europe 28 
Japan    17 
Canada               4 
Other Asian    2 
Mexico    2 
Brazil     1 
Africa     193 
 
By 1989, all fifty states had sponsored overseas trade missions.94 
Peter Eisinger sees a pattern in how overseas offices opened: the first offices, 
opened in the late 1960s, were in the capital cities of established European trading 
partners. Then states opened offices in Canada, Mexico, Brazil, and Japan. In the 1980s, 
states moved into Hong Kong, and Illinois opened the first state office in China. Ohio 
was the first to open an office in Africa, in Lagos, Nigeria.95 The story of the opening of 
the Texas Trade Office in Mexico City in 1971 will be told in the next chapter, on 
Texas’ international trade role. 
As near as can be discerned, it appears that the first overseas offices were opened 
at state expense, with little to no direct federal funding involved. It was not until 1980 
                                        
93 John Griffing, The Other Deficit: A Review of International Trade in California and the U.S. 
(Sacramento: Senate Office of Research, California Legislature, November 1984): 20. 
94 Information from the National Association of State Development Agencies cited in Blaine 
Liner, “States and Localities in the Global Marketplace,” Intergovernmental Perspective 16 
(Spring 1990):13. 
95 Eisinger, p. 292. 
 95
that the federal government reorganized to better support overseas trade; on 2 January 
1980, the export support division of the U.S. Department of State was transferred into 
the Department of Commerce, creating the International Trade Administration (ITA), “in 
response to highly-charged international trade competition.”96 
Again in the 1990s, some state legislatures began to question the value of their 
offices. Some states reformed their trade promotion efforts, decreased the budgets of 
state development offices and closed overseas offices, or began charging corporate 
clients for the assistance they were given. 97 Texas had opened overseas offices under 
Gov. Ann Richards; Governor George W. Bush closed all but one, leaving only the 
Mexico City office, continuously open since 1971.  As recently as August of 2003, 
California’s overseas trade offices were severely criticized for falling prey to political 
favoritism and a failure to deliver, and finally abolished amidst a severe state budget 
crisis.98  
 
 
The Role of Governors  
The role of the governor is increasingly cited as essential to trade promotion and 
development. Governors sought trade adjustment assistance for industries negatively 
affected by trade as early as the 1950s, bypassing the federal government and appealing 
directly to foreign investors.99  
John Kincaid writes, “Since the New Deal especially, governors have acquired 
considerable skill and experience as intergovernmental diplomats representing their 
states in negotiations with the federal government as well as other states. They have also 
developed greater abilities to act together to resolve problems cooperatively without 
Washington and to represent their common interests jointly.”100 
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When President Nixon initiated formal diplomatic relations with China in 1972, 
nearly half of the United States’ governors sought invitations to travel to China to 
establish potentially lucrative contacts in what appeared to be a vast untapped market for 
U.S. goods. Texas Lt. Gov Bill Hobby led the first Texas trade mission to China in 1979 
with a dozen oil industry representatives.101 
As states have become more active, organizations like the National Governors’ 
Association and the National Association of State Development Agencies have 
expanded to include assistance for promoting states overseas. The Western Governors’ 
Association, the Border Governors’ Conference, and other regional governing 
associations are also available to assist today’s governors and officials in promoting their 
states overseas. 
The National Governors Association (NGA) was formed in 1908 to help 
governors resolve a water dispute; today it acts as a forum in which governors may 
gather to discuss issues of common concern. The NGA also lobbies the federal 
government on behalf of the governors. The Border Governors Conference, discussed in 
Chapter Five of this dissertation, is a spin-off of the NGA. 102 
 
 
Federal vs. State Assistance for Small Business 
Despite constitutional grounds for limiting states to the domestic sphere, the U.S. 
federal government has consistently supported state- level international initiatives. In the 
1980s, an official from the newly-created International Trade Administration testified 
before Congress: “We at the Commerce Department recognize the important role the 
states play in the international trade arena. We also recognize that by joining forces with 
the states the export position of the United States can be strengthened.”103 Thus the U.S. 
federal government renders considerable assistance to states in their efforts abroad 
through officials stationed at U.S. embassies and consulates worldwide.  
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Although the federal government has supported the states’ efforts, the state-level 
viewpoint has been more effective for smaller businesses, argues Alan Posner. In a 1984 
guidebook for exporters, Posner wrote that the federal agencies responsible for export 
promotion – the U.S. DOC, the Small Business Administration, and the Export-Import 
Bank – “have very little to do with export promotion on behalf of small and medium 
firms.” He explains that most of the assistance given by these federal agencies goes to 
larger companies. Posner says U.S. DOC has been criticized for giving general 
information rather than specific guidance on how manufacturers can begin or increase 
exporting their goods, and the agency’s funds for domestic development were cut in the 
1980s, “part of the Reagan Administration’s design to have less Federal involvement in 
the domestic economy.”104  
Export regulations can be daunting for a small business to negotiate, and getting 
information about overseas opportunities and market conditions is expensive. Thus small 
and medium businesses are better off looking to their state development agencies for 
export assistance, Posner argues. States can give the personal attention that the federal 
agencies simply cannot give to a multitude of small actors across the nation. State 
officials often have helpful personal contacts that federal agencies cannot cultivate from 
the federal level. And state officials are able to give the specific information about 
regional services that meets a potential exporter’s immediate needs, according to 
Posner.105  
John Kincaid explains that the state apparatus for supporting local business 
developed because the federal government was not as responsive. “Owing to the 
inability of the federal government to respond adequately to the problems of particular 
states and local industries, businesses tended to turn to their governor’s office for 
assistance,” Kincaid writes.106  
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This difference in response might stem from the differing ways that state and 
federal officials viewed the domestic economic changes as they unfolded. Peter Eisinger 
explains,  
Officials in Washington, observing the deepening penetration of 
international forces in the American economy, seem to have focused 
principally on the unrelenting growth of the merchandise trade deficit. But 
state and local officials, ever alert for opportunities to exploit for 
economic development, appear to have adopted a more balanced view: 
although they have persistently worried about the loss of jobs to import 
competition, they have also seen in the growth of exports evidence of an 
expanding universe of markets for American producers and, in the 
expansion of foreign investment, a way to save domestic manufacturing 
jobs and industries.107 
 
Even so, the states have come around to the viewpoint that trade can be 
beneficial only through hard experience. Eisinger shares an anecdote from the 1985 
Southern Governors’ Association meeting that sums up the contradiction of the position 
U.S. states find themselves in a global economy. Eisinger tells, “In one session, the 
governors’ central concern was the devastation of the textile industry in their region 
under the onslaught of imports. In the next session, however, the theme of the meeting 
was ‘The South Going Global – The Internationalization of the South.’”108 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has told how global political and economic changes affected the 
U.S. economy, bringing international concerns to bear on the welfare of the U.S. states, 
and leading the states to begin developing relations directly with other nations.  
While the U.S. federal government regulates foreign and domestic commerce and 
sets U.S. trade and tariff policy, states have the legal authority to tax and spend in order 
to serve the public welfare. Both levels of government are under intense electoral 
pressure to keep voters employed, provide public services, and maintain a growing 
economy. Thus the states and the federal government share the goals of a thriving 
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economy, and the states are the most necessary means through which national economic 
goals are met. The openness of the U.S. federal system gives states the freedom to 
innovate their own policies, and the tendency of the states to compete against one 
another leads to the replication of mechanisms from state to state. 
It is the states and cities, not the federal government per se, that feel the direct 
impact of U.S. trade policy. Thus state and local officials were the first to recognize the 
need to develop new economic development strategies to keep local economies afloat. 
The strategies employed by the states – cultivating foreign direct investment, opening 
overseas offices, helping local businesses to increase exports – were state- level 
initiatives that spread across the nation as states competed against one another for 
position in the world economy. The federal government supported these mechanisms, 
but the states responded to local needs independently by initiating direct contact with 
foreign nations. 
Why did the involvement of states in international economics not cause conflict 
with the U.S. federal government or result in restriction? Because states have the legal 
authority to promote economic development, the question of the constitutionality of the 
states’ international economic role has not been a serious issue, largely because this role 
has been one of trade promotion.  
The states’ trade promotion activities have not caused intergovernmental conflict 
due to the common goals of economic development that both the federal government and 
subnational governments pursue. Therefore, rather than act to restrict the states, the 
federal government has supported an increased international role for states for the 
purposes of economic development. 
However, trade is one area which in the future may lead to increased 
intergovernmental conflict. While the states’ short-term goals of economic development 
do not conflict with federal policy goals, the federal government is considering future 
trade negotiations that may lead to intergovernmental conflict. Already the states have 
been asked to yield some areas of traditional regulatory authority, such as sanitary 
standards for the production and transportation of products, to an harmonious 
international standard. The pressure for a single standard from other nations and 
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multinational corporations will only increase. The ability of state and local governments 
to subsidize local businesses, or to award procurement contracts, could be forced to yield 
to a single standard for the purposes of harmonization of international standards and the 
removal of barriers to free trade. 
Thus in the future, the states and the federal government could find themselves in 
serious conflict over the conduct of international trade and how it will affect the states in 
ways that directly undermine the levels of sovereignty the states currently enjoy. 
Following the same timeline traced here, the next chapter looks at how changes 
in the global economy played out in the Texas case, leading the state to take several 
measures to support the interconnection of the Texan and Mexican economies, including 
opening a trade office in Mexico City in 1971 and promoting increased agricultural 
exchange in 1984, among several other developments.  
 101
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
TEXAS FORGES A PLACE IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 
  
 
 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter gives an historical overview of how the opening of the U.S. 
economy affected the U.S. states in general, and the several strategies the states 
employed to adjust to changing economic conditions at home. This chapter looks more 
closely at one state’s response. The central focus of this chapter is on Texas’ trade 
relations with Mexico, but those developments are a part of the larger story of how 
Texas established a place for itself in the global economy.  
By looking closely at this one case, we can gain a greater understanding of the 
specific ways one state responded to changes in domestic policy by adopting new 
strategies to compete against other states.  
This case shows how one state realized how its interests were affected by 
developments in the world economy, and, in competition against other states, Texas used 
its autonomy to innovate and adopt economic development policies that were in 
harmony with federal economic policy goals. 
Looking closely at this one specific case also brings some other influences to 
light, such as the role played by the state’s private sector, how interpersonal relationships 
facilitate the establishment of international intergovernmental relations, and the differing 
nature of international relationships formed by state officials and federal lawmakers. As 
James Rosenau might explain it, state officials have less responsibility for national 
security and therefore can put a priority on economic goals, enabling state officials to act 
in the international arena where federal officials might be restrained.1 
In this case, the federal government did not move to restrict the state, rather, the 
change in foreign policy focus at the federal level, moving from a focus on military 
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power to embrace commercial relations as a strategy for maintaining the United States’ 
hegemonic position, gave the state opportunities to expand its international economic 
activities. At arguably one of the most intense periods of the Cold War, at that point just 
before the Cuban Missile Crisis and escalation of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, U.S. 
states were already stepping into the world scene through trade relations, in order to 
meet their economic development goals. The change in strategic focus at the federal 
level to emphasize trade then draws the states in to play a greater role in U.S. foreign 
relations. 
But even while the state and federal levels goals of increased trade and national 
security strategy coincide, the Texas-Mexico case reveals that Texas officials were able 
to form productive relations with Mexican officials even during times of tension 
between Washington and Mexico City, because of the differing levels of foreign policy 
responsibility between the two levels of government. Texas, acting within its jurisdiction 
to meet its domestic economic development needs, does not carry responsibility for 
national security and therefore is able to reach out the Mexico in a different way from 
the federal government, albeit still with the common goal of meeting national economic 
goals. 
This chapter is a timeline of sorts: the first section unfolds a growing awareness 
that the Texas economy is affected by international developments. Texas’ first 
institutionalized response was to open its Trade Office in Mexico City in 1971. The next 
section does not include a direct venue, but tells how the state-level officials and 
representatives from the oil business played a vital role in the federal national security 
strategy of warmer U.S. relations with China. The next section details Texas’ experience 
with foreign direct investment. The next institutional venue is the Texas-Mexico 
Exchange Commission to facilitate relations between Texas and Mexican agricultural 
sector. Next follows a series of steps toward U.S.-Mexican commercial integration, 
supported at the state and local level, which eventually leads to the negotiation of 
NAFTA by the U.S. and Mexican federal government.  
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TEXAS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY, 1960-1970S 
In 1961, the nation of France sent a trade commissioner to Texas – but by this 
time, France already had six trade offices in the States: in Washington, D.C., New York, 
Chicago, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and New Orleans. The opening of the Texas 
office recognized “the increasing importance of Texas, and Dallas in particular, in the 
American economy,” French officials said. The commissioner, who planned to office in 
both Houston and Dallas, was to promote exports and investments both to and from 
France and Texas and expedite business contacts. French officials said at the time that 
eight to ten percent of France’s exports to the United States went to Texas, and that five 
to eight percent of U.S. exports to France came from Texas.2 
In Texas, there was a growing consciousness that developments in the 
international economy mattered to the Texas economy. The European Economic 
Community (EEC) was initially formed in 1952 to allow allies to trade coal, iron, and 
steel, those products vital for European defenses. In 1962, an oil pipeline, at the time 
called one of the world’s largest, was built to carry Middle Eastern and North African oil 
to the first six nations to form the EC – West Germany, France, Italy, Holland, Belgium, 
and Luxembourg. Oil consumption in Europe was on the rise, as consumers changed 
from coal to fuel oil, and the number of automobiles on European streets increased. The 
predicted effect of this political action halfway around the world was a reduction in 
market share for Texas oil.3 
The formation of the European trading bloc inspired a sense of urgency among 
Texas business. A report published by the University of Texas Business Review 
cautioned that a “failure to keep Texas-made products competitive in price and quality 
would result in declining sales along with unemployment and reduced profits for the 
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state’s industries,” particularly agriculture, the report said. “With the huge year-to-year 
gains being made in agricultural productivity, it is imperative that the European market 
for U.S. farm products is held and even expanded.” The report urged Texans to welcome 
the challenge of the European Economic Community by adapting to the changes rather 
than building “a tariff wall around ourselves.”4 
The Dallas Morning News printed another story about the European Community 
in 1962, this one about how the EEC had responded to an increase in U.S. tariffs on 
European-made carpets and other products by raising tariffs on U.S.-made chemical 
products. The article questioned whether or not Texas chemical manufacturers would be 
affected by the EEC’s tariff action – proof that even as early as 1962, the connection was 
being made between international economics and state- level interests.5 
Former Gov. John Connally was reportedly the first Texas governor to support 
state efforts to promote international trade. Gov. Connally initiated Texas’ first overseas 
trade mission in 1968, to Australia.6 
The consumption of Texas products worldwide translated into a healthy trade 
relationship with Japan. Trade in cotton between Texas and Japan was well-established, 
dating back to 1886. In 1972, Texas had exported more than $142 million worth of food 
and livestock. The Japanese were apparently quite fond of Texas grapefruit, which they 
referred to as “pinkies.”7 
But as other states began to open overseas trade offices, Texas officials were 
eager to jump into the race for foreign market share. Texas was in a natural position to 
cultivate a relationship with its next-door neighbor, Mexico, although for a long time, 
many businesses were too intimidated to venture there. 
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VENUE ONE: THE TEXAS TRADE OFFICE IN MEXICO CITY 
   
The Texas Trade Office had an auspicious debut on 1 October 1971. On hand for 
the opening were a number of Mexican officials, including the extant president, Luis 
Echeverría.8 Also attending were past Mexican president Miguel Aleman9, acting 
Minister of Foreign Relations Ruben Gonzalez Sosa, and Jose Campillo Sainz, 
undersecretary of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce.10 
The Trade Office was a part of the Texas economic development agency, at the 
time known as the Texas Industrial Commission (TIC).11 According to two TIC staff 
members at the time, Texas governor Preston Smith and Mexican president Luis 
Echeverría became good friends, most likely by virtue of being in office at the same 
time.12 They had a mutual respect for one another, even though the two were very 
differently politically: Gov. Smith, a conservative Texas Democrat, and Pres. 
Echeverría, a Mexican nationalist and leftist. Gov. Smith had allowed a Mexican trade 
office to open in Dallas in 1970, and in seems that in return, Echeverría endorsed the 
Texas office in Mexico City.  
Competing against other states for position in the world economy was a 
motivating factor for Texas to open the Mexico office, according to Jim Harwell, who 
was executive director of the TIC from 1968-1978. At the time, he remembered, “we had 
this quasi-mandate from the (Texas) Legislature to promote international business.”  
The TIC board’s minutes from 1967-1971 show that increasing international trade 
was a significant part of TIC’s mission. In 1967, board and staff members discussed how 
Texas was competing with “the far East,” also called “the Orient,” for industrial 
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development.13 A competitive awareness of other U.S. states’ international efforts is also 
evident: at a 1969 meeting, commissioners spoke with envy of the multi-media 
presentation the Denver Chamber of Commerce would make to foreign visitors to attract 
international business opportunities to the Denver area.14  
Domestic and overseas trade shows were also part of the Commission’s activities. 
During the 1968 World’s Fair – Hemisfair – in San Antonio, TIC helped sponsor an 
international trade center, financed by contributions from members of the Texas 
International Trade Association and featuring a staff fluent in 10 languages. Other trade 
missions are mentioned in the commission’s minutes: to Osaka, Japan (“the Orient”); to 
Australia; and two to the Soviet Union, sponsored by the U.S. Department of Commerce, 
but featuring only Texas oilfield equipment manufacturers. Texas at the time was not 
shy in claiming to be “the center of the petrochemical industry in the US.” At this time, 
U.S. Department of Commerce (U.S. DOC) sponsored overseas trade missions that were 
categorized as “horizontal” –– featuring many types of products –– or “vertical” –– 
featuring one type of industry, such as oilfield equipment. Businesses from any state 
could participate in these kinds of missions. But Texas was the first state to sponsor its 
own, single-state overseas trade missions.15 Texas’ two missions to the Soviet Union 
took place “before Nixon was there and announced détente,” explained Mr. Harwell.16 
So when other states, such as Georgia and New York, opened overseas offices, – 
“Hell, Arkansas had one!” Harwell recalls – but no state had a Mexican office, Harwell 
felt Texas had a unique opportunity. 17 
Before the trade office opened, at least one trade mission to Mexico was led by the 
Texas Secretary of State (part of the Texas Governor’s office) and accompanied by 50 
businessmen. Also the TIC export director, Col. Jim Havey, took a “market survey” in 
Mexico during the summer of 1970. Havey reported to the TIC board that on this trip, a 
Mexican buyer was persuaded to change a $3,000,000 order from a Canadian supplier to 
a “Texas concern.” The product was likely telephone poles, which were transported from 
                                        
13 Texas Industrial Commission minutes, 14 December 1967. 
14 TIC minutes, 23 October 1969. 
15 Interview with Col. James Harris, Austin, TX, 16 November 1998. 
16 Jim Harwell interview, 28 November 1998. 
17 Harwell interview, Wimberley, Texas, 28 November 1998. 
 107
Houston to Mexico on Texas trucks that were also bought by Mexicans. A bus took 
Mexican truck drivers from the border to Houston and the Mexicans then drove the 
trucks, loaded with telephone poles, to their new owners in Mexico. The Texas 
Department of Public Safety arranged for the drivers’ crossing into Texas and designated 
their routes.18  
The Texas Legislature authorized the trade office in 1970. For the fiscal year in 
which the office opened, (from September of 1971 to the end of August 1972), the 
Legislature allocated $150,000 from the General Revenue Fund for “international trade 
projects including but not limited to foreign trade missions, overseas offices, reverse 
investment missions…travel consumable supplies and materials…planning grants and 
all other activities for which no other provisions are made.” The agency estimated it 
would receive $200,000 in federal funds but there are no details on how those were used 
or if they were used for the office.19 
Given the state was venturing into uncharted territory, state officials had to take 
steps to ensure that the state could act legally in another nation. A few months before the 
office opened, the TIC director for international trade, James Havey, wrote to the Texas 
Attorney General to ask whether the state could legally pay for the services of an 
employee working and residing in Mexico.  
Unforeseen complications still arose. Shortly before the office opened, Mr. 
Harwell wrote the state AG to ask that the Mexico Office be allowed to buy stamps from 
the Mexican post office, because “Mexico requires that all correspondence utilizing its 
mail system, and originating in Mexico, must have Mexican postage stamps affixed to 
such pieces of mail.” At that time, state law allowed for purchases of stamps only from 
U.S. post offices.20 
It seems there was a tacit agreement on the part of Texas and Mexican officials 
that no other U.S. state would be allowed to open a Mexico office.21 Texas had the only 
office there for eighteen years. Mr. Harwell says the director of an industrial 
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development office in Arizona tried to open a Mexico office in 1973 or 1974. The 
Mexicans refused the offer. The Arizonan called Harwell and asked with obvious 
frustration, “How did you do that, get to open an office there?”22 A California trade 
office had been proposed but the story is that a California office lacked the support of 
the Mexican federal government. California did open a Mexico City trade office, but not 
until 1989, followed by Illinois six months later.23  
The function of the Texas office was to arrange meetings between Texan and 
Mexican business representatives. The Texas businesses were looking for buyers for 
their products, opportunities to invest in Mexico, or to lure Mexican manufacturers to 
establish a plant in Texas.  
According to Mr. Harwell, the presence of the Trade Office encouraged Texas 
businessmen to make contact with Mexico that would not have otherwise occurred 
because of how suspicions U.S. business was of Mexico. The expropriation of U.S. 
oilfield equipment and leases by Mexican President Lázaro Cárdenas in 1938 had soured 
many U.S. businesses on venturing into Mexico. Some of those who did would come 
back with “horror stories,” said Mr. Harwell. “Learning how to do business in Mexico 
was the only difficulty. Someone would buy something and then suddenly it wasn’t his. 
Or he sent stuff down and it was confiscated by (Mexican) Customs and he couldn’t get 
his stuff back, and couldn’t get any authorization, couldn’t file insurance, you were just 
swallowed up down there if you didn’t go through the right channels.”  
Then the U.S. Congress passed a law prohibiting U.S. companies from bribing 
foreign companies. “That was a hell of a thing, it was a bind for American companies 
how to figure out how to do business over there if you can’t do it in the normal way,” 
said Mr. Harwell. But the effect of the law was that U.S. businesspeople had to rely on 
the Texas Industrial Commission to help “do business above board,” Mr. Harwell 
explained.24   
 
                                        
22 Harwell interview, 28 November 1998. 
23 Electronic communication with Cesar Bueno, Trade and Investment Specialist, State of Texas-
Mexico Office, 9 November 2000. 
24 Harwell interview, 28 November 1998. 
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State/Federal/International Issues 
The U.S.–Mexico axis (international causes): what were the international political 
and economic conditions that contributed to or prevented the state’s effort to reach 
across the Rio Grande? 
Relations between the United States and Mexico can be characterized at this time 
as both tense and neglected. Mexico did not figure prominently on the Nixon 
administration’s limited Latin American agenda. Vice-President Nelson Rockefeller’s 
visit through the region had led him to conclude there was a strong potential for Marxist, 
Castroite, and Communist influence throughout Latin America, including Mexico. The 
new U.S. policy of cooperation with Latin American dictators necessitated ignoring 
significant human costs, frustrating many segments of Latin American and Mexican 
society. U.S. Pres. Richard Nixon’s support of dictators and possible instigation of the 
overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile did not make him a popular man in Mexico.25 
There are disagreements over U.S. federal trade policy and drug trafficking during 
this time. The Nixon administration responded favorably to Mexico by rescinding a 10 
percent import surcharge but refused to open the market to Mexican tomatoes. A 
disruptive anti-drug operation was replaced by a new tactic of supposedly mutual 
cooperation, but U.S.-Mexico relations over drugs have been marked by distrust and 
tension since then. 
Mexico’s creation of the border tariff- free zone in 1966 is of huge significance. 
This marks the beginning of the maquiladora industry. A maquiladora is a corporation 
allowed to temporarily import raw materials and equipment duty-free. The raw materials 
are assembled in Mexico and re-exported to the United States or elsewhere. Under 
current Mexican law, foreigners can own 100 percent of a maquiladora. Labor costs are 
very low and transportation back to the United States inexpensive and quick.  
                                        
25 Peter H. Smith writes: “In retrospect, it appears the overthrow of Allende was due more to the 
escalation of political and social conflict within Chile than to the efforts of the United States. It is 
undeniably true, however, that the United States was making strenuous efforts to undermine and 
overthrow the Allende regime.” Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American 
Relations (New York: Oxford, 2000): 177. 
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Given Mexican Pres. Luis Echeverría’s preference for a closed economy, the 
creation of the tax-free zone seems incongruous. Nevertheless, the maquiladora industry 
stands as the most significant intertwining of the U.S. and Mexican economies.  
In short, neither Mexico’s violent internal struggles, Echeverría’s protectionism, 
nor the Nixon administration’s support of dictatorships and neglect of Mexico seemed to 
limit Texas’ pursuit of the Trade Office. This indicates that the U.S. government sees all 
levels of government as appropriately involved in meeting federal goals to increase 
exports. Acting within its authority, in conjunction with federal goals and in competition 
with other states, Texas shows initiative in venturing into Mexico, the first U.S. state to 
do so.  
Despite high levels of concern on the part of the United States about Mexico’s 
susceptibility to communist influence, Texas is not prevented from institutionalizing 
trade relations with Mexico by opening the Trade Office in Mexico City.  
 
The Texas-U.S. axis (national causes): was the problem Texas sought to address 
under state or federal jurisdiction? What was the corresponding federal response: did the 
federal government support the mechanism, ignore it, or move to restrict the 
mechanism? 
Adjusting to a changing domestic economy by reaching across national borders is 
arguably within the state’s jurisdiction. There is no indication the state of Texas sought – 
nor needed –federal permission to open its Mexico City office, given that Texas has the 
authority to pursue its own economic development goals. But it is clear federal 
authorities knew of and approved of the opening of the office.  
By all accounts, the relationship between Texas Industrial Commission and U.S. 
Department of Commerce officials was completely amicable, even symbiotic. The trade 
office in Mexico City was right next door to the U.S. embassy, which included the office 
of the federal agency’s commercial attaché. Although publicly, Department of 
Commerce officials claimed Texas would receive no special treatment over any other 
state pursuing trade opportunities in Mexico, covertly there was some advantage to being 
next door to the attaché. Federal officials would assist Texas Trade Office personnel in 
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making appointments and in publicizing upcoming missions, including printing the 
occasional trade fair brochure. According to former state officials, USDOC did not fund 
any TIC activities, except for the occasional brochure. 
Interestingly enough, even if U.S. DOC sponsored a trade mission, it was always 
billed as a Texas trade mission with no mention of the federal agency’s sponsorship. 
Thus Texas received the credit for the trade mission. In turn, the Industrial Commission 
required any trade mission participants to report any sales or projected sales made while 
on a trade mission, and would share this information with the Department of Commerce. 
Thus U.S. DOC would get the overseas sales figures it often had difficulty in obtaining, 
because competitive businessmen tended to keep that information secret. These figures 
were also included in TIC’s reports to the Texas Legislature.  
 
The Texas-Mexico axis (state causes): How was the venue created? Did Texas’ 
interest in and method of contact with Mexico differ from the U.S. government’s 
relations with Mexico?  
U.S. federal government policy at the time encouraged increasing exports and 
foreign direct investment and the U.S. federal system allows states the freedom to pursue 
these goals. U.S. states then found themselves competing against one another for 
overseas opportunities. Mexico was the most logical venue for the Texas Industrial 
Commission to pursue to fulfill the national goal of economic development and to be the 
first state to establish a presence in Mexico.  
Personal relations between Gov. Smith of Texas and Pres. Echeverría of Mexico 
opened doors to international trade that would have remained closed otherwise. 
Echeverría’s acceptance of the trade office could have been a statement that he saw a 
place for U.S. involvement in the Mexican economy, and yet other states were unable to 
do so. This indicates the personal relationships between the two leaders mattered.  
The TIC manager who ran the Mexico City office was also on exceedingly good 
terms with the Mexican president’s office. Col. Benoid Glawe had been the air attaché to 
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the U.S. embassy for six years prior to his appointment as manager of the office, and 
served as manager during three Mexican presidential administrations.26  
The Texas and U.S. governments shared goals of economic development, so the 
interest was mutual. But relations between Texas and Mexico were far warmer than 
relations between Mexico and the United States. The lack of public support for Mexico 
from the Nixon administration could certainly have made Echeverría more receptive to a 
friendly Texas governor, and given Mexico an opportunity to interact with a U.S. 
capitalist who did not also carry the baggage of anti-communist ideology. This case 
indicates that sometimes states are able to accomplish lower-security goals, because 
states carry less responsibility for enforcing U.S. national security goals.  
 
 
 
CITIES AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
As the state is opening its first foreign trade office, hoping to gain an edge over 
other U.S. states, Texas cities were already working on trade promotion as well. In 1973, 
the Dallas Chamber of Commerce sponsored three trips in which state officials 
participated. Then-Governor Dolph Briscoe went to Tokyo, a group of businesspeople 
went to Osaka, Japan; and Lt. Gov Bill Hobby accompanied 27 businesspeople to 
Stuttgart, Germany to improve trade relations, seek real estate capital, and attract a 
proposed Volkswagen plant to Texas.27 
The Texas Legislature also got involved. In 1976, a subcommittee of the House 
Committee on Business and Industry held hearings in the border city of Laredo, Texas, 
“to evaluate the status of international trade in Texas” and to determine “the means 
which might be used to assist Texas industry and commerce to more fully utilize the 
international trade opportunities available within the state,” particularly how trade could 
be developed through Texas land and sea ports. The subcommittee invited others to the 
                                        
26 Harwell interview, 28 November 1998. 
27 Jim Burnett, “Texas Traders Head for Stuttgart,” The Dallas Morning News, 24 November 
1973.   
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meeting, including Laredo customshouse brokers, bankers, truckers, and others involved 
in the movement of goods.28 
By now, Texas politicians were spreading the word that foreign trade mattered to 
the state’s economy. In 1977, House Speaker Billy Clayton told an audience of farmers, 
“An open door to trade with the rest of the world is a necessity for Texas.” In 1976, 
more than $1.5 billion worth of Texas-produced farm goods were exported overseas; that 
figure represented seven percent of total U.S. farm exports.29  
The state Legislature held hearings in September of 1977 to study whether or not 
foreign trade zones would benefit the state.30 The development of foreign trade zones in 
Texas cities is one indicator that the U.S. federal government supported the entry of 
subnational governments into international trade. The U.S. Congress had passed the 
Foreign Trade Zones Act in 1934. The Act defined a foreign trade zone as an “isolated, 
enclosed, policed area, operated as a public utility…in or adjacent to a port of entry, and 
furnished with facilities for handling, storing, manufacturing, exhibiting, and shipping 
goods.”31 Cities were required by federal law to get the state’s permission before 
applying to the federal government for a grant to designate a part of the city, often an 
airport, as a foreign trade zone, where foreign companies could show manufactured 
goods and raw materials at trade fairs or open permanent offices without paying 
federally- imposed tariffs or posting bonds. The purchasing company, upon delivery in 
Texas or the United States, would pay duties.32 
Businesses that operate in a foreign trade zone save money if the tariff rate drops 
while imported goods are stored in the zone. Even if the import of a product is restricted 
by import quotas, the product can still be stored in the zone, awaiting a new quota period 
to open. Raw materials can be brought into the zone and processed into a different 
product with a lower tariff rate. It was believed that cities with foreign trade zones would 
                                        
28 “Trade Hearing Due in Laredo,” The San Antonio Light, 28 July 1976.  
29 Editorial, “Texans Need an Open Door,” The Dallas Morning News, 29 June 1977. 
30 Dick Merkel, “Legislators Planning Trade Fair hearings,” The San Antonio Express, 8 
September 1977. 
31 Sharon Donovan, “Port Study Geared to Determine if a Foreign Trade Zone Will Float,” The 
Houston Chronicle, 3 March 1981.  
32 “Bill Makes Trade Center of S.A., Backers Say,” The San Antonio Express, 4 March 1977; 
Dick Merkel, “S.A. Duty-free Zone Gets Nod,” The San Antonio Express, 29 April 1977.  
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attract new industries.33 One study estimated that if the city of El Paso developed a 
foreign trade zone at the airport, the city would create 6,000 jobs and gain $322 million a 
year.34 
The process was this: a city would request permission of the state to apply for 
and receive the federal funds necessary to create a trade zone. The Texas Legislature 
would pass authorizing legislation; once done, federal approval was likely, albeit time-
consuming: it took about 18 months of effort before the Dallas-Ft.Worth Regional 
Airport successfully completed the application. 35 The U.S. DOC announced approval of 
the zone, and cities received some development funding from the Economic 
Development Administration of the federal government.36  
By April of 1977, there were 19 foreign trade zones in the United States, five of 
those in Texas. Three were along the border, (Harlingen, Laredo, and McAllen) and two 
in the interior in major cattle centers (San Angelo and Amarillo).37 
El Paso and San Antonio were granted state permission to apply for foreign-trade 
zone status in April of 1977.38 El Paso got permission in April 1980; San Antonio finally 
received its designation in 1982. Texas Gov. Bill Clements and San Antonio Mayor 
Henry Cisneros announced the zone at a San Antonio luncheon celebrating Mexican 
Independence Day, Diez y Seis de Septiembre.39 Mayor Cisneros said the trade zone was 
“a very positive direction in our relations with Mexico, a new wedge, a new tool on that 
front.” Gov. Clements said he hoped the zone would strengthen the relationship between 
Mexico and the United States. “The United States has no friend or ally more important 
than Mexico,” the governor said.40 
                                        
33 “Foreign Trade Zone Offers Pluses,” The El Paso Times, 31 July 1977.  
34 Jerry Large, “Trade Zone Could Mean $322 Million,” The El Paso Times, 27 August 1978. 
35 Bill Choyke, “Good News Expected on Trade Zone,” The Ft. Worth Star-Telegram, 17 August 
1978.  
36 Editorial, “Texans Need an Open Door,” The Dallas Morning News, 29 June 1977. 
37 Michael Wallis, “Island foreign zone bill OK’d,” The Beaumont Enterprise Journal, 8 April 
1977 
38 Ibid. 
39 James McCrory and Jim Wood, “Clements Makes S.A. Trade Zone Official,” The San Antonio 
Express-News, 17 September 1982.  
40 Jeff Davis, “Trade Zone Revealed at Diez y Seis Lunch,” The San Antonio News, 17 
September 1982.  
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U.S. OPENING TO CHINA: THE COINCIDENCE OF FEDERAL SECURITY 
AND STATE COMMERCIAL GOALS 
The previous chapter told how the federal government’s national security goals 
resulted in increasing imports from European allies in order to retain them within the 
U.S. sphere of influence, to the detriment of certain sectors of the U.S. economy. But the 
federal government’s use of trade as a national security tool arguably reached its zenith 
when the United States established relations with the People’s Republic of China.  
The U.S. opening to China created a new global security configuration. In 
February of 1972, U.S. President Richard Nixon began to restore diplomatic relations 
with China, in a well-recognized bid to prevent a closer relationship from developing 
between communist China and the United States’ main adversary, the Soviet Union. On 
15 December 1978, the administration of President Jimmy Carter and the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) issued a joint communiqué announcing that the United States 
would change its formal diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China, effective 1 
January 1979.    
Certainly, in keeping with the concept that state involvement in international 
relations was unnecessary, inappropriate, and even dangerous, one would not expect to 
see a subnational government presence in China at any time. Yet, even before diplomatic 
relations were fully restored, Texas business was courting opportunities with China with 
the state government’s assistance and support – and with the encouragement of the U.S. 
federal government.  
Just as the change in recognition was announced, China made public its intent to 
aggressively develop its energy sector and its need for advanced technology. That same 
week, U.S-based LTV Corp sold $40 million in drilling rigs to China. Beijing had 
already purchased two drilling rigs from National Supply Co., a division of Amoco Steel 
in Houston, for $30 million, for use off the Chinese coast; China lacked the technology 
to explore this petroleum-rich area. In 1978, Coastal States Gas Company was the first 
U.S. company to agree to buy Chinese oil; Coastal planned to import 3.6 million barrels 
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of high-grade, low-sulfur crude for $50 million. Processing the Chinese oil was expected 
to create business for other U.S. firms involved in oil processing.41 
U.S. oil executives – mostly Texans – were invited to China shortly after 
President Nixon’s visit. There the capitalists found communist officials in need of oil 
technology, but in possession of a sense of humor. As the story goes, a senior Beijing 
official was explaining that Chinese crews had been directed to drill very deeply to find 
oil. But he quickly promised that technicians would “refrain from drilling too deep, so as 
not to drill through into” the United States.42 
Apparently reassured by this promise, U.S. business was more than willing to 
help China improve its drilling technology. At the time, the most realistic estimate of the 
amount of oil under Chinese soil was 50 billion barrels, more than the proven deposits 
under U.S. soil.  
The year 1977 was a busy one for transit between Texas and China. In 
September, at least eight oil companies from Houston and Dallas sent representatives to 
China to tour Chinese oil facilities. The next month, sixteen Chinese oil experts visited 
Texas to tour U.S. energy facilities. Future president George H.W. Bush, then only “the 
former liaison chief in Peking (who) was himself a Texas oilman (who) has traveled 
several times to China with other Texas equipment executives on trade missions” held a 
reception for the Chinese.43 
Before the opening of diplomatic relations, China had to make all purchases in 
cash. But the new status opened the door to lines of credit, increasingly open trade, the 
entrée of U.S. private investment into China, and the possibility of Export-Import Bank 
funds and other forms of U.S. government aid, as well as future formal trade agreements.  
After the change was announced, the U.S. Energy Secretary James Schlesinger 
said that diplomatic recognition would be good for business: “The companies will 
perceive the political risks are lower, that greater confidence can be placed in financial 
                                        
41 Bob Dudney, “Chinese Rounding Up Texas Oil Technology,” The Dallas Times-Herald , 24 
December 1978. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Dudney.  
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arrangements, and, as a consequence, one of the barriers to investment will be 
reduced.”44  
At this point, the involvement of subnational government in exports had the full 
support of the federal government. A Carter administration official, former Florida 
Speaker of the House Richard Pettigrew, told State Legislatures Magazine that the “new 
challenge we face nationally and in each state” is to increase exports and strengthen 
trade policy. “It is a new national priority. The reason is, that we are beginning to 
understand that our future is very much tied to how well we can improve our 
competitiveness abroad in moving out our goods.”45 
In January of 1979, Chinese Vice Premier Teng Tsiao-ping visited the United 
States, including a swing through Texas. Reflecting their differing policy 
responsibilities, state and federal officials responded differently to Premier Teng’s visit. 
During his time in Washington, Texas’ two U.S. Senators attended a Capitol Hill 
luncheon in the vice premier’s honor. But, citing previous commitments, neither traveled 
with the communist leader from Washington to Texas, despite a request by the White 
House that they do so. Republican Sen. John Tower and Democrat Lloyd Bentsen’s 
refusals were seen as expressions of disapproval of President Jimmy Carter’s China 
policy, although Sen. Bentsen had supported the normalization of relations.  
Linking trade and national security was not wholeheartedly endorsed by 
Republican Sen. Tower. After the luncheon, Sen. Tower acknowledged that a China-
U.S. alliance was “prudent,” given their shared threat posed by the Soviet Union. But he 
was critical of the Carter administration’s conduct of foreign affairs, and cautioned 
against expecting too much benefit from trade with China, at the risk of eroding U.S. 
power. “The administration must demonstrate far more diplomatic cunning and political 
acumen than it has to date, lest its continuing ineptitude in the conduct of foreign 
relations places this country in an inferior position,” Sen. Tower said after the luncheon. 
“We must remember that the PRC is a long way from the economic capability or 
                                        
44 Ibid. 
45 Bo Byers, “Efforts Being Made to Hike Texas Exports,” The Houston Chronicle, 23 December 
1979.  
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consumer and industrial readiness to absorb any great influx of American products and 
services.”46 
While the Texas delegation to Congress was fairly cool towards the Chinese 
officials, state officials were quite welcoming.  Texas Gov. Clements had opposed the 
change in diplomatic recognition, but when Teng arrived in Texas, Gov. Clements was 
at a Houston reception arranged by the U.S. Department of State for Teng and his 225-
member entourage. “Whether we agree with him or not…whether we like chop suey or 
not, we intend to treat him as a guest,” Gov. Clements said in response to news that the 
Conservative Caucus in Houston would protest the Chinese leader’s visit. Gov. Clements 
explained that the development of China’s petroleum reserves would be mutually 
beneficial to China and Texas. “(The Chinese) would have to buy from us the kind of 
equipment they need.” Clements added that contracts to sell drilling equipment to 
Mexico were also in the works.47 
Gov. Clements’ oil services company, SEDCO, was one of the companies 
negotiating with China over the sale of semi-submersible offshore drilling platforms, 
which sold for up to $60 million. 48  
Gov. Clements, of course, was not officially involved in SEDCO’s daily business 
dealings while governor. All the same, the close relationship between Texas politics and 
the oil industry is reflected by the trade mission taken by Texas Lt. Governor William P. 
Hobby later in 1979 with a dozen oil industry reps. Hobby said that “we are optimistic 
that this first Texas-China Trade Mission will result in increased economic exchange 
between the new Chinese market and Texas suppliers.”49 The international development 
department of the Texas Industrial Commission coordinated the mission. Gov. Clements 
had considered heading the mission but had gone to Eastern Europe on a three-weeks-
long agricultural trade mission instead, possibly to avoid an impression of a conflict of 
                                        
46 “Texans’ views Mixed After Meeting Teng,” The Houston Chronicle, 31 January 1979.  
47 Patrick Martinets, “Clements ofers no sympathy for Teng-visit Protesters,” The Fort Worth 
Star-Telegram, 30 January 1979.  
48 Dudney, “Chinese Rounding Up Texas Technology.”  
49 “Hobby, Oilmen Join in China Trade Talks,” The Dallas Times-Herald , 20 September 1979. 
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interest due to SEDCO’s negotiations with China.50 Thus in September of 1979, Texas 
state officials were leading trade missions into the United States’ two largest communist 
security threats, with the knowledge and support of the federal government.  
What does this tell us about the relationship between security and trade? At the 
time, the analysis of economics and security were still largely treated as distinct in 
International Relations theory, and were often referred to as “high” vs. “low” politics, 
with trade being designated as of lesser importance to national security. But in practice 
trade is now a tool of national security strategy, and because states are necessarily 
responsible for economic development, states are now venturing into the arena of 
international commerce and thereby are involved in national security strategy, despite 
the conceptual and legal limits on state involvement in foreign affairs prevalent at the 
time. 
Indeed, the federal government had already opened the door for U.S. business to 
increase trade with communist nations. The Bureau of East-West Trade opened as part 
of the 1969 Export Administration Act, to promote trade in non-strategic, peaceful 
commodities between the United States and the centrally-planned economies of the 
Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. By 1975, two-way trade between 
these entities stood at more than $3.2 billion. 51 
But at times, the subnational officials’ eagerness to expand trade overseas 
clashed with federal practices, such as national security restrictions on some exports and 
the need for federal licenses for some exports. In March of 1979, Gov. Clements and 
Georgia Gov. George Busbee, representing the National Governors Association, 
appeared before the U.S. Senate Banking Committee to complain about the difficulties 
that business had in trying to obtain the export licenses necessary to sell their products or 
technology overseas. Gov. Clements said businesspeople seeking export licenses faced 
an obstacle course of overlapping jurisdictions and incompetent, uncaring bureaucrats. 
As Gov. Clements was wont to do, he offered his own plan to fix the problem, 
                                        
50 Saralee Tiede, “Hobby Sees Huge Oil Benefits With China,” The Dallas Times-Herald , 10 
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51 From Lighthouses to Laserbeams: A History of the U.S. Department of Commerce, 
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suggesting that only the departments of State, Defense, and Commerce have jurisdiction 
over export licenses, with a final appeal to the president available. “Continuation of the 
cycle of increased licensing constraints on exports, criticism of their ineffectiveness and 
congressional reaffirmation of increased restraint must come to an end if our nation is to 
remain a respected power in world trade,” Gov. Clements told the committee.52 
 
TEXAS’ INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIES  
 Increasing Exports 
In 1977, Texas ranked sixth in the nation in export dollar volume with $5.2 
billion in exports, behind California, Michigan, Illinois, Ohio, and New York.53 
By April of 1979, Texas still ranked sixth out of all U.S. states in export dollar 
volume, a position that accounted for nearly 97,000 jobs and about $5.2 billion worth of 
exports. From 1972 to 1976, eight percent of Texas’ economic growth was attributable 
to its exports. In 1976, Texas sea and airports sent $8.9 billion worth of goods to foreign 
markets, in the form of cotton, chemicals, non-electric machinery, transportation 
equipment, and feed grains. Nationwide, 4.3 million U.S. jobs at the time were linked to 
exports, and sixteen percent of all products, manufactured or mined, were exported. 
During the 1970s, U.S. exports overall quadrupled – the outcome of efforts by the 
federal government as well as many a subna tional government.54  
Despite its number six rank, Texas still did not have an overseas international 
trade program, when reportedly, two-thirds of all states did. Texas still had a department 
of international development, but only one foreign office: the Mexico City office had a 
staff of two and a total annual budget of $53,574. The office claimed an 800-to-1 return 
on that annual investment in the office. But the manager Texas’ international trade 
department – which itself had only two employees by the end of 1979, due to a budge 
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cut that took one employee – cautioned that Texas’ lack of an overseas program meant 
Texas was losing out on opportunities that other states were likely to get. 55 
By 1980, Texas had moved from sixth place among U.S. states to second in 
exports: Texas sold $19.8 billion of manufactured goods overseas; second only 
California with $25.1 billion in foreign sales. International trade created some 70,000 
jobs for Texans from 1977 to 1980. 56 
The concern about competing with other states spurred efforts to open another 
overseas office. A former state senator wrote a report for the 1981 Legislature called, 
“An International Office for Texas.” The report argued that exports are  
…the principal means by which America pays for its purchases 
from foreign countries, and that all Americans are affected when exports 
do not grow rapidly enough. A large trade deficit makes U.S. economic 
growth more difficult to achieve. It is also a major reason why the value of 
the dollar has declined. This has increased inflation, raising the prices 
Americans have to pay for all goods. 57  
 
The report argued that more offices could help Texas manufacturers find 
overseas markets and distributors and determine the creditworthiness of foreign firms. 
In 1983, another TIC official was voicing the same refrain – that Texas was not 
sufficiently funding development efforts to gain the full benefit. At the time, Texas was 
wooing companies in California to persuade them to relocate to Texas, where taxes were 
lower. But the Texas Legislature had allocated only $90 million for the Texas Industrial 
Commission’s advertising campaigns. TIC Executive Director Charles Wood expressed 
dismay: “A couple of major ad campaigns can use up most of that,” he said. He 
compared Texas’ efforts with those of North Carolina, which had an enviable industrial 
development program. “They have 22 people and $6 million to do what we do with four 
people and $2.1 million,” Wood lamented.58  
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Foreign firms were also courting Texas companies to relocate on foreign soil. 
Representatives from foreign firms enthusiastically sought out executives in Dallas and 
Houston in particular, and to a lesser extent in San Antonio, Austin, and El Paso, hoping 
to lure Texas energy and high-technology companies to their home nations through such 
incentives as reduced rents, guaranteed sales, lower wages, and grants for technology 
development. By 1983, several Texas companies were present in Great Britain, France, 
and Ireland.59 
 
 
Foreign Investment in Texas 
Most investment into the United States as a whole came from European, 
Canadian, or Japanese sources. Middle Eastern investors also bought into the Texas oil 
industry. There were fewer Mexican investors in the United States, but most of the 
Mexican money went to the Southwestern United States. From 1978-1983, Mexican 
businesses completed 19 transactions in the United States; five of those were in Texas, 
five in California, one in Arizona, five in NY, one in Massachusetts, and two in 
unknown locations. The U.S. firms receiving the investment included two hotel 
companies, a carpet plant, two shopping centers, and several banks. The investors were 
largely Mexican banks, individuals, or groups of investors.60  
The list of other foreign direct investment transactions in Texas is far-ranging, as 
are the sources of the investment capital. Companies from the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Canada, Lebanon, France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, Sweden, and Norway invested in the following endeavors: a cafeteria 
company, oil and gas and chemical companies as well as oil and gas exploration leases, 
shopping centers, business parks, hotels, lots of land, a fiberglass company, a property 
development company, Dillard’s department store chain, banks, apartment buildings, a 
drilling company, condominiums, oil field equipment, business parks, San Antonio’s 
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I, Source Country (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade 
Administration, Office of Trade and Investment Analysis, June 1983): 103-104. 
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Crockett hotel, a bakery in Dallas, a shipping company in Houston, engineering 
companies, semiconductors, an agricultural supply company, makers of metal building 
components, a cement company, mining company, Winn’s five and dime stores in San 
Antonio, and a steel company. Foreign investment took the form of either merger or 
acquisition, joint ventures, real estate, equity increases, or new plants.61 
From 1974 to 1983, Texas had 526 completed transactions. New York led all 
states with 871 transactions while California had 857 and Florida, 830.62 
Some Texans did not look favorably on the increase in foreign investment. In 
1983, Texas Commissioner of Agriculture Jim Hightower complained that foreign 
purchases of Texas land would likely hurt Texas farmers. Hightower was testifying 
before the Texas House of Representatives State Affairs Committee, in favor of two 
proposed bills to limit the amount of land owned by foreign investors. Commissioner 
Hightower said that although foreign ownership amounted to only around 1 percent of 
total agricultural acreage, included in that 1 percent was some of Texas’ best agricultural 
land, along the Red, Brazos, and Trinity Rivers and along the Rio Grande. From January 
1982 to January 1983, 137,000 acres of Texas land was purchased by foreign investors, 
increasing the total of foreign-owned acreage by 17 percent, Comm. Hightower reported. 
Comm. Hightower’s concern was that these “absentee investors – foreign 
corporations and cash-rich speculators (have) no common interest to share with a Texas 
farm family. How does foreign ownership of our agricultural resources affect our farm 
economy?” asked Hightower. Some of the possible effects he listed are “inflated prices 
(that) artificially raise the appraisal values and thus the taxes on adjoining farms owned 
by already hardpressed Texans”; higher land prices reduces the affordability of land for 
“our own citizens” to purchase; absentee landlords will not maintain the land as well as 
would “the hand-on farmer who’s out there day- in-day-out, doing his best to earn a 
                                        
61 Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: Completed Transactions, 1976-1983, Volume 
III, State Location (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade 
Administration, Office of Trade and Investment Analysis, June 1983): 131-141. 
62 Foreign Direct Investment: Volume I. 
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livelihood from the soil – with hope one day of passing that land on to his children,” 
Hightower testified.63 
Commissioner Hightower’s Department of Agriculture would release fact sheets 
on “statistics that shape agriculture.” On 18 July 1983, TDA released a sheet titled 
“Exports Fail to Boost Farm Income,” showing that as exports steadily rose from 1973 to 
1981, from $15 billion to $44 billion, farm incomes fell steadily from $33 billion in 1973 
to $18 billion in 1977, and in succeeding years incomes rose and fell with no reliable 
pattern. “Farm Exports Up 143 percent Since 1973; Farm Income Down 40 percent 
Since 1973,” the text concludes. The cutline of the graphic acknowledges the Reagan 
administration’s export-based farm policy. Comm. Hightower is quoted: “Agriculture 
exports have helped to diminish the U.S. international trade deficit, and have boosted the 
income of many export firms, but farmers have seen their commodity prices fall and 
their income plummet to the lowest level in 50 years.”64 
Later in 1983, TDA released another set of statistics showing that “the real value 
of U.S. farm sales has declined 25 percent since 1973.” Hightower’s comment is that the 
“falling value of farm sales is directly responsible for the crisis in net farm income.” 
Hightower concludes that “a fair price for farm products” is all that will improve farm 
income.65 
Despite his vocal opposition to exports, Commissioner Hightower 
enthusiastically pursued sales of Texas agricultural products to Mexico. Comm. 
Hightower developed what is apparently the first set of “agreements” between a U.S. 
state and Mexico, and developed a mechanism for information sharing and policy 
coordination, the Texas-Mexico Exchange Commission, examined in the following 
section. 
 
 
                                        
63 Hightower Tells Panel That Foreign Investors Are Buying Texas Farmland, Press Release, 
Texas Department of Agriculture, 28 March 1983 (Retrieved from the Texas State Archives, 11 
July 2003).  
64 Texas Department of Agriculture, “Exports Fail to Boost Farm Income,” TDA Flashfacts. 
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VENUE TWO: THE MEXICO-TEXAS EXCHANGE COMMITTEE 
Even while general efforts were made to increase Texas trade in the 1970s, there 
is no evidence that any significant efforts were made to specifically promote Texas 
agriculture worldwide. The Texas Department of Agriculture organizational charts from 
1977 show a “Marketing Division,” but there is but no mention of international 
marketing at that time.  
But an International Marketing Division was developed during the two terms of 
Texas Agriculture Commissioner Jim Hightower, who served from 1983-1991. Through 
the work of the division, Hightower sought to increase the presence of Texas agricultural 
products worldwide, by reaching out to Texas farmers to encourage them to sell their 
products directly overseas. 
Today, TDA still has a separate international marketing division today, and food 
and fiber production accounts for ten percent of Texas’ gross state product. Eighty 
percent of Texas land is devoted to agriculture, including ranching and livestock. Ten 
percent of Texas annual GDP is from agriculture.66 In 2002, Texas exported more than 
two billion dollars’ worth of agricultural products and $114 million in livestock and 
livestock products.67 
Democrat Hightower was elected to his first term as commissioner of agriculture 
in 1982. He was reelected in 1986 and then lost his bid for a third term in 1990 to 
Republican Rick Perry, who served as Agriculture Commissioner and later was elected 
Texas Lieutenant Governor. When Gov. George W. Bush became the President of the 
United States in 2000, Perry succeeded George Bush as governor, earning that title for 
himself in the election of 2002.  
Today Jim Hightower is not an elected official, but he calls himself “America’s #1 
Populist.” He publishes books and a newsletter critical of the current administration’s 
                                        
66 Texas Department of Agriculture Statistics, electronic communication with Lisa Elledge, 
TDA, September 2003.  
67 BIDC, Texas Exports Database. (Retrieved 27 October 2003.) Available from 
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policies.68 While serving as Texas Agriculture commissioner, Hightower had a platform 
for his populist philosophies, and took every opportunity to express his disagreement 
with the Reagan administration’s export- led trade policy. As shown in an earlier section, 
his department routinely issued statistics showing how increased trade negatively 
affected American small farmers. 
So when Commissioner Hightower took steps to increase trade between Texas and 
other nations, one of his goals was that exports should benefit the small producers rather 
than the large multinational corporations. He hired Paul Lewis, a Texan who had spent 
the previous six years living in Brussels, Belgium, working on export development for 
the U.S. National Cotton Council.  
Marketing director Lewis recalls that in the first days of developing the 
international program, he felt a sense of promise about what the Department hoped to 
accomplish for Texas’ small farmers. While working overseas for the Cotton Council, 
Mr. Lewis noticed who was benefiting the most as U.S. exports increased – “It was the 
big corporations, the cotton merchants, the textile producers, the cotton seed producers. 
As Hightower used to say (in speeches), the small hardscrabble farmer had no voice, was 
not on the radar screen,” Lewis says. The large corporations “don’t share with the 
farmers who are the producers,” the ones doing the hardest work, he explains.  
At a time when the statistics showed U.S. farms were foreclosing, Comm. 
Hightower began several initiatives designed to support the “just folks,” as he called 
them, who were working the Texas land. He encouraged farmers to join cooperatives, 
but given Texas’ individualistic culture, only a few were formed. These eventually came 
under the influence of larger corporations, Lewis says. 
Hightower’s populism was the foundation for his approach to increasing exports. 
His goal was to “eliminate the middlemen,” where possible, by encouraging small 
business to do their own processing and export the final product directly to foreign 
buyers. Processing items such as soybean oil required a large capital investment, which 
was out of reach for most Texas farmers. But Texas farmers were accustomed to selling 
their harvests of vegetables like tomatoes and peppers to a company like Campbell’s 
                                        
68 See www.jimhightower.com.  
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Soup, to turn into Pace’s Picante Sauce. Hightower wanted Texas farmers to process 
their own produce and benefit from the higher prices they could get for processed 
products such as bottled salsa or fruit preserves.  
TDA started a “Taste of Texas” program where Texas-made goods were given a 
special label and featured in overseas trade missions and food shows. Hightower 
encouraged growers to move into niche markets by growing Christmas trees or delicious 
Texas blueberries. He began an agricultural development loan program. Also, TDA 
would defer the costs of participation in foreign trade shows: if a small producer could 
get a case of product and literature to Austin, TDA would ship the items overseas and 
exhibit the foodstuffs at trade fairs.69 
TDA’s international marketing department was at the center of Comm. 
Hightower’s strategy to involve the small farmer in international trade. International 
marketing director Lewis enjoyed his job. “We had a sense we were getting to the guy 
being overlooked, the little mom and pop salsa producers – someone who’d never 
exported before,” he says today. He quickly hired foreign nationals with the language 
skills and cultural knowledge he felt were necessary to form successful business 
relationships with other countries. He hired marketing specialists from Egypt, Hong 
Kong, the Netherlands, and Mexico. The Mexican and a South Texan were paired up to 
be the marketing team for Mexico. 70  
 
Focus on Mexico 
While the “Taste of Texas” program supported processed goods for export, those 
goods had limited appeal in Mexico, where bottled goods are less popular due to uneven 
access to refrigeration. Thus marketing to Mexico was focused mostly on livestock.  
Mr. Lewis recalls that Texas and Mexico already had some trade in cattle going 
on between private parties. Mexicans had been buying Texas cattle for breeding 
purposes and selling grass-fed corriente cattle to Texans.71 Once bought by Texas 
                                        
69 Personal interview with Paul Lewis, Austin, Texas, 19 July 2003. 
70 Ibid.  
71 The corriente breed’s ancestry can be traced to hardy stock brought to the New World by 
Spanish explorers as early as 1493. “Breeds of Livestock,” website of  the Department of Animal 
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ranchers, the corriente would be given shots of growth hormone and fed grain and oats 
to fatten them up for market.  
TDA had six livestock export facilities along the border; all livestock going from 
Texas to Mexico passed through these facilities and were inspected by Mexican 
veterinarians for disease or parasites. The manager of the export pens was a TDA 
employee who would often introduce Texas cattle breeders to Mexican buyers, who in 
turn linked TDA to the Mexican federal agriculture secretary.  
Building on contacts with Mexican cattle buyers, Lewis and Hightower arranged 
for a four-day trade mission to Mexico City in August of 1983. Hightower, Lewis, and 
other TDA personnel met with Mexican federal officials from the ministries of 
agriculture and commerce, as well as a United Nations food delegate and representatives 
of the Mexican Farm Organization Federation. The TDA delegation was also received 
by the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, evidence that U.S. federal officials had knowledge 
that a group of Texas officials were in Mexico seeking to develop commercial ties.72  
Upon his return to Texas, Comm. Hightower said the trip had “laid the 
groundwork for a long-term relationship that will benefit both Texas farmers and 
Mexico.” He said he was “greatly encouraged” that Texas farmers would be able to sell 
agricultural products directly to Mexican buyers. “By cutting out the big middlemen,” 
the national corporations that broker grain sales and instead selling direct, “our farmers 
will get a higher price and Mexico will pay a lower price,” Comm. Hightower said. He 
added that in the previous year, purchases of Texas agricultural products by Mexico had 
fallen by half. 73 This was likely the effect of the 1982 Mexican peso crisis on Texas 
trade, but could also indicate that Texas had lost some sales to other U.S. states, such as 
Wisconsin, and large agricultural companies such as Cargill.74 “The single best thing 
                                                                                                                   
Science, Oklahoma State University, http://www.ansi.okstate.edu/breeds/cattle/corriente/; 
(Updated 30 May 1996; Retrieved 2 August 2003).  
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that could happen to the farmers of Texas is for Mexico to have a healthier economy,” 
Comm. Hightower declared.75  
While it is clear that this trip shows an awareness of the importance of 
international links to Texas politics and business, is not at all clear what results followed 
this trade mission to Mexico City. A year passed, with no press about Texas-Mexico 
agricultural ties, until November of 1984, when TDA announced that Hightower was 
now cultivating ties with Mexican officials at the state level. What followed was a series 
of agreements between Hightower and several Mexican states.  
 
 
Texas’ State-to-Foreign-State Relations  
First, in November of 1984, Comm. Hightower and the governor of the Mexican 
state of Tamaulipas, Emilio Martinez Manautou, announced a bilateral agreement to 
increase trade and to share agricultural information with the other state’s government 
and agricultural organizations.  
The agreement lists the following goals: that the two states will work to establish 
“information exchange procedures among governments, universities, and agricultural 
organizations pertaining to prices, supplies, and trade prospects” including exchange 
programs for students and agricultural personnel; that each state would learn the import 
and export restrictions put in place by the other nation’s federal government; and that the 
committee would consider how best to coordinate business, trade, and cultural exchange 
between the two states.76 
“The agreement puts into place a lasting mechanism by which Texas and 
Tamaulipas can address dozens of important agricultural issues,” Comm. Hightower said 
at the public signing ceremony in Ciudad Victoria, Tamaulipas’ capital city.  
                                        
75 TDA Press Release, Hightower ‘Encouraged’.  
76 TDA Press Release, Hightower and Governor of Tamaulipas, Mexico sign Bilateral 
Agreement on Agriculture, 13 November 1984. One month later, in December 1984, Comm.  
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Comm. Hightower acknowledged that it was unusual for two state governments 
from two different nations to form such a pact. “Normally we think of such bilateral 
agreements as being a function of federal governments, not the states,” Hightower said. 
“What we are witnessing today is two states which have identified a mutual area of 
concern – agriculture – that we intend to address ourselves.” Hightower then insinuated 
that the remote federal governments in each nation did not fully understand the needs of 
their states. “This approach will make the views of the two states better known to the 
federal governments of both the United States and Mexico.”77  
The Texas-Tamaulipas agreement created an eight-person committee – 
comprising four Texans and four Tamaulipans – to implement the cooperative business-
boosting projects outlined in the agreement. In December of 1984, Comm. Hightower 
introduced the members of the Texas-Tamaulipas Bilateral Exchange Committee at a 
ceremony on the International Bridge that crosses the Rio Grande. At the bridge, the 
United States and Mexico are linked via the states of Texas and Tamaulipas, through the 
cities of McAllen and Reynosa.  
From the international bridge, Hightower also announced that TDA would be 
signing bilateral agreements with the Mexican states of Nuevo Leon and Coahuila, thus 
giving Texas agreements with the three out of the four states along the Texas-Mexico 
border.78 “Texas cannot prosper if our neighbors in Mexico do not also prosper. All of us 
– the agricultural producers of Texas, Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leon and Coahuila – have the 
same purpose. We want to work together for mutual progress,” Hightower said.79 
Two months after the public introduction on the bridge, the Texas-Tamaulipas 
Exchange Committee had its first formal work session in February of 1985 in 
Matamoros, Mexico, just across the border from Brownsville, Texas. The agenda 
included discussion of a possible joint venture to develop a cattle embryo transplant 
clinic, and how to import citrus from Mexico to Texas without also importing the 
Mexican fruit fly, banned by USDA regulations. TDA was interested in importing citrus 
                                        
77 TDA Press Release, Hightower and Governor of Tamaulipas. 
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because a severe freeze in the Rio Grande Valley in December 1983 had left Texas citrus 
packers and shippers in the Valley without fresh fruit to process.80  
 
Texas’ State-to-Foreign Nation Relations: The Mexico-Texas Exchange Committee 
While Hightower was cultivating arrangements with the neighboring state 
governments, he was maintaining contact with Mexican federal officials as well. Some 
officials visited Austin on occasion. After crafting the several state-to-state agreements, 
the agriculture commissioner from the state of Texas then moved on to sign an accord 
with the federal agriculture secretary from the nation of Mexico. In July of 1985, Comm. 
Jim Hightower and Sec. Eduardo Pesquiera Olea signed what they each said was the first 
“bilateral trade accord” between a U.S. state and Mexico.81   
At the memorandum-signing ceremony in Mexico City, TDA released statistics 
showing that trade between Texas and Mexico had shown steady improvement over the 
past year, from mid-1984 to July of 1985. “The value of livestock shipments to Mexico, 
as recorded at TDA’s six export facilities, has increased from $26.2 million in all of 
1981 to over $55 million in just the last ten months,” Hightower said. Texas had 
exported $32 million worth of Holstein dairy cattle and $12 million of feed cattle to 
Mexico. Hightower credited the presence of “international marketing experts who know 
Mexico, its customs, and agriculture” for the successful sales increases.82 
While the previous documents signed by Hightower and Mexican state officials 
were referred to as “agreements,” the paper signed with the Mexican federal official was 
not referred to as an agreement, but as either an “accord” or a “memorandum of 
understanding.” It is possible that the Mexican federal government was more mindful of 
the need to use non-binding language than was the state agency.  
Except for the change in language, the Mexico-Texas Memorandum was similar 
to those signed between Texas and the Mexican states. It included commitments to 
cooperate on technical projects, exchange technical personnel, to promote livestock and 
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products through trade fairs, and to exchange information on livestock and agricultural 
production in Texas and Mexico.  
Following the pattern of the state-to-state level arrangements, the memorandum 
gave rise to a forum for officials to convene. The Mexico-Texas Exchange Committee 
(M-TEC) was a larger version of the state- level committees, formed to develop specific 
projects in order to pursue the agreed-upon goals.  
To co-chair the M-TEC alongside him, Comm. Hightower invited former U.S. 
Representative from Texas Robert Krueger, of New Braunfels, Texas, himself from a 
ranching family. 83 From 1979-1980, Bob Krueger had filled a special Ambassador-at-
Large position created by the Carter administration to coordinate policy with Mexico. 
Because of his time in that office, Amb. Krueger had knowledge of Mexican business 
culture as well as some long-standing contacts. “Successful, long-term relations are built 
on personal contact with key government and private sector officials,” Krueger said 
upon accepting the appointment. “Nowhere are personal contacts more important than in 
Mexico.”84 
While co-chairing the M-TEC, Amb. Krueger told a Texas business newsletter, 
“It is highly unusual for Mexico to be willing to work with a state interest instead of the 
federal government.” He explained that Mexico was willing to do so because of the high 
levels of tension between the two federal governments over the illegal drug flows 
between the United States and Mexico. But the Commission allowed Mexico to 
communicate with state- level officials, “where such tensions do not exist,” the 
newsletter reads.85 
In keeping with the theme of competition for trade opportunities, Amb. Krueger 
acknowledged that Texas was hoping to increase trade with Mexico at the expense of 
other entities, such as the state of Wisconsin, from which Mexico was buying dairy 
cattle, and Cargill, the international agriculture distributor, from which Mexico was 
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buying grain. TDA’s goal was for Mexico to buy grain directly from Texas cooperatives, 
according to Krueger. 
Today known as Senator Krueger,86 he recalls taking several trips to Mexico in 
his capacity as deputy chairman of the M-TEC. Hightower’s staff would call on him for 
help finding contacts within Mexico and for occasional advice. “I was a symbolic tie” 
between Texas and Mexico, Sen. Krueger says now. 
The Texas-Mexico Exchange Committee held its first formal meeting on March 
18, 1986, in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, across the border from El Paso, Texas. A 
newspaper account explained, “Mexican officials, who are fond of pomp and ceremony, 
rented a huge hall and filled it with Mariachi music to mark the first meeting…which 
they hope will open up new Texas markets to their producers.” Among the products 
Mexicans hoped to sell in Texas were citrus, chili peppers, peaches, vegetables, fresh 
flowers, and brooms.  
The day’s events included workshops on crop and livestock regulations and 
meetings to share technological information. One attendee was Manuel San Miguel, 
president of the Mexican Meat Packers Association. Señor San Miguel said his industry 
was hoping to buy 40,000 head of Texas cattle for processing in Mexican plants to resell 
in the United States as beef products. But U.S. Department of Agriculture regulations 
prohibited this practice, because the Texas beef could become mixed with Mexican 
livestock exposed to pesticides banned in the United States, according to Sr. San Miguel. 
Unable to plead his case effectively at the federal level, Sr. San Miguel appealed to the 
Texans for help. “What we need from Mr. Hightower and the senators from Texas is a 
little push, a little help with the USDA in Washington because they claim the meat from 
the Texas cow will lose its identity when it gets to Mexican plants and will return as 
Mexican beef,” he told the Austin American-Statesman. “We’re willing to let U.S. 
inspectors go into out plants to certify that” the beef slaughtered in Mexico will meet 
U.S. regulations.  
                                        
86 Krueger was appointed Senator in 1993 by Gov. Ann Richards to fill the unexpired term of 
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Years later, Paul Lewis remembers the federal government as unresponsive to 
this Mexican producer’s willingness to open his plant to U.S. inspectors. “Here he 
wanted to do things the right way and USDA was not working with him,” Mr. Lewis 
recalls. 
Sr. San Miguel wasn’t the only one complaining about the U.S. federal 
government that day. In another dig at the Reagan administration, Hightower was quoted 
as saying: “If things were hunky-dory between producers in Mexico and the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, there wouldn’t be a need” for the state-level commission.  87 
 
 
Results 
It is unclear what effect these initiatives had on Texas-Mexico agricultural 
exchanges. Paul Lewis, the former international marketing director, recalls that the M-
TEC helped export a lot of beef, pork, and other meat products. His staff helped the 
Agriculture commissioner from the state of Kentucky network with Mexican officials. 
But there are no hard numbers to show the M-TEC’s accomplishments.  
Mr. Lewis says that the office had intended to develop a system of tracking sales 
to Mexico. The office built what he calls the “first local-area-network” using one IBM 
computer, several clones, “250K of memory and very slow processors” in order to create 
a master list of every potential Texas exporter of live animals, breeding stock, food 
products, and so on. But “one component that was never fully developed was tracking 
the results” of linking suppliers with distributors. In speeches, Commissioner Hightower 
would refer to trade numbers indicating an increase in commerce between Texas and 
Mexico, but Lewis says these numbers likely came from counting the livestock that 
flowed through the TDA border export facilities, not necessarily from numbers tracked 
on office computers.88 
At least one, and perhaps several, cattle embryo transfer facilities were developed 
out of M-TEC negotiations. Embryo transfer technology was developed for ease of 
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88 Personal interview with Paul Lewis, Austin, Texas, 19 July 2003. 
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breeding. The preceding technological method had been frozen bull semen. Embryo 
transfer involves harvesting cow eggs that are then fertilized and sold to be implanted in 
a “surrogate mom” cow. The embryo transfer facilities were at least in part to develop 
humped Zebu cattle for export to Central and South America.89  
Mr. Lewis says that although he was in the thick of things at the time, developing 
Texas’ international trade, he had no sense then of how global economics were 
changing, “not until NAFTA brought it to (my) attention.” 90 
In 1990, Hightower lost his re-election bid to Republican Rick Perry in a truly 
mud-slinging battle.91 His independent streak had hit a roadbump when he promised the 
European Union a consistent supply of hormone-free beef, at a time when very few 
Texas ranchers were open to raising hormone-free beef. Although consistent with his 
organic approach to all things agricultural, the issue turned into a liability for Hightower. 
The Texas Beef Council and other agricultural interests donated large sums of money to 
Rick Perry’s campaign, and Hightower lost the race.  
 
 
 State/Federal/International Issues 
The Texas-U.S. axis (national causes): was the problem Texas sought to address 
under state or federal jurisdiction? What was the corresponding federal response: did the 
federal government support the mechanism, ignore it, or move to restrict the 
mechanism? 
Increasing agricultural exports was within the state’s jurisdiction and therefore 
the federal government was not likely to restrict the state. 
The U.S. federal government knew of Comm. Hightower’s efforts to promote 
Texas products in Mexico and worldwide. Mr. Lewis recalls that TDA officials would be 
in touch with the USDA attaché to the U.S. embassy and the U.S. ambassador wherever 
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they would go for a trade show. “It wasn’t like we were trying to end-run them; we kept 
them in the loop,” he says. U.S. federal officials would alert TDA to upcoming foreign 
trade shows, and also help TDA with overseas food shows by helping to clear shipments 
through foreign customs, co-sponsoring receptions, and giving tips on where to find 
hotels with good government rates. “We had good support,” Lewis says. Federal 
officials  
“were helpful wherever we went: Hong Kong, Singapore, Riyadh, Beijing, Japan. 
We were not trying to do anything secretly – usually the local USDA guy was up there 
with Hightower, doing his job, supporting the exports. We were not establishing 
American foreign policy. We knew the line is trying to establish foreign policy – that’s 
the president’s deal. But we were just looking for ways to help Texas.” 
Sen. Krueger does not recall having any contact with federal officials about the 
operation of the Commission, showing how free the state was to pursue its own 
economic goals even in a changing domestic policy environment. The state’s freedom 
comes from its authority to tax and spend as it sees fit for economic development 
purposes. To wit, the M-TEC was completely state- funded. “Hightower would never 
have asked for support from the Reagan administration,” says Sen. Krueger. “He would 
have liked to do what the federal government had not done for the small farmer.” 
In a separate interview, Mr. Lewis confirms no federal money supported the 
program. “Jim Hightower would have never asked the Reagan administration for 
financial help,” he says.  
 
 The U.S.–Mexico axis (international causes): what were the international 
political and economic conditions that contributed to or prevented the state’s effort to 
reach across the Rio Grande? 
 In the 1980s, tensions between the United States and Mexico ran high over 
politics in Central America. In 1983, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Jeanne 
Kirkpatrick cautioned that Mexico’s economic struggles made it susceptible to 
communist influence that could seep up from Central America. Former U.S. Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger chaired a commission on Central American policy that, in its 1984 
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report, warned of the likelihood of Nicaragua’s Marxism spreading throughout Latin 
American, including Mexico. Also in 1984, the chief of the U.S. Southern Command in 
Panama, General Paul F. Gorman, testified before a U.S. Senate committee that within 
ten years Mexico would be the United States’ “No. 1 security problem” because it was 
“the most corrupt government and society in Central America” and it was already “a 
center for subversion.” 92 
Mr. Lewis also recalls that there was little positive contact between the U.S. 
federal government and Mexico at the time over trade issues. Yet in the midst of 
unfriendly relations between federal governments, state actors were free to establish 
their own ties, due to having less responsibility for national security than the federal 
government. 
Sen. Krueger confirms that hypothesis when he recalls that the tensions at the 
time between the United States and Mexico “opened up an opportunity (for Mexico) to 
deal with a state government. It made overtures from state- level officials more 
attractive.”93 
 
The Texas-Mexico axis (state causes): How was the venue created? Did Texas’ 
interest in and method of contact with Mexico differ from the U.S. government’s 
relations with Mexico?  
Both Mr. Lewis and Commissioner Hightower felt strongly that hiring foreign 
nationals gave TDA an edge in cultivating foreign relationships. Mr. Lewis recalls, “We 
hired people who knew what they were doing. It was a new thing to hire foreigners. Two 
white guys did stuff before. Other states, we’d see them at food shows, they were not 
hiring so many foreigners. They were envious we had the budget to hire people with 
language skills and expertise.” Hightower allocated the budget, Lewis says, because 
hiring foreign talent “was a priority with him.”  
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   In 1985, Hightower had said in a speech, “Having the international marketing 
experts who know Mexico, its customs and its agriculture, is another important reason 
TDA is able to help our Texas livestock producers.”94  
 “There was no down side” to the M-TEC, Lewis says. Having visible ties to 
Mexican federal officials gave Texas officials more credibility with Mexican importers, 
particularly in a culture like Mexico’s that emphasizes personal relationships. “We could 
get local support more easily” in Mexico because the locals knew the Texans were tight 
with Mexican federal officials, Lewis says.  
Sen. Krueger bluntly explains that while there was a practical need for a Texas-
Mexico forum to discuss technical matters, there was also a political motivation for 
Comm. Hightower to seek closer ties with Mexico. “Texas politicians are always 
looking for ways to expand the ir electoral base, and make ties with Hispanics. There 
were real problems Texans had with the import of Mexican cattle – brucellosis was a 
problem, and some felt the inspection procedures were a problem. There were legitimate 
issues to be explored. There may have been a significant commercial reason (for the M-
TEC) but the political reason was strong. If (Hightower) deals with Mexico, that helps 
cement his Hispanic political base. Doing more with Mexico on agriculture satisfied the 
Anglo landowner and the Hispanic.”95 
 
 
Do State-Level Efforts Culminate In NAFTA? 
The idea of a North American common economic market between the United 
States, Canada, and Mexico was first put forth by officials in U.S. border states. In 1979, 
Texas Gov. Bill Clements and California Gov. Jerry Brown endorsed the idea while they 
founded the Border Governors’ Conference.96 
During the summer of 1980, Gov. Clements headed a National Governors’ 
Association committee on North American Cooperation. The nine-member group held 
its first formal meeting in February of 1981 in Washington, where ambassadors to the 
                                        
94 TDA Release, Pesquiera, 29 July 1985. 
95 Krueger interview. 
96 See Chapter Five of this dissertation. 
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United States from Mexico and Canada met with governors to discuss how North 
American cooperation could develop in the future. “I envision that this council, while it 
would have no policy-making powers, would provide a forum for all levels of 
government and the private sector to discuss issues of importance to all,” Gov. Clements 
said. He urged the U.S. federal government to “put Canada and Mexico in a priority 
status in our foreign policy (and) treat them as peers and as equals.”97  
Former governor of California Ronald Reagan supported a trilateral trade accord 
in his first campaign for president in 1980.98 
The idea of a common market was also popular with Texans in the federal 
government. Abelardo Valdez was Pres. Jimmy Carter’s chief of protocol at the U.S. 
DOS. Upon leaving office in 1980, the native of Floresville, Texas, near San Antonio, 
became a vocal advocate for a free trade zone, 200 miles deep along each side of the 
border. The purpose of a Western Hemisphere “common market,” he explained to a 
meeting in San Antonio in December of 1980, would be to compete against the 
European Common Market. Ambassador Valdez also saw such a mechanism as a means 
of lessening tension between the United States and Mexico. He said that in 1979, total 
U.S.-Mexican trade was worth $18.6 billion, 50 percent more than the figure for 1978.99 
How much did Mexico’s newfound oil reserves contribute to the idea of a 
common market? Amb. Valdez cautioned that any U.S.-Mexico talks on economic 
cooperation should exclude discussion of oil. “I don’t think we should tie our 
cooperation in this venture to oil,” Amb. Valdez said. “The Mexicans get upset 
whenever we talk about oil, because they think, ‘You just want our oil.’ The Mexicans 
don’t want to be thought of as an oil well, but I think (a free trade agreement) can be 
built up to include energy down the road.”100 
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Amb. Valdez hoped that a border- long free trade zone would, by the year 2000, 
expand to include Canada, other Latin American countries, and the Caribbean. The 
Reagan administration had shown some interest in Valdez’ plan, and was already 
pursuing a U.S.-Canadian Free Trade Agreement. Because of the increasing intertwining 
within the hemisphere, Amb. Valdez argued that economic development was crucial if 
there was any hope of alleviating the chronic unemployment characteristic of the border 
economy, particularly given the projected growth in population for Latin America.101 
Federal support of free trade was important, according to Amb. Valdez, because  
The United States is finding it increasingly difficult to compete in 
the world market, due mainly to reduced production and ineffective 
marketing…the attraction of new industry to the border lands and the 
increase in jobs and human services would spark a renewal that eventually 
could be expanded throughout Latin America…. We are past the time 
when unrest and upheaval in El Salvador, say, has no effect on the United 
States.102  
 
An important aspect of economic cooperation for Valdez was the involvement of 
the private sector. “Federal development aid, drastically cut when our priorities changed 
during the Vietnam War, is still necessary,” he said. “But private money is even more so. 
Without the private sector on both sides, the concept won’t work. After all, there’s the 
money is.”103 Valdez’ comments foreshadow the fact that the main issue on the future 
NAFTA negotiations table for the United States would be investor protection, necessary 
for U.S. businesses to overcome the fear and mystery surrounding business transactions 
in Mexico.  
But others on the U.S. side of the border did not warmly embrace the idea of a 
border-wide free trade zone. Concerns were raised about immigration and the 
effectiveness of regulating the flow of goods and protecting the public health, and the 
proposal to move border control to the edge of the free trade zone, 200 miles away from 
the border. The director of the port of Brownsville, Texas, Al Cisneros, vigorously 
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opposed free trade and the idea of the zone. “It’s going to have too many repercussions 
for too many people,” he said.104 
Indeed, the Mexican government itself was cool to the idea, as predicted by Bob 
Krueger. A free trade zone is “counter to the policy many of their (Mexico’s) business 
and government people have been following,” Amb. Krueger said in 1981.105   
At the time, the idea did not catch on at the federal level. But along the border, 
fostering cross-border cooperation became more and more common and regular. 
U.S. exports to Mexico were also growing steadily: in 1986, the United States 
exported $12.39 billions of dollars’ worth of goods while importing $17.56 billion of 
goods from Mexico. These values grew; in 1994, U.S. exports to Mexico valued $50.84 
and imports from Mexico were almost even at $49.94 billion. 106 
Developments in Texas moved apace. Gov. Bill Clements’ first term ran from 
1978-1982. He lost a bid for reelection in 1982 to Democrat Mark White. Then 
Clements ran again in 1986 and this time defeated White.  
In his first term, Clements had helped start the Border Governors’ Conference 
and had been a vocal advocate of closer ties to Mexico, often visiting Mexican officials, 
even their president. Clements’ support of Mexico was often criticized as being based on 
a lust for Mexican oil. But in his second term, Clements continued to formalize closer 
ties with the governors of the neighboring Mexican states.  
In the first four months of 1988, Gov. Clements signed cooperative accords with 
the governors of all four Mexican states bordering Texas – Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leon, 
Coahuila, and Chihuahua.  The documents acknowledged that Texas and each 
neighboring Mexican state would benefit from working together to develop their 
economies, promote tourism, catch auto thieves, and discourage drug abuse. 107 Gov. 
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Jorge Treviño Martinez of Nuevo Leon said through a translator, “If we can develop the 
economy in our border, if we do this together, thousands of Mexican families and 
thousands of Texas families will benefit jointly.”108 
The state-to-state pacts promised a jointly-financed tourism promotion called 
“Vacation in Two Nations.” The state governors exchanged taped anti-drug abuse 
announcements for broadcast in each of the states. The Mexican states of Nuevo Leon 
and Tamaulipas planned to open government offices in Texas. A program to share 
information on auto thefts was planned. Promises were made to exchange information on 
transportation, including swapping research staff. Plans were made for sewage treatment 
plants and the construction of new bridges over the Rio Grande/Rio Bravo. Texas and 
Chihuahua planned cooperative ventures between the University of Texas at El Paso and 
the Autonomous University of Chihuahua, including satellite links between the 
campuses.  
At the same time as these state- level developments, members of the U.S. 
Congress were criticizing Mexico for what it said was a lack of effectiveness in the war 
on illegal drug traffic. Gov. Fernando Baeza of Chihuahua took the occasion of the 
signing to comment on the tensions over drugs evident in the U.S.-Mexico relationship. 
“All countries should get involved in the war against drugs. Nothing good or positive 
will come out by criticizing,” he told reporters through an interpreter. “Mexico has paid 
a very high price, a very high toll, in its war on drugs.”109 
Gov. Clements, always consistently vocal in supporting Mexico, now began to 
speak up in support of Mexican governors. He saw his outreach to Mexico as mutually 
beneficial in the short-term, but hoped that connections with U.S. governors would 
eventually lead to more empowerment for Mexican governors. After a visit with 
Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari in February of 1989, Clements said he felt 
the Mexican governors were being given more autonomy in decisionmaking. Increasing 
the governors’ authority could only be beneficial for accelerating development along the 
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Texas-Mexico border, Gov. Clements said. “You will see these things take on a life of 
their own along the border without the usual bureaucratic delays that have historically 
taken place where so many other activities were dictated by the federal government in 
Mexico City,” he said.110  
The idea of freer trade between the United States and Mexico was supported by 
the attendees of the Border Governors’ Conference in 1990, during the ten-year 
anniversary of the creation of that cooperative body. 111 One of the points included in the 
1990 resolutions concluding the meeting was that the governors would support talks 
between U.S. and Mexican federal officials aimed at eliminating non-tariff trade barriers 
on agricultural products.112 
 Each nation had sent their highest commercial officials to the 1990 Border 
Governors’ Conference meeting, and used the occasion to introduce the idea of greater 
economic cooperation between the two countries. Mexican Secretary of Commerce and 
Industrial Development Jaime Serra Puche told attendees that Mexico needed to 
participate in the international marketplace in order to modernize. He said Mexican 
President Carlos Salinas de Gortari had initiated Mexican technology development 
programs, deregulation, and diversifying Mexican exports beyond petroleum. He said 
the maquiladoras had grown in importance to the Mexican economy. From 1983 to 
1989, Mexico had seen a 19 percent annual increase in the number of maquilas, and that 
1,742 plants now employed 450,000 workers.113 
U.S. Commerce Secretary Robert Mosbacher told the governors they were “part 
of a laboratory experiment” in commercial integration. He praised Mexico for the 
decline in its inflation rate, which decreased from a whopping 159 percent in 1987 to 
less than 20 percent in 1989. Texan Mosbacher said he expected Mexico to have a 
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“world-class” economy. “The Mexican people can ignite growth in Latin America and 
inspire others around the world,” Secretary Mosbacher told the governors.  
By this time, Mexico had committed to opening its economy and was seeking 
sources of foreign investment. First, President Salinas went to Davos, Switzerland, to the 
1989 World Economic Forum to seek stronger trade ties with the European Union, but 
Europe was preoccupied with the ending the Cold War, and Salinas was virtually 
ignored. Salinas then resigned himself to the fact that if Mexico wanted to improve its 
economy, it must do so through closer ties to the United States, his second choice. 
Mexico began an intense lobbying campaign to generate support for the agreement, both 
throughout Mexico as well as in Washington, the first time Mexico ever launched such a 
campaign. 114  
Meanwhile, back in the United States: after the 1988 round of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations, U.S. state officials began to 
realize how the federal government’s international commitments were affecting state 
laws. The GATT’s intent was to eliminate trade restrictions that would put foreign 
producers at a competitive disadvantage. Thus the federal government now required 
some state laws to be changed in order to be in compliance with the international treaty.  
The states consequently found themselves to be the underdogs in trade 
negotiations. Since U.S. trading partners prefer a single national standard rather than 
scrambling to meet 50 different state standards, the states would be the ones whose 
traditional areas of regulatory authority would be affected. 
During the NAFTA negotiations, the U.S. Department of Commerce did provide 
a “single point of contact” through which states could stay informed on the negotiations 
and be better prepared for regulatory changes. States were allowed to “grandfather” in a 
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selected number of state regulations, protecting those laws from being challenged in the 
future by trading partners.115  
But as NAFTA negotiations got underway in 1992 among representatives from 
each federal government, the governor of the State of Texas, Democrat Ann Richards, 
was a vocal supporter. She said, “the issues discussed here are not only (of) regional 
importance, they are hemispheric.” At the 1991 Border Governors’ Conference meeting, 
the newly-elected Richards said the support of the border states would make or break the 
success of the agreement. “We know that no matter how carefully crafted a free trade 
agreement is, the burden of (e)nsuring its success is going to remain primarily with those 
of us along the border,” Gov. Richards said. “We must work together to develop the 
infrastructure, the roads and the bridges and the ports and the railroads that tie us 
together.” Without the infrastructure, the roads and bridges linking the two nations, Gov. 
Richards said, the agreement “will be little more than words on a piece of paper.”116  
The border governors as a whole expressed support for NAFTA, as did many 
governors throughout the United States.117 At the time of the 1993 Border Governors 
Conference in Monterrey, Mexico, NAFTA had been negotiated and signed, but not yet 
ratified, and was facing a skeptical U.S. Congress. One reporter said the meeting of the 
governors “turned into a muted version of a pep rally” for the three-nation accord. The 
governors, as always, signed a document to conclude the meeting; the Monterrey 
Declaration expressed the border governors’ support for NAFTA. 118  
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In the 1990s, the link between the Mexican and U.S. economies only 
strengthened. The value of U.S. exports to Mexico rose from 33 billion dollars in 1991 
to 111 billion in 2000.119  
 
 
Gov. Bush and Mexico  
Gov. Richards was defeated by George W. Bush in 1994. Five Mexican 
governors attended Gov. Bush’s inauguration ceremonies, and attended a working 
breakfast with him the next morning. 
Illustrating the importance of the Mexican economy to the Texas economy, Gov. 
Bush got right to work supporting Mexico, which was in an economic mess following 
the 1994 Mexican peso crisis. But it was not only the Texas governor who realized the 
effect Mexico had on the U.S. economy – the U.S. state governors were largely 
supportive of the Clinton administration’s proposed bailout package to lend Mexico 
some $40 billion. At a National Governors’ Association (NGA) meeting in January of 
1995, Gov. Bush in particular lobbied for the aid to Mexico, and he was joined by 
governors from other regions of the United States, such as Christine Todd Whitman, 
Republican governor of New Jersey, and Gov. Mike Lowry of Washington state, a 
Democrat. The bailout was “the right thing to do,” Gov. Lowry said. “It will cost our 
economy much more if Mexico is very unstable economically. Our relationship with 
Mexico is very important to all the people in this country. The stability of their economy 
is very important to us from the standpoint of 700,000 jobs in our country.”120 
Gov. William Weld of Massachusetts proposed an NGA resolution asking the 
federal government to pass aid for Mexico. “Mexico must receive the support necessary 
to get through this current difficulty in order for states to achieve the benefits projected 
under” NAFTA, the proposal read. 
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Even so, the traditional idea that states should not participate in foreign relations 
was persistently manifest. Another Republican governor, Arne Carlson of Minnesota, 
opposed any loan to Mexico, but also opposed the governors discussion of a federal 
matter, which he felt “does not belong at the governors’ conference.”121 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
The story of how Texas developed its place in the world economy illustrates the 
many elements that come into play for other U.S. states as well: the effect of a changing 
global economy, the open U.S. federal system that encourages states to compete against 
one another, the capacity of states to innovate policies and policy mechanisms, the 
influence of the private sector, and the importance of shared goals with the U.S. federal 
government. The Texas case also shows how interpersonal relationships at the 
subnational government level can operate more freely than international relations at the 
federal level sometimes do, because state actors do not carry the same responsibility for 
enforcing national security as does the federal government.  
As the U.S. economy became more integrated with the world economy, Texas 
officials responded by establishing economic relations directly with foreign actors. 
Texas officials, aware that other U.S. states were developing direct foreign relations and 
aggressively courting foreign economic opportunities, were eager to find a niche for the 
state in the world economy before other states beat them to it. Because each state is 
responsible for its own economic development, states are free to compete for advantage. 
Texas’ geographic proximity to Mexico made it a natural market for Texas business to 
pursue. But given the veil of mystery surrounding how to do business in Mexico, the 
private sector turned to Texas state officials to pave the way through venues such as the 
Texas Trade Office and the Mexico-Texas Exchange, started by the Texas Department 
of Agriculture. 
But given the traditional view of states as having limited capacity and interest in 
foreign affairs, why would the federal government not exercise its authority to restrict 
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the state and others from developing relations directly with foreign nations? While the 
federal government set the nation’s trade policies, economic development is a state 
responsibility. But maintaining a growing economy, especially at a time of rapid global 
economic change, requires a magnitude of effort demanding the efforts of all levels of 
government. Although technically the federal government could act to restrict any state-
level contact with a foreign nation, the states play a vital part in meeting the nation’s 
economic development goals. Thus, even when the states developed relationships 
directly with foreign actors, the federal government supported these developments, 
recognizing that subnational- international economic relations are crucial means of 
meeting domestic goals, and that states were expanding their traditional responsibility to 
maintain economic development by moving into the global economic arena. 
Texas found its domestic commercial goals in harmony with the federal 
government’s goals, particularly as federal foreign policy expanded to include trade as a 
means of redefining security relationships. The position Texas would take in the world 
economy was shaped by its natural resources, particularly its oil resources and the 
expertise in that area shared by private businessmen and state officials like Gov. Bill 
Clements. Texas’ oil resources allowed it to benefit – perhaps more than other states, in 
this case – from this change vis-à-vis the U.S. opening to China.  
In the Texas-Mexico case, the two venues described here highlight the importance 
of personal relationships in developing state- foreign links. Texas governors and state 
officials have played an important role in developing venues for trade promotion, and for 
promoting regional relations and policy coordination, as will be explained in the 
following chapter on Relations. 
During the Cold War, state officials were able to relate to foreign actors 
differently from federal officials, due to differences in policy responsibility between the 
two levels of government. Even though Texas saw itself as having a role in fighting the 
Cold War, the state did not bear the burden of responsibility for anti-communism or 
national security. Therefore Gov. Smith was able to cultivate a friendly relationship with 
Mexican President Echeverría, despite the vast ideological differences between the two, 
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and despite the fact that many in Congress saw Pres. Echeverría as unreliable.122 Not 
bearing full responsibility for U.S. national security, but striving to meet the demands of 
the Texas economy, Gov. Smith was able to cultivate friendly relations with a foreign 
leader even when relations at the federal level are tense. 
Texas Agriculture Commissioner Hightower used his freedom to cultivate 
relations with Mexico as an opportunity to criticize the federal government for trade 
policy he saw as eroding the independence of U.S. farmers, and for a lack of flexibility 
in federal regulatory standards. Hightower’s case shows that he could pursue relations 
and policies that differed from the federal government’s with no repercussions, but when 
he offended the private sector by pursuing organic beef production, then his opponents 
aggressively supported his opponent and he lost his reelection bid. Hightower’s 
experience show the private sector role undergirds policy development at all levels of 
government. The private sector is a powerful influence on state and federal 
policymakers, because of the reliance of the public sector on private business activity as 
a source of income.  
But even though the states have been unrestrained in seeking trade ties with other 
nations, the future of U.S. trade relations may include changes for the states. It can be 
argued that increasing activity at the subnational government level served to further 
economic globalization in ways that have led to the desire for more international trade 
treaties, such as NAFTA. But as the United States negotiates more such trade 
agreements, the international pressure for harmonization of standards will only increase, 
and state laws will have to yield. The irony here is that as the states responded to federal 
trade policy changes, and were supported in developing their international roles, the 
states’ actions furthered the volume and frequency of international trade to the point that 
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the federal government started to regulate the activity more through treaties, which will 
eventually limit the states by moving to a single international standard.  
While the short-term goals of development are shared between the states and the 
federal government, already the federal government is developing long-term goals 
towards more trade treaties that may usher in an era of coercive federalism and increased 
conflict with the states. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SOUTHWEST REGIONAL RELATIONS  
AND POLICY COORDINATION 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter looks at two state- level mechanisms designed to foster good 
relations between the ten states along the Southwestern border. Officials from four U.S. 
and six Mexican states form the Border Governors’ Conference (BGC) and the Border 
States Attorneys’ General Conference (BSAGC). These two mechanisms are designed to 
enhance information-sharing and to facilitate policy coordination. 1  
In both the U.S. and Mexican federal systems, only the federal government is 
authorized to conduct foreign relations. Therefore, neither the U.S. nor the Mexican 
states have the authority to forge any binding international agreements. But the U.S.-
Mexico border has always been an area where responsibility shifts between levels of 
government. In this atmosphere of ambiguity, out of concern for the increasing number 
of governing challenges the federal government was not addressing, the states asserted 
themselves, creating mechanisms for international intergovernmental relations. 
But each nation’s president endorsed the state- level conferences, indicating 
federal support for the idea of regional policy coordination. There was some mild 
concern at the federal levels when the BGC was forming, when state officials made clear 
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their intent to discuss matters of federal jurisdiction. But since then, the two conferences 
have continued to operate without federal restriction or objection. 
The Southwestern U.S. states share general goals with the federal government of 
harmonious relations with Mexico. But the border states have a much stronger interest in 
developments in Mexico than does the rest of the nation. When Mexico experiences an 
economic crisis, it is the border economy that is affected more intensely than the rest of 
the nation. The nation as a whole experiences the social effects of increased 
immigration, but the border states’ experience is intensified.  
State, federal, and international concerns have converged along the U.S.-Mexico 
border for more than 150 years. And what counts as “the border” depends upon one’s 
geographical viewpoint: in Texas, “the border” means those counties that are edged on 
one side by the Rio Grande. But in Washington, officials often refer to “the border” and 
mean those four states that touch Mexico. Differences in perspective mean state and 
federal officials often find communication on border issues difficult, compounding the 
reluctance to address an area that historically, has not been a political priority for either 
level of government. 
But as the population of the border region has boomed, it has become more 
difficult to ignore. The border is home to approximately 12 million people, more than 
6.3 on the U.S. side and exceeding 5.5 million in Mexico. The growth rates for U.S. 
border counties exceed growth rates for the rest of the nation by more than 40 percent in 
some places.2  
Lawrence Herzog writes that the border has transformed as the global economy 
has changed, and there should be a corresponding change in how policy along the border 
is formed. He writes,  
Not only is the border inhabited by millions of U.S. and Mexican 
citizens, it is an important source of revenue for both countries. 
Management decisions regarding the border environment, criminal justice, 
drug enforcement and boundary surveillance, trade, and transportation, 
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therefore, must take into account both regional and national interests that, 
at times, may diverge.3 
 
When there is conflict over U.S. policy with Mexico, the states complain more 
about the effect of the policies rather than the policy itself. In other words, the states do 
not agitate for or against a particular federal policy as much as they complain about how 
a current federal policy affects them. For example, with respect to immigration, the 
Southwestern states and the U.S. federal government have clashed less over setting 
immigration limits and more over the practical aspects, such as how best to patrol the 
border – with either increased law enforcement or through militarization – and who is 
financially responsible for incarcerating criminal aliens and providing social services to 
illegal immigrants.  
A former Texas state official who worked on border issues complains of an 
ongoing lack of clarity over exactly what federal policy towards Mexico is. He says both 
the state and federal government are more “comfortable” reacting ad hoc than 
articulating a proactive vision of policy towards Mexico. Responsibility for the 
development of the border has been chronically shifted from one level of government to 
another – the state at times has claimed the border is a federal responsibility, and the 
federal government has argued social problems along the border are the responsibility of 
the state or local governments.4 The “lack of hierarchy” that Keohane and Nye argue 
applies to policy in general today is an ongoing characteristic of the U.S.-Mexico border.  
Despite the lack of formal authority to confer with other nations, the state 
governors took advantage of the lack of clarity over border responsibility to invite the 
Mexican governors to join in a forum to discuss issues of common concern, a first for 
the border region.  
                                        
3 Lawrence A. Herzog, Where North Meets South: Cities, Space, and Politics on the U.S.-Mexico 
Border. (Austin: University of Texas, Center for Mexican American Studies, 1990): xii. 
4 Telephone interview with Fernando Centeno in San Antonio, formerly of the Texas Office of 
the Secretary of State, 20 October 2003. For more on border issues, see Herzog, Where North 
Meets South ; Timothy J. Dunn, The Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border, 1978-1992: Low-
Intensity Conflict Doctrine Comes Home. Austin: University of Texas, Center for Mexican 
American Studies, 1996. 
 154
At the first meeting, only mild concern was expressed by the federal government 
that state officials were going to discuss matters of federal jurisdiction. But the 
governors have been sensitive not to tread too obviously on areas of federal authority, to 
avoid provoking a constitutional challenge or causing a political upset. The governors’ 
meetings have continued without further conflict. And only a few years after the 
inception of the Border Governors’ Conference, federal actors facilitated the 
organization of the Border States Attorneys’ General Conference. 
Both of these state-level conferences suggest that when states share general goals 
with the federal government, even in a loosely-defined policy environment, states are 
quite free to engage in direct relations with foreign nations.  
However, state- level international conferences are one area that in the future 
could be the target of federal restriction. If the state conferences evolved into a unified 
voice in protest against federal policy, either the U.S. or Mexican federal government 
might come to see the bodies as capable of influencing opposition to federal policy. If 
the state officials were to join forces with citizens’ groups or nongovernmental 
organizations to protest the preemption of any area of state regulatory authority due to an 
international agreement, the influence of these groups could increase significantly. 
While these conferences operate without interference now, the future picture could be 
different as globalization continues to change the nature of intergovernmental relations. 
Thus it is important to consider how these mechanisms developed, their current role, and 
the federal response.  
Because the state- level relations mechanisms develop in the context of federal-
level relations, a sense of the U.S.-Latin American history is necessary to show the 
political environment in which international intergovernmental relations among the 
Southwestern states develop. An exhaustive history of the U.S.-Mexico relationship is, 
sadly, beyond the scope of this project. Therefore this chapter begins with some general 
historical background on U.S.-Latin American relations, with a spotlight on relations 
with Mexico, and the story of each mechanism is preceded by a brief overview of the 
state of U.S.-Mexican relations at that time. 
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GENERAL HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, 1939-Present 
The United States’ foreign policy objective during the Cold War was 
“containment” – preventing the spread of communism from the Soviet Union or China to 
any other nation. To this end the U.S. policy sought a communist- free Latin America for 
two reasons: regional security and economics. 
Regional Security: In the late 1930s, the rapid surge of Hitler and Mussolini’s 
armies throughout Europe and North Africa made policymakers aware that nations could 
be threatened by mere proximity to antagonistic or ambitious governments. Defending 
the hemisphere as a whole from Communist influence was now recognized as the only 
way to ensure the United States’ own safety.  
Postwar U.S. policy towards Latin America encouraged the spread of democratic 
governments and free-market development. But the “loss” of Cuba to the leadership of 
revolutionary Fidel Castro in 1959 was a shock to the United States. Cuba’s case made it 
feasible to U.S. policymakers that other underdeveloped, poverty-stricken Latin 
American nations could follow the same path. In the 1970s, the emphasis on supporting 
democratic governments gave way to the support of any government that declared itself 
the opponent of communism, regardless of its democratic failings.  
Economic Needs: As during a “hot” war, the United States sought to keep open 
lines to vital natural resources throughout Latin America.  
 
 
Mexico’s Role  
War, suspicion, violence, and more war mark the history of U.S.-Mexican 
relations. But the thread of common needs brought about by proximity ties the two 
nations together.  
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Security concerns motivated U.S. relations with Mexico during World War II. 
The United States bought much of Mexico’s strategic minerals to keep Mexico from 
selling to the Japanese.5 The United States since WWII has sought to include all of Latin 
America (except for Cuba) in a hemispheric security arrangement. Although geopolitics 
characterized U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War, the goal of geopolitical solidarity 
with Latin America was not met as successfully as U.S. policymakers might have hoped. 
Mexico’s discovery of major oil resources in 1972 led to increased economic 
interdependence between the two nations, but not necessarily greater mutual respect. The 
strategic role of oil in world politics increased Mexico’s economic importance to the 
United States and fueled U.S. anxieties that Mexico would fall under communist 
influence. While the possibility of such seems unlikely from the post-Cold War 
standpoint, the fear of a communist influence in Latin America seemed authentic. On 
this basis, U.S. policymakers justified intervention in several Latin American nations.  
For its part, Mexico has struggled to maintain a sense of autonomy from U.S. 
influence. While the United States’ main fear during the Cold War was of the Soviet 
Union, Mexican society was then, and still is, often divided over “the American peril;” 
the idea that past territorial aggression on the part of the United States has been replaced 
by a cultural and economic imperialism.6 Since the early 1990s, however, economic 
necessity has driven the Mexican government to embrace at least the economic 
integration of the two nations; Mexico instigated the creation of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement in 1993 and lobbied hard for its passage starting in 1990.  
An interesting development of Mexican perspectives towards the United States 
can be seen in the Mexican president’s attitudes towards the English language. Pres. Luís 
Echeverría (1970-76) took pride in the fact he knew nothing of English. Pres. Miguel de 
la Madrid (1976-82) did not speak English in public but had studied in the United States. 
Pres. Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-94) was a graduate of Harvard University. Pres. 
                                        
5 María Emilia Paz, Strategy, Security, and Spies: Mexico and the U.S. as Allies in World War II 
(Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press, 1997): Chapter 5.  
6 Jorge G. Castañeda, “Mexican Foreign Policy,” in Limits to Friendship: The United States and 
Mexico (New York: Random House, 1989): 168.  
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Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) speaks English in public. And his successor, Vicente Fox, 
has said that all Mexican schoolchildren should learn math – and English. 7 
States in both countries are in the middle of communication and cooperation 
challenges coming from two directions. States struggle with the intergovernmental 
tensions that exist between and within levels of government in each nation, and from the 
other direction, as states develop links with foreign governments, states must understand 
the functional and cultural differences between the U.S. and foreign systems. 
For example, the capacity of U.S. states to act informally is a significant 
difference in both structure and style between the United States and Mexico. Although 
Mexico has been undergoing a gradual political decentralization, the Mexican system is 
still far more centralized and formal than the U.S. system. U.S. states and cities have 
more autonomy than the Mexican system allows its state or municipal governments. In 
the U.S. system, different levels of government act without the knowledge of the other 
levels of government, but even within levels of government, it is normal for one state 
agency to be oblivious to the activities of another state agency. 8 
Not surprisingly, Mexican federal officials have at times misunderstood how the 
U.S. system works. Because power in the Mexican federal system is concentrated in the 
presidency, Mexican officials tend to assume the U.S. system is the same. Not 
understanding the capacity of U.S. states to act informally, Mexicans as a rule will 
contact the highest level office first, even if the issue at hand is under the jurisdiction of 
a lower governmental authority. This assumption of the Mexicans has at times reduced 
their effectiveness in communicating with U.S. government agents.9 
                                        
7 An observation shared by former U.S. Ambassador to Mexico (1981-1986), John Gavin, during 
a telephone interview from Los Angeles, 8 March 2000.  
8 When the author began interviews for this project, she was surprised to find that officials at one 
Texas agency who were involved in cultivating direct relations with Mexico had no knowledge 
of what other agencies with the same goals were doing. Even offices within the same agency 
with a common need to communicate with Mexico had no knowledge of one another. One 
individual at the Texas Secretary of State’s office designed a “Border Roundtable” to bring 
together all the agency officials who deal with Mexico, but this individual recently left the office 
and it remains to be seen if his initiative will survive his departure. 
9 When Mexico protested a Texas state policy board’s decision to store nuclear waste near the 
town of Sierra Blanca, Mexican delegations had difficulty understanding why then-Governor 
George Bush could not stop the dump. Under Texas law, the policy board was solely responsible 
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But the learning curve is steep; many at the Mexican federal level now recognize 
that state and local governments in the United States play a much larger role in the U.S. 
political process than do the Mexican states in Mexico. One federal official at the 
Mexican embassy in Washington, who coordinates border affairs, says that local and 
state governments are the first to recognize social and political needs; thus he feels states 
are important sources of information. “Exchanging information with (state and locals) 
helps us to know better what’s going on,” he says.10 
 
 
THE BORDER GOVERNORS’ CONFERENCE 1979/1980 
The first formal and institutionalized venue for intergovernmental relations 
between the ten states along the U.S.-Mexico border was the Border Governors’ 
Conference, which continues today. The conference’s first meeting was in June of 1980. 
On the agenda for the first meeting of state officials: energy, immigration, and drug 
trafficking, topics of federal jurisdiction in both the United States and Mexico. A brief 
summary of U.S.-Mexico relations at the time sets the stage for the story of how the 
BGC developed. 
 
U.S.-Mexico Historical Context, 1972-1980  
* Mixing Oil and Politics *  On the world scene, the Iranian Revolution caused 
the cessation of all Iranian oil exports by the end of 1978. Over the next two years, 
petroleum prices rose from thirteen to thirty-four dollars a barrel. Although total global 
production had fallen only about five percent, panic produced a 150 percent increase in 
price per barrel. Uncertainty gripped producers. Demand had risen steadily over the past 
few years. The availability of oil from nations who were not a part of the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was not yet fully known. The conservation 
                                                                                                                   
for the decision, yet Mexico continued to lobby the governor when their efforts would have been 
better spent directed at the board.  
10 Personal interview with Ricardo Piñeda, Director of Border Cooperation Affairs, Embassy of 
Mexico, Washington, D.C. 15 November 2000. 
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movement was not yet visible but would soon gain momentum from higher oil prices 
and long lines for gasoline. 
Mexico was sitting on a great deal of the world’s non-OPEC oil. The huge 
Reforma oil fields were discovered in 1972; Mexico kept information about the 
discovery largely quiet. The field’s output was initially reserved for domestic use, but in 
1974, Mexico began exporting limited amounts of oil. Mexico’s production increased 
from 500,000 barrels per day in 1972 to 830,000 in 1976 and 1.9 million in 1980 – 
“almost a fourfold increase in less than a decade,” writes Daniel Yergin.11 While Mexico 
previously had been avoided by international lenders, after 1976, the nation borrowed 
with vigor and was pursued by many a global banker and private investor.  
Relations between the two nations appeared to improve when the presidents of the 
two nations, Jimmy Carter of the United States and Jose Lopez Portillo of Mexico 
created the U.S.-Mexico Consultative Mechanism in 1977, designed to be a forum for 
the regular exchange of information between Cabinet- level officials from both nations. 
The Mechanism met in May of 1977 and May of 1978. According to official literature, 
in 1979, the two presidents reaffirmed their intent to strengthen the mechanism, but no 
meetings were held that year. The Mechanism was later restructured under Presidents 
Lopez Portillo and Ronald Reagan, and renamed the Binational Commission (BNC). The 
Commission began to meet again in November of 1981, and still meets today. 12 
* Oil Does Not Equal Respect * Oil and its resulting wealth and prestige changed 
Mexico’s position on the world political scene. As the owner of its own oil resources, 
Pres. López Portillo could refuse invitations to join OPEC. In 1979, he presented his 
own World Energy Plan to the UN General Assembly. The following year, Mexico and 
Venezuela joined forces to subsidize oil to Caribbean nations, at significant cost to the 
                                        
11 Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1991): 667. 
12 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Fact Sheet: U.S.-Mexico 
Binational Commission, (Updated 1 May 1996.) Available from 
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/wha/ufsbnc.html. See Also U.S. Department of State, Fact 
Sheet: Mexico: The Binational Commission. (Updated 4 September 2001, Retrieved 7 October 
2003.) Available from http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2001/fsjulydec/4990.htm 
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two oil-producing nations, and to ship oil on good terms to Nicaragua as a means of 
supporting Sandinista revolutionaries.13  
Oil fueled Mexican growth rates of eight percent through 1981. But rural areas 
remained stagnant and a great deal of food had to be imported from the United States. 
Elsewhere in world politics, the Carter administration had approved an embargo of grain 
sales to the Soviet Union as punishment for its December 1979 invasion of neighboring 
Afghanistan. As oil prices rose and Mexico still needed to import food, Mexicans found 
themselves uneasy about the connection between food, politics – and oil. Just at the time 
Mexico had the means to gain a modicum of independence from the United States in 
foreign policy, the reality of economic dependence on its neighbor hit hard. There was a 
nagging feeling in Mexico that the United States wanted its oil and might go so far as to 
use Mexico’s food dependence to get it.14  
A deterioration of the U.S.-Mexico relationship was fed by such fears and what 
Mexico perceived as “Washington’s refusal to join a host of other industrialized nations 
in acknowledging Mexico’s new importance.” When U.S. Pres. Carter arrived in Mexico 
City in February of 1979, Pres. López Portillo stood before the press corps and gave a 
speech hinting at a deep anxiety. “Mexico has suddenly found itself the center of 
American attention – attention that is a surprising mixture of interest, disdain, and fear, 
much like the recurring vague fears that you yourselves inspire in certain areas of our 
national subconscious,” he said. Pres. Carter did not acknowledge López Portillo’s 
veiled requests for reassurance.15 And the day Pres. Carter arrived, the U.S. Trade Office 
in Mexico City closed.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                        
13 Alan Riding, Distant Neighbors: A Portrait of the Mexicans. (New York: First Vintage Books, 
1986): 241.  
14 Riding, p. 282.  
15 Ibid, pp. 465-466. 
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The Border Governor’s Conference 
The Border Governor’s Conference is an annual working meeting of the 
governors and their staffs to discuss border policy concerns.  
The conference has its roots in the Public Works and Economic Development 
Act of 1965 (Title V), intended to foster economic development in Appalachia. In 1975, 
Jim Wright (D-Texas) amended Title V to allow counties along the U.S.-Mexico border 
to lobby federal authorities with “one voice.” 16 President Gerald Ford signed the 
legislation into law on 31 December 1975. In June of 1976, the four U.S. border 
governors sent a petition to Commerce Secretary Elliott Richardson declaring their intent 
to form a joint federal-state commission under the new legislation. The result was the 
Southwest Border Regional Commission (SWBRC), administered by the Department of 
Commerce, and co-chaired by a presidential appointee and a rotation of the four U.S. 
border state governors.17 The SWBRC was one of eight Title V regional commissions in 
the United States.18  
The Commission’s purpose was to consider such problems as economic 
development, immigration, the influx of illegal aliens, overcrowded educational and 
medical facilities, increasing traffic at international crossings and the flood of narcotics 
smuggled across the border.”19 Title V legislation did not empower regional authorities 
to interact with foreign governments, but diffusive border problems begged for the 
Mexican states’ cooperation if the Commission was to meet its goal of border 
development. Thus the idea of inviting the Mexican border state governors to the 
conference arose.  
The official Border Governors Conference (BGC) history credits Arizona 
governor Bruce Babbitt for proposing a binational governors’ forum while the four U.S. 
                                        
16  “Three Governors Back Border Aid,” The Dallas Morning News, 21 March 1976.  
17 The four U.S. governors at the time were Dolph Briscoe of Texas, Jerry Apodaca of New 
Mexico, Raul Castro of Arizona and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., of California. 
18 William Schmitt, Border Governors Conference – A State Level Foreign Policy Mechanism, 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, Foreign Service Institute, 25th Session of the 
Executive Seminar in National and International Affairs, 1982-83.) 
19  “Three Governors,” Dallas News. 
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governors were at a 1979 SWBRC meeting. 20 However, other sources credit Texas 
Governor William P. “Bill” Clements with the idea of including the Mexicans.  
Gov. Clements pursued closer relations with Mexico with more vigor than any 
previous Texas governor. During his 1978 gubernatorial campaign, Clements 
emphasized Mexico’s importance to Texas and urged the betterment of conditions along 
the Texas-Mexico border. One of his first acts as governor was to fly to Mexico City to 
meet with Mexican President José López Portillo. Gov. Clements’ background as an 
oilman raised questions about whether his primary motive was to garner business for his 
oil-drilling company, SEDCO. He was undeterred by such allegations, and during his 
first term (1979-1983), he met with his “Mexican counterparts” twenty times. 21 
Gov. Clements “was really the first governor who saw how important Mexico 
was to Texas economy,” a former staff member said. Clements frequently invited 
Mexican governors to Texas for big meetings and fancy dinners.22 
Whether it was Clements or Babbitt who suggested including the Mexicans is 
unclear, but in either case, the other three governors quickly endorsed the idea and for 
the rest of 1979, possibilities for a binational meeting were discussed.  
But even before meetings with the Mexicans began, relations among the four 
U.S. border governors turned contentious over just how to approach Mexico – and which 
level of government could best foster international cooperation. Early in 1979, the two 
most ideologically opposed governors, conservative Texas Gov. Clements and California 
Gov. Edmund G. “Jerry” Brown, a liberal Democrat, readily agreed the SWBRC should 
be the venue for the Southwestern states to negotiate with Mexico on energy and border 
problems, aside from any negotiations by the Carter administration. Gov. Brown 
exclaimed that when visiting Washington, “I get the idea there is no Southwest.” 
                                        
20 First International Meeting of the Border Governors of the United States and Mexico, (, 
Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, June 26 and 27, 1980).  
21 E.V. Niemeyer, Jr., “Texas Discovers Its Mexican Neighbors,” in Rio Bravo II (Austin: 
Morgan Printing Company, Fall 1992): 78. 
22 Personal interview with Jorge Garces, Austin, Texas, 26 March 1999. 
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Although the two governors had their political differences, they both envisioned a future 
common market between the United States, Canada, and Mexico.23  
But Clements and the Arizona governor, Democrat Bruce Babbitt, clashed on 
many levels. Gov. Babbitt, at the time also chairman of the SWBRC, took the role of 
defending the federal government and fellow Democrat, President Jimmy Carter. 
Clements was so vocal in his disapproval for U.S. policies on drugs, immigration and 
energy that Arizona governor Bruce Babbitt vowed he would not let the June 1979 
SWBRC meeting in Brownsville, Texas turn into “a platform for attacking Carter and 
putting forth national policy.” Arriving in Brownsville, Gov. Babbitt told reporters the 
U.S. governors’ conference should focus on “regional matters, such as…economic 
development and tourism along the border.” 24  
At the conclusion of the meeting, the four governors planned to send the position 
papers – at least the ones they could agree on – to the U.S. Department of State as 
background information for international agreements, to act as input from that region of 
the United States closest to Mexico. Gov. Clements’ papers for the meeting proposed a 
revised bracero program to bring “guest” migrant workers from Mexico into the United 
States, and an exchange of U.S. electricity for Mexican oil and gas.  
Gov. Babbitt, upon arriving in Brownsville for the start of the meeting, made it 
clear he would not support Clements’ proposals at the meeting as a basis for national 
policy or treaty negotiation with Mexico.25 He characterized Clements’ proposal for joint 
U.S.-Mexican ventures to develop Mexico’s oil reserves as “a continuation of the 
American imperial position.”26 He said the message Clements seemed to be sending 
Mexico is: “’We’ll show you how to get that energy and (you) let us soak up some of 
your cheap labor,’” Babbitt said. “We’ve got to be more sophisticated and careful about 
                                        
23 John Geddie, “Clements, Brown agree on Mexican action,” The Dallas Morning News, 28 
February 1979. At this time, Mexico balked at the first mention of a North American common 
market, “fearing it would lose control of its economy and energy resources.” The story of how 
Mexico came to support NAFTA is in Chapter Five.  
24 Dave Montgomery, “Arizona governor to resist efforts to make conference anti-Carter,” The 
Dallas Times-Herald  (21 June 1979). 
25 Fred Bonavita, “Border State Governors Disagree on Clements’ Key Policy Stands,” The 
Houston Post 23 June 1979. 
26 “Clements’ Tactics Called ‘Imperialist,’” The Austin Citizen, 22 June 1979. 
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recognizing Mexico’s interests.”27 He added that Mexican President José Lopez Portillo 
“doesn’t want Mexico to be the gas station for the rest of the world.”28 Instead, Gov. 
Babbitt proposed the United States make aid available to Mexico for refining its own oil, 
which could then be exported to the United States.29 
Arriving in Brownsville later the same day, Gov. Clements told reporters: 
“Because of the growing economic independence of Mexico, a new relationship with our 
neighbor to the south is rapidly developing and I think the United States’ role in this 
relationship must begin right here in the Southwest,” he told reporters. “Our job and 
objective is not to usurp the duties and prerogatives of the U.S. State Department or the 
presidency or the Foreign Office of Mexico, but we are here to speak up and offer 
Washington the benefit of our experience.”30  
During the SWBRC meeting, Clements demonstrated that his reputation as a 
tough-talking Texan was well-earned. One Austin reporter wrote, “When the 
representatives of the other states balked at his statement that his (immigration) proposal 
should be endorsed, Clements responded by saying Texas has more than half the U.S. 
border with Mexico. He would work out his own agreement with governments of 
bordering Mexican states. Then he quickly indicated what he really meant was that it 
was a matter for continuing and intensive study.”31  
At the meeting’s conclusion, the four Southwestern state governors had agreed in 
principle to study ways to reduce drug trafficking, and to urge the U.S. government 
adopt a “stable national energy policy (and develop) a program of mutual benefit 
involving the purchase of Mexican oil and gas.” Any mention of “joint ventures” with 
Mexico had been deleted from Clements’ original proposals. In addition, the governors 
added in a suggestion of Gov. Jerry Brown’s, which Gov. Clements supported, that the 
                                        
27 Jim Davis, “Arizona Governor Blasts Clements’ views of Mexico,” Corpus Christi Caller, 22 
June 1979.  
28 Fred Bonavita, “Oil Top Issue As Governors Open Meeting,” The Houston Post, 22 June 
1979. 
29 Dave Montgomery, “Squabbles Usher In Start of Border Conference,” The Dallas Times-
Herald, 22 June 1979. 
30 “Rival Bonilla At Meet Is Surprise For Clements,” The San Antonio Light, 22 June 1979. 
31 Dave McNeely, “’Texas Position’ Falls On Deaf Ears,” The Austin American-Statesman, 23 
June 1979. 
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United States, Mexico, and Canada cooperate in a future North American Common 
Market.32 The hope was that by the following year, the Mexican governors would be 
joining the SWBRC meetings as well. 
In early 1980, Gov. Clements – who had already met with several of the 
governors from the four Mexican states bordering Texas – met again with Gov. Alfonso 
Martinez Dominguez of Nuevo Leon, and told him of the U.S. governors’ desire to meet 
with the Mexican governors. Gov. Dominguez agreed to act as intermediary between the 
Mexican border governors and the Mexican president. Without President José Lopez 
Portillo’s permission, the Mexican governors could not participate in an across-the-
border forum. In March of 1980, Martinez and Clements met in Monterrey with 
President Portillo; the three men agreed the conference would take place in early 
summer, in Juárez, across the Rio Grande from El Paso. The agenda was to comprise the 
issues already proposed by the U.S. governors: energy, immigration, and drug 
trafficking. President Lopez formally granted his support, as did U.S. President Jimmy 
Carter via his special ambassador-at- large to Mexico, Robert Krueger, a Democrat and 
former U.S. representative from Texas.  
This is the same Bob Krueger, readers may recall, who appeared in the previous 
chapter on Texas’ Trade, as the co-chair of the Mexico-Texas Agricultural Exchange 
Commission in 1984. But at this stage, four years earlier, Krueger is not yet totally 
supportive of U.S. states developing direct foreign relations. Despite President Carter’s 
approval of the meeting, Amb. Krueger was critical of the meeting for including issues 
such as drug control, immigration, and pollution, which he said should be discussed by 
federal officials only. He suggested states could focus on the education of immigrant 
children and health matters.33  
Despite Amb. Krueger’s objections, the first meeting of the Border Governors’ 
Conference convened in June 1980 in Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua. The governors 
presented position papers on agriculture, twin plants (maquíladoras), cultural exchanges, 
                                        
32 Anne Marie Kilday, “Clements Gets Governors To Do Little In Meeting,” The Fort Worth 
Star-Telegram, 24 June 1979. 
33 Fred Bonavita, “U.S.-Mexico Governors’ Meeting Convenes Today Amid Criticism,” The 
Houston Post, 26 June 1980. 
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energy and commerce, tourism, and ecology and pollution. 34 There were some fireworks, 
mostly involving Governors Babbitt and Clements over Clements’ energy and 
immigration proposals. 
While the previous year, Gov. Babbitt of Arizona had also raised objections to 
the governors discussing issues of federal jurisdiction, this year he seemed to have no 
problem with it, and objected to Amb. Krueger’s remarks. “Border relations are too 
important to leave to impersonal decisions in Washington and Chapultepec,” Babbitt 
told reporters. “The most significant accomplishment here was that for 100 years we 
have misunderstood each other and for the first time the six Mexican border governors 
and the American governors have sat down together. It’s the beginning of an important 
and historical process.”35 Gov. Bruce King of New Mexico agreed it was entirely 
appropriate for the states to discuss the issues and lobby their federal governments for 
action “on policies agreed to first at the state level.”36 
Even Gov. Babbitt was more temperate towards Clements’ suggestions. And 
Clements’ guest worker plan was much better received at the first BGC meeting than at 
the previous SWBRC meeting. Conference attendee Leonel Castillo of Houston, former 
director of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, praised parts of Clements’ 
proposal and said it was more liberal than President Carter’s 1977 proposal, which had 
been opposed by Mexican-American groups and the U.S. Congress, and consequently 
scuttled.37 The ten governors agreed to send their suggestions to their federal 
governments. 
                                        
34 The Mexican governors were Roberto de la Madrid of Baja California, Samuel Ocaña Garcia 
of Sonora, Oscar Flores Tapia of Coahuila, Alfonso Martinez Dominguez of Nuevo Leon, 
Enrique Cardenas Gonzales of Tamaulipas, and Manuel Bernardo Aguirre of Chihuahua. The 
U.S. governors were William P. Clements of Texas, Bruce King of New Mexico, and Bruce 
Babbitt of Arizona. Gray Davis represented Gov. Edmund G. Brown of California.  
35 “Krueger Chides Meeting of U.S., Mexican Governors,” The Fort Worth Star-Telegram, 29 
June 1980. 
36 “Krueger Chides Meeting of U.S., Mexican Governors,” The Fort Worth Star-Telegram, 29 
June 1980.  
37 George Kuempel and Stephen Downer, “Governors Hail Meeting,” The Dallas Morning News, 
28 June 1980. 
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At the conclusion of the meeting, it was clear that no problems, either of state or 
federal jurisdiction, had been resolved. Clements’ response was that setting a precedent 
of cross-border communication made the meeting itself an accomplishment.  
But the SWBRC itself was short-lived. Four months after the June 1980 
binational conference, the Reagan administration abolished the Title V regional 
commissions. Enough funds remained for four more meetings. To handle the monies, the 
U.S. governors established a non-profit Southwest Border Region Conference, Inc.38 As 
these funds dwindled, it was unclear whether or not the governors would willingly pay 
for future meetings. But some saw the abolishment of the regional border commission as 
a step backward for U.S.-Mexico relations. Discontinuing the governors’ forums would 
likely inspire more criticism. It was decided the meetings would continue, alternating 
between a Mexican state and a U.S. state, with the host state responsible for funding that 
year’s meeting.39  
During the second meeting in October of 1981 in El Paso, Texas, the differences 
in the U.S. and Mexican federal systems was illustrated by the governors’ public 
comments. The U.S. governors openly argued amongst themselves over Pres. Reagan’s 
proposal to grant “limited legality” to undocumented aliens living and working in the 
United States, a proposal that eventually became the Immigration Reform and Control 
Act in 1986, which granted amnesty to about three million immigrants. Republican 
Clements of Texas initially opposed Pres. Reagan’s plan, but came around to support it. 
As the conference got underway, the other three U.S. governors – Jerry Brown of 
California, Bruce Babbitt of Arizona, and Bruce King of New Mexico, Democrats all – 
were vocal in their opposition to the plan and to Clements for supporting it.  
Amidst the U.S. governors freely expressing their opinions of President Reagan’s 
immigration plan, one of the Mexican governors, Samuel Ocana A. Garcia of Sonora, 
was asked his opinion of the Reagan proposal. Ocana’s short response illustrates the 
                                        
38 Ann Arnold, “Governors OK new Southwest border panel,” The Fort Worth Star-Telegram, 1 
October 1981.  
39 Today, the U.S. states often rely on the private sector to fund the meetings while Mexican 
hosts are more likely to use public monies. 
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more submissive relationship of Mexican governors to their federal government: “That’s 
a federal government matter and I’m not at liberty to discuss it,” he told reporters.40 
Gov. Ocana’s further remarks at the close of the meeting can be interpreted as 
critical of the amount of talk generated by the bickering U.S. governors. Gov. Ocana 
said, “we must not meet next year to address the same problems and find them at the 
same level as they are today.” One Texas reporter characterized Ocana’s remarks thus: 
“it would appear Ocana was telling his fellow governors he’s a busy man whose patience 
and expense account weren’t prepared to stand another session of hugs, 
handshakes…and watching the U.S. governors bicker…He’d like to see the American 
governors talk to the Mexican governors about the situations at hand and quit playing 
political one-upmanship with each other.”41 
 
 
The Border Governors’ Conference Today 
The Border Governors’ Conference continues today. Just before the 2003 
meeting in New Mexico, Gov. Tomás Yarrington of the Mexican state of Tamaulipas 
wrote a guest editorial for the Albuquerque newspaper. “The Border Governors' 
Conference does much of its work behind the scenes,” he wrote “as it provides the 
framework for state agencies from all ten states to devise and implement practical cross-
border solutions and policy positions on a year-around basis.” Gov. Yarrington lists the 
Conference’s recent initiatives: working to maintain the border’s maquiladora industry, 
to develop cross-border public health initiatives and to coordinate environmental 
policy. 42  
Most of the “behind the scenes” activity Gov. Yarrington referred to is carried 
out by each governor’s representative to the Conference, who attends several conference 
planning meetings throughout the year.  
                                        
40  Dick Merkel, “Border Chiefs Not Talking on Hard Issues,” The San Antonio Express-News, 
10 October 1981.  
41 Ibid.  
42  Gov. Tomás Yarrington, “Hurdles Await Border Governors,” The Albuquerque Journal, 7 
August 2003.  (Retrieved 6 October 2003.) Available from: 
http://www.abqjournal.com/opinion/guest_columns/guestb08-07-03.htm 
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The governor’s representative works closely with the committee delegates from 
his or her home state. The committees, now called Working Tables, have evolved into 
one of the most interesting features of the conference. The Working Tables at the 1998 
meeting in Brownsville presented the results from a year of research on Border 
Crossings, Economic Development, Environment, and Social Development. Governors 
and senior staff members choose the topics of the Working Tables, according to what 
issues the governors feel should be addressed. 
The delegates to the Working Tables represent the state agencies responsible for 
implementing policy on the corresponding Working Table topic. For example, Texas 
volunteered to head the Border Crossings Working Table for the 1999 meeting; thus the 
delegates researching the topic all year were from the Texas Department of 
Transportation. The delegate assignments change annually as different states volunteer 
to host each Working Table. The agency heads are involved because of their expertise, 
as well as the fact that they will be responsible for implementing any policy changes 
resulting from the meetings. 
Shortly before the annual meeting, the Working Tables meet with the governors’ 
representatives to share their recommendations and initiatives. By the meeting’s end, the 
compiled recommendations of all the Working Tables have become the Joint Declaration 
signed by all the attending governors. The declaration is in both English and Spanish and 
copies are sent to each nation’s president. 
Traditionally, each meeting starts on a Thursday evening and runs through Friday 
afternoon. While there are a few public events, most sessions are private and restricted to 
the governors, their representatives, and Working Table delegates. Dinner and lunch are 
usually “governors only,” with even translators barred (according to the 1997 agenda, no 
“wives, representatives or guests” are invited). 
Whether or not the Governors Conference has been responsible for specific 
policy improvements is difficult to discern. The governors lobbied their respective 
Congresses to pass NAFTA, and NAFTA passed. The consulates in Hermosillo and 
Matamoros were kept open; the price of laser visas for Mexican children under age 15 to 
enter the United States was reduced from $45.00 to $12.00 after the border governors 
 170
lobbied U.S. authorities. But despite the governors’ support that NAFTA provisions 
allowing trans-border trucking be implemented, Mexican trucks are still granted only 
limited access to U.S. soil.  
In recent years, the number of recommendations included in the Joint Declaration 
has been minimized so the dearest topics can be emphasized. The Declarations now 
serve as a blueprint against which the subsequent year’s goals and accomplishments can 
be measured.   
After the first conference, Arizona Gov. Bruce Babbitt said, “The most 
significant accomplishment here was that for 100 years we have misunderstood each 
other and for the first time the six Mexican border governors and the American 
governors have sat down together. It’s the beginning of an important and historical 
process.”43 A 1983 U.S. State Department report praised the conference: “It can count 
among its accomplishments the creation of an atmosphere of cooperation not visible 
elsewhere in our relations with Mexico, and a significant raising of public consciousness 
of problems along the border…”44  
There are no doubt intangible effects of the border governors feeling free to 
contact one another directly as the need arises. Arguably, one outcome is the 
establishment of other venues for intergovernmental relations between the Texas and 
Mexico. The trickle-down effect of open communication at the top is evident throughout 
the other policy areas this dissertation examines.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                        
43 “Krueger Chides Meeting of U.S., Mexican Governors,” The Fort Worth Star-Telegram, 29 
June 1980. 
44 William Schmitt, Border Governors Conference – A State Level Foreign Policy Mechanism, 
(U.S. Department of State, Foreign Service Institute, Executive Seminar in National and 
International Affairs, 1982-83): Summary page.  
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State/Federal/International Issues 
The Texas-U.S. axis (national causes): was the problem Texas sought to address 
under state or federal jurisdiction? What was the corresponding federal response: did the 
federal government support the mechanism, ignore it, or move to restrict the 
mechanism? 
The problems Texas sought to address were both of state jurisdiction – such as 
the social effects of immigration, like education – and of concurrent state and federal 
jurisdiction, such as transportation.  
The U.S. federal government knew U.S. governors planned to meet with 
Mexican governors. The first meetings were funded by the U.S. DOC via the Southwest 
Border Regional Commission funds. The Carter administration approved of the idea 
even as it objected to the governors’ discussing federal issues. 
Mexican Pres. Lopez Portillo approved of the meetings – but with strings 
attached. The Mexican governors were required to attend a briefing with the Mexican 
president before each BGC meeting. This tradition continued until recently. The current 
Mexican federal delegate to the meetings says the governors “have a voice now. The 
governors do not keep their mouths shut.”45 
Federal authorities from each nation were invited to the first meetings, perhaps to 
quell concerns of a subnational uprising. It is questionable whether or not federal 
officials’ fears were put at ease while listening to Texas Governor Bill Clements 
enthusiastically propose substantial changes to federal energy and immigration policies. 
His short- lived threat to negotiate his own agreements with Mexico likely raised some 
eyebrows.  
Many federal officials attended in the early years. Mexican President José Lopez 
Portillo attended the third meeting. Numerous ambassadors, secretaries of the Treasury, 
and so on, attended meetings as well.  
But ten years after its inception, the number of attendees and the hoopla 
generated by federal participants seemed out of control. Nearly 1300 people came to a 
                                        
45 Personal interview with Enrique Escorza of the Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico 
City, 29 October 2002. 
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meeting in Tucson, Arizona in the early 1990s. A turning point came in 1995: the 
scheduled meeting in Chihuahua was canceled when only one U.S. governor planned to 
attend. It became clear the meetings’ appeal had waned as the logistical demands of 
scheduling – and paying for – the numerous participants overwhelmed the working 
nature of the meetings. The answer? Reduce the number of delegates to ten per state and 
eliminate all federal participation.  
But it was discovered the Mexican governors were not permitted to sign the Joint 
Declaration summarizing the meeting unless the document had the approval of an 
official from the Mexican foreign ministry. So at the 1996 Santa Fe meeting, the only 
federal representative allowed was from the Mexican foreign affairs ministry, 
Secretararío de Relaciones Exteriores (SRE). Since then, two federal observers are 
allowed at the planning meetings and the conferences: one from the Mexican SRE and 
one from the U.S. State Department.46 
The host state has the right to invite other federal officials, but typically these 
officials are from regional federal offices such as the Internationa l Boundary Water 
Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, or the North American 
Development Bank. Seldom is anyone from Washington or Mexico City invited. The 
observer status of federal officials is enforced; they are allowed into the private sessions 
only if needed as a resource on a particular topic. There has never been any federal 
representation on the BGC committees, even if a committee’s purpose is to study an 
issue of federal responsibility, such as immigration.  
One former Texas governor’s representative to the BGC says concerns about the 
constitutionality of state officials discussing federal issues have been raised at times. He 
says the governors do not necessarily talk publicly about illegal drugs, immigration, or 
arms smuggling into Mexico, but they will talk about those in private. Generally 
speaking, the Conference members are careful not to interfere in a federal government 
responsibility, although the purpose of the body is to represent a regional viewpoint to 
federal authorities.  
                                        
46 Personal communication from Margie Emmermann, Policy Adviser, Office of the Governor of 
Arizona, 12 April 1999.  
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One thing to consider is why the states were starting their own conference around 
the same time that the U.S. and Mexican governments were beginning regular meetings 
through the Consultative Mechanism, later the Binational Commission.  
The creation of the two mechanisms at nearly the same time indicates mounting 
concerns between the two countries in need of attention. But the federal mechanism 
seemed to falter, and did not meet in 1979 and 1980, the two years that the state- level 
mechanism was developing.  
State actors are consistently dissatisfied with the level of attention the federal 
government gives to border issues. The creation of a regional mechanism to lobby the 
federal government on U.S.-Mexico and border issues symbolizes that dissatisfaction. 
Pres. Carter’s relationship with Pres. Lopez Portillo dipped after Carter visited Mexico 
in February of 1979.  
Texas Governor Clements, of course, disagreed with almost everything Pres. 
Carter did, and did not see the necessity of waiting for the federal government to confer 
with his neighbors to the South. This attitude trickled down to the governor’s staff. In a 
1980 interview with John Kincaid, a special assistant to Gov. Clements, in charge of 
relations with Mexico and Latin America, said: “We don’t have to ask permission of 
Washington in order to talk to the Mexican government. We are a sovereign state.”47  
But even Gov. Babbitt moved from defending Carter and the federal 
government’s supremacy in foreign affairs, to declaring that Washington, D.C. was not 
adequately addressing border concerns, indicating the border governors had little 
confidence that the federal government shared the same level of interest in the region. 
Apparently feeling their interests would not be well-represented by the federal 
government, state actors pushed the limits on state in foreign affairs, and took the 
initiative to create a state- level forum for international policy coordination.  
 
 
                                        
47 John Kincaid, “American Governors in International Affairs,” Publius: The Journal of 
Federalism 14 (Fall 1984): 96. 
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The U.S.–Mexico axis (international causes): what were the international 
political and economic conditions that contributed to or prevented the state’s effort to 
reach across the Rio Grande?   
National security concerns about oil figure heavily in this relationship at this time 
of worldwide energy crisis. Rather than constraining the state, these cond itions could 
have driven the U.S. governors to seek closer relations with the Mexican governors. 
Pres. Carter not have close relations with José Lopez Portillo., but Gov. Clements was in 
a unique position to understand the significance of oil to U.S. national security and how 
this could affect U.S.-Mexico relations. From 1973-76, he served as Undersecretary of 
Defense, the No. 2 man in the Department of Defense. He had made his fortune as a 
Texas oilman. He had a vested interest in accessing Mexican oil, both to supply the 
United States with oil and to secure opportunities for the Texas oil industry. Higher oil 
prices allowed Mexico to purchase new oilfield equipment, much of it from Texas 
suppliers. In this case, Clements' goals coincided with the national needs due to the 
energy crisis. 
 
 
The Texas-Mexico axis (state causes): How was the venue created? Did Texas’ 
interest in and method of contact with Mexico differ from the U.S. government’s 
relations with Mexico?  
Texas’ interest in contact with Mexico in part driven by the oil interests of Gov. 
Clements, same as the federal government’s, as described above, and by a lack of 
confidence in the federal government’s willingness to address burgeoning border issues 
in energy as well as public security, illegal drugs, and immigration.  
Regarding the method of contact, the personal element matters as Gov. Clements 
and Pres. Lopez Portillo were on very good terms. Gov. Clements was also quite friendly 
to and inclusive of the governors of the four Mexican states bordering Texas.  
Expanding the Southwest Border Regional Commission to include the Mexican 
governors has had ongoing effects within Mexico. It is arguable that the participation of 
the Mexican governors in the Border Governors Conference has led the Mexican federal 
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government to recognize the role their state governments can play in the policy process – 
within limits. The Mexican federal government is still highly centralized, and power 
concentrated at the Presidency. Mexican state governments do not have the autonomy 
enjoyed by U.S. states. The BGC was the first time Mexican states were allowed to 
participate in a joint U.S.-Mexican forum focusing on state powers and opportunities. 
The willingness of the federal Mexican authorities to allow the states to represent 
themselves at the meetings has likely led the way for the states to represent themselves 
in other areas. As the governors began to act with authority on border issues, 
opportunities to participate in federal- level border negotiations opened up – for both the 
U.S. and Mexican states. Whereas U.S. states have for years been invited by the U.S. 
federal government to participate in border- issue conferences such as the Environmental 
Protection Agency’s Border XXI meetings, Mexican states have only recently been 
permitted to attend such meetings at the invitation of Mexican federal officials. 
Beginning in October 2001, Mexican and U.S. states are invited to participate in the 
U.S.-Mexico Binational Commission meetings.48 In this way, the U.S. states have 
influenced Mexican politics by consistently seeking the participation of their neighbor 
states in border issues. 
A U.S. DOS official who has attended the meetings for several years says it is 
beneficial for state actors to be conferring on common issues, given the complexity of 
the concerns involved. “We encourage states to work together; only good can come from 
that,” he says. “The states are very pragmatic on trade, health, etcetera. We (DOS) would 
want to facilitate that, not stand in the way.” He says “the states are key players – we 
have to have them at the table, or things won’t work right. We must collaborate.” 49  
 
 
 
 
                                        
48 Texas Secretary of State, Accomplishments – Executive Summary. (Retrieved 7 October 2003.) 
Available from http://www.sos.state.tx.us/border/jdxxaccomplishments.shtml 
49 Personal interview in Washington, D.C. with David Randolph, Coordinator of U.S.-Mexican 
Affairs, U.S. Dept of State, 13 November 2000. 
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U.S.-MEXICO BORDER STATES ATTORNEYS GENERAL CONFERENCE 
The Border States Attorneys’ General Conference (BSAGC) is also a working 
conference involving the attorneys general from the ten states along the U.S.-Mexico 
border. The Conference began meeting in 1986. 
 
U.S.-Mexico Historical Context, 1980-1986 
* Oil and Politics * In 1979, a price hike in oil gave Mexico the means to 
conduct further exploration. With newfound expertise in the field, Mexico enjoyed 
helping Cuba, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica search for their own oil. By 1981, Mexico was 
said to have the world’s fifth- largest oil supply and the seventh-largest gas reserves.50  
To prevent dependence on the U.S. oil market, and thereby retain a sense of 
autonomy, Mexico President José López Portillo ordered in 1980 “no more than 50 
percent of Mexico’s crude exports should go to any single client.” 51 However, when 
world oil prices starting dropping in June of 1981, Mexico had little choice but to 
increase its exports to the United States. 
In August of 1981, Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex), Mexico’s federal oil agency, 
signed a long-term contract to supply the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve with 50,000 
barrels of oil per day (bpd). Mexico was rapidly losing money as oil prices still fell. To 
compensate, the nation borrowed from foreign lenders. But suspicions that the peso was 
overvalued and unstable led to a significant flight of capital. In February 1982, José 
López Portillo devalued the peso by 40 percent. Another peso devaluation in August was 
followed by a suspension of principal payments on Mexico’s huge foreign debt. That 
same month, Pemex signed an additional 12-month contract to supply the U.S. reserve 
with 110,000 bpd. Thus by 1983, half of Mexico’s exported oil – 750,000 bpd – was 
going to the United States, to fund its crucial national security reserve of oil. 52 
                                        
50 Riding, p. 240. 
51 Riding, p. 241. 
52 Alan Riding, Distant Neighbors: A Portrait of the Mexicans (New York: First Vintage Books, 
1986): 91 and 486. 
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The oil dip made two things very clear: the first was oil’s huge new role in world 
finance. By 1982, Mexico had an international debt greater than $84 billion, borrowed 
against its newfound oil wealth. 53   
The second was the irony that Mexico’s oil and gas – its presumed ticket to 
political independence from the North – had created more economic interdependence 
between the Mexican and U.S. economies than ever before. This was most readily 
apparent in the effects of the 1982 peso devaluation on the Southwestern United States. 
Businesses in the border states felt an immediate impact, as many of their best clients –
Mexicans – had no capital for purchases. But exporters of everything from oilfield 
equipment to light aircraft lost clients. Adding fuel to the fire, so to speak, was the fact 
that the consequent recession in the United States shrunk markets for Mexico’s non-oil 
exports.  
The evidence of the Mexican economic woes in the border states contrasted 
greatly with the ignorance of interdependence apparent in the U.S. capital. When the 
Mexican Finance Minister, Jesús Silva Herzog, realized Mexico’s inability to pay even 
the interest on its huge debt, he anxiously flew to Washington on 13 August 1982 to seek 
help in staving off Mexico’s imminent bankruptcy. After explaining his country had run 
out of foreign exchange, he was told by Treasury Secretary Donald Regan: “Well, that’s 
your problem.” Only after Silva Herzog made clear how involved U.S. banks were in 
Mexico’s economic welfare did frantic negotiations to shore up its economy begin. The 
Southwest’s regional interest in the Mexican economic health became the national 
interest when the interpenetration of U.S. business in Mexico was made clear to federal 
policymakers. The Reagan administration, somewhat reluctantly, promised an 
emergency package of aid, including $1 billion in advance payment for oil and other 
loans.54 What was called a “rollover” was really a way to keep from saying that Mexico 
had at least partially defaulted on its loans.55  
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54 Riding, p. 487. 
55 Yergin, p. 731. 
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* Central America *  In 1981, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Pres. Reagan’s ambassador to 
the United Nations, said that “Central America is the most important place in the world 
for the United States today.” Civil wars in Nicaragua and El Salvador took on global 
importance as the Reagan administration identified the area “as a fundamental testing 
ground of national resolve in a worldwide struggle against the forces of communism,” 
writes Peter H. Smith.  56 Secretary of State Alexander Haig explained the United States 
had to assist the military government in El Salvador because of a “well-orchestrated 
international Communist campaign designed to transform the Salvadoran crisis from the 
internal conflict to an increasingly internationalized confrontation…This effort involves 
close coordination by Moscow, satellite capitals and Havana, with the cooperation of 
Hanoi and Managua…It is a threat, in our view, not just to the United States but to the 
West at large.”57 
Washington was not happy when Mexico joined with the French government in 
August 1981 in supporting the El Salvadorean revolutionary group Farabundo Martí 
Liberation Front (FMLN). In February 1982, José López Portillo issued a plan to 
negotiate a settlement in El Salvador, create a nonaggression treaty between the United 
States and Nicaragua, and to “serve as a bridge” for dialogue to reduce tensions between 
Cuba and the United States. The Reagan administration dismissed his plan in favor of 
military solutions.  
Another thorn in the Reagan administration’s side was Mexican’s joining with 
Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama in on the island of Contadora in January 1983 to craft 
a peace plan for the Nicaraguan conflict. The Reagan administration worked behind the 
scenes to prevent adoption of the Contadora peace plan, at the same time increasing 
military aid to El Salvador. Eventually elements of the Contadora plan were included in 
a plan developed by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sánchez, which in 1987 brought 
“a measure of peace” to the region. 58 For his efforts, President Arias was awarded the 
1987 Nobel Peace Prize.  
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57 Ibid, p. 179. 
58 Ibid, p. 215. 
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* Grenada *  In 1983, an internal and bloodless coup in the small Caribbean 
island nation of Grenada turned ugly when disagreement between the two coup leaders 
led to the murder of one by the other. A plan for the evacuation of some 1,000 U.S. 
citizens on the islands mushroomed into a full-scale military invasion. On 21 October 
the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States met without Grenada and agreed to invite 
friendly governments to intervene in Grenada. The following day, the Caribbean 
Community voted to suspend Grenada’s membership in that organization and passed 
sanctions against the troubled nation as well. Also on that date, Pres. Reagan approved 
proceeding with invasion plans.  
The next day, Sunday October 23, across the globe in Beirut, a suicide bombing 
by an Islamic extremist took the lives of 241 U.S. Marines. The tension level in the 
White House escalated, as did concerns that the popular Middle Eastern terrorist tactic of 
hostage-taking might now be used in Grenada. On 25 October, 1900 U.S. Marines as 
well as airborne troops and a small contingent of Caribbeans invaded Grenada. Within a 
few days, the United States had met its military goals. The casualties: twenty-one 
Grenadian security forces and twenty-four civilians, twenty-four Cubans, and nineteen 
U.S. servicemen. 
Pres. Reagan explained to his constituents that Grenada was “a Soviet-Cuban 
colony being readied as a major military bastion to export terror and undermine 
democracy…We got there just in time.” Others saw the situation differently. Speaking at 
the United Nations Security Council, Mexican ambassador Porfirio Muñoz Ledo rejected 
the invasion as “a clear violation of international law…totally lacking in justification.” 
The Security Council voted 11-1-3 in favor of a resolution deploring the military action. 
Pres. Reagan was even criticized by his compatriot, British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher, who complained that the United States had invaded a member of the British 
Commonwealth. 59  
                                        
59 Smith, pp. 181-182. 
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The Border States Attorneys General Conference 
The first meeting of the ten attorneys general from the U.S.-Mexico border states 
took place in Guaymas, Sonora, Mexico on 21 and 22 November 1986. By all accounts 
it was an informal get-together, with no agenda, more of a cocktail party and photo 
opportunity than a policy session.  
The conference had earlier been proposed by the Mexican Attorney General, 
Sergio García Ramirez, to U.S. Attorney General Ed Meese, as a way of improving 
border coordination on criminal justice issues, including drug interdiction. 60 It is likely 
that Mexico was using part of a sizeable anti-drug grant from the United States to fund 
the meetings, and that the meetings themselves were a way of showing the United States 
that Mexico was using the grant constructively. 
The Texas attorney general at the time, Jim Mattox, remembers thinking that the 
Mexican attorneys general “did not have a good understanding of the relationship of the 
U.S. state attorneys general to the U.S. federal attorney general. Most state attorneys 
general did not have high levels of criminal jurisdiction at the time,” Mr. Mattox said. 
“The Mexicans thought we did. We were not certain if they wanted to meet with us or 
with the U.S. Attorney General.”61 
The Mexicans’ number one concern was the guns being smuggled from the 
United States into Mexico. “We were interested in guns to the extent that they 
destabilized the country (Mexico) and (because) the drug runners were using high-
powered weapons,” explained Mr. Mattox. The Mexicans’ next concern was the 
“adoption” in the United States of kidnapped babies from Mexico. Of lesser importance 
to the Mexicans was the issue of illegal drugs, “and their emphasis was always on 
reducing demand rather than supply,” Mattox said. The Mexicans were also interested in 
missing persons – the Mexican nationals who entered the United States and were never 
                                        
60 Telephone interview with Ed Meese from Washington, D.C., 4 April 2000; also in William F. 
McDonald, The Changing Boundaries of Law Enforcement: State and Local Law Enforcement, 
Illegal Immigration, and Transnational Crime Control: Final Report. (National Institute of 
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61 Phone interview with Jim Mattox from Austin, Texas, 3 February 2000. 
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heard from again. For their part, the U.S. attorneys general wanted to talk about money 
laundering, auto theft, and drug smuggling.  
The Mexican attorneys general were interested in learning more about U.S. 
technology. But there was “great resistance” among U.S. state officials to sharing 
information on weapons, equipment, anything that could inform drug smugglers about 
enforcement activities or methods. “Our side viewed them (the Mexicans) as part of the 
problem,” Mr. Mattox explained. But, “we were cautioned not to talk to them about 
corruption,” he remembers, “probably by someone from DOJ (U.S. Department of 
Justice).” 
After a few years of mostly insubstantial, happy-hour-type meetings, the U.S. 
attorneys general were of a mind to cancel the whole endeavor. 
Then a horrific crime illustrated the necessity for cross-border law enforcement 
cooperation. In 1989, a University of Texas student, Mark Kilroy, was vacationing with 
friends in the Mexican border city of Matamoros, in Texas’ neighboring state of 
Tamaulipas. During the evening of March 14, he disappeared.  
By March 16, four Cameron County deputies and six U.S. Customs agents were 
on the case. Kilroy’s uncle was a Customs agent in Los Angeles. At first, Mark’s 
kidnapping was thought to be a retribution against the Customs agency for a secret 
operation of Customs agents in Mexico, who were tracking the routes Central Americans 
used to get through Mexico into the United States. The Mexican government had found 
out about the secret agents and was angry. 62 But the initial suspicions about who Mark’s 
kidnappers might be soon proved to be wrong.  
Kilroy’s family searched for him. His father wandered the streets of Matamoros 
with paper flyers of Mark’s photograph. People barely spoke to him. Finally Mr. and 
Mrs. Kilroy went to see then-Attorney General Mattox at his Austin office. Mattox sent 
his chief investigator to Matamoros. Then Mattox met with the Tamaulipas state attorney 
general, who soon fired many of the police who had been on the case. Mexican 
authorities intensified the search. Weeks later, Mark’s body and the bodies of several 
                                        
62 Jim Schutze, Cauldron of Blood: the Matamoros Cult Killings (New York: Avon Books, 
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others were found on a farm outside Matamoros. All had been the victims of ritual 
sacrifice by a devil-worshipping cult involved in drug smuggling. They believed 
participating in human sacrifice would render them immune to capture and even 
invisible to law enforcement.  
This was the first time officials from both sides of the border had cooperated to 
solve such a significant crime, says former Attorney General Mattox, and it did not 
always run smoothly. More than one U.S. law enforcement officer involved in the Kilroy 
investigation said they came face-to-face with corruption among the Mexican officers. In 
order to get information on the missing University of Texas student, U.S. officials 
stressed their humanitarian desire to help Kilroy’s family find some peace, and 
deliberately communicated to Mexican officials that illegal drug or financial activities 
would be overlooked. “Serious transgressions in that case were ignored,” says a federal 
agent who worked on the case. Because of his willingness to tolerate corruption, “I 
gained their respect.” 
Attorney General Mattox says that having met the Mexican authorities through 
the BSAGC meetings, knowing them on a first-name basis, was vital to the pursuit and 
eventual conclusion of the case, he said, adding, “They (the Mexican officials) were very 
responsive to me.”  
In the past, the kidnapping would not have caught the attention of either a U.S. 
state or Mexican attorney general. Any problems would have been dealt with through the 
local police chief – probably the first person the Kilroys contacted. 
After this case, the BSAGC meetings became more businesslike and more 
helpful. Each side seemed better able to communicate their viewpoints and to listen with 
more understanding, Mr. Mattox said. In June of 1991, Mr. Mattox’s successor, Dan 
Morales, attended the BSAGC meeting in Tijuana. A new resolve seemed evident. The 
North American Free Trade Agreement was now a political possibility, and Mexican 
officials were eager to convey that law enforcement in Mexico could be trusted.  
At the end of the meeting, the attorneys general signed the “Tijuana Resolution,” 
which recognizes the “new relation” between the two nations, and “the increasing social 
and economical interchange in the frontiers of both friendly nations…” The Resolution 
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vowed cooperation in seven areas, including auto theft, money laundering, regulating the 
adoption of Mexican children, and the need to assist police forces: “to elevate the quality 
and preparation of those elements in charge of preventing and investigating the 
crimes.”63 The resolution set the agenda for subsequent meetings, which continue today. 
However, local law enforcement says the Kilroy case did little to improve 
relations along the border, and that few things changed in day-to-day law enforcement 
transactions. While running for Texas governor in 1990, Mr. Mattox was able to 
generate some tangible political support for a cross-border system for tracking missing 
persons; but this support evaporated when Mattox lost to Ann Richards in the 
Democratic party’s gubernatorial primary.  
The border attorneys general still meet annually, although the group seems less 
organized than the Border Governors’ Conference. Hosting duties rotate from state to 
state, and in 2002 and 2003, no meeting was held. 
One state official said the meetings help both sides understand the legal and 
political capacities and limitations of the attorney general agencies on the other side of 
the border. Prior to the regular meetings, assumptions were made about what each side 
could do or not do, he says. Each side tended to see the capacities of the other through 
the lens of their own capabilities; yet the powers of U.S. and Mexican state attorneys 
general are very different.  
On the U.S. side, a state attorney general acts as the state’s legal representative, 
defending the laws of the state from legal challenge. The Texas attorney general 
responds to cases that originate at the county level. On the Mexican side, the attorney 
general has a police function as well as a prosecutorial function, and the Mexican state 
police are part of the state Attorneys General, as the federal police (FJP) are part of the 
PGR. Mexican attorneys general also handle more criminal cases than do most U.S. 
attorneys general, although Texas has moved into more criminal law in recent years, 
including money- laundering and Internet crime.  
 
                                        
63 Transcript of the XIV U.S.-Mexico Border State Attorneys General Conference, compiled by 
Roberto San Miguel, and printed by the Texas Office of the Attorney General, 1995. 
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State/Federal/International Issues 
The Texas-U.S. axis (national causes): was the problem Texas sought to address 
under state or federal jurisdiction? What was the corresponding federal response: did the 
federal government support the mechanism, ignore it, or move to restrict the 
mechanism? 
The criminal justice problems Texas sought to address are arguably concerns 
shared by both the state and the federal government.   
The U.S. federal government knew of and approved of the creation of the 
conference, but apparently did not fund the U.S. side of the meetings.  
Texas’ Mr. Mattox does not remember how he learned the meetings were to 
begin, but he said he never got nor sought permission from U.S. federal authorities. At 
some point, questions were raised whether or not the states could carry on such close 
relations with foreign entities, particularly when it seemed the Mexicans wanted the U.S. 
officials to enter into cooperative agreements. “We realized they were talking to us as if 
we were the federal government," Mr. Mattox said. This caused some concern among 
Texas officials, whether or not they were overstepping their constitutional authority. “Of 
course, in Texas we took the position we were sovereign over everybody,” Mr. Mattox 
jokes. “We never came to any conclusion (on the constitutional question), we just moved 
forward anyway.” Obviously, the states met no resistance from U.S. officials.  
Mr. Mattox said there may have been a U.S. federal representative at the early 
BSAGC meetings, but to his recollection, federal officials did not have a significant 
involvement in the process at first.  
Today, federal representatives from both sides are invited to make reports and 
observe the meetings, but the state officials are definitely in charge.  
As far as federal officials are concerned, the meetings have not caused any 
problems between the states and the U.S. federal government. One DOJ official says it’s 
“not a bad idea” to foster relations at the state level. Another official says the Mexicans 
are pleased that state officials want to communicate with them, and the meetings have 
opened doors to cooperation on issues such as international prosecutions, child support, 
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stolen vehicles, and other issues of local interest. The meetings are fine, “as long as 
they’re not interfering with something we (the federal government) do or are being 
counterproductive,” says this federal official.  
State officials acknowledge that U.S. federal officials have been generally 
supportive of the meetings: “They (U.S. feds) give us the room we need provided we 
don’t break international law, and if there’s a treaty involved we defer,” he says. 
At the annual meetings, it is clear how the U.S. and Mexican states enjoy 
different levels of autonomy. The Mexican state officials are deferent to the Mexican 
federal officials; while the U.S. federal officials are more deferentia l to the states, and 
are respectful of the state’s initiatives. This makes things easier for the U.S. states, which 
one Texas law enforcement official feels is appropriate because, as he explains: “Let’s 
face it, we’re doing a lot of their (the federal government’s) work.”  
 
The U.S.–Mexico axis (international causes): what were the international political and 
economic conditions that contributed to or prevented the state’s effort to reach across the 
Rio Grande?   
It can be argued that the changing nature of national security concerns during 
these closing years of the Cold War necessitated the involvement of the states in 
burgeoning criminal justice challenges. As Cold War issues on the international agenda 
waned, illegal immigration and drug use climbed higher on the U.S. national security 
agenda. But these issues require a different approach from the military policy of 
containment. Diffuse in nature and regional in impact, an effective method requires 
cooperation at all levels of law enforcement. Thus state officials arguably became 
partners in fighting the new national security threats. 
In May of 1977, U.S. Pres. Jimmy Carter and Mexican Pres. José Lopez Portillo 
had created a binational forum called the U.S.-Mexico Consultative Mechanism. The 
Mechanism established a means of regular communication between Cabinet- level 
officials in both nations. In 1981, the Reagan administration renamed it the Binational 
Commission (BNC). The BNC comprises working groups of officials exchanging 
information on political, economic, and social matters. It is likely that the idea of a state 
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attorneys general conference was first broached at a BNC meeting between the U.S. and 
Mexican federal attorneys general as they discussed criminal justice issues.64 
The Texas-Mexico axis (state causes): How was the venue created? Did Texas’ 
interest in and method of contact with Mexico differ from the U.S. government’s 
relations with Mexico?  
The BSAGC cannot be called a governing mechanism as much as it is a 
mechanism for facilitating communication, which it seems to accomplish.  
Before the mechanism began, Texas was already somewhat active in increasing 
cooperation with Mexico on border crimes. During Jim Mattox’s administration, the 
Office of the Texas Attorney General had already sponsored cross-border crime law 
enforcement cooperation seminars.65   
Because of the creation of the Binational Commission, the method of contact 
does not differ in this case between the U.S. government and the Texas government. 
Regular meetings among state officials mirror the cabinet-level meetings among federal 
officials via the BNC.  
Texas and Mexico enjoy the benefits of a mutual relationship that exists 
independently of U.S.-Mexico ties. A former assistant to Dan Morales told an analyst 
that Morales had “a close working relationship with Mexican criminal justice officials 
that is not reflected in the U.S.-Mexican binational relationship on criminal matters.” 
The assistant claimed that, on issues affecting the Texas-Mexico relationship, Mexican 
officials “prefer to work directly with the Texas government instead of through the U.S. 
government,” as might have been the case in the past.66 
 But at least one Mexican federal authority expressed a slight tinge of disapproval 
when speaking about the attorneys’ conference, saying that state authorities want to 
handle some issues as if they were merely state or domestic issues, when in fact they are 
                                        
64 Fact Sheet: U.S.-Mexico Binational Commission, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of 
State, 28 June 1993): 459.  
65 Mr. Mattox felt these meetings were more cost-effective than the meetings of the attorneys 
general. 
66 Interview with Texas Deputy Attorney General Drew Durham, conducted by Jan Gilbreath, 
and related in her paper, The Mexico-Texas Relationship: Redefining Regionalism, paper 
prepared for La Nueva Agenda de la Relacíon Bilateral Conference (Mexico City, May 19-20, 
1995): 17.  
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federal issues and should be treated as such. “There are procedures and channels to 
follow. Sometimes they don’t pay attention to those,” says this official. He complains 
that at times, his office has not been notified properly about a fugitive exchange. “Texas 
used to be a country. The Texas Rangers think they own the country and forget that the 
agencies are there and have a function to do. Sometimes they interfere with the function 
of federal agencies.”67    
His comments reflect the tradition of federal control characteristic of the 
Mexican system, and the practice that Mexican state authorities must keep their federal 
government informed of their activities, more so than U.S. authorities are accustomed to 
doing. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
Given the low political priority placed on the U.S.-Mexico border, it is 
sometimes difficult to prove exactly what the policy goals with respect to this area are. 
But for purposes of analysis, this project assumes the U.S. border states and the federal 
government have shared general policy goals with respect to relations with Mexico, in 
that both levels of government want minimal conflict with Mexico. But during the Cold 
War, problems with Mexico were often downplayed or ignored. Since the Cold War’s 
end, Mexico rose slightly higher on the U.S. foreign policy agenda, but U.S. 
policymakers are often still uncomfortable addressing relations with Mexico. 
Many of the social concerns along the border are under state jurisdiction, but 
historically Texas has been slow to address the issues, instead arguing the federal 
government should act in that area. But as globalization increased the movement of 
people across borders, and the border population grows, pressure mounts for some level 
of government to take action. The creation of the Border Governors’ Conference shows 
that in this atmosphere of ambiguity of responsibility for border concerns, and out of 
frustration with the federal government, state officials initiated a mechanism for regional 
policy coordination.  
                                        
67 Personal interview with Mexican federal agent in San Antonio, Texas, 5 December 2001.  
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While U.S.-Mexico relations during the Carter administration benefited in the 
long term from the creation of what became the Binational Commission, short-term 
relations between the two federal governments were still strained.68  Texas Gov. 
Clements, already a wheeler-dealer in Mexico through his oil contacts, represented the 
state’s business sector and its desire to curry relations with Mexico without carrying the 
responsibility for enforcing national security. The governor’s subnational- level 
priorities, the ability to place economics above security, likely made his overtures quite 
appealing to Pres. López Portillo.  
The three other Southwest states were led by Democrats at the time. Gov. Bruce 
Babbitt of Arizona kept up the party line the first year by defending Pres. Carter’s turf, 
resisting the idea that it was appropriate for state governments to discuss federal issues. 
But by the following year, Gov. Babbitt was admittedly pleased to see the states meeting 
independently with Mexico. This indicates that, as former U.S. House Speaker Tip 
O’Neill quipped, “all politics is local.” Gov. Babbitt’s responsiveness to local interests 
proved stronger than his party affiliation with the President. The U.S. federal 
government – represented by Special Ambassador to Mexico Robert Krueger – was only 
mildly concerned about the governors moving into “their turf” of direct relations at first, 
but did not act to restrict the states. 
As the Conference has continued, the governors have been sensitive not to tread 
too obviously on areas of federal authority and do not discuss federal issues in public, 
likely more out of deference to the Mexican governors, who take fewer liberties in their 
more centrally-controlled federal system.  
If anything, the U.S. states could likely get away with more opposition than they 
have tried, without inviting the federal government to curtail them. Texas Gov. 
Clements’ vocal complaints about federal policy – and the lack of a serious federal 
response – suggests that even now, the states could be much more aggressive in 
opposing or endorsing federal policy than they currently are. The U.S. Department of 
State representative who attended the BGC meetings fo r several years says the states are 
                                        
68 Robert Pastor, Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992): 50-51. 
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quite respectful of not treading on federal prerogatives, and describes the Joint 
Declarations as “very mildly-worded. Many governors would like to take a stronger 
position but they know it is politically sensitive.”69 
The states have no legal authority to confer with foreign nations on any policy 
issue. But there has always been a lack of clarity of responsibility for border policy. 
Several factors contribute to the shifting of responsibility for policy in the border: a lack 
of political clout among border residents who suffer high levels of chronic poverty; 
physical distance from governing centers in both Austin and Washington, and the 
complexity of a space where state, federal, and international concerns converge with no 
clear hierarchy of power.  
The lack of a formal role for the states did not prevent the states from acting, 
rather it gave the states the space to take initiative. After all, lobbying the federal 
government is an appropriate action for states concerned with the efficacy of domestic 
policy. Extending this to include the Mexican governors seemed only natural, from the 
view of state actors.  
In this dynamic policy environment, characterized by multiple complex issues 
and a lack of clarity of responsibility, the state governors and attorneys general were able 
to assert themselves with only minimal conflict from the federal government, despite the 
lack of a formal role allowing state actors to confer directly with their foreign 
counterparts. The open U.S. federal system gives states the freedom to innovate policies 
to address local needs. If Keohane and Nye are correct about today’s foreign policy 
agenda, then as issues become more complex and the global economy more intertwined, 
the experience of the border states indicates that lower levels of government have the 
opportunity to become increasingly assertive, given the openness of the system and the 
vagueness about who is responsible for policy. 
However, a possible outcome of assertive states could be renewed policing by the 
federal government to prevent the growth of a mechanism whose influence could 
challenge Washington. As globalization continues to affect policy across the board, then 
                                        
69 Personal interview in Washington, D.C. with David Randolph, Coordinator of U.S.-Mexican 
Affairs, U.S. Dept of State, 13 November 2000. 
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the states and federal government might find their long-term goals in relations with 
Mexico to be in conflict. If state actors were to join forces with opposition interest 
groups, the border officials’ mechanisms could evolve into an influential body capable 
of criticizing the federal government, in which case either the Mexican or U.S. federal 
government would likely trump the state- level conferences. But there seems to be a great 
deal of room before that point is likely to be reached. 
But for now, given generally common goals and a lack of definition of authority 
for border development, states have been able to define for themselves how they relate to 
Mexico, and have been free to cultivate relations directly with their Mexican 
counterparts. Each of these conferences could be more aggressive in working to 
coordinate policies and pressuring the federal government than they currently are, but 
are not likely to increase their activism out of deference to the federal governments in 
both nations. Whether or not states take that opportunity may well depend on either 
leadership at the top or the capacity of grassroots groups to organize and pressure state 
leaders into action. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE CONVERGENCE OF JURISDICTIONS ON 
INTERNATIONAL CRIME: FUGITIVE APPREHENSION AND 
RECOVERY 
 
“Criminals do not have to have treaties; they just work, very effectively. In all 
parts of the world, criminals are always ahead.” – Attaché, Procuraduría General de la 
República. 
 
   
INTRODUCTION 
As domestic policy has become internationalized, the local practice of criminal 
justice has changed. For state and local law enforcement, globalization has meant 
learning to handle local crimes that involve foreign citizens. All levels of government 
share the goal of enforcing the public safety, but the twist here is that international 
treaties govern those aspects of local law enforcement involving foreigners, and in this 
area, by developing an independent role in foreign affairs, state and local law 
enforcement runs the risk of damaging U.S. foreign relations overall. Even so, the 
federal government has not actively prevented the states from developing foreign law 
enforcement contacts, and even have policies in place that tacitly encourage the states to 
act independently to recover fugitives.  
In this case, the states are acting within their traditional jurisdiction, but as the 
nature of domestic policy has changed, the states’ role has expanded to include crimes 
that involve foreign perpetrators and victims. While the federal government negotiates 
treaties that are intended to control the behavior of even state and local law enforcement, 
subnational officials often violate these treaties out of frustration or ignorance. One 
might expect the federal government to seek to restrict subnational governments in this 
area, but the sheer number of officials and cases make this unfeasible. Instead, federal 
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officials rely on state and local law enforcement to meet their public safety goals and 
hopes that no international incidents result from the actions of state and local officials. 
While law enforcement operates within state and national borders, and legal and 
jurisdictional limitations, technology has created a borderless world for criminals.1 As 
the international movement of people and goods increases and accelerates, state and 
local cops find themselves pursuing international fugitives, tracking global drug crimes, 
apprehending money launderers, and arresting foreign nationals for anything from petty 
to significant crimes. Globalization changes the domestic environment; it demands that 
subnational governments develop new capacities. 
States share goals with the federal government to ensure the public safety. 
Subnational governments and the federal government share concurrent jurisdiction in 
criminal justice and each level has its own law enforcement apparatus.  
To the federal government, the increasing role of state and locals in foreign law 
enforcement relations is a mixed blessing. Federal agencies cannot possibly handle the 
sheer volume of cases involving foreign nationals, and need state and local law 
enforcement to process what really are state and local cases. The federal government 
does not take over a case even if a foreign national is involved; a local crime remains a 
local crime. But the states’ use of their own international contacts puts federal officials’ 
teeth on edge. Because international criminal justice concerns are governed by treaty, 
there is potential for the states to violate the treaty in the course of pursuing their own 
cases. Therefore the increasing involvement of subnational law enforcement in 
international cases involves a degree of risk to U.S. foreign relations as a whole.  
Now, before the effect of globalization on law enforcement has been fully 
realized, the War on Terror is again changing the demands on law enforcement. During 
the Cold War, national security was the province of the federal government. The U.S. 
military, restricted in its domestic role, had sole responsibility for maintaining the 
integrity of seldom-threatened national borders and for carrying out military action 
                                        
1 William F. McDonald, State and Local Law Enforcement, Illegal Immigration and 
Transnational Crime Control, Final Report. (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 
U.S. Department of Justice, 1999).  
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overseas.2 The states shared responsibility with federal law enforcement agencies for 
protecting public safety at home. 
But on the morning of 11 September 2001, the concept that security threats to the 
United States can be categorized as either “domestic” or “foreign” was destroyed. Since 
then, state and local law enforcement have been asked to do more to ensure the nation’s 
safety from terrorist threats.  
It remains to be seen how fighting terrorism will affect the role of domestic law 
enforcement. The reevaluation of government functions following the tragedy of 
September 11th puts renewed emphasis on the importance of interagency cooperation 
both between federal agencies and among all levels of government.  
The changing nature of security threats and more actors in the process means 
there is an elevated risk of miscommunication and misunderstandings, and the increased 
likelihood of interagency power struggles. As globalization has brought international 
overtones to domestic law enforcement concerns, the challenge of intergovernmental 
coordination is heightened in cases including different nations, different languages and 
different legal processes.  
But as this case study will show, there is a chronic lack of clarity surrounding the 
international law enforcement role of the states. Because of the legal issues surrounding 
states and international criminal justice, these roles are likely to remain unclear. 
  
 
The War on Terror and Shared Goals  
While all levels of law enforcement share the same short-term goals – to protect 
the public safety – the War on Terror already has found some state and local law 
enforcement at odds with the means adopted by the federal government. One tension 
here is that fighting terrorism on the domestic front diverts law enforcement resources 
from local concerns in favor of protecting federally-designated “soft targets” such as 
                                        
2 The exception to this rule is the state National Guard troops, which can be under either state or 
federal control, in either a military or police capacity, and are an understudied phenomena in the 
study of federalism and law enforcement. 
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infrastructure. Another is the resistance of many subnational entities to fully 
implementing the Patriot Act. Others refuse to enforce federal immigration laws.3  
There are many times when state and local officers will cooperate with federal 
immigration agents. They will provide support during immigration raids, report an 
illegal individual after arrest on state criminal charges, or release a convict to 
immigration authorities for deportation.  4 But illegal presence in the United States is a 
federal offense, not a state crime, and state and local officers will not arrest for it.5 
But in April of 2002, the U.S. Department of Justice considered updating a legal 
opinion to give state and local police departments the authority to arrest for civil 
immigration violations. The response at the subnational level was overwhelmingly 
negative. Police objected on two fronts: one, lacking the resources to pursue immigration 
violators and two, their reluctance to damage relations with immigrant communities, 
who are often targeted by domestic criminals because of their illegal status. Police chief 
Ron Louie of Hillsboro, Oregon, said, "We're trying to build bridges with people living 
in fear. If police officers become agents of the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS), their ability to deal with issues such as domestic violence and crime prevention 
will be severely curtailed."6 
In Putnam County, Tennessee, Sheriff Jerry Abston spoke to the division of 
responsibilities between federal and subnational law enforcement:  
"I wouldn't have the resources to do that…Money's tight in the state, in the counties, too. 
It's [the INS'] job to take care of the borders, and I just think they need to do it."7 
                                        
3 Elaine de Valle, “Immigrant Advocates Blast Ashcroft Plan,” The Miami Herald . (24 April 
2002, Retrieved 19 September 2003). Available from: 
http://www.miami.com/mld/miami/3130211.htm 
4 The agency previously known as the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) is now two 
agencies in the Department of Homeland Security. The enforcement arm is Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement; the other is Citizenship and Immigration Services. 
5 “California Police Chiefs Association Letter to the Attorney General,” The National 
Immigration Forum, 10 April 2002. (Retrieved 20 September 2003). Available at: 
http://www.immigrationforum.org/currentissues/articles/041002_calpo.htm  
6 "Helping People Without Papers," The Portland Oregonian, 5 April 2002. 
7 "Midstate Authorities Balk at Possibly Enforcing Immigration Laws," The Tennessean, 15 
April 2002. 
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Other federal government actions in the war against terrorism could negatively 
affect the good relations state and local law enforcement are developing with other 
nations.  Federal counterterrorism strategies such as detaining foreign nationals without 
charges or seeking the death penalty for accused terrorists could hinder progress in 
matters of local concern like extradition and fugitive recovery.  
Thus it is necessary to consider that in the important policy area of law 
enforcement, the goals of the states and the federal government are the same, but as the 
security climate changes due to terrorism concerns, the international role that state and 
local law enforcement are asserting for themselves now could change as federal 
strategies change. But before the future can be considered, it is important to take a closer 
look at the current international role of state and local law enforcement and the federal 
response. 
 
 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter examines how all levels of domestic law enforcement converge on 
criminal justice relations in general and specifically on an issue with international 
repercussions, that of the apprehension and recovery of international fugitives. The 
specific case examined in this chapter involves relations between fugitive recovery 
officials in Texas and Mexico. True, fugitive apprehension is arguably a greater concern 
among border states, but even interior U.S. states are realizing the need to learn how to 
pursue criminal suspects as they flee the United States, and understand how to return a 
foreign fugitive to another nation. While Texas is the focus here, California has also 
pioneered the development of international intergovernmental mechanisms for fugitive 
recovery. Officials in Texas and California increasingly assist other U.S. states with 
fugitive recovery.  
There are many barriers to successful fugitive recovery. The first is that resources 
cannot be devoted to tracking every fugitive, so only the most violent are actively 
sought. With respect to the others, officials can only hope that the individual will return 
to Texas and be discovered during a traffic stop, or apprehended for an additional crime. 
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This default practice remains the cheapest means of recovering a fugitive, but is the least 
effective, the most dangerous, and the most frustrating to law enforcement. 
During the past twenty years, the gradual improvement in relations between the 
United States and Mexico has increased the options for law enforcement to apprehend 
and recover fugitives. There are now three generally reliable means: deportation, 
extradition, or foreign prosecution. A U.S.-citizen fugitive may be either deported or 
extradited; a Mexican-citizen fugitive may be either extradited or prosecuted in Mexico.  
The first section is a brief overview of the fugitive recovery processes that will 
be examined in greater detail later in the chapter. The following sections review different 
facets of how globalization affects the U.S.-Mexican law enforcement relationship. Then 
the three fugitive recovery methods are examined more closely. The concluding section 
considers the implications of globalization on U.S.-Texas-Mexico relations in law 
enforcement in all their complexity. 
 
 
FUGITIVE RECOVERY PROCESSES IN BRIEF 
            In Texas, there are two state agencies primarily responsible for pursuing 
international fugitives. The Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) is responsible 
for overseeing the state’s prisons and parolees; TDCJ seeks escaped convicts or violent 
parole violators. The Texas Office of the Attorney General (OAG) is the state’s top civil 
law agency, but in recent years, the agency has expanded into some areas of criminal 
law, such as gang prevention, computer crimes, and apprehending child predators. OAG 
will seek individuals who have not yet been arrested or incarcerated. Local municipal 
police or county sheriffs may also pursue a fugitive, either with or without the assistance 
of the state agencies.  
If the fugitive is a U.S. citizen, then recovery could be relatively quick. U.S. 
federal officials have, in recent years, encouraged Mexico to deport U.S. citizens who 
flee to Mexico. Negotiations at the federal level have opened the door for state and local 
officials to seek deportation via their own contacts. Thus state officials could recover a 
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fugitive from a foreign country within a matter of hours, without ever notifying federal 
officials. 
The first step is to locate the fugitive. For an investigator in Texas to locate a 
single person on the run in Mexico requires skills both diplomatic and techno logical. 
The Mexican federal police, now known as the Agéncia Federal Investigacion (AFI), 
will not conduct surveillance on foreigners, and U.S. investigators are prohibited from 
conducting an independent investigation within Mexico. So state officials rely on a 
variety of resources: personal contacts in law enforcement, informers – including family 
members of the suspects, and an array of technological devices. State and local law 
enforcement can also call upon the services of the U.S. federal government. The U.S. 
Marshals Service (USMS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have personnel 
in Mexico, attached to the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City and at some regional consular 
offices. U.S. law enforcement cannot perform arrests in another nation, and must always 
be accompanied by Mexican law enforcement agents when on official business.8  
As soon as the fugitive is located, the Texas officials will contact the San 
Antonio branch office of the Mexican federal Attorney General’s office, the 
Procuraduría General de la República (PGR). The PGR will ask for a copy of the 
fugitive’s outstanding arrest warrant. Although a U.S. warrant, like a U.S. law 
enforcement official, has no authority in Mexico, a person who is wanted in the United 
States is inadmissible to Mexico. Inadmissibility at time of entry is grounds for a non-
Mexican citizen to be deported. Lying or using a false name to gain entry is grounds for 
a person to be excluded from re-entering Mexico.  
Once a U.S.-citizen fugitive is apprehended, he or she may agree to voluntarily 
return to the United States. If the person refuses a voluntary deport, Mexican 
immigration officials will take the person before an immigration judge, who can order 
the fugitive’s deportation to the United States or exclusion from Mexico.  
                                        
8 While U.S. federal officials must have clearance through the U.S. Ambassador to be in country, 
there is a lack of clarity about whether or not state and local officials must have embassy 
clearance before entering a foreign nation. But while embassy clearance may or may not be a 
technical requirement, the U.S. federal government and the Mexican government prefer 
subnational government officials obtain clearance, and no U.S. law enforcement has authority to 
perform an arrest in a foreign nation.  
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But a Mexican citizen will not be deported, and many Mexican judges will not 
deport a U.S. citizen of Mexican descent.9 So state and local law enforcement have two 
choices to recover a Mexican citizen: they can either initiate an extradition, or they can 
ask Mexican officials to carry out an international prosecution. 10  
For an extradition, subnational officials must contact the Office of International 
Affairs (OIA) at the U.S. Department of Justice (U.S. DOJ) in Washington, D.C. The 
OIA was created in 1979 to handle the increasing numbers of extradition requests to and 
from the United States.11 Extraditions are a political and legal procedure governed by 
international treaty. State and local officials have no authority to carry out an extradition 
on their own, as confirmed by Holmes v. Jennison. Every extradition request is 
administered by OIA and presented to the foreign government by the U.S. Department of 
State (U.S. DOS).12  
On the Mexican side, extraditions are handled by both the Mexican federal 
Attorney General’s office, the Procuraduría General de la República (PGR), and the 
Mexican equivalent of the U.S. Department of State, the Secretaría de Relaciones 
Exteriores (SRE), which makes the final decision on extraditions. The Mexican 
immigration agency, Instituto Nacional Migración (INM), will assume custody of an 
individual for a deportation.  
If an extradition is denied for a Mexican citizen, then Mexico will prosecute the 
individual in Mexico as if the crime were a Mexican case. This is called an Article IV 
prosecution, or a foreign prosecution, and is popular with many U.S. state authorities. 
Each of the four U.S. states bordering Mexico – Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and 
                                        
9 In 1998, Mexico passed the “No Loss of Nationality” Law, which allows Mexicans to hold dual 
nationality, but not dual citizenship.  A Mexican who becomes a citizen of another nation retains 
Mexican nationality, and children born outside of Mexico but of Mexican parentage are also 
considered Mexican nationals.  See Mexico Connect, “Mexican Dual Citizenship,” (Retrieved 1 
October 2003.) Available from http://www.mexconnect.com/mex_/dt/dtdualcitizenship.html.  
10 It is also possible for the United States and Mexico to conduct a third-party extradition 
involving a citizen of another country. 
11 Ethan A. Nadelmann, Cops Across Borders: The Internationalization of U.S. Criminal Law 
Enforcement. (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State Press, 1993): 342.  
12 The current U.S. -Mexican extradition treaty has been in force since 1980.  
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California, as well as Colorado – have state- level offices that handle international 
prosecutions. Some local jurisdictions pursue international prosecutions as well. 
If they prefer, state and local officials in the United States can skip the 
extradition request and work with Mexican authorities directly on an Article IV 
prosecution. Since Article IV is a provision of Mexican law, U.S. federal officials need 
not be a part of that process, and usually are not. 
Texas and U.S. federal officials will readily reciprocate. If Mexican authorities 
report the U.S. location of a Mexican-citizen fugitive from Mexican law, TDCJ, the U.S. 
Marshals or the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE – formerly the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service) will retrieve the suspect and transport him to 
the border, where Mexican officials will assume custody.  
 It is impossible to know exactly how many fugitives from U.S. law are in 
Mexico. One state officials estimates Texas alone could have several hundred. Due to 
limited resources, the state actively pursues only the most violent. Since the creation of 
the fugitive unit in 1993, TDCJ officials have recovered fewer than ten U.S.-citizen 
fugitives from Mexico. Although the figure seems small, the rate of recapture is 
significant: every person located in Mexico has been returned to Texas, a record that 
officials from both sides of the border say testifies to the effectiveness of the 
intergovernmental cooperation between Texas and Mexico. While many other parole 
violators are suspected to have fled to Mexico, these ten are thought to be extremely 
violent and therefore are at the top of the list.  
As of late 2003, the state of Texas have listed nine violent fugitives thought to be 
in Mexico.13 These nine are long-term fugitives and have yet to be located; one is a 
prison escapee. 
The statistics for the numbers of fugitives recovered by the United States as a 
whole are more impressive. In 2002, Mexico extradited 25 persons to the United States.  
                                        
13 Six of the fugitives have yet to be arrested and are being sought by the Texas Office of the 
Attorney General. The other three are being sought by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice: 
two are prison escapees, one is a parole violator, and the fourth was mistakenly released. 
Information about the fugitives can be found at the OAG website: 
http://www.oag.state.tx.us/criminal/article4_wanted/fugitives  
or at the TDCJ website: http://people.txucom.net/tdcj-iad/  
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By 3 October 2003, 26 persons were extradited to the United States for the year. 
By that same date, 202 individuals had been removed or excluded from Mexico and 
deported to the United States. These figures include fugitives wanted on federal warrants 
and individuals sought by state and local authorities. 
  
 
GLOBALIZATION AND CRIME: THE INTERSECTION OF STATE AND 
LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT WITH INTERNATIONAL CRIME  
 
Free Trade and Mexico’s Opening 
Law enforcement relations between the U.S. and Mexico have often been 
contentious, reflecting the complicated relations between the neighboring nations. 
Relations at the state and local levels have been problematic and at times violent. But 
most criminal justice officials interviewed for this chapter acknowledge that, while still 
in need of improvement, communication and cooperation between the United States and 
Mexico on criminal justice issues have progressed recently. Why are relations so 
improved at this point in time?  
Probably the most significant factor leading to increased communication on law 
enforcement issues is the recent political change in Mexico and the accompanying 
changes in Mexico’s foreign relations. Mexico used to keep to itself, hoping that not 
interfering in the business of other nations would mean other nations would not intrude 
on Mexican sovereignty. But this has changed. As one Mexican federal criminal justice 
official explains: “We used to think in Mexico, (law enforcement) is a matter of 
sovereignty – what happens inside my country is only of concern to me, I don’t need to 
share it. Then, we saw the world increasing relationships, so-called globalization, and we 
saw that things cannot happen the way we are used to. We decided to open up and fortify 
ties” between Mexico and the United States, explains this official.  
The perception that international crime is increasing has also forced Mexico to 
open up. “In law enforcement matters, there is no border,” he explains. “On both sides, 
we find problems are widespreading.”  A second Mexican official concurs. “Cooperation 
is the only antidote,” to the increase in crime, he says.  
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As trade in legal goods has increased, trade in illegal goods has risen in tandem. 
Aside from consuming huge amounts of legitimate products, the United States consumes 
more drugs than any other nation. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
has allowed Mexican organized crime groups to take advantage of increased flows of 
goods and persons to become part of an increasing network of corruption that originates 
in Mexico but extends into the United States.14 
Other forms of crime accompany the drug trade. Money laundering, 
counterfe iting, credit card fraud, and human smuggling have joined the other usual 
suspects that have historically characterized the U.S.-Mexico criminal justice 
relationship, such as auto theft, insurance fraud, gun smuggling and kidnapping. State 
and local agencies play a part in regulating all these activities; many states now have 
stronger powers to investigate money laundering than does the federal government.  
 
The Effect of Immigration: The Risk of Improper Arrests 
Criminal justice relations at the state and local level have also been affected by 
increases in immigration. There is no conclusive evidence that foreign-born individuals 
in the United States are more prone to criminal behavior than are native-born residents. 
Some studies show that immigrants are less likely to commit crimes than natives and, if 
incarcerated, are less likely to commit new crimes after release from prison. 15 But it is 
difficult to accurately determine if there is a link; likely much crime among illegal 
immigrant populations goes unreported out of fear of deportation.  
But as Texas’ population has grown, the numbers of foreign-born residents have 
increased. In the 1990s, Texas’ foreign-born population grew by 37 percent. In 1990, the 
U.S. Census showed Texas with a total population of 16,986,510. Nine percent of that 
number self- reported as foreign-born, totaling 1,524,436 persons. In 2000, Texas’ total 
                                        
14 Louise Shelley, “Corruption and Organized Crime in Mexico in the Post-PRI Transition,” 
Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 17 (August 2001). 
15  See Carl F. Horowitz, An Examination of U.S. Immigration Policy and Serious Crime, Center 
for Immigration Studies, April 2001. (Retrieved 20 September 2003). Available from 
http://www.cis.org/articles/2001/crime/toc.html#13, and Matthew T. Lee; Ramiro Martinez Jr.; 
and Richard Rosenfeld, “Does Immigration Increase Homicide? Negative Evidence From Three 
Border Cities.” The Sociological Quarterly 42 (Fall 2001): 559. 
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population had grown by 22.8 percent, an additional 3.4 million people, to nearly 21 
million people; foreign-born residents now compose 13.9 percent of the population. 16   
Statistics showing the number of foreign-born inmates in the Texas prison system 
are not easy to find. In July of 1997, the total Texas prison population was 136,485; 
11,394 were foreign-born inmates, or eight percent, slightly less than the percentage of 
the Texas foreign-born population as a whole in 1990, which was then nine percent.17  
Increases in the foreign-born population bring state and local law enforcement 
directly into the international arena, with the potential to disturb U.S. foreign affairs. The 
arrest and detention of a foreign national are supposed to be done according to the terms 
of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, an international treaty in force since 
1963.18 More than 160 countries, including the United States and Mexico, are 
signatories. The Convention requires that foreign nationals, when detained in a foreign 
nation, be allowed to contact their consular officials for assistance. Some nations require 
consular notification and some nations give the individual in custody the option to 
notify, but the individual must still be informed of the right to contact consular officials.  
Complications arise when local law enforcement violates the treaty and neglects 
to inform detainees of their right to consular notification.  
Sometimes U.S. state courts have sentenced foreign nationals to death for crimes 
committed in the United States. This in itself broaches no treaty, but when combined 
with a failure to inform, has strained U.S. foreign relations with the convict’s home 
nation. On more than one occasion, Texas has executed a Mexican national despite 
strenuous objections from the Mexican government. In 2002, Mexican President Vicente 
                                        
16  U.S. Census Bureau, Texas. (Updated 15 July 2003, Retrieved 21 September 2003.) Available 
from http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48000.html; and Federation for American 
Immigration Reform, Immigration in Texas. (Retrieved 21 September 2003.) Available from 
http://www.fairus.org/html/042tximpact.html.  
17 Remarks of Catherine McVey of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, before the House 
Judiciary Committee 15 July 1997. (Retrieved 20 September 2003). Available from 
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/6029.htm. 
18 “Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocols,” International Law 
Commission, Available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/consul.htm. Retrieved 19 September 
2003. 
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Fox even canceled a trip to Texas to protest the state’s execution of a Mexican citizen 
who was not notified of his right to consular access. 19 
Some attorneys have used a failure to inform to seek a judicial remedy, such as a 
new trial or sentencing hearing. In May of 2002, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals ordered a resentencing hearing for a Mexican national on death row who was 
not informed of his right to contact his consul.20 
In January of 2003, the Mexican government filed a complaint before the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague, Netherlands, concerning the cases of 
54 Mexican nationals sentenced to death in the United States. According to the 
complaint, none of the fifty-four individuals had been notified of the option to contact 
consular officials, “who may have been able to prevent the application of the death 
sentence,” according to a statement made by the Mexican Secretary of Foreign 
Relations. The complaint asks the ICJ to request the United States comply with the 
Convention, delay any scheduled executions, and review and reconsider the death 
sentences – all of which would be state decisions, if state prisoners are involved.21  
In February of 2003, the ICJ decided the United States should take “all measures 
necessary” to halt the scheduled executions of three of the 54 Mexican nationals until a 
final decision can be reached. Public hearings in the case are scheduled for December 
2003.22 Two of the three are incarcerated in Texas, the third in Oklahoma; none of the 
three are currently scheduled for execution. 23 As of October 2003, there are 17 Mexican 
nationals on Texas’ Death Row. 24 
                                        
19  Pres. Fox was to visit four Texas cities and to meet with U.S. Pres. George W. Bush at his 
ranch in Crawford, Texas. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/americas/2194566.stm, updated 
Thursday, 15 August 2002, retrieved 18 August 2003. The Mexican national, Javier Suarez 
Medina, was convicted of shooting to death Larry Cadena, an undercover Dallas police officer. 
20  http://www.thenewsmexico.com/noticia.asp?id=24759.  
21 The Government of Mexico Submits to the International Court of Justice in The Hague the 
Cases of 54 Mexicans Sentenced to Death in the United States, Mexican Secretariat of Foreign 
Relations, Press Release No. 006/03, Mexico City 9 January 2003.  
22 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), International Court 
of Justice, Press Release 2003/25, 25 July 2003. Available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/ipress2003/ipresscom2003-25_mus_20030725.htm, Retrieved 19 
September 2003. 
23 Scheduled Executions, Texas Department of Criminal Justice.  (Updated 12 September 2003; 
retrieved 19 September 2003). Available from 
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When a Mexican national is executed in Texas, though, relations between 
Mexican and Texan law enforcement officials remain cordial. One Texas official says 
“surprisingly, no, we’re not one bit affected by the executions. The Mexicans at the San 
Antonio office are very professional; they don’t take it personally. They know we don’t 
have control over the system.” The Mexican justice officials say that because the 
Mexican foreign ministry, and not the Attorney General, is respons ible for granting 
extraditions, then officially, an execution doesn’t intrude on working relationships. “If 
they (the convicts) break the law and they came (to the United States), they must obey 
the law here,” says one of the Mexican representatives. Another Texas official echoes 
this statement: “They (the Mexican officials) know the person executed is a criminal.”  
All the same, one state authority says he has been told that law enforcement 
representatives should not travel to Mexico or expect to get any assistance from Mexican 
officials during the two-week window surrounding the execution of a Mexican national 
by the state of Texas.  
 
Local Jurisdictions and the Death Penalty  
Differences in criminal sentencing between the two nations have been the most 
consistent barrier to the formal transfer of fugitives from Mexico to the United States. 
The death penalty is a serious point of contention between the two nations. Mexican law 
does not include capital punishment, even though support for the death penalty among 
the majority Catholic population in Mexico has recently increased. The terms of the 
U.S.-Mexican extradition treaty allow Mexico to refuse to extradite even a U.S. citizen, 
unless assurances are given by the state that the death penalty will not be sought at 
trial.25 
                                                                                                                   
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/scheduledexecutions.htm; Capital Punishment: Current Death 
Row Population, Oklahoma Department of Corrections. (Updated 4 August 2003; retrieved 19 
September 2003).  Available from http://www.doc.state.ok.us/DOCS/CapitalP.HTM; 
24 Citizenship of Offenders on Death Row, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, (Updated 18 
February 2003; Retrieved 25 September 2003.) Available from 
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/nationalities.htm.  
25 “Appendix C: Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the United 
Mexican States,” included in Criminal Prosecutions Under Article 4 of the Mexican Penal Code: 
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However, the prosecution for the state – either a county prosecutor or district 
attorney – is sovereign in deciding whether or not to seek the death penalty in a criminal 
trial. The federal government has no influence over a county prosecutor’s decision to 
seek a particular sentence in the state’s case. Thus, although disagreements over the 
death penalty are of huge significance in international relations, the local county 
prosecutor plays an integral role in this process of international politics.  
Capital cases, such as aggravated murder and cop-killings, are the most 
emotionally charged of crimes. Cases in which feelings already run strong are intensified 
when the perpetrator manages to escape the country, an extradition must be sought, and 
a foreign government determines whether or not a trial may proceed.  
Many U.S. criminal justice officials see another country’s refusal to extradite as 
interfering with U.S. sovereignty. Yet Mexico has used the power to extradite as a means 
of asserting its sovereignty. One former federal official explains that a refusal to 
extradite is “about protecting Mexicans, but really it is about not giving the United States 
all they want and maintaining Mexican sovereignty. We’re the bullies from the North 
telling them what to do – when they can assert the upper hand, they do. Extradition is 
one area where they can, and there aren’t many.”  
Because the death penalty is so politically popular in the United States, elected 
county prosecutors will resist giving death penalty assurances for fear of being perceived 
by their electorates as soft on crime. In such cases, OIA officials will counsel the county 
prosecutor at the first stages of the extradition process. If the county prosecutor refused 
to set aside a death sentence, OIA officials say they would not file an extradition request, 
and would instead assist the county with a request for a foreign prosecution. However, 
federal officials say that once the prosecutor understands there will be no return of the 
fugitive if a death sentence is sought, the prosecutor will usually issue assurances for the 
sake of returning the fugitive to the United States to stand trial. 
Prosecutors around the United States have reluctantly learned how to work with 
Mexico on death penalty issues, but a new barrier has developed recently. In late 2001, 
                                                                                                                   
A Technical Assistance Manual, The Office of the Attorney General Dan Morales, State of 
Texas, May 1994.  
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the Mexican Supreme Court surprised U.S. officials by deciding that Mexico will no 
longer extradite a suspect who faces a life sentence. U.S. officials see this as further 
interference with U.S. sovereignty to pursue any sentence deemed appropriate. The 
decision reflects Mexico’s stated values that prison should be a means of rehabilitation, 
and that both the death penalty and a life sentence reflect the view that rehabilitation of 
the criminal is not possible.  
The new ruling means a U.S. prosecutor who wants to recover a fugitive for trial 
may not be able to seek either a life sentence or the death penalty. Thus a well- informed 
criminal fugitive would recognize that an escape into Mexico, while not the reputed 
panacea of years past, does eliminate certain sentencing options if the absconder is 
returned to the United States. It remains to be seen if continued objections to the life 
sentence ban on the part of U.S. prosecutors will result in a change in the Mexican 
policy, or if the Mexican policy will force a change in U.S. practices. 
 
State and Local Law Enforcement and International Treaties 
Treaties and jurisdictional limits are the legal restrictions on subnational 
governments with respect to international criminal justice issues. Three of the main 
treaties are the 1) Vienna Convention on consular relations, discussed above, which 
involves more than 160 nations; 2) treaties governing the extradition process, negotiated 
between the United States and individual nations, and 3) the Mutual Legal Assistance 
Treaties in Criminal Matters (MLAT), discussed below. 
If state and local law enforcement fail to follow the procedures outlined by these 
treaties, the U.S. federal government could be held responsible by other nations for the 
failures of state and local law enforcement. So the possibility of a treaty violation is one 
source of anxiety for the federal government. U.S. DOJ has made regular efforts to 
educate state and local law enforcement on the importance of following Vienna 
Convention procedures, but there are still failures on the part of state and local law 
enforcement to follow consular notification procedures. 
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A fairly recent development is the use of MLAT, negotiated between the United 
States and individual nations by attorneys representing both OIA and U.S. Department 
of State.26 
Most state and local officials interviewed for this project were likely to have 
heard of the Vienna convention, but some were not aware of the existence of a Mutual 
Legal Assistance Treaty between the United States and Mexico.  
The goal of an MLAT is “to improve the effectiveness of judicial assistance and 
to regularize and facilitate its procedures.”27 
 When a U.S. official from any level of government asks any Mexican official for 
help obtaining information, such as birth certificates or proof of automobile ownership, 
those requests are supposed to follow the procedures outlined by the MLAT. The terms 
of the treaty designate the U.S. Department of Justice and the Mexican Procuraduría 
General de la República (PGR) as the points-of-contact through which all requests for 
information should be processed.   
But time-consuming formal processes are exactly what Texas officials see as a 
hindrance to effective action, especially when the location of a wanted criminal in 
Mexico has been confirmed. If the formal process were followed, a request for 
information would have to run its course from Austin to Washington to Mexico City, 
giving the fugitive ample time to change locations. So subnational government officials 
prefer calling a foreign contact directly for expedient assistance. 
DOJ officials say they need the states to act on their own initiative rather than 
deluge the D.C. office with requests for assistance. One official explains that if OIA got 
                                        
26 Ethan Nadelmann, Cops Across Borders: The Internationalization of U.S. Criminal Law 
Enforcement. (University Park: Pennsylvania State Press, 1993): 342-343. 
27 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal 
Matters Treaties (MLATs) and Other Agreements. (Retrieved 2 October 2003.) Available from: 
http://travel.state.gov/mlat.html. The United States has bilateral Mutual Legal Assistance 
Treaties (MLAT) currently in force with: Anguilla, Antigua/Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, 
Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Brazil, British Virgin Islands, Canada, Cayman Islands, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dominica, Egypt, Estonia, Greece, Grenada, Hong Kong, Hungary, 
Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Korea (South), Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, Montserrat, 
Morocco, Netherlands, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Romania, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, St. 
Vincent, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad, Turkey, Turks and Caicos Islands, Ukraine, 
United Kingdom, Uruguay.  
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a phone call every time one of the states needed legal information from Mexico, then 
OIA would be deluged, constantly writing, translating, and sending letters, “and for 
something that is not our case.” Federal officials feel it is “better all around” if states 
take the initiative. The only caveat: state and local officials should call OIA if there is 
some question whether a state’s action will violate another nation’s sovereignty. 
Officials say checking with OIA can prevent problems from developing in U.S. foreign 
relations; foreign officials will complain to DOJ or to the State Department if there is a 
violation of sovereignty or unilateral action taken by U.S. government at any level. 
The volume of U.S.-Mexico cases is such that even the centrally-controlled 
Mexican system will, at times, delegate responsibility. Sometimes Mexican officials 
from the regional PGR offices will contact the PGR attaché at the Mexican embassy in 
DC – following the preferred formal procedure – and they will be told, “‘do it yourself, 
we are busy,’” explains a former Mexican federal official. 
One Mexican official suggests there should be a phone number that U.S. county 
authorities could call to get information on how to handle situations involving Mexican 
nationals. Currently, some U.S. officials will call the nearest Mexican consulate. A local 
cop on the U.S. side of the border says the Mexican consulate is a good tool for law 
enforcement, but only if local officials understand what the consulate is and what it can 
do, and too often they do not. 
But with the exception of extraditions, the fugitive recovery processes examined 
in this chapter are not governed by treaty and therefore are not legally binding. No U.S. 
state has any formal authority to liaison with Mexico. Although deportations are carried 
out according to Mexican law, there is an informality about the process on the U.S. side.  
If state and local entities were to try to write out procedures for exchanging 
fugitives, for example, the language would have to be noncommittal and not include any 
promises, as a treaty would.  
The lack of written directives and clear procedures for states to follow elicits 
complaints from some. A retired federal official who was stationed along the U.S.-
Mexico border expresses frustration with how to get things done along the border. He 
says there is a “mission to do something, but no tools.” One local cop complains, “That’s 
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the problem with law enforcement – there are no written laws on how to do things with 
Mexico one way or the other.” Instead, there are “unwritten rules” worked out by law 
enforcement agents through their daily practice and proximity. But the unwritten rules 
don’t necessarily make life easier, he says.  
But the lack of written rules gives the states more freedom to pursue relations 
directly with foreign governments. One state fugitive investigator says, “There is no 
need for (written procedures). It’s just one law enforcement agency helping another, the 
way it’s been working in the U.S. for years, now expanded to a foreign country.” 
 
 
U.S.-MEXICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE RELATIONS: A CONVERGENCE OF 
CONCERNS 
“During the Cold War, we were just neighbors. Now, we recognize how important it is 
to be together.” – Mexican Procuraduría General de la República Official. 
 
Partners in Crime: Drugs and Corruption 
Traffic in illegal drugs is second only to immigration as the most significant 
issues in U.S.-Mexico relations. The drug trade boomed in the 1970s, leading to changes 
in U.S. drug laws and creating an apparatus for interdiction. The U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Agency (DEA) was created in 1973 by consolidating the narcotics divisions previously 
housed in the U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Customs, and the Food and Drug 
Administration. 28 Increased efforts towards law enforcement cooperation with Mexico at 
the state level have followed this mushrooming federal law enforcement presence on the 
U.S.-Mexican border.  
Starting in 1977, during the presidencies of Jimmy Carter and José López 
Portillo, federal officials from each nation began to meet regularly through the 
mechanism of the Binational Commission. Drug interdiction was put on the agenda then 
and has remained there since. After the Cold War’s end, communism fell on the United 
                                        
28 The FDA is part of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Nadelmann, p. 140. 
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States’ national security agenda and some argued that illegal drug traffic was now the 
nation’s number one national security concern. 29   
Yet while the institutional mechanisms promoting policy coordination are on the 
increase, the corrupting influence of the drug trade has hindered cooperation. A local cop 
on the Texas border says law enforcement cooperation along the U.S.-Mexico border 
was better twenty years ago, because there was less drug corruption among officials 
then.  
But corruption is far from just a local border problem. In 1997, Mexico’s “Drug 
Czar” Jesús Gutierrez Rebollo, a former four star general and the Mexican official 
invested with the most responsibility for combating the illegal drug trade, met with U.S. 
Drug Czar Gen. Barry McCaffrey in the United States. Gen. McCaffrey praised Gen. 
Rebollo for his cooperation in public and disclosed sensitive intelligence information to 
him in private. Upon returning to Mexico, Gen. Rebollo was arrested and jailed in 
Mexico on charges of collusion with known drug dealers. Needless to say, the news was 
not well received by Gen. McCaffrey. 30  
Gen. Rebollo’s arrest was far from the first drug-related disruption to U.S.-
Mexican law enforcement relations. Twelve years earlier, the United States confronted 
Mexican corruption when U.S. DEA agent Enrique “Kiki” Camarena and his pilot were 
kidnapped, tortured and killed. Law enforcement officials on both sides of the border 
describe Agent Camarena’s murder as the most significant event to date in U.S.-Mexican 
criminal justice relations. 
 Agent Camarena was kidnapped from the parking lot near the DEA office in 
Guadalajara, Mexico on 7 February 1985. After his disappearance, the DEA temporarily 
shut down its Mexican offices in Guadalajara, Culiacan, and Jalisco.  
U.S. agents in Mexico, still searching for Kiki, were urged to lie low. The DEA sent out 
teletype messages telling other U.S. officials not to go to Mexico for any reason, not 
                                        
29 Comments by Dianne Feinstein during the Senate debate on U.S. aid to Mexico, C-SPAN, 20 
March 1997.  
30 See El Toro's Timeline of Rotten Mexican Bureaucrats, Gullible U.S. Policymakers, the 
Profits, Joys, and Embarrassments of Narco-Corruption, and the Long, Slow March to Reform, 
http://lonestar.texas.net/~wombat/corruptime.html, (Retrieved 18 August 2003). 
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even on holiday. Agents received death threats from known leaders of Mexican drug 
organizations, who were offering to pay $10,000 for the death of each U.S. agent. 
The United States put considerable pressure on Mexico to be accountable for 
Camarena’s disappearance. Eventually, Camarena and his pilot were found; their bodies 
had been dug up from wherever they had originally been buried and left on the side of a 
Mexican road. 
Today, representatives of the Mexican Attorney General’s office stationed in the 
United States say Camarena’s murder was a shock to the system in Mexico. The event 
revealed unmistakably to Mexicans how much corruption was rife throughout the 
Mexican police force. Camarena’s murder has never been officially solved. No one 
knows why Agent Camarena was killed, but “Camarena knew too much,” says one PGR 
official. 
Actors in both countries describe Camarena’s death as the turning point in U.S.-
Mexican law enforcement relations. “At that time, each country was reluctant and 
distrustful,” says a Mexican official. Getting past the distrust was slow.  
But in the years following Agent Camarena’s murder, law enforcement in both 
countries realized they did not have the knowledge or familiarity with one another’s 
procedures necessary to share information legally and diplomatically. Since then, 
Mexico has been more willing to establish international instruments via treaties and 
accords, says one PGR official. “If we’re going to (work) together, we (realized we) 
need to exchange information and establish trust,” he says. 
Thus the two nations reached an agreement to increase the foreign law 
enforcement presence in each nation. The PGR opened four regional offices in the 
United States in 1992. The offices in Los Angeles and San Antonio feature an attaché 
and an investigator, and there are one-person offices in both San Diego and El Paso. At 
the same time, U.S. DOJ legal attachés were added to the consulates in Guadalajara and 
Monterrey. 
The regional PGR offices have been crucial to the development of good relations 
with the U.S. states. Before the offices opened, there was only isolated communication 
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between Mexican authorities and local and state agencies. On the whole, “not too many 
people had knowledge of one another,” says a PGR official.  
Thus the PGR representatives in the United States write a lot of letters telling U.S. 
state and local law enforcement about the preferred procedures to follow when 
processing Mexican criminal suspects, and how the regional offices are willing to assist 
with apprehending or prosecuting fugitives in Mexico, tracking down stolen 
automobiles, assisting those detained in Mexico on weapons charges, and, perhaps most 
dear to the Mexicans, confirming the identity of suspects so the correct person is arrested 
and no civil rights violations occur. “Getting to know people creates confidence,” says 
one PGR official. 
As of 2003, the numbers of U.S. law enforcement within Mexico far outnumbers 
the presence of Mexican law enforcement in the United States. The United States is 
represented in Mexico by FBI Legal Attachés in Mexico City, Guadalajara, Hermosillo, 
Monterrey, and Tijuana.31 The DEA has agents stationed in those locations in addition to 
Ciudad Juárez, Mazatlan, and Merida.32 The U.S. Marshals Service has agents stationed 
in Mexico City at the U.S. Embassy, along with agents from U.S. Customs; Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; the Coast 
Guard; the Internal Revenue Service; and the Secret Service.  
In the United States, the PGR has an office in the Mexican Embassy in 
Washington, Washington, D.C. and the four regional offices, with fewer than twenty 
total employees, including office assistants. Mexico is limited more by economics than 
politics, says one PGR representative. The cost to run the San Antonio office alone is 
more than $50,000 a month, what with rent, insurance, cars, phones, and so forth. “How 
do we justify this expense when we have a lot of needs in Mexico?” he asks.  
 
                                        
31 U.S. Dept. of Justice, Legats. (Retrieved 20 September 2003). Available from 
http://www.fbi.gov/contact/legat/legat.htm.  
32 U.S. Dept. of Justice, DEA Office Locations. (Retrieved 20 September 2003) Available from 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/agency/domestic.htm.  
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Navigating Corruption 
“Money is a corrupting thing. High morale in a group can make a difference. 
But morale is low in local police in Mexico.” – Country Attaché, U.S. Department of 
Justice. 
 
The corrupting influence of the illegal drug trade has compromised Mexican law 
enforcement. Drug dealers will augment low police salaries in exchange for protection. 33 
A former U.S. federal official who worked along the U.S. side of the border explains that 
an institutionalized system has evolved where all levels of Mexican law enforcement get 
a little “extra compensation,” something those in the United States do not understand. He 
explains how it works: if, for example, a Mexican customs inspector gets a bribe of 
$100.00, he gives his boss at least half of that; the boss keeps $30.00 of that amount, and 
in turn gives his boss $20.00. 
This former official says a willingness to overlook some corruption is necessary 
to get the information needed for a particular case. The key to dealing with corruption in 
Mexico, says this retired official, is to be aware what interests a corrupt official is 
protecting. “You’re a problem if you’re a threat to their livelihood,” he says. A savvy 
U.S. agent can even use a corrupt Mexican cop’s greed to get information and assistance. 
He recalls some U.S. agents would make a show of inviting a Mexican official to dinner, 
increasing that official’s prestige. U.S. agents would even share strategic information 
that a corrupt official could use for his financial gain. “You have to separate your 
(immediate) goal from dealing with crooks,” he says. He adds that the border state 
governors and attorneys general could bring more attention to corruption if they chose. 
U.S. officials express frustration that a byproduct of a corrupt system in Mexico 
is the slow pace at which Mexican investigations of cases involving a U.S. fugitive often 
proceed – although this can be explained by the tendency of law enforcement agencies 
worldwide to prioritize the ir own cases ahead of those originating elsewhere. But with 
drug money flowing to cooperative officials, incentives for investigating other offenses 
are lowered, complain U.S. officials. “They don’t earn bribes helping to investigate a 
                                        
33 Several U.S. officials said that state and local law enforcement in Mexico are reputedly the 
most corrupt because they are less regulated than the federal Mexican police. 
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murder,” especially one that took place in the United States, says a local Texas border 
cop. 
But this same cop says some Mexican officials admire the more professional 
police forces north of the border and would like to see their own forces improve. 
“Mexican cops are a little bit jealous of us, that we can live the way we live without 
taking bribes,” he says.  
One top Texas official was happy to announce he had never bribed anyone in 
Mexico for information or assistance. “We have no money anyway (at this state 
agency),” he adds. 
Current Mexican President Vicente Fox has made professionalization of the 
police in Mexico at least a rhetorical priority, and has visited the U.S.-Mexican border to 
discourage bribery at border crossings. Several agencies have been reorganized. Fox’s 
approach acknowledges that an inefficient, unprofessional system has bred corruption 
among officers. Even Mexican citizens seldom trust the police. Polls show that three-
quarters of crime in Mexico City goes unreported.34  
 In 2002, Mexico’s Attorney General, Rafael Macedo de la Concha, admitted his 
office was still permeated by corruption, despite two years of effort to cleanse it. 
"Corruption, as well as impunity, continues to be present, although certainly on a much 
smaller scale than when we arrived here," he told reporters. He said that since President 
Fox had assumed the presidency, more than 800 public servants had been tried for 
corruption. He assured the press his office was handling “responsibly” the constant 
charges of human rights violations by PGR agents.35 Pres. Fox created a Special 
Prosecutor’s Office on human rights in the PGR, and a National Human Rights 
Commission to investigate crimes committed by public servants against student 
protesters in the 1960s and 1970s.36 
                                        
34 “About 75% of Mexicans distrust justice system,” The News Mexico, 17 October 2002. Online 
news publication was at www.thenewsmexico.com but the site is not currently in operation.  
35 “Atty General’s Office Still ‘Infiltrated’ by Corruption,” The News Mexico, 13 August 2002. 
Previously available at www.thenewsmexico.com.  
36 Association for the Prevention of Torture, International Seminar: Truth Commissions: Torture, 
Reparation, and Prevention, July 18-19, 2002, “Informational Document on the Mexican 
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But some U.S. officials will admit that corruption is not only a Mexican problem. 
A Texan who investigates auto theft tells of problems with corruption on the U.S. side of 
the border as well. “I think we (U.S. officials) are too quick to point out the difficulties 
in Mexico and fail to realize they (the Mexicans) encounter the same problems with us.  
We too have corruption.  We also have a failure, on some occasions, to follow the law – 
state, federal, and specifically international law.”  
A Texas official who works with Mexican officials says that while he has never 
experienced corruption among the Mexican law enforcement he works with, officials in 
the United States have betrayed him. Once he was about to capture a fugitive, only to 
learn that local law enforcement had alerted the fugitive to run. 
And among U.S. federal officials, there is a sense at times that Mexican 
corruption has tainted law enforcement officers on the U.S. side of the border. The 
suspicion is, that local officials will be lulled into tolerating mild corruption in their 
ranks, because it seems insignificant compared to what they see and hear about just 
across the border in Mexico.  
 
 
Mexican Concerns: Civil Rights and Guns  
Mexican officials, for their part, perceive that U.S. law enforcement sometimes 
do not apply professed U.S. standards for civil liberties and criminal protections to 
Mexicans held in custody in the United States. Mexican officials want the civil rights of 
prisoners protected from violation by what they see as overzealous U.S. law 
enforcement. Their main concern is that Mexican citizens are should be prosecuted 
properly, without constitutional violations or violations of the Vienna convention.  
The levels of concern for civil rights of prisoners is noticeably different between 
the two nations: among Mexican officials interviewed for this project it was a consistent 
theme, but civil rights were scarcely mentioned by U.S. officials at any level.  
                                                                                                                   
Context,”  Available at: http://www.apt.ch/americas/mexico/mex1eng.htm, July 2002; Retrieved 
18 August 2003.  
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Mexican federal officials stationed in Texas say U.S. officials do not respond 
well to the subject about civil rights. U.S. officials seem to see such concerns as 
protecting criminals at best, and as hypocrisy at worst. Even a sympathetic Texas official 
described the Mexican view on civil rights as “somewhat hypocritical,” because, 
arguably, prisoners in the United States are offered more civil rights protections than 
they might receive in Mexico. “But they want us to apply our own (U.S.) standards to 
their guys,” the official explains.  
Another concern for Mexican law enforcement is the differing attitudes towards 
guns between the two countries. Part of the folklore of the Texas-Mexico relationship 
includes tales of running guns into Mexico for political purposes or, more recently, to 
assist drug traffickers. Since the days of the Mexican Revolution, Mexico has been 
sensitive to guns entering the country from the United States. Thus anyone entering 
Mexico with a gun or ammunition is immediately arrested. The problems arise when 
those arrested are border residents who have merely forgotten to remove gun equipment 
or shell casings from their cars before crossing into Mexico to go shopping or to lunch.  
After several U.S. citizens were arrested for apparently innocent transgressions 
of the no-gun law, Mexico changed its laws to relax the punishment for a first-time gun 
offense. These changes, aimed at preventing the incarceration of forgetful hunters, 
“show we can cooperate,” says one Mexican PGR official.  
By summer of 2000, prominent signs warning of certain arrest for carrying guns 
and ammunition into Mexico were posted on the U.S. side of all border crossings into 
Mexico. The new signs have resulted in fewer apprehensions of U.S. travelers with arms 
in Mexico, says a Mexican federal official. However, one Texas official complains that 
the signs are inadequate. The signs should read “mandatory jail time in Mexico,” but 
they do not, he says, adding that the signs would have been better if state officials had 
been allowed to design the signs, rather than the U.S. federal government. 
But a problem for U.S. officials is that the gun ban also applies to U.S. law 
enforcement. Mexico has consistently refused to allow U.S. agents stationed in Mexico 
to bear arms, without going through a lengthy process to obtain a temporary carry 
permit. Thus all FBI agents, Secret Service agents, U.S. Marshals and DEA agents in 
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Mexico are, officially, unarmed. The United States has consistently pressured Mexico to 
change this policy, but to no avail.  
 
 
FUGITIVE APPREHENSION: A CONVERGENCE OF JURISDICTIONS 
“Diplomats want to do things diplomatically; politicians want the numbers; but 
fugitive people just want the job done.” – Texas Department of Criminal Justice 
Investigator 
 
Fugitives as Symbols of Frustration in Both Directions: Denying Extraditions and 
Performing Kidnappings 
On Mexico’s part, distrust of U.S. law enforcement has run deep throughout 
history. Chronic mistreatment of Mexican nationals at the hands of Texas law 
enforcement has left Mexican officials feeling that Texans were more interested in 
scapegoating any available Mexican rather than finding the guilty party. At the highest 
levels, Mexican officials were perpetually uneasy in the face of the United States’ 
overwhelming power and influence in the region.  
Although an extradition treaty was signed by the United States and Mexico in 
1978, in practice Mexico, as well as other countries, uses extradition to express 
frustration with the asymmetrical power relationships between the United States and the 
rest of the world. Refusing to return a fugitive is one of the few ways another nation can 
cause the United States discomfort. In years past, anti-American sentiment has been 
strongest among officials at SRE, the Mexican State Department, where final 
responsibility for extradition decisions rests.  
Thus for decades Mexico would not extradite Mexican citizens, balked at 
returning U.S. citizens, and was almost certain to refuse to hand over U.S. citizens of 
Mexican descent. For decades, Mexico’s official reluctance to return fugitives from U.S. 
law gave the nation a reputation as a haven for criminals, leaving U.S. law enforcement 
exceedingly frustrated.  
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In the view of U.S. law enforcement, Mexico’s refusal to extradite is a means of 
protecting criminals, and worthy only of contempt. The U.S.-Mexican border, for them, 
can be like a wall behind which suspects could hide in safety.  
A Texas cop estimates that of 250 open homicide cases in his border county, 60 
percent involve Mexican citizens. “No one understands how hard it is living in a border 
town and being a police officer,” he says. “The river divides two cities,” he says, but it 
also divides two countries, making a cop’s job all the more difficult. “Criminals can just 
go back to Mexico. Narcotics offenses, rapes, robberies – they go unarrested, not 
unsolved.” 
 At times, such frustration with Mexico’s official non-extradition policy has led 
unscrupulous individuals to justify recovering fugitives illegally, by going into Mexico 
and bringing a suspect back to the United States in the trunk of a car. The academic term 
for this practice is irregular rendition, but state officials generally are not familiar with 
that term and just call it kidnapping. It is sometimes called “blackbagging,” referring to 
the black bag put over a suspect’s head; or, more derisively, a “Mexican extradition,” – 
because Mexican citizens are the most difficult to recover through formal channels, the 
person grabbed is most likely to be a Mexican citizen.  
A former Texas Ranger says, that in his day, kidnappings were uncommon 
because good relations among law enforcement officers along the border then made such 
vigilantism unnecessary. “It was easier to have Mexican authorities bring suspects here 
than bring them across the border (by kidnapping),” he says. But his experience was in 
the days prior to the explosion in illegal drug traffic. 
Today, it is difficult to determine how common a practice “black-bagging” is. 
Not surprisingly, no one keeps statistics on the practice. Most officials are reluctant to 
talk about it. Officially, only bounty hunters hired by the families of crime victims 
would be the ones to engage in the practice. But an active-duty policeman along the 
border admits to having brought suspects across in the trunk of his car. “Some stuff we 
just needed,” he explains. “It doesn’t help cooperation, but (the return of the fugitive) is 
not going to get done otherwise.”  
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A former state official tacitly admits black-bagging occurs when he says it is 
“effective, but (doesn’t) promote the respect nations are supposed to have.” And a 
current representative of the Mexican Federal Attorney General’s office says that in his 
experience, such kidnappings were somewhat frequent even in the mid-1990s, and are 
still going on today. In the fall of 2001, authorities in one Texas county had a Mexican 
citizen in custody who claimed to have been brought across the border against his will.  
As recently as Fall of 2002, rumor had it that law enforcement authorities from a 
U.S. state had entered into Mexico and “persuaded” two fugitives into returning to the 
United States. While in reality, a voluntary deport may involve a fair amount of 
persuasion, the assumption is that a voluntary deport is carried out by Mexican 
authorities who will inform the suspect of his or her legal rights. But if subnational 
officers from the United States enter Mexico for the purposes of “persuading” a 
fugitive’s return, presumably Mexican law enforcement is not involved and the fugitive 
remains uninformed of available legal options.  
The worst-case scenario, in the view of U.S. federal officials, would be if a 
Mexican national were persuaded by state or local agents to return to the United States, 
only to receive a death or life sentence. The likely result would be significant damage to 
U.S.-Mexico cooperation in all areas, due to an illegal resolution of a single local case.  
OIA representatives obviously frown on such independent action, which one 
official wryly termed “excess enthusiasm.” OIA sees the vigilantism of “black-bagging” 
as so damaging to U.S.-Mexico relations that the United States will extradite to Mexico 
any known bounty hunters who have kidnapped a suspect. A Mexican official says that 
prosecuting bounty hunters in Mexico has helped cut down on kidnappings. Others say 
U.S. judges could help by being more alert to finding out how a defendant got to the 
courtroom. 
OIA authorities said they doubt a state authority would carry out a blatant 
kidnapping, but admit there may be cases of collusion or tacit support on the part of state 
officials who know a kidnap is being planned, and do nothing to stop it. One official 
expressed concern for the safety of subnational officials, who by entering Mexico for a 
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law enforcement purpose are in violation of Mexican immigration law and could 
themselves be arrested.  
U.S. officials also express intense frustration that suspects who can afford it can 
pay for their freedom. One official source says that when a suspect is apprehended in 
Mexico, the first thing the suspect does is tell law enforcement who he’s paying off for 
protection. “It’s so fucked up over there, you have no idea,” says the source. “It’s so 
nasty and corrupt, it’s scary.”  
But just as it is possible for a suspect to bribe his way out of custody, it is 
possible to buy someone’s capture. While officially, U.S. law enforcement will not pay 
to get a suspect out of Mexico, unofficially, it happens. “There’s money out there that 
will bring them back,” a source says, implying that U.S. prosecutors and families of 
crime victims supply the funds.  
Once a fugitive is in Mexican custody, those with resources can mount a legal 
challenge to a return, much to the frustration of Mexican authorities who might rather 
see the suspect extradited. A PGR official who works on extraditions sighs, “If they have 
money to get a fancy lawyer, it takes years to get rid of them.” 
The advantage to having friends in Mexican law enforcement is that sometimes, 
friendly Mexican law enforcement have physically pushed suspects across the border 
into the waiting arms of grateful U.S. agents. But this attempt to cut corners presents its 
own dangers. PGR authorities say it is a crime to push a person across the border with no 
immigration hearing, for the fugitive in question could end up suing the Mexican 
government. A U.S. federal official stationed in Mexico says, “In Mexico, personal 
relationships are very important. There’s a saying in Mexico: ‘To friends anything is 
possible. To enemies – show them the law.’ But U.S. officials can get Mexicans in 
trouble by pressuring friendships,” for favors such as an illegal return of a suspect.  
The most notorious case of kidnapping a suspect involved U.S. federal agents. In 
1990, the Mexican doctor involved in the torture and murder of DEA Agent Camarena 
was kidnapped by bounty hunters and brought to the United States, where DEA agents 
arrested him. Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain was held in custody from April 1990 to 
December 1992 on charges of participating in Camarena’s murder. The doctor’s 
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abduction caused a serious rift between the United States and Mexico. At one point, the 
PGR office in San Antonio closed for a day because of tensions surrounding the doctor’s 
kidnapping. 
Ultimately, Dr. Alvarez-Machain was acquitted of charges due to insufficient 
evidence. But first, he sought his release on the grounds that his arrest violated terms of 
the U.S.-Mexican extradition treaty. Although two lower courts agreed, the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled his arrest was not in violation of the extradition treaty, and that “a 
U.S. court retained its power to try a person for a crime even where the person was 
brought within the court’s jurisdiction by forcible abduction.” The Court acknowledged 
the abduction “may be in violation of general international law principles,” and 
suggested Dr. Alvarez-Machain should seek a civil remedy. 37  
The Supreme Court’s decision was interpreted in Mexico as an approval of 
kidnapping as a method of return. In response, the Mexican government became the first 
to impose the written rules on the conduct of U.S. DEA agents while in Mexico. The 
rules limited the number of DEA agents allowed in Mexico and restricted where they 
could live, required they have written permission from the Mexican government while 
traveling, revoked their diplomatic immunity from prosecution, and required that 
intelligence information be shared with Mexican authorities. According to a U.S. federal 
official, the Supreme Court decision was one reason why Mexico did not extradite 
anyone again until 1996.38 
Dr. Alvarez-Machain returned to Mexico, where he has not been charged. While 
Agent Camarena’s killing has not been officially resolved, Mexico has convicted several 
members of the drug ring allegedly involved in his murder on other charges, including 
leader Rafael Caro-Quintero, now serving a forty-year sentence in Mexico.39 Caro-
                                        
37 Alvarez-Machain II, 504 U.S. at 670 (1992); See American Society of International Law, 
International Law in Brief, 6 June 2003 (Retrieved 20 September 2003). Available from 
http://www.asil.org/ilib/ilib0610.htm#j01.  
38 1990-1994.U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency. (Retrieved 1 October 2003.) Available from: 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/history/deahistory_05.htm 
39 “Beyond Indeterminancy and Self-Contradiction in Law: Transnational Abductions and Treaty 
Interpretation in U.S. v. Machain,” European Journal of International Law, (Updated 14 August 
1999; Retrieved 21 September 2003). Available from http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol6/No1/art1-
01.html.  
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Quintero is one of thirteen Mexican drug traffickers indicted in the United States, whom 
the U.S. DEA is still waiting for Mexico to extradite to the United States.40  
  
 
The Early Days of Fugitive Recovery: Reciprocal Friendships  
“How well you know someone can get stuff done.” – Former Texas Ranger 
 
The early days of fugitive apprehension between the United States and Mexico 
relied on the personal relationships forged by state and local law enforcement in Texas 
with their Mexican counterparts. The primary state actors involved in recovering 
fugitives then were the Texas Rangers, a law enforcement division of the Texas 
Department of Public Safety.  
Although historically, the Rangers as a whole had a reputation for discriminatory 
and often violent behavior towards Mexicans, individual Rangers were able to cultivate 
mutually helpful relationships with Mexican officers across the border.41 One former 
Ranger, who served from 1949 to 1979 and retired with the rank of captain, was full of 
stories about how he shared information and exchanged fugitives with the Mexican 
police he knew then. The relationships he had were informal, beneficial to both sides, 
and not in any way impeded by the bigger issues of U.S.-Mexican relations such as the 
death penalty or extradition politics. 
He relates how suspected criminals were exchanged back then:  
We had friends on the border. We’d tell them, ‘we want this guy 
who’s over there in Mexico.’ They’d say, ‘But y’all will give him the 
electric chair.’ We’d say, ‘Yep, we prob’ly will.’ They wouldn’t hand him 
over, but they’d say, ‘Well, we’ll let you know when he’s coming back 
over to Texas.’ They’d call on the phone or meet us on the border (to tell 
when the fugitive had crossed back to Texas). That was years ago – 
extradition didn’t mean too much one way or the other then. Sometimes 
                                        
40 Extraditable Mexican Traffickers, September 1999. U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Drug 
Enforcement Agency. (Retrieved 21 September 2003.) Available from 
www.ialeia.org/99011.pdf.  
41 See Walter Prescott Webb, The Texas Rangers: A Century of Frontier Defense (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1935) and Arnoldo de Leon, They Called Them Greasers: Anglo 
Attitudes toward Mexicans in Texas, 1821-1900 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983). 
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they’d say, ‘We got him, he’ll be in that adobe hut in Big Bend (National 
Park) at 10 pm.’ We’d go there, and he’d be sitting in that adobe shack at 
Boquillas, and no one else was around. They were giving him to us. 
 
The Texans would return the favor. When the Ranger found someone who was 
wanted in Mexico, he would call his Mexican law enforcement contacts to come meet 
him and the suspect at the border. His philosophy of returning a Mexican fugitive was 
simple: “If he was wanted over there, well, we didn’t want him over here.”   
It would take about a year of lunch invitations, cups of coffee, and just chats to 
cultivate a good relationship, he says. Whenever the Rangers apprehended a Mexican for 
a minor offense in Texas, the Captain saw an opportunity to build goodwill with the 
Mexican officers: rather than incarcerate him, the Rangers would take him to the border 
and hand him over, in a completely informal deportation process.  
From these overtures, the Rangers and Mexican police began to cooperate on 
apprehending smugglers and tracking down fugitives on either side. Sometimes, the 
Rangers would even be invited to go into Mexico to assist the Mexican federal police, 
the federales, in hunting down a suspect. Once when a body washed up on the south side 
of the river, the Captain was invited to go over to obtain fingerprints – he used a 
children’s molding clay to take the impression. Knowing that carrying guns into Mexico 
was forbidden, the Texans were sure to leave behind – or at least to carefully conceal – 
their weapons before crossing the bridge.  
After business was over, the Texans and the Mexicans would go to lunch or to an 
American movie, something the Mexicans always looked forward to, the Ranger says 
with a smile.  
The Captain used the discrepancy in resources between the Texas and Mexico 
law enforcement agencies as an opportunity for relationship building. Mexican officers 
were always short of ammunition. “You could tell they had maybe only two or three 
bullets in their guns,” he says, clearly concerned for the safety of his friends. So an 
exchange of goods evolved. “They’d bring fruit, maybe a serape (woven blanket), and 
we’d give them ammunition, kind of a switch.” When asked how the state agency 
viewed these donations, he said, “We didn’t tell our superiors. They didn’t ask. I think 
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maybe they thought we were” giving goods away, but it never caused a problem, he 
says.  
However, the relationships were not completely trouble-free. Differences in 
attitude about law enforcement concerned him. “In Mexico, they just think different” 
about law enforcement, he says. Officers were clearly underpaid, underequipped, and not 
well trained. Plus, while fluctuations in international politics were never an issue then, 
local politics often interfered with relationship building. “Back in El Paso, when there 
was a change in the local police in Juárez (across the river from El Paso), they’d find a 
lot of the previous officers, out in the back, shot dead.” Such corruption made it difficult 
to know whom to turn to for help. Once the Ranger was tipped off by an informant he 
trusted that a load of drugs was coming into West Texas. He regrets that his efforts to 
have the drugs apprehended likely resulted in the murder of the informant; information 
got through to the wrong people. “Sometimes it’s just too hard to explain things that 
happen,” he concludes. 
 
 
Fugitive Recovery Today: Deportations  
“It’s a trust relationship. They call for assistance, we call them; it’s mutually 
beneficial. There are no hidden agendas – we all want to get the bad guys locked up.”— 
Texas Department of Criminal Justice official, speaking of Mexican law enforcement 
officials.  
  
The focus of this section is on relations between Texas and Mexico, but the 
findings here can be generalized to other states because the less formal methods of return 
are in accord with Mexican law and therefore can be requested by any U.S. law 
enforcement official. Also, the U.S. federal government has for some time now urged 
other nations to deport or expel U.S. citizens who have gone to another country for the 
purpose of eluding U.S. law.  
Of course, personal relationships still matter today, as they did in decades past. In 
the border states, state and local law enforcement are more likely than federal authorities 
to have personal contacts who are willing to help. But fugitive recovery practices are 
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becoming more routine and therefore, theoretically, less dependent on personal 
relationships. 
The system in theory is quite simple: Texas Department of Criminal Justice or 
the Office of the Attorney General will locate the suspect, either through the agency’s 
own contacts or with help from U.S. federal agents stationed in Mexico. Then state 
officials notify the PGR office in San Antonio and request Mexican agents go to the 
known location to apprehend the suspect and initiate deportation proceedings.  
The system in practice is more complicated. Because there are so many parole 
violators and resources are limited, state officials actively pursue only those offenders 
with the most violent criminal histories. 
 In 1993, after a series of high profile and disturbing crimes by Texas convicts on 
parole, then-Governor Ann Richards created the Governor’s Fugitive Investigation 
Squad. Prior to this unit’s creation, there was no mechanism for actively tracking 
dangerous parole violators. Law enforcement counted on a violent offender being pulled 
over by traffic cops, or, as occurred in 1993, the offender would be pursued only after 
committing other serious violent crimes. The creation of the fugitive unit meant 
manpower could be devoted exclusively to active pursuit of violent parolees. As one 
official explained: “There is a big difference between the warrant servers, who will go 
do the ‘knock and talk’ (knock on doors and see if the fugitive is at that address) and 
investigators who pro-actively track down a fugitive.” 
 Although the TDCJ fugitive unit and the PGR office in San Antonio each opened 
around the same time, relations between the two offices did not begin until around 1997, 
when officials from the two offices met at an annual conference of the National 
Association of Fugitive Investigators. That meeting was followed by invitations to lunch 
and the relationship-building process began. The outcome of this cooperation between 
investigators was the recovery of a fugitive from Texas law who had been hiding in 
Mexico for 38 years. The fugitive was recovered in a matter of months after the two 
lawmen – one Mexican, one Texan – began to share information. 
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Federal officials at the Office of Interna tional Affairs at the Department of 
Justice said the Mexican federal government has disapproved of quick deports of U.S. 
citizens in the past, but are grateful these expulsions are becoming more frequent. 
The numbers of deportations from the United States back to Mexico are much 
higher than the numbers of extraditions in the same direction. From September 1997 to 
December 2001, the PGR regional office, with the assistance of U.S. authorities, 
deported 102 fugitives from Mexican law from the United States back to Mexico. In the 
same period, 22 were extradited from the United States back to Mexico; that amounts to 
almost five deportations for every one extradition.  
According to the U.S. Department of State, 160 U.S. citizens were deported from 
Mexico to the United States in 2001, and by 3 October 2003, 202 persons removed or 
excluded from Mexico and deported to the United States. 
The expenses involved in transporting a Texas prisoner to and fro are paid for by 
the state agency issuing the arrest warrant. TDCJ is required by law to take bids from all 
interested prisoner transportation entities, either from private prisoner transportation 
companies or the U.S. Marshals, who charge state and local law enforcement for 
prisoner transport. The state then chooses the lowest bid. 
On the whole, Texas officials roundly praise Mexican officials for their help and 
cooperation in returning U.S.-citizen fugitives. “I can’t say enough good about the 
Mexicans,” says a high-ranking state official. “They’ve been real helpful to us. We’re 
dealing with some real badasses. (These fugitives) have a long criminal history. The 
Mexicans don’t want them over there either.”  
Another state law enforcement official explains that the cooperation existing now 
“would have been impossible before, but we have the Mexican AG office (in San 
Antonio), and have friends now.” 
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State/Federal/International Issues 
The Texas-U.S. axis (national causes): was the problem Texas sought to address 
under state or federal jurisdiction? What was the correspond ing federal response: did the 
federal government support the mechanism, ignore it, or move to restrict the 
mechanism? 
It is within the state’s traditional jurisdiction to pursue a fugitive from state law. 
However, when that fugitive crosses an internationa l boundary, the federal government 
should step in. But as state officials have been able to cultivate their own criminal justice 
contacts in other nations, the states have been able to act directly without involving 
federal officials. 
The federal government is often unaware when state criminal justice officials 
confer directly with foreign actors to recover a fugitive. If a successful recovery is made 
through informal contacts, OIA will likely never know of the episode. Only if there is no 
progress on the case within Mexico will state officials turn to OIA to begin formal 
extradition proceedings.  
But the Office of International Relations has actively encouraged other nations to 
deport rather than extradite fugitives, particularly if they are U.S. citizens. “Voluntary 
deportation of U.S. citizens not facing a death penalty won’t ruffle any feathers,” says a 
DOJ official stationed in Mexico City.  
Although both levels of law enforcement share the goal of recovering fugitives, 
each level sees their own concerns. Where subnational actors focus on their particular 
interests, federal officials view U.S.-Mexico relations through a wide-angle lens. When 
subnational actors pursue their own cases, there is always a risk of a mistake through 
ignorance or misunderstanding. Says one U.S. Department of State official, “My concern 
is that the formal structure for extradition or deportation is threatened.”  
But federal officials recognize the states can accomplish much by conferring 
directly with Mexican agents. An OIA official says: “We do not disapprove of state 
authorities developing productive law enforcement relations with Mexican authorities or 
having direct contact with the PGR representatives in San Antonio. On sensitive matters, 
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we just want them to consult with us. We want to ensure that they don't do things that 
are going to damage law enforcement cooperation for everyone in future cases.”  
The above statement, from a personal interview, contradicts the official OIA 
paperwork for fugitive extraditions. The paperwork directs state and local law 
enforcement to contact OIA – and only OIA – about recovering a fugitive, and not to 
contact foreign authorities directly. The extradition papers read:  
 
Direct contacts by a federal or state prosecutor, investigator, or 
other police authority…located in the country where the fugitive is 
believed to be located may violate foreign law, create problems with 
respect to securing the return of the fugitive, and even damage U.S. law 
enforcement relations with that country. 42  
 
But in practice, TDCJ and OAG authorities will not call OIA first, but will call 
the PGR representative in San Antonio. State officials strongly prefer to request the 
Mexicans deport the absconder rather than initiate the time-consuming extradition 
process.  
At the subnational level, there is a consistent theme of frustration with federal 
procedures. One Texas county official says the difference between following the formal, 
federal route and relying on personal relationships is like night and day. To get 
information on a criminal suspect out of Mexico City, he could contact the DOJ legal 
attaché stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, but if he does this, “it never gets 
done right,” he says, sotto voce. Or he could send a formal request for help to Interpol in 
Washington, which then goes to Interpol in Mexico City, and takes too long. “You’ll see 
(the requested information) six months down the road if you’re lucky,” this county cop 
says. “But I deal directly with the Mexicans, and before long, I have the information. It’s 
just law enforcement to law enforcement. It’s a matter of reciprocity.”  This official has 
heard no complaints about this informal way of getting things done, but acknowledges 
that he may “step on the toes of the Legat (the DOJ Legal Attaché). It’s a little territorial 
– like ‘this is my bone and no one’s going to get my bone.’ They say we’ll get (the 
                                        
42 Request for Extradition (Washington, D.C.: Office of International Affairs, U.S. Department 
of Justice). 
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information) tomorrow – which never comes. But I have rapport with individuals and I 
get it now.” 
Although the federal government has been encouraging foreign governments to 
increase deports of U.S. citizens, it has not been thoroughly communicated to 
subnational law enforcement that deportations, in most cases, would not meet with the 
federal government’s disapproval. State officials are still uncertain that using their own 
contacts to recover fugitives would not disturb the federal government. One state official 
said, of deports: “We consider it back-door stuff. Department of State probably wouldn’t 
be very happy. We’re probably doing something wrong. But we’re used to getting things 
done quickly.”  
An FBI agent wishes there were a way the states’ individual contacts could be 
more beneficial. “If it were done in a more controlled way, we would probably remove 
more U.S. fugitives from Mexico; we’d have more people to go around. But most people 
being sought (by the states) face a life or death sentence. The people the states put their 
resources towards finding are icky guys. No one gets excited about the guy doing wire 
fraud, but about triple homicides. When they are removed, the Mexicans look at those 
closely, because of the seriousness and visibility of the case.” 
 
 
The U.S.–Mexico axis (international causes): what were the international 
political and economic conditions that contributed to or prevented the state’s effort to 
reach across the Rio Grande?   
Federal officials say that Texas has benefited from hard-fought improvements in 
law enforcement relations between the U.S. and Mexican federal governments. An OIA 
official says: “Aside from their own efforts, Texas authorities are no doubt benefiting 
from the federal government's work with Mexican authorities to expand deportations. 
The change in Mexico and expansion of deportations is a manifestation of better trust 
and cooperation that we have been cultivating for years with our counterparts in the 
Mexican government.”  
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The Texas-Mexico axis (state causes): How was the venue created? Did Texas’ 
interest in and method of contact with Mexico differ from the U.S. government’s 
relations with Mexico?  
For decades, Texas officials have taken advantage of the opportunity to cultivate 
direct contacts within Mexican law enforcement, benefiting from proximity and mutual 
need. The federal government’s decision to allow the Mexican Attorney General to open 
the PGR regional office in San Antonio has facilitated the development of those 
relationships, as has the federal government’s encouragement that Mexico deport U.S.-
citizen fugitives. So in the case of deportations, Texas method of contact with Mexico 
took place within a framework put in place by the federal government. 
While the method seems largely successful, and state officials acknowledge that 
progress is being made, they still often feel frustrated in both directions, towards Mexico 
and towards Washington, D.C.  
TDCJ officials are grateful for the productive relations they have with the PGR, 
and could not be happier that the PGR has a Texas office. Says one state investigator:  
(Since) we have a good rapport with the PGR office in San Antonio, 
we’re going to go straight to them. They’d do the same for me. We both say, 
‘help me with this guy.’ OIA wants us to do the paperwork, and yes, the 
paperwork needs to be in order, but if you can just have someone grab the guy 
(and deport him) without going through all that nonsense (extradition), then 
you’re better off. 
 
But other officials are uncertain how to establish working relationships with their 
Mexican counterparts. One local homicide detective in central Texas longs for 
productive contacts in Mexico, but says he does not even know where to begin to find 
help. “If I could just get a phone number, somewhere,” he laments. “But I have no idea 
even how to find a phone number to call.” He hopes for a future where law enforcement 
within the United States will have a directory of municipal and state police stations in 
Mexico – and he would be happy with a number just for the office building, as if 
wanting a name is too much to hope for. 
 Mexican officials are sometimes troubled by the informal style employed by 
officials in the United States. Then Mexican way is still more formal than the U.S. way, 
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because the Mexican political system is more centralized than the U.S. system. Texas 
officials will telephone the San Antonio branch office of the PGR with a request for 
assistance, and are surprised to learn that the office would prefer to receive a written 
request, sent through the formal diplomatic channels via central offices in Washington 
and Mexico City. Urgent phone calls result in actions, but PGR authorities still want the 
request to be submitted later in writing. The PGR branch offices are required to submit 
monthly reports to Mexico City, and written requests from Texas officials help justify 
the steep expenses of running the office. But Texas officials do not quite know how to 
respond to this, says one PGR official. It is “difficult” to get the necessary formal 
requests for assistance letters from state agencies, he says. “They never want to write 
anything.” 
 
 
EXTRADITIONS 
“We (the state of Texas) have a moral obligation not to be an exporter of crime.” 
 – Texas Department of Criminal Justice Official  
 
Treaties and Practices 
An extradition is the surrender of a criminal suspect by one authority to the 
custody of the authority with the jurisdiction to try the criminal’s charge. Within the 
United States, extraditions can take place between the states. International extraditions 
are governed by treaties negotiated between the United States and the individual nations.  
The current extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico was 
negotiated in 1979, and replaced the previous 1899 treaty and its additional conventions 
from 1925 and 1939. The 1979 treaty provides a long list of extraditable offenses, 
ranging from crimes against persons such as murder, rape, and malicious injury to 
hijacking, fraud, embezzlement, and counterfeiting. Neither country is obligated to 
extradite, so the surrender of a fugitive is viewed as an act of goodwill by the receiving 
nation. 
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Mexico has historically been reluctant to extradite to the United States. U.S. 
officials will give many reasons for this, including Mexican opposition to the death 
penalty, the nation’s need to protect Mexican sovereignty, or just a rare opportunity for 
Mexico to annoy the United States. Understanding the logic behind Mexico’s extradition 
patterns has been a source of frustration for Texas officials. Even U.S. authorities, who 
meet regularly with Mexican officials to discuss law enforcement matters, seem 
confounded by the air of mystery surrounding Mexican extradition practices. Mexico 
says it will extradite Mexican nationals under “exceptional circumstances,” such as for 
particularly heinous crimes; OIA officials would like to know what the exceptional 
circumstances are but say there is “no hope” of getting such a definition from Mexico. 
DOJ officials who have served as Legal Attachés (known as Legats) at the U.S. 
Embassy in Mexico City agree that Mexican judges can be quixotic when reviewing 
extradition petitions, but some see more practical obstacles. A former Legat says that 
U.S. officials could do a better job of giving Mexican officials the data they need to find 
a fugitive. “Half the time (U.S. officials) don’t want to give information to the Mexicans 
because they don’t trust them,” says this official. “Then they complain that the Mexicans 
are no help.”  
Another Legat explains that differences in procedures, especially in how criminal 
evidence is collected and presented, account for some extradition denials. Mexico 
expects statements directly from witnesses, while the U.S. method is to take an affidavit 
from the investigator. Also, the Mexican extradition judge wants to know that all the 
evidence has been properly translated and checked by official sources. “(Judges) have a 
checklist; if it (the U.S. extradition package) doesn’t match, they are likely to deny,” 
says the official. “We need to see what the problem is, rather than wait for an 
unfavorable decision.” 
In the past several years, there has been slow improvement in returns. Mexico 
began extraditing Mexican-citizen fugitives for the first time in 1996, after a slow 
recovery from the Machain kidnapping; but only eight Mexican citizens were handed 
over to the United States in the five years that followed.  
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Starting in 1996, Mexico increased the number of U.S. citizens and third-country 
nationals it extradited; from 1996 through 2000, an average of 12 a year from Mexico to 
the United States, while the United States sent an average of 15 persons per year to 
Mexico. 
However, in 2001, the first year of the Fox administration in Mexico, 14 
Mexicans were found to be extraditable. 
The United States will send its own citizens to other nations for trial. From 1990-
99, the United States sent 1500 people to other countries; 200 of those extradited were 
U.S. citizens.  
 
 
The Extradition Process 
Unlike deportations, extraditions are one area of international law enforcement in 
which state and local authorities have to follow official procedures. State and local 
governments cannot file extradition requests independently. All extradition requests 
must go through the Office of International Affairs (OIA) at the Department of Justice in 
Washington D.C.  
Texas officials will file an extradition request whenever they know a fugitive is 
out of the country, but have been unable to recover the fugitive quickly through their 
informal contacts. If Mexican authorities approve the extradition request, the suspect can 
be taken into custody for 60 days on a provisional arrest warrant. The 60 days allows the 
U.S. jurisdiction to finish assembling the evidence against the suspect. 
While OIA officials say they have no problem with subnational officials using 
their own contacts to seek a fugitive’s deportation, they expect state and county officials 
to respect other nations’ extradition practices, and to realize that the OIA officials have 
more experience in dealing with foreign nations efficiently and diplomatically. 
Compiling the extradition paperwork is the complete responsibility of the county 
attorney or state official with jurisdiction in the case, which has to pay for the entire case 
to be translated. But after completing the paperwork, including translations, the 
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extradition package is sent to the OIA, and U.S. federal officials handle the case after 
that. 
Ultimately, the Mexican Foreign Minister, the Secretaria de Relaciones 
Exteriores (SRE) is responsible for ruling on extraditions. This puts the Mexican foreign 
secretary in a very political position that the U.S. Secretary of State does not experience, 
because extraditions in the United States are handled administratively by OIA. President 
Fox’s first foreign minister, Jorge Castañeda, received death threats in conjunction with 
extradition decisions he made while in office.  
 
 
State/Federal/International Issues 
This section explicates the state’s role in an existing international mechanism 
rather than a state-generated venue. So the standard axis questions do not apply. 
However, the three axes can be examined to reveal some significant intergovernmental 
tensions exacerbated by the internationalization of the domestic criminal justice arena:  
 
Texas–U.S. Tensions: State officials say communicating with federal officials on 
the extradition paperwork is less than satisfactory. More than one official complains of 
having to redo extradition paperwork because OIA lost the original petitions. “They 
must have a big turnover rate in D.C.,” growls one state official. Another recalls that the 
arrest request for TDCJ’s one outstanding fugitive, José Salaz, was dropped because 
OIA did not finish the paperwork in time. An OIA official responds that if any 
paperwork was dropped, it must have been because the Texas agency did not get the 
paperwork to OIA in time. 
One of these same state officials calls extradition “a nightmare procedure,” and 
much prefers the informal method of receiving fugitives via deportation. When Mexican 
immigration performs a quick deportation, “we don’t have to mess with the politics of 
the State Department.” This official could recall only one fugitive returned through the 
extradition process during his 14-year tenure. Extradition is “just a worthless system,” he 
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says. He says that even the DOJ Legal Attaché in Mexico City has lost paperwork. 
“Drives us crazy.” 
Another Texas official concurs and would rather work independently than 
through OIA. “Often, DOJ hasn’t finished the paperwork and we already have him back” 
through a quick deport, the official says. 
A local policeman also complains about the lack of federal response. He tells of 
repeatedly calling OIA and continually getting recorded messages rather than live 
individuals. He finally reached a person who promised to help, but that official has yet to 
follow through. 
In 2002, the Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Justice reviewed the 
extradition practices of the Office of International Affairs. The final report found that 
“OIA’s effectiveness in processing and managing an extradition request was 
inconsistent…OIA did not review cases to determine if follow-up action was needed…to 
close cases in a timely manner.” The report recommended that OIA improve its case 
management strategies and to improve coordination with the FBI, U.S. Marshals, and 
U.S. immigration authorities to identify fugitives. No mention is made in the conclusion 
of improving relations with state and local authorities.43 
There is also some tension between state and federal officials over when to request 
an extradition. These tensions may ease if Mexico continues to increase extraditions of 
Mexican citizens. But for now, the state- level perception is that OIA continually requests 
extraditions, even in cases where Mexico is unlikely to extradite, to try to force Mexico 
to define what it considers to be extraditable circumstances. An OIA authority denies 
that they push Mexico on extraditions just to make a statement. Rather, federal cases 
often have multiple defendants, and involve sensitive information, thus making those 
cases more appropriate for an extradition rather than a foreign prosecution.  
However, this OIA official admits the office will request extradition even when 
doubtful to get the suspect into custody on a provisional arrest warrant. If Mexico 
                                        
43 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Review of the Office of 
International Affairs’ Role in the International Extradition of Fugitives. Report No. I-2002-008 
(March 2002): vi, 35. 
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refuses an extradition request, the suspect remains in custody, and the case automatically 
becomes a Mexican prosecution.  
 
U.S.–Mexico Tensions: The Mexican Supreme Court’s 2001 decision barring 
extradition in cases that face a life-in-prison sentence surprised officials in the United 
States and they are working to find a way around this new limitation. Mexican law 
allows a 40-year maximum sentence in all but a few circumstances, but will also allow 
consecutive sentences. In order to extradite, Mexico wants U.S. officials to give 
assurances that the individual in question will not serve longer than 40 years.44 
But each U.S. state is sovereign in setting its own criminal laws, so sentences 
vary from state to state. Some U.S. states, such as California and Florida, have a 
sentence of life without parole, so in those states, “life” means the natural life of the 
convict. Prosecutors in those states are struggling to find a way to balance Mexico’s 
restrictions on extraditions against the political pressures from their electorates. 
The decision has certainly increased the workload of the DOJ legal attaché in 
Mexico City, who must learn what each states’ “life” sentence really means in order to 
assist with extradition requests. 
For their part, Mexican PGR officials also complain about the extradition 
paperwork. They say that U.S. officials will sometimes give them extradition requests at 
the last minute. The U.S.-Mexican extradition treaty says notice should be given 60 days 
in advance. But the San Antonio PGR office was once notified they had one day to make 
arrangements to remove a Mexican fugitive from the United States, and the office had to 
scramble to meet the deadline.  
In a more positive light, the contrast in resources between the two nations has 
proven to be, at times, an opportunity to improve relations. A PGR official recalls a 
Mexican citizen in Omaha, Nebraska, who was to be extradited. The airfare to return 
him to Mexico was pricey. The U.S. Marshals escorted the suspect from Omaha to San 
                                        
44 The Associated Press, “Mexico Limits Extradition,” The New York Times International. 4 
October 2001. (Retrieved 1 October 2003.) Available from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/04/international/americas/04MEXI.html?ex=1065153600&en
=dca615a74dc7b2cf&ei=5070.  
 237
Antonio, and paid the way. Then the PGR took him from San Antonio to Mexico City. 
“That’s proof of a good relationship,” says the PGR representative. “This country (the 
United States) has money, which sometimes we don’t have.” 
 
Texas–Mexico tensions: At the county level, there are perennial tensions over 
Mexico’s reluctance to extradite fugitives who could face a death sentence. 
Texas officials are hoping that Mexico’s recent ban on extraditions in cases where 
a life sentence is possible will not be a problem. Since the Court’s decision, Texas state 
authorities have been trying to explain to Mexican officials that in Texas, a “life” 
sentence doesn’t mean “life.” A convict in Texas will serve 30-40 years before 
becoming eligible for parole. Since this does not exceed Mexico’s maximum sentence of 
40 years, the Mexican life sentence ban should not necessarily affect Texas.  
 
  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTIONS 
 “Mexico doesn’t want to be seen as a safe haven for criminals. They don’t like 
this idea that if you run across the border, you’ll be safe.” – Texas official, Office of the 
Attorney General 
 
Extradite or Prosecute 
If Mexico refuses to extradite a Mexican national back to the United States to be 
tried for a crime committed in the United States, then what recourse do U.S. and 
Mexican officials have, once the suspect has crossed the international border? U.S. 
authorities can request that the Mexican attorney general prosecute the suspect, as if the 
crime had been committed in Mexico.45  
A general principle of international politics is aut dedere, aut iudicare (extradite 
or prosecute), which means that a nation refusing to extradite a fugitive should prosecute 
                                        
45 Technically, a U.S. citizen could be prosecuted under the Article IV provision if the victim 
was a Mexican national. But the officia l U.S. position is to always seek extradition of a U.S. 
national.  
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the individual within its own borders and under its own laws.46 In the Mexican penal 
code, this principle is codified as Article IV, and is the default procedure that ensues 
after an extradition is denied.47  
While U.S. and Mexican federal prosecutors tussle over the Mexican standards 
for extradition, subnational governments in the United States are free to pursue 
international prosecutions directly with Mexican authorities. An Article IV prosecution 
is a provision of domestic Mexican law and is not a part of any international treaty. 
There is no U.S. law involved, save for the fact that the crime committed in the United 
States must also be a crime in Mexico. U.S. federal authorities do not have to be – and 
usually are not – involved in Article IV cases.  
Article IV was written into the Mexican Federal Penal Code in 1931, but such a 
provision has existed in Mexican law since 1871. But nearly 100 years passed before the 
provision began to be regularly utilized by authorities in the United States.  
It is not clear when the U.S. federal government became aware that Mexico 
would prosecute a crime committed in the United States. The provision may have been 
utilized by the U.S. Department of Justice in 1976 during Operation Janus, when the 
U.S. federal government encouraged Mexican law enforcement to prosecute individuals 
who had violated U.S. drug laws. The program had the support of the Mexican federal 
attorney general at the time, but was ended after a few years and deemed a failure.48  
So it seems the states, and not the U.S. federal government, were the first to take 
advantage of the provision. The first recorded use of the Article IV provision in U.S.-
Mexico relations is on 19 May 1981, when the California Department of Justice 
(CALDOJ) filed a request for an Article IV prosecution. Ruben Landa, a CALDOJ 
                                        
46 McDonald.  
47 The English translation of Article IV reads: “Crimes committed in a foreign territory by a 
Mexican against a Mexican or against a foreigner, or by a foreigner against a Mexican, will be 
punished in the Republic of Mexico, in accordance with federal law, if the following 
requirements are met: That the accused be in the Republic of Mexico; That the prisoner has not 
been definitively tried in the country where he committed the crime, and; That the infraction 
with which he is charged be a crime both in the country where it was committed and in the 
Republic of Mexico.” From Yuri Calderon, Paco Felici and Elizabeth T. Buhmann, Criminal 
Prosecutions Under Article IV of the Mexican Penal Code: A Technical Assistance Manual of 
the International Prosecutions Unit (Austin, TX: Office of the Attorney General, 1994): 21.  
48 McDonald, p. 78. 
 239
special agent who traveled frequently to Mexico to exchange information and pursue 
cases, is credited with “discovering” the Article IV provision when he learned about it 
from a Mexican prosecutor.49 CALDOJ opened an international prosecutions unit, and 
today, the Los Angeles and San Diego police departments and county prosecutors each 
have an international prosecutions office as well. 
Mexican officials from the Mexican federal attorney general’s office say their 
records show the United States began filing requests for Article IV prosecutions in 1985. 
This discrepancy in dates could be due to a change in how cases were filed: a California 
official says the first cases were filed with the PGR’s regional office in Tijuana, Baja 
California; and later began to be filed with other state offices of the PGR. The PGR’s 
central office for handling Article IV requests did not open in Mexico City until 1993.  
But it seems local law enforcement officials along the border have been aware 
for some time that Mexico would prosecute a crime committed north of the border.  A 
Texas policeman in a border county says as long ago as the 1970s, he had crossed the 
border to testify in a case, and had taken recovered drugs to Mexico as evidence for 
cases, while working in cooperation with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency. But this 
cop was unfamiliar with the term “Article IV;” he knew the procedure by the Spanish 
phrase “crimen contra extranjeros,” or “crimes against foreigners,” the phrase often used 
in Mexico to describe the Article IV procedure.  
But in Texas, the official story is that the Texas Attorney General’s office first 
learned about Article IV prosecutions from California officials during annual meetings 
of the Border States Attorneys General Conference.  
The Texas Attorney General opened its International Prosecutions Unit (IPU) in 
1994. The Texas unit has helped with Article IV prosecutions originating in Arkansas, 
Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Virginia. While most Texas county officials file requests 
through the OAG’s unit, the Dallas County Sheriff’s Department also files Article IV 
requests with the Mexican government. The Austin Police Department has hopes of 
filing Article IV requests independently. Most of these cases involve Mexicans, living in 
Texas, who have been murdered by other Mexican citizens.  
                                        
49 Ibid, p. 80. 
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On 19 August 1993, the PGR opened a unit in Mexico City to handle Article IV 
requests. Mexicans say the office was opened in order to comply with the extradition 
treaty, which demands prosecution in cases where extradition is denied. La Unidad 
Especializada para la Atención de Delitos Cometidos en Territorio Extranjero 
(Overseas Crimes Unit) is a part of la Oficina de Asuntos Legales Internacionales 
(Foreign Legal Affairs Office). For the first several years, there was only one person 
assigned to the office to process Article IV requests. For a time, judicial police were 
assigned to the unit to investigate cases, but these were rescinded in 1997. From 1997-
2002, the unit did not have its own investigators and had to rely on any available federal 
police or Interpol agents.  
Starting in 2002, the Mexican federal police began once again to assist with 
investigations, and a PGR official says the result is a three-week turnaround on new 
cases. 
When the office first opened, there were 101 requests filed by U.S. authorities. 
Fifty-five of these have resulted in a conviction. As of 31 October 2002, the Mexican 
office had a total of 418 open cases.  
No information is available on what it costs the Mexican government to carry out 
an Article IV case; the international affairs office budget covers extraditions as well as 
foreign prosecutions and does not calculate expenses separately.  
 
 
A Success Story? 
Before states began to use the Article IV provision, cases involving perpetrators 
in Mexico would just stay inactive at the district attorney’s office in the county where 
the crime took place. When Texas first opened its International Prosecutions Unit, the 
main challenge for the director of the IPU was to convince Texas law enforcement at the 
local level that it was possible to mount a case against a criminal who was still in 
Mexico. The then-director says county attorneys had a lot of distrust born of the 
perception that Mexico systematically protects criminals. “We had to tell them that this 
can be done, when things like this had not been done (in Texas) yet. The district 
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attorneys were impressed that Mexico wanted to try to find people.” He says the first 
case to be successfully prosecuted in Mexico in the 1990s gave credibility to the process. 
But still, the success rate for Article IV cases can seem disappointing. As of 
2003, the Texas IPU has 65 open cases in various stages of the prosecution process. All 
of these cases involve Mexican citizens on the run from U.S. law (U.S. citizens would be 
deported or extradited but usually not prosecuted). In the nine years since the office 
opened, 19 cases have been resolved: the suspect was either sentenced; tried and 
convicted; released; or the case was closed for some other reason. 50 
The former IPU director admits it is a “challenge to mix reality with politics. You 
may file 30 cases and get 2 resolutions.” He admits the rate of resolutions of cases looks 
small compared to the number of outstanding cases. “People say that’s a bad track 
record, but compare it to local statistics anywhere for robberies and arrest ratios,” he 
says. “It’s no reflection on Mexican willingness to help. The perception of Mexico as 
having no (police) authority is breaking down. There is more openness now. I never saw 
a bad actor in Mexico. The fight against crime is not one we’re ever going to win, but 
it’s not one we’re going to not fight.” 
The current director of the Texas IPU says an international prosecution is the 
method most likely to bring satisfaction to the parties affected by the crime, and a way 
around the frustrations of extradition politics. “It’s an opportunity to be proactive,” he 
says. “We can reach across the border, we can tell the victim’s family, ‘we’re not just 
sitting here.’” He says an Article IV prosecution is the most effective way to achieve 
closure to cases. He feels that given Mexico’s inconsistent record with extraditions, 
Article IV prosecutions should be pursued at the outset, rather than as a second choice. 
Families of the victims in the United States will often tell state officials they want the 
suspect prosecuted in Mexico. Life in a Mexican prison is infamous for its hardships, 
and there is no parole.  
The Texas government also saves money when Mexico performs an international 
prosecution. Depending on the complexity of the case and the amount of documentation 
                                        
50 In two cases, suspects were arrested upon returning to Texas. One went before a jury and was 
acquitted because the state’s main witness had died. One committed suicide while in custody. 
Both count as closed cases now. 
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and translation needed, an Article IV case file can cost $10,000-20,000 to complete. But 
this is far less than a local trial, says the Texas IPU director. A capital murder case can 
cost a half a million or more, plus appeals, plus $15,000 or more a year to incarcerate the 
convicted party. “We save money by not trying him here,” the Texas official says. 
 
 
The Article IV Process 
The PGR office in Mexico City prefers to have Article IV requests presented in 
person, so whenever possible, the director of the state unit, along with the lead 
investigator from the county with jurisdiction in the case, will travel to Mexico City to 
present the case to Mexican officials. The Article IV case file must include the arrest 
warrant, proof of the suspect’s identity and Mexican citizenship – preferably in the form 
of a Mexican birth certificate – as well as photographic evidence from the crime scene 
and witness statements. All the paperwork must have been translated into Spanish. The 
Texas IPU director is fluent in Spanish and can translate, if necessary, for the county 
investigators when they meet with Mexican officials.  
PGR personnel will review the case and discuss it with the Texans. If the case is 
accepted, the PGR will request a judge review the evidence and issue an arrest warrant 
for the suspect. Thereafter the case is carried out as if it were a Mexican case. The 
suspect is tried in a Mexican court and, if convicted, serves time in a Mexican jail – all 
for a crime committed in the United States. 
The Texas IPU most frequently requests Mexico prosecute homicide cases. The 
office has also filed Article IV requests for cases of vehicular manslaughter and sexual 
assaults of children, but has yet to pursue fraud, drug cases or auto thefts, although all 
would qualify. Homicides, however, are the top priority and, given limited resources, 
“we have more than enough of them to deal with,” says the official in charge of the 
Texas International Prosecutions Unit.  
Texas prosecutors – like Texas fugitive investigators – also express frustration 
with the difficulties of locating suspects once they enter Mexico. The PGR wants Texas 
 243
officials to tell them where to find the suspect. “It’s a constant argument we have,” says 
the director of the Texas Unit.  
We give (the PGR) a starting point of an address – but after that, 
we need them to follow up and find out where he is from that point on. 
They say: ‘we looked at that address and he wasn’t there – where else do 
we look?’ We don’t have people there. They say they don’t have the 
manpower. But we can’t send investigators there without their knowledge. 
An Article IV is like saying, we want you to handle this, so then we can’t 
say, ‘you’re not doing a good enough job, so we’re sending our person to 
investigate.’ 
 
In some cases, the address a source will give state officials is vague; in some 
more remote parts of Mexico, there are no street addresses. Officials will be told the 
person might be found at “dirección conocido,” which means: the local postmaster will 
know the address.  
Sometimes, an international case is hampered when mistakes are made at the 
local level within the United States. Cases involving foreign nationals need to be 
investigated differently from domestic cases, explains the Texas unit director. Local 
police investigating the crime need to know to look for immigration papers, or a birth 
certificate proving nationality, or letters with an address to where the suspect might flee; 
even evidence of money wired to another country can be crucial in tracking a fugitive to 
another country.  
And local law enforcement in the United States may not realize the importance of 
getting a Mexican national’s full name. Most Mexicans adapt to U.S. ways and use only 
one first name and one last name, but in Mexican custom, most individuals have two 
first and two last names. If the suspect’s full name is not sent to the border, the suspect 
may be able to leave the United States with impunity.  
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State/Federal/International Issues 
The Texas-U.S. axis (national causes): was the problem Texas sought to address 
under state or federal jurisdiction? What was the corresponding federal response: did the 
federal government support the mechanism, ignore it, or move to restrict the 
mechanism?  
 
Prosecuting a state criminal is within the state’s criminal justice authority. 
Because Mexican law provides for international prosecutions, the state is able to confer 
with Mexico on these cases. 
It is not clear if the U.S. federal government was aware of or utilized the Article 
IV option before the states began pursuing international prosecutions in Mexico. Despite 
the presence of the Article IV provision in Mexican law, current research indicates that 
California was the first to regularly request international prosecutions, not the federal 
government.  
A Texas official says he was “somewhat aghast” to find that the U.S. Department 
of Justice, with its resources, had not regularly pursued international prosecutions in the 
past, especially given that a prosecution within Mexico was virtually the only avenue for 
justice before Mexico began to extradite more reliably in 1996. 
Even now, federal officials are generally not involved in Article IV prosecutions, 
unless the case began as an extradition request and was denied. Article IV prosecutions 
are mainly the purview of state and local authorities, and these jurisdictions carry 
complete financial responsibility for pursuing the cases, receiving no financial help from 
the federal government.  
While the goals of an extradition and a foreign prosecution are the same – the 
apprehension and punishment of the guilty – state officials prefer foreign prosecutions, 
while federal officials see extradition as superior. One OIA official puts it bluntly: “If 
the crime is done here (in the United States), and the victims and the evidence are here, 
and the investigation is done here, then it makes sense to prosecute here. Article IV is a 
second-best means.” Extraditions are perceived as more desirable because faith in the 
U.S. criminal justice system is much stronger than in the Mexican system.  
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And local government officials, like federal officials, tend to favor extradition 
over international prosecutions, and resent Mexico’s limitations on extraditions. Because 
of the political pressure to win convictions, elected county officials prefer to extradite a 
criminal rather than relinquish him to a criminal justice system perceived as inferior. 
However, heinous crimes such as murder, while extraditable, are the type of crimes for 
which prosecutors are most likely to want to seek the death penalty or a life sentence. In 
those cases, prosecutors must provide the Mexican government with assurances that 
neither of these sentences will be imposed in order to extradite – or be satisfied with a 
Mexican prosecution.  
The involvement of the state or local authorities in international prosecutions is 
not seen by OIA as having foreign policy implications. Extradition is handing a man 
over to a foreign government; it is an exercise of foreign policy and must be carried out 
between federal governments. But international prosecutions are a function of Mexican 
law, and therefore not a matter of U.S. foreign policy. OIA officials say they have “no 
problem” with states initiating Article IV requests directly with Mexico. “It is not 
foreign policy, what the states are doing,” says one federal official. “It’s not what we 
would see as encroaching.”  
While the topic of deportations can make federal officials uneasy, the states’ 
pursuit of international prosecutions is seen as an additional resource for protecting the 
public safety. “The more law enforcement on the books, the better,” says one OIA 
official.  
 
 
The Texas-Mexico axis (state causes): How was the venue created? Did Texas’ 
interest in and method of contact with Mexico differ from the U.S. government’s 
relations with Mexico?  
The practice of Article IV prosecutions, while not a perfect system, is evolving 
into an effective mechanism for achieving justice in cases of cross-border crime. 
At least one Texas official sees Article IV prosecutions as a way for Mexico to 
improve the bad impressions that so many U.S. law enforcement hold. says the director 
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of the Texas prosecutions unit. “They are as anxious to get criminals off the streets as we 
are,” he says. “It’s a win-win situation. The counties save money; Mexico takes a 
lawless individual off the streets and shores up the world’s perception of it.”  
While institutionalization of the Article IV provision seems progressive, there are 
still frustrations with the method. Because Mexican police have their own cases to 
pursue, it can seem to officials in the United States that foreign prosecutions are a low 
priority to Mexican prosecutors. Officials at the U.S. DOJ say that Article IV 
prosecutions are “a nice idea” that can work when Mexico allocates enough resources to 
it; “the problem is, they don’t have the resources,” a federal official says. Mexico has a 
good conviction rate once a suspect is in custody, but there is a huge backlog, adds 
another. 
 
The U.S.–Mexico axis (international causes): what were the international 
political and economic conditions that contributed to or prevented the state’s effort to 
reach across the Rio Grande? 
Public safety is the concern here, for domestic law enforcement in both nations. 
The Article IV provision in Mexican law gives Mexico a measure of autonomy from the 
United States. It allows Mexico to prosecute a criminal without having to extradite, thus 
protecting a Mexican national from the U.S. death penalty. “Mexicans still see the 
traditional role of the (government) as the paternal protector of all its children,” says a 
U.S. diplomat in Mexico City. Article IV gives Mexico a way around extraditing to the 
United States, but allows the nation to prosecute a criminal suspect rather than letting 
him or her roam free. Without the provision in Mexican law, neither Texas nor any other 
U.S. states would have developed the capacity to work with Mexico on international 
prosecutions. 
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CONCLUDING SECTION 
COMMUNICATION: OPTIONS AND CHALLENGES 
The nature of security threats to the United States have moved from Soviet 
communism to global terrorism. The fact that terrorism is a proven domestic threat 
means that concern for public safety and national security have converged, jus t as other 
domestic policy areas have melded into foreign policy. The trend is for international 
crime to increase, and as it does, subnational actors will become even more active 
internationally. Now that the federal government has asked state and local law 
enforcement to do more to protect homeland security, state and local law enforcement 
must become more aware of international politics and the potential threats to the United 
States.  
But the Texas-Mexico case reveals three areas that merit serious consideration. 
The first is the international treaties governing law enforcement and their relevance to 
state and local law enforcement. The second is intergovernmental communication. The 
third is sensitivity to Mexican concerns. 
Considering Treaties 
The three main treaties that govern U.S.-Mexican criminal justice relations are: 
the extradition treaty, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, and the Mutual 
Legal Assistance for Criminal Matters Treaty (MLAT). Treaties are intended to be the 
way the federal government controls the behavior of subnational law enforcement 
officials. 
The only thing totally clear in the area of U.S. states and international relations is 
that the U.S. Constitution prohibits state and local governments from negotiating 
treaties. But state and local law enforcement are still bound by the treaties, and the 
federal government could be held responsible for treaty violations. This being the case, 
one would think the federal government would take extra steps to make sure state and 
local officials understand how the treaties apply to them. But there are still mistakes 
made at the subnational level.  
Extradition: Of the three treaties, state and local authorities have the most 
knowledge of the U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty because there is no way for an 
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extradition to be carried out through informal channels. But frustration with the 
extradition process is so high that subnational authorities will exhaust all possible 
informal means to recover a fugitive through their own contacts – sometimes even 
through illegal kidnapping – before turning to extradition as a last resort.  
But Mexican officials see that not every U.S. jurisdiction understands the 
extradition procedures. Often the regional PGR offices will receive extradition requests 
that are in error. “We’re shocked at their ignorance,” he says. Counties will even confuse 
state-to-state extraditions with international extraditions. He says state officials often 
“don’t know about or want to hear about” international conventions and treaties.  
Officials at the Office of International Affairs at the U.S. Department of Justice 
confirm that subnational authorities are often unsure how to pursue cases involving 
foreign nationals. 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: There is particular concern that local 
police, who are usually the first to be in contact with foreign nationals in a criminal 
incident, have the least knowledge of how to process foreign nationals according to the 
Vienna Convention. Violations of the treaty by subnational law enforcement have 
resulted in action brought against the United States by Mexico in the International Court 
of Justice. Treaty violations occur when subnational law enforcement fails to notify a 
foreign detainee of the right to seek assistance from consular officials stationed in the 
United States. In some cases, local officials are unaware of the treaty’s stipulations; in 
others, detainees fail to identify themselves as foreign nationals, and local officials are 
held responsible.  
Mexican officials seem to see the treaties and diplomatic protocols as a safeguard 
against an improper arrest or a death sentence for a Mexican citizen, and are dismayed 
that some district attorneys and even U.S. Attorneys still do not know how to arrest a 
foreign national. “Some of the locals are not trained that whenever we face a situation 
with Mexican nationals or U.S. nationals in a (criminal) incident, there are proper 
channels to follow to avoid problems in the future,” says a Mexican official. 
Whose responsibility is it to ensure that all levels of government are aware of 
international protocols? The U.S. federal government presents training seminars through 
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such venues as the National Association of District Attorneys, the National Fraternal 
Order of Police, and the National Association of Attorneys General. At these types of 
meetings, DOJ personnel will address attendees on how they can best address 
international crime issues and maintain good relations with foreign authorities. OIA says 
they have good relations with state attorneys general, and encourage them to call D.C. 
for advice. 
In addition to the training sessions provided by federal authorities, there are some 
statewide seminars as well. At a Border Law Enforcement Conference held in 2002 in 
San Antonio, Texas, the Texas Attorney General included short sessions and distributed 
copies of its own handbook on consular notification procedures.51 
 The Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty on Criminal Matters: Few subnational 
officials interviewed by this project were aware of the existence of the MLAT, which 
lays out formal channels that should be followed for purposes of exchanging information 
necessary for criminal cases.   
The MLAT is not entirely clear on whether or not subnational officials are 
prevented from sharing information informally. It indicates that other means of obtaining 
assistance are allowed, as long as they are consistent with the nation’s own laws.  
The treaty does allow each nation’s central authority to refer a request on to 
another competent authority – but in most cases, the “other authorities” would be the 
state and local governments, who are already handling requests directly, rather than 
proceeding through formal channels.  
Mexican officials acknowledge that MLAT “shortcuts” will inevitably happen 
but feel some procedures should still be followed out of respect for the legal framework 
of the treaty. And at least one Mexican expressed concerns that the state and local 
officials may be overstepping their authority. He says Texans need to understand that 
some issues are “best handled by the federal government. Proper procedures need to be 
followed.” All the same, they will provide information to state and local authorities; 
                                        
51 Office of the Texas Attorney General John Cornyn, Magistrate’s Guide to the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Notifications, Foreign Prosecutions Unit, January 2000.  Available at 
www.oag.state.tx.us.  
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Mexican authorities recognize that formality takes time, and in law enforcement, time is 
not always available. 
While the Mexican officials raise concerns about abiding by the MLAT, U.S. 
federal officials are outright approving when the states share information directly with 
Mexican authorities. One OIA official says it is not a treaty violation for states to do 
things informally. “It is one means to assist foreign authorities. It’s a good way of 
getting things done that can’t get done otherwise. If it is legal (in the other country) and 
fine with both countries’ federal officials, then states and locals can get things done 
informally if they can. We encourage that.” He says it is “impractical” for OIA to handle 
MLAT requests all the time. “In reality, we couldn’t handle the volume,” he says. Even 
if only California and Texas matters came through their office, that would still be too 
much for the federal office to handle. 
Considering Treaties: Treaties are the only formal means of control the federal 
government has over the behavior of state and local law enforcement. Should 
subnational governments have more of a role in treaty negotiations? If the extradition 
process is obeyed but avoided, if the Vienna Convention is often violated, and if the 
MLAT if not even known about, then there seems to be something lacking in the treaty 
process. Subnational governments are constitutionally prohibited from forming their 
own treaties, but not from participating in federal treaty negotiations. Fairness would 
dictate that all parties involved in an agreement should take part, at least to a degree, in 
structuring the agreement. If all parties are not included on the basis of fairness, then 
perhaps they should be included in the process just as a practical matter, so there is more 
knowledge of the treaty’s terms at the lower levels of government. 
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Considering Intergovernmental Communication 
Even though the federal government has encouraged other nations to return U.S. 
citizen-fugitives through deportation, and Texas state officials have for years sought to 
recover fugitives from Mexico through their own contacts, there apparently is little clear 
communication between the two levels of government on this issue.  
A TDCJ  official says that no federal official has ever communicated to him that 
it is permissible for his agency to be recovering state fugitives through deportation. At 
times he has wondered if his state agency has been “on thin ice” by conferring directly 
with Mexican agents. “But we’ve been doing it for years, and it has not become an 
issue,” he says. He knows the U.S. Marshals are recovering federal fugitives through 
deportation, but says federal officials “surely don’t encourage the states to do it.” 
Mexican authorities are in a unique position to see the frequent lack of 
communication that takes place both between and within levels of government in the 
United States. Mexican officials stationed in the United States have frequent contact 
with U.S. law enforcement at all levels to exchange information on investigations and 
requests for assistance. 
Mexican officials are surprised at how U.S. agencies do not share information 
easily with them. This is “a real problem,” says one official. “If they (U.S. agencies) 
would just share when they get the request, it should solve international problems.” He 
says some requested information arrives months or even years later. Another says it is 
“kind of hard” to get information from U.S. agencies, that they have to know people 
first, and know who has what information available and might be willing to share it. 
But it is also confusing to Mexican officials to see how little communication 
there is between levels of government in the United States. Mexicans see the interagency 
frictions that exist at the federal level – how some U.S. federal agencies are reluctant to 
work with other federal agencies. Mexican officials also see the oddity that some U.S. 
law enforcement agencies have access to information that other agencies do not. The 
FBI and INS use different fingerprinting systems, and the INS does not retain their 
information. When it comes to fugitive apprehension, each agency puts their resources 
towards finding their own fugitives, not another agency’s fugitives. 
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Several Mexican officials commented on ways that federal agents clash with 
local police, or how local prosecutors do not like having federal prosecutors involved in 
a case. 
The Mexicans’ mission in the United States can suffer because of 
intergovernmental miscommunication. Sometimes the PGR will request that federal 
immigration officials hold an inmate in the Texas prison system, only to find out the 
person has been released or even already deported. Once the PGR office alerted U.S. law 
enforcement of an arrest of a U.S. citizen in Mexico, but U.S. officials did not respond. 
Aside from what the Mexican agents see, even relations between state and local 
government agencies can be contentious. State and county criminal justice officials have 
been at odds for years because of overcrowding in Texas prisons. Those inmates the 
state does not have room to house are sent to county jails. County jails are not fond of 
this practice, although some have managed to turn their extra space into a revenue-
generator by charging the state for housing TDCJ inmates. But sometimes, county 
officials will not arrest state parole violators, because of the expense involved in 
detaining them in overcrowded county jails. Once a county jail flatly refused to hold a 
prison escapee for a TDCJ investigator. 
Friction between the FBI and state law enforcement has a long history. The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the nation’s premier federal domestic law 
enforcement agency. The retired Texas Ranger interviewed for this project says that in 
the past, federal intelligence officers treated state police with contempt. He says FBI 
agents would show up to the scene of an investigation, but would not share information 
with the state or local police. Eventually things improved, he says. What changed? 
“Hoover died,” the Ranger says abruptly, referring to J. Edgar Hoover, a former director 
of the FBI.  But even now, the Ranger says, the federal government could do more to 
promote better relations between levels of law enforcement. 
Opinions among state and local law enforcement towards the FBI are mixed. A 
local border policeman was assigned to work a particular case with an FBI agent. The 
cop “couldn’t work with” him. The agent was too rigid, too concerned with going by the 
book and worst of all, unwilling to overlook a little corruption to get the information 
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they needed for their case, says the cop. A top state official refers to FBI agents as 
“accountants with guns,” because many FBI agents reputedly have business degrees 
rather than law enforcement backgrounds. But state investigators are grateful for the FBI 
presence in Mexico. “It helps to have an agent in their town who can go talk with the 
locals,” says one.  
But state officials say international intergovernmental relations are furthered 
when selected law enforcement officers from all over the world gather at the annual FBI 
training academy, held in Langley, Virginia. When one state official went through the 
training, law enforcement agents from 43 other countries also took the course. The 
personal contacts made are priceless, says the official.  Another TDCJ official 
established a lasting friendship with an officer in Guanajuato, Mexico, while going 
through the training academy. 
Even while federal officials are not entirely comfortable with direct state-foreign 
relations, an FBI agent admits “we speak with two voices,” in that the FBI training 
academy encourages relationship-building between state and foreign officials. 
Texas officials do have good words to say about law enforcement task forces 
funded by the federal government and administered by the FBI. Task force members 
come from the FBI, the U.S. Marshals Service, the DEA, TDCJ, and area municipal 
police and county sheriffs departments. Dallas hosts an FBI Violent Crimes Joint Task 
Force and a U.S. DOJ “Safe Streets” task force. There are other task forces for drug 
interdiction, money laundering, gang activity, and an impromptu force can be set up for 
tracking a prison escapee.  
The task forces are “the way to go,” says one high-ranking Texas law 
enforcement official. “I wouldn’t be able to do what I do without them. It’s the 
mechanism for getting agencies to work together.” He explains that while each law 
enforcement agency has different reasons for wanting to take a criminal down, the goal 
is the same. “It’s really a small community (of law enforcement people) that work on all 
these cases,” says the official. 
The main benefit of the task forces is the open sharing of information and 
pooling of resources. The task forces allow state agencies access to FBI technology, 
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increased security clearances, federal vehicles, and federal overtime pay for the state 
agents assigned to the force. The task force concept has increased cooperation between 
law enforcement agencies at all levels of government, one state official says. Prior to the 
task forces, “the feds would take but not give information. Now, we’re equal partners.”  
After a mission is completed, the task force will hold a joint press conference with all 
member agencies represented.  
Two local cops interviewed for this project have suggested a task force of 
Mexican and U.S. law enforcement would be fruitful. 
But there are some critics of the task forces. An Austin criminal defense attorney 
complains that federally-funded task forces are composed of unelected officials and have 
no accountability. “They should be answerable to civilian governments and they’re not,” 
he says. 
Some of what the Mexicans perceive as intergovernmental friction may be 
attributed to the different capabilities of different levels of government. A federal official 
in Texas says that state and local officials are better with street crime, because they have 
more officers on the street, and can arrest people for lesser offenses, like jaywalking or 
traffic violations, which can lead to discovering more significant criminal activity. The 
U.S. Marshals have sheriff powers and can arrest for those lesser offenses, as local law 
enforcement can, but the FBI cannot.  
Sometimes the different levels of law enforcement, even while sharing goals, can 
find themselves at cross-purposes.  
Federal agencies have developed projects that negatively affected state law 
enforcement efforts. Operation Casablanca was a federal money-laundering project 
conducted in 1998. U.S. federal agents arrested many Mexicans during the operation, 
and that had repercussions in Texas, where it “killed years of work,” says a former state 
official. “We were going to have a (law enforcement) conference, but (couldn’t) call that 
week to Mexico City to get anything,” because relations were damaged by the federal 
government’s actions.  
This state official recalls the frustration he felt that state law enforcement is not 
included in regular meetings of federal U.S. and Mexican officials. He says federal 
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officials do not understand how the big picture of U.S.-Mexico relations affects states. 
“D.C. doesn’t really know what’s going on here,” he says. “People in D.C. don’t 
understand how to relate to the border.”  
On the U.S. side, a DOJ official admits he sees more tension between federal 
agencies than between the federal and state governments. But he expresses appreciation 
for what the states do: “If states are doing something that’s working, we don’t mind. We 
each do our own things.” He says state and local authorities have better local contacts 
and may be able to act more quickly, whereas federal agents must maintain higher- level 
relations, carry the authority of the national interest, and remember the “diplomatic big 
picture.” But he concludes that all levels of law enforcement “are important. We need to 
recognize each role and not complain at one another.”  
The attitudes of federal officials can make a difference to the levels of 
cooperation that exist between different levels of law enforcement. Along the U.S. 
borders, federal officials have many opportunities to work alongside state and local 
officials. One federal official, now at the U.S. embassy in Mexico City, was previously 
stationed at a U.S. consulate along the Mexico border. He tells how his predecessor at 
the consulate tried to control state and local officials, insisting that all state and local 
officials in the region come to him to get clearance whenever they needed to cross into 
Mexico. State and local authorities responded with resentment. They felt the federal 
official had no jurisdiction over them, and kept information from him. The official now 
in Mexico City agreed with the state and local officials. The lesson he learned by 
observing his controlling predecessor was, “Federal agents who insist on following the 
letter of the law will be shut out” by state and local agents. Upon assuming the position 
at the consulate, this official told state and local agents, “I am here to support you. What 
can I provide to you?” He asked to be kept informed of illegal activity in his jurisdiction, 
and he was kept in the loop. “Keep your friends close, and your enemies closer,” he 
concludes.  
Sometimes frequency of contact among certain officials on both sides of the 
border can lead to a successful relationship. When this has happened, the federal 
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government’s response was to reproduce the local success in a larger context, with 
mixed results.    
One example is the Border Liaison Mechanism. In the mid-1990s, U.S. and 
Mexican federal officials stationed in the San Diego area developed very friendly 
working relationships; there were high levels of trust between the U.S. Attorney and the 
Mexican Consul General. An informal information-sharing mechanism developed 
between the two offices. In 1997, U.S. Department of State officials from Washington 
developed the Border Liaison Mechanism (BLM), inspired by the good relations 
exhibited in San Diego. Today, Border Liaison Mechanisms exist in Tijuana/San Diego, 
Tijuana/Calexico, Nogales/Hermosillo, Ciudad Juárez/El Paso, Laredo/Nuevo Laredo, 
Matamoros/McAllen, and Matamoros/Brownsville. The goal of the mechanism is to 
“address a wide array of topics, from the civil rights of U.S. and Mexican citizens, ways 
of enhancing law enforcement cooperation in cases of auto theft and other transborder 
crime, and child custody issues.”52  
But relations among officials are not always as naturally harmonious as in the 
San Diego case. A federal official expresses concern that the federal government would 
take a local instance of cooperation, and then expect those same good relations could be 
replicated all along the border. “We encourage state-to-state level relations, but it’s one 
thing to dictate policy, another to dictate relationships. We can’t do that from here 
(Washington).”   
Considering Communication: The numbers of subnational law enforcement 
officials are far too numerous for the federal government to monitor, but there is still a 
surprising lack of communication between the levels of government on the parameters of 
states’ international roles. Many state and local officials say the federal government 
should promote international informal relationships, but in a way that allows each 
jurisdiction the freedom to respond to unique circumstances and accommodate 
personalities.  
 
                                        
52 Office of National Drug Control Strategy, An Overview of Federal Drug Control Programs on the 
Southwest Border. (Retrieved 3 October 2003). Available from:  
http://www.ncjrs.org/ondcppubs/publications/enforce/border/state.html 
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Considering Diplomacy 
Several U.S. officials stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City say that it 
was not until moving to Mexico City that they realized the importance of U.S. politics to 
Mexican politics and society. Everything that happens in Mexico is seen in the context 
of its relationship to the United States. Says one U.S. official: “When talking with 
Mexicans on (law enforcement) issues, you get a verbal dissertation on the history of the 
two countries, the UN Convention on Migrants,53 how migrants need to be free to flow, 
etc, deaths on the border because of where the INS is forcing them (to cross into the 
United States) – they see everything as a U.S.-Mexico issue.” 
The sense of pressure on Mexican officials is palpable: on the one hand, they are 
painfully aware of how far Mexican law enforcement needs to progress beyond 
corruption. They know the United States is willing to help, but the help is not easily 
accepted because of the sometimes intense resentment of the United States within 
Mexican politics. 
Says a U.S. official at the U.S. Embassy: “Most Mexican law enforcement 
officials are careful not to be perceived as our lackeys. Most want to help. But U.S. 
officials see law enforcement issues before we see sovereignty issues. But when a 
Mexican authority pushes someone over the bridge, the heat gets on that person who 
helped the United States.”  
Mexican officials acknowledge that interaction with the United States has 
improved Mexican criminal procedures: in 1997, Mexico passed an organized crime law 
patterned after the United States government’s Racketeering Influenced Corrupt 
Organizations Act. Prior to the law’s passage, evidence gleaned from electronic 
surveillance or gathered through undercover methods was not admissible in a Mexican 
court. “This is a positive outcome of how we have been influenced by the United 
States,” he says. 
                                        
53 The United Nations Convention on Migrants’ Rights was adopted by the General Assembly at 
its 45th session on 18 December 1990 (A/RES/45/158) and entered into force on 1 July 2003..A 
primary goal of the treaty is to ensure equality of treatment for migrants and nationals. Twenty-
three nations, including Mexico, have ratified the Treaty; the United States has not. (Retrieved 5 
October 2003.) Available from: http://www.unesco.org/most/migration/convention/ 
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But Mexican authorities working in the United States feel they are still struggling 
to overcome the impression that Mexico is “a haven for criminals,” one Mexican official 
says. “Many still have the old mentality that we’re going to protect criminals and so they 
won’t give us information. But we have to prove to them that we can bring them back. 
The only way is to show (U.S. officials) we mean business and like to work with them.”  
PGR representatives say they still encounter attitudes of distrust, mostly among 
local officials, particularly along the border where officers know their counterparts and 
can exchange information themselves, without involving higher-ups. “We need to work 
on the local level,” says the former director of the San Antonio PGR office, “where the 
attitude, particularly in West Texas, is that ‘we want to do it ourselves.’ Those attitudes 
are not harmful if there is a good example (of cooperation) operating at the top.” But 
sometimes, Mexican officials find out that fugitives or stolen vehicles have been 
returned “improperly,” which he blames on the attitude of state officials that they can 
“do things on their own.” 
 The irony of September 11th is that the terrorist attacks on the United States have 
increased the need for international coordination at all levels, even as it has heightened 
political tensions between the United States and Mexico at the top.  
Considering Diplomacy: Generally speaking, good working relationships 
between Mexican officials and their U.S. counterparts remain good even amidst higher-
level differences. But the risk remains that state and local officials, acting on their own 
interests, out of ignorance or frustration with formal channels, could seriously offend 
Mexico and tie up extraditions and deportations to the United States across the board. 
This could be circumvented if a higher value were put on understanding Mexico, starting 
at the top. OIA officials in Washington are certainly excellent diplomats towards 
Mexican officials, but this is not visible to officials at the lower levels of government 
within the United States.  
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Conclusion: The Need for Trust and Clari ty 
Because law enforcement handles threats to the public safety, the challenge to 
communicate effectively in this area is charged with an urgency that other issue-areas do 
not carry. While the general goals of state and federal law enforcement are the same, 
each level of law enforcement has its own specific goals and means of achieving them.  
As criminal justice concerns have expanded to include international 
developments, state and local governments have found it in their interests to cultivate 
good relations with Mexican agents out of necessity. State and local officials have been 
assertive in developing their own relations with their foreign counterparts, although 
claiming this freedom could carry significant costs to U.S. law enforcement overall if 
misused by individual officials. 
Federal officials interviewed for this project acknowledge they need subnational 
law enforcement to take the initiative and handle local matters directly with the 
appropriate foreign officials. After all, states are pursuing cases within their jurisdiction. 
But there is a significant level of discomfort with the lack of control the federal 
government has over state and local law enforcement, and the many grey areas as to the 
extent to which state and local law enforcement can be internationally active. 
International treaties are supposed to be the means by which the subnational role is 
restricted, but the current treaties seem to have a stunning lack of relevance to the daily 
operation of international law enforcement at the subna tional levels. While ambiguity 
plays a role in the lack of federal restriction, a more significant reason is that the federal 
government lacks the resources to handle the growing numbers of state and local 
criminal justice cases involving foreign nationals.  
Why then, are federal officials not more explicit in communicating to subnational 
officials that they are free to cultivate direct relations?  
Part of the lack of explicit communication is due to legal issues. If federal 
officials encouraged states to act independently, the federal government could be held 
responsible for treaty violations by state and local officials. So legally, a lack of clarity 
benefits federal officials, who seem to count on ambiguity acting as a restraint on state 
and local officials, in the absence of respect for or knowledge of treaties. 
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Subnational governments also benefit from a lack of explicit rules that allow 
freedom of action. “It is easier to beg forgiveness than to ask permission,” says one 
federal official. So in practical terms, a lack of clarity benefits subnational governments 
by giving them room to maneuver, who can claim either ignorance of international 
procedures or an urgent need for assistance. 
But the most significant barrier to communication is the lack of trust that runs 
both ways. Many federal officials feel that even if the federal government laid out 
explicit rules, state and local officials would still find a way to stretch or even ignore the 
rules. For their part, state and local officials often resent what they feel are impositions 
by a distant federal government ignorant of local concerns; more rules would just 
increase that resentment.  
In the long term, it is possible the federal government will seek to assert greater 
control over law enforcement. Fighting terrorism is already increasing the role of state 
and local law enforcement even as it is causing intergovernmental conflict.  
Because the federal government cannot or will not monitor state and local agents, 
the federal government could put more resources to communicating with state and local 
officials. A way needs to be found for state and local officials to be more aware of treaty 
negotiations that may affect the pursuit criminal investigations.  
Perhaps a system of regional liaisons could be developed for purposes of keeping 
subnational governments informed as to the priorities of DOS, DOJ, and Department of 
Homeland Security and the procedures for handling international cases in general and 
Mexican cases specifically. And at the subnational level, the possibility exists for 
creative new forms of governance to emerge as governments construct regional 
cooperative anti-terror strategies and mechanisms. 
Not talking about issues raised by the increasing role of U.S. states in foreign 
affairs is not going to put anyone’s mind at ease. More communication is essential. 
Subnational law enforcement needs to understand that treaties are supposed to set the 
limits of what they can do through their own international contacts. And state and locals 
officials need to understand that following good diplomatic procedures is, in the long 
run, in their interest, to keep the channels of cooperation open for others working on 
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similar cases. Ultimately, understanding diplomatic procedures is the remedy for the 
frustrations state and local law enforcement so often experience on international cases. 
But federal officials should be communicating this message more coherently and 
consistently with state and local law enforcement. 
The short-term goals of federal law enforcement and subnational law 
enforcement with respect to violent crime will stay the same. The question becomes 
what role future presidential administrations see for state and local law enforcement in 
fighting the War on Terror. The diffuse nature of the threats would seem to require the 
inclusion of all levels of law enforcement in fighting terrorism, as the Bush 
administration is seeking. But whether or not increased intergovernmental conflict 
results depends on the role the federal government wants state and local law enforcement 
to play. The strategies employed by the federal government could either curtail the 
pursuit of international role of state and local officials or increase conflict, as has 
happened over the PATRIOT Act and the question of immigration enforcement. How 
well-defined each level of government’s role is could determine how effectively they 
communicate and work together, but the legal ambiguities in this area prevent the 
subnational role from being more clearly defined.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
INTERNATIONAL CHILD SUPPORT: 
THE STATES LEAD, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FOLLOWS 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines how the U.S. federal government and U.S. state 
governments converge on the issue of international child support enforcement. The story 
of how Texas established ties with Mexico and other nations to enforce child support 
orders is a chapter in the larger story of how globalization has changed families. 
How does a state agency ensure that a negligent parent residing in another country 
pays child support? This was the question Texas state officials found themselves asking 
as the number of cases involving nonpayment of child support by parents in foreign 
nations grew. Family law – which includes marriage, divorce, and child support – has 
traditionally been the jurisdiction of the states. But as U.S. society has become more 
internationalized, state officials have found themselves with growing numbers of child 
support cases in which at least one party, either parent or child, resides in a foreign 
nation. 
The story of how Texas came to be a leader in international child support 
enforcement involves several state officials carefully treading through legal, 
constitutional, and humanitarian concerns, in order to meet the needs of children around 
the world. Texas blazed the trail using tools the federal government supplied; once 
Texas built the trail, the federal government followed the state’s lead and finally 
empowered all the states to handle international cases on their own. 
The twist to the story is the difference in approach between the federal 
government and the states over this issue. The official in charge of the Texas office has 
frequently locked horns with the federal government over how international child 
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support cases should be handled, even while federal officials have consistently looked to 
him for assistance in developing their nascent program.  
The state office that handles international child support cases is the Texas Office 
of International Coordination, opened in 1993 as part of the Child Support Division of 
the Texas Office of the Attorney General (OAG). At the federal level, the main entity 
involved is the Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE), part of the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS).  
In 1996, OCSE, along with the U.S. Department of State (DOS) began 
negotiating reciprocal child support arrangements with foreign nations, enlarging the 
federal government’s regulation of family law, traditionally a state- level responsibility.  
Also in 1996, the federal government explicitly granted all U.S. states the 
authority to negotiate international arrangements for purposes of collecting child support 
payments. But Texas and other U.S. states had for years been trying to find ways to 
pursue international child support cases, knowing they were treading on shaky 
constitutional ground. What follows is the story of how Texas became involved in 
international child support enforcement, illustrating how the states’ autonomy to respond 
to specific local needs results in policy innovation that can serve as a model for federal 
action. And in this case, the federal government has adapted the states’ policy innovation 
and, if it is implemented nation by nation, the will gradually preempt the states from 
negotiating their own arrangements. 
 
 
How Can a State Work an International Case? 
Texas was an unlikely state to become a policy leader in, of all things, 
international child support enforcement. Texas consistently ranks lower than many other 
U.S. states in social spending.1 But in this case, a combination of a growing social need 
                                        
1 In 1997, Texas ranked 44th among all states in state and local government spending per capita, 
39th in social services and housing expenditures per capita, 47th in transportation, and 24th in 
education expenditures per capita.  “Texas Expenditures at a Glance,” Texas State and Local 
Spending: A Comparison With Other States for 1997 (College Station: Texas Agricultural 
Extension Service, The Texas A&M University System, 1998). (Retrieved 29 October 2003.) 
Available from communityeconomics.tamu.edu/Taxpapers/ TX_State_Local_Spending.pdf.  
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and caring state officials transformed Texas into a leader. While California has also 
established links with other nations on child support issues, Texas was the first state to 
open an office exclusively to handle international child support cases, in the Office of 
the Attorney General (OAG).2 And the head of the Texas office, Gary Caswell, acts as 
an adviser to the federal government in this area, traveling frequently throughout the 
world to negotiate arrangements for the transfer of child support payments between U.S. 
states and other nations. 
The development of an apparatus to enforce child support orders also reflects 
society’s changes. The nationwide system has evolved as society has recognized that 
government has a valid role in enforcing legal orders, even in what are often considered 
private family matters. Child support today is a government program that ensures a non-
government benefit goes from the noncustodial parent to the custodial parent.  
Family law is traditionally the purview of the states, so in the past support 
programs and enforcement levels varied from state to state. But as U.S. society has 
grown more mobile, the federal government has gradually become more involved in 
regulating issues of family support. In 1950, the National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) developed the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of 
Support Act (URESA), to standardize methods for handling a growing number of cases 
where child support payments needed to flow between parents and children living in 
different U.S. states. The intent behind standardized methods was to try to ensure a 
“deadbeat” parent could not escape family financial support obligations by moving to 
another state.  
In 1968, a revision of the support act (RURESA) expanded the definition of a 
“state” to include foreign jurisdictions with “substantially similar” procedures for 
enforcing child support orders. Technically, this opened the door to states treating 
                                        
2 Child support  is one policy area  where Texas is active but so are the majority of other states. 
Without further state-by-state research, it is difficult to get a complete story of intergovernmental 
relations between the states and the federal government on the issue of international child 
support. But the federal official in charge of child support confirms that Texas has been a leader 
in developing reliable methods of conferring with other nations and justifying the development 
of independent state-foreign relations for purposes of child support enforcement. 
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foreign nations as if they were other U.S. states for purposes of child support 
enforcement.  
But in those days, the Texas child support program was in the state’s welfare 
department, and lacked legal enforcement mechanisms and resources to determine the 
status of another nation’s legal system. Very few civil lawsuits to force payment were 
filed then, because the delinquent amounts were seldom significant enough to attract the 
interest of private lawyers.  
But by 1970, eleven percent of all U.S. families with children were single-parent 
households. This number would only grow in the future – by 1998, 28 percent of all U.S. 
families with children were headed by single parents, comprising about 14 million 
single-parent families.3  
In 1974, in hopes that increasing child support payments by noncustodial parents 
would reduce the amount the government was spending on welfare, the U.S. Congress 
passed Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. Title IV-D mandated all U.S. states open a 
child support enforcement agency adhering to federal standards, in order to qualify for 
federal funding for welfare programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC). Each state was required by federal law to enforce existing court orders, to 
assist in establishing paternity, and to cooperate with other states on interstate cases.  
Title IV-D marked a significant increase in the U.S. federal government’s 
involvement in family law, and created an apparatus for enforcing court-ordered 
financial support. “It was a huge step to change the law,” says Tom Laramey, formerly 
an attorney with the Texas Office of the Attorney General. “But politically, (child 
support enforcement) appeals to all sides. Conservatives say we’re saving taxpayer 
money by reducing welfare; liberals say we’re helping the welfare mommas.”  
In Texas, child support enforcement now became part of the Attorney General’s 
office. But in the 1980s, even domestic child support cases were not a priority issue. Mr. 
Laramey admits that Texas had a nationwide reputation for lax enforcement. “I’m sure 
we were as bad as there was, if not a little bit worse. But no state gave priority to out-of-
                                        
3 Almanac of Policy Issues, Child Support. (Updated 1 April 2001, Retrieved 22 October 2003.) 
Available from: http://www.policyalmanac.org/social_welfare/child_support.shtml 
 266
state cases.” Most states, says Laramey, would send a case off to wherever the negligent 
parent was thought to be, so the other state would have to locate the parent.  
While the interstate cases were put in the mail, the international cases sat in the 
office and gathered dust. Some district attorneys and county clerks in Texas handled a 
case here and there, but most cases languished. Mr. Laramey and other OAG officials 
were uncertain what to do with the growing stack of international cases. They were still 
unsure if pursuing foreign cases was legal, according to either U.S. constitutional law or 
Texas state law.  
The challenge was how a U.S. state court could lega lly recognize a court order 
issued by a foreign jurisdiction, and how a U.S. state court could issue an order that 
would be enforced in another country. Both of these issues needed to be resolved in a 
way that would satisfy judges in both U.S. courts and foreign courts, in order to 
circumvent a legal challenge to the state’s authority by a negligent parent in an 
international case. 
State officials reasoned that if a foreign court issues an order in a substantially 
similar manner as would a U.S. court – if due process were followed – then why 
shouldn’t a U.S. court be able to recognize the order as valid and take steps to enforce it? 
If a U.S. court could not recognize a child support order issued by a foreign court, then 
the U.S. court would have to redo all the work of the foreign court. State officials felt it 
did not make sense to duplicate the work of another court, even if that court were in 
another country. But the trick was how to determine if another nation’s legal system was 
in accord with the U.S. system, as far as following due process. Did the other nation’s 
court follow processes that were in harmony with the U.S. notions of fairness and 
justice? This was the essential question to be answered. 
Mr. Laramey knew the 1968 RURESA language said a U.S. state could treat a 
foreign nation with a substantially similar legal process as if it were another U.S. state, 
for purposes of child support collection. In the early 1980s, Texas Attorney General 
Mark White had declared that the legal systems in Germany and England were similar 
enough to Texas’ to ensure reciprocity on child support cases, consistent with Texas law. 
As a way around possible legal restrictions, Texas and another nation would each 
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declare the intent to reciprocate with one another. This was known as a “parallel 
unilateral policy declaration,” or PUPD. Because a PUPD is not a binding international 
agreement, it was argued by some state and federal officials that a PUPD did not qualify 
as an international compact and therefore did not put the states in danger of a 
constitutional violation. 4  
But the creative use of mutual declarations of intent apparently did not result in a 
sustained effort to recover child support obligations in foreign cases.  
In 1984, Mr. Laramey remembers trying to learn all he could about the Mexican 
legal system to determine if Mexico could enforce a U.S. court order in the same manner 
as a U.S. court would. The need in Texas was to find a way to handle cases that involved 
one party in Mexico and one in Texas. His goal was to get his boss, Attorney General 
Jim Mattox, enough information to issue a declaration that Mexico had a substantially 
similar legal system, and that Texas state lawyers could then legally pursue cases 
involving a party in Mexico. He hired a Mexican attorney to research this, but he was 
not a significant help. Given the cases were not a high priority, and the reality of limited 
resources, Mr. Laramey never got his declaration issued.  
  
Finding a Basis for State Involvement 
Then came a change in administration at the OAG. Under Attorney General Dan 
Morales, who served from 1991 to 1999, child support cases were given more priority, 
even as the U.S. Congress passed the 1992 Child Support Recovery Act (CSRA), on the 
basis of its power to regulate interstate commerce. The Act was intended to prevent a 
noncustodial parent from moving to another state to avoid being under the jurisdiction of 
the original court, and criminalized failure to pay child support to a child living in 
another U.S. state.5   
                                        
4 Gary Caswell, “International Child Support – 1999,” Family Law Quarterly  32 (Fall 1998): 
531.  
5 Because the CSRA federalized family law, an area traditionally under state jurisdiction, there 
was some question as to the constitutionality of the law, but as of 1998, nine circuit courts found 
the law to be constitutional because the Commerce Clause allows Congress to regulate interstate 
commerce, including child support payments that move from state to state. See Caswell (1998): 
534.  
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In the early 1990s, Gary Caswell was working in the child support section of the 
Texas Attorney General’s office. He had inherited all the international cases that had 
been sitting, untouched, in the OAG. By 1994, Texas had 134 active cases involving 11 
foreign nations.6  
Mr. Caswell and Cecilia Burke, then the director of the OAG’S child support 
enforcement division, made a presentation in 1991 to the Border States Attorneys 
General conference to raise awareness of the need to find a way to handle child support 
cases with Mexico, where the need was most critical. Ms. Burke recalls that at the time, 
some states were able to resolve a few cases here and there, but most were not putting 
resources in that direction, partly because of the lack of clarity on how far the states 
could get involved in international cases.7 
Mr. Caswell proposed to the Texas attorney general that the state could be 
appropriately involved in international child support cases on two bases. One was the 
traditional authority of states to handle all family law matters, implying that the lack of 
federal involvement meant the state, by default, could negotiate international cases in the 
absence of a federal law. The second basis, Caswell argued enthusiastically, was comity, 
the historical practice of recognizing the laws and legal orders of another nation, evolved 
through international commercial relations. 
For the next few years, Mr. Caswell researched issues and court cases and sought 
to find a way to build on the willingness of other nations to cooperate. He relied on the 
Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA), developed by NCCUSL in 
1964, which is not about child support, but allows U.S. courts to recognize foreign 
monetary judgments. Mr. Caswell reasoned that if U.S. courts could recognize a foreign 
monetary order for purposes of commerce, on the basis of comity, then a U.S. court 
should be able to treat a foreign order for child support as valid in the United States on 
the same basis.  
Mr. Caswell’s goal was to find a line of reasoning that would convince a foreign 
judge that it was appropriate for the state of Texas to be in a foreign court seeking 
                                        
6  Germany, 55 cases; Canada, 35; Sweden, 12; Poland, 11; Mexico, 8; England, 6; Slovakia, 3; 
and one each with France, Australia, Russia, and Ireland. 
7 Personal interview with Cecilia Burke in Austin, Texas, 7 August 2000.  
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enforcement of a court order. He had no doubt that attorneys defending child support 
obligors would challenge in court the legal basis for the prosecuting court to recognize a 
foreign order. Some attorneys raised questions about currency conversion and the 
financial basis for determining support amounts, given the disparity in incomes between 
the United States and most other nations. Mr. Caswell’s logic had to be convincing to 
judges to keep cases moving forward, resulting in renewed payments.  
Another of Mr. Caswell’s goals was to put procedures in place that would 
obviate the need for a court in one country to redo an order that was fairly issued in 
another country. If due process were followed in the other nation, Mr. Caswell reasoned, 
and the defendant had notice of the hearing and proceedings, the opportunity to be heard, 
the right to confront and cross-examine and so on, then a Texas court should recognize a 
foreign order and vice versa. However, if a foreign court would not recognize an order 
from a U.S. court, Mr. Caswell still wanted the foreign court to issue its own order that 
payments be sent. 
Mr. Caswell presented his case for using comity as a basis of state action on 
international cases to the National Child Support Enforcement Association (NCSEA), a 
private, non-profit professional association for those working on child support issues in 
the United States. Professionals in other states were uncertain at first, but soon came to 
see comity as a reasonable basis for states to confer with other nations with less fear of a 
charge of constitutional infringement.  
Soon Mr. Caswell began traveling to other nations to discuss pending cases and 
how to handle them. Mr. Caswell’s travel is funded in part by the NCSEA, and by the 
federal Office of Child Support Enforcement. Most federal systems, like the United 
States, have restrictions on substates’ capability to sign compacts or agreements with 
foreign nations. Mr. Caswell’s office uses the term “arrangements” to describe the 
methods of communication agreed upon by Texas and a foreign nation.  
Soon, other nations began to agree to work with Texas. By the year 2000, Texas 
had arrangements worked out with eight Canadian provinces, Austria, Australia, the 
Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Mexico, Norway, Poland, Sweden, and the United 
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Kingdom. 8 Mr. Caswell has also negotiated with other countries, including Estonia and 
Japan. 
All parties to the Texas arrangements are aware that no legal consideration 
supports the arrangements and the parties have no recourse to hold each other 
responsible. The parties are involved “because we think it’s a good idea,” Mr. Caswell 
says.9 
 
The Texas Process of Establishing a Relationship with a Foreign Nation 
Cooperative policies between the state of Texas and a foreign nation begin with an 
exchange of letters between appropriate agencies, followed by a discussion of relevant 
laws, procedures and policies. Mr. Caswell and his staff compare the foreign nation’s 
laws and procedures with Texas law and practice. The foreign nation’s laws must be 
substantially similar to Texas law in order to meet the definition of a “state” in the Texas 
Family Code.10 The foreign country’s laws and processes must meet Texas standards of 
“due process and fair play. 11 
Once it is clear the foreign nation’s laws and concepts of justice are similar and 
that the foreign agency will provide reciprocal services to Texans, an opinion letter and 
policy declaration supporting the recognition and enforcement of the foreign 
jurisdiction’s child support orders is sent to the country’s Foreign Support Enforcement 
                                        
8 Administration for Children and Families, Office of Child Support Enforcement, Texas State 
Profile. (Updated 2 September 2003, Retrieved 29 September 2003.) Available from: 
http://ocse3.acf.dhhs.gov/ext/irg/sps/report.cfm?State=TX&CFID=48711&CFTOKEN=9163846
8#3  
9 Personal interview with Gary Caswell in San Antonio, 24 July 2000. 
10  “’State’ means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United 
States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States. The term includes: (A) an Indian tribe; and (B) a foreign jurisdiction that has 
enacted a law or established procedures for issuance and enforcement of support orders that are 
substantially similar to the procedures under this chapter, the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement 
of Support Act, or the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.” 
Texas Family Code, Section 159.101 (19). (Retrieved 28 September 2003). Available From 
http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/statutes/fa/fa0015900.html#fa002.159.101 
11 The foreign courts must have in personam and in rem jurisdiction over the parties in the suit; 
ensure fair notice of the proceedings, an opportunity to respond, and the process by which the 
foreign support orders are obtained “cannot be offensive to Texas public policy.” Gary Caswell, 
Memo on International Reciprocity  (Austin: Office of the Attorney General, December 1996). 
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Agency, to its embassy in Washington, D.C., and if applicable, to the nation’s consulate 
in Texas.  
Finally, Texas and the foreign nation exchange authenticated copies of relevant 
foreign law and an outline of procedures, translated if necessary. 12 For non-English-
speaking countries, the agencies work together to develop bilingual forms for 
distribution to agency personnel.13 
The arrangements involve establishing an office to serve as a central point of 
contact, standardized forms, similar court procedures, and a system for transferring 
money from Texas to the receiving nation or vice versa.  
Some challenges arise in the process. All support payments are sent first to the 
OAG in Austin and then forwarded to the custodial parent. But when checks started 
going from Austin to custodial parents in foreign nations, the payments were returned 
due to insufficient postage. For a time, Mr. Caswell’s office had to hand process all 
foreign mail while a reliable system to send money overseas was in development. 
  
Federal Involvement in Family Law Increases 
In 1996, Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which expanded federal government involvement in 
family law in general and specifically in international child support. The bill required all 
U.S. states to adopt the provisions of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act 
(UIFSA), which had passed in 1992. The states had to adopt the standard procedures by 
1 April 1998, as a condition of receiving federal funding. 
The Act defined a “state” to include foreign jurisdictions with laws or provisions 
similar to the procedures laid out by UIFSA. Therefore, U.S. states can use the same 
procedures with qualifying foreign entities, as the U.S. states would follow with a sister 
U.S. state. Passage of this legislation gave explicit approval to the states for contacting 
foreign nations for purposes of negotiating reciprocal child support arrangements. 
                                        
12 The relevant laws include statutes on declarations, age of emancipation, statutes of limitations, 
presumptions, etc.  
13 Forms include Transmittal/Acknowledgement, Locate Data Sheet, Registration Statement, 
Petition, General Testimony, Statement of Arrears, Parentage Acknowledgment, and Affidavit or 
Direct Payments and Facts of Possession. 
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PRWORA also authorized the U.S. federal government to declare a qualifying 
nation as a Foreign Reciprocating Country (FRC). The FRC must maintain certain laws 
and procedures common to U.S. support enforcement agencies, such as the 
establishment of paternity and support orders; collection and distribution of support 
payments to the initiating court; the presence of a central authority through which all 
contacts are initiated and supervised; and services must be provided free of charge to 
U.S. applicants. In addition, some jurisdictions are required to provide other services, 
such as locating persons named in the support suit. 
The federal reciprocal status certifies that the responding nation’s forms and 
procedures are substantially the same as the United States,’ thus settling that question the 
states had been struggling to determine years earlier. The FRC status is negotiated by 
authorities in DHHS and DOS. In the absence of a declaration of federal reciprocal 
status, the states are able to continue to negotiate their own arrangements with foreign 
jurisdictions, until such time as those countries are given federal reciprocal status and all 
state arrangements are preempted by the federal designation. 
Although the United States has met with officials from more than 30 nations to 
discuss child support matters, since 1997, only nine nations have been designated FRC. 
Meanwhile, the states have forged more reciprocal agreements independently of the 
federal government. While not every U.S. state has an arrangement with the following 
nations, there are state- level arrangements with Germany, Hungary, Mexico, Finland, 
Switzerland, Fiji, Micronesia, Denmark, Jamaica, the British Virgin Islands, and South 
Africa, among others. Many states had arrangements with the nine nations that have now 
been preempted by federal agreements: Australia, most Canadian provinces, the Czech 
Republic, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, and the Slovak 
Republic.14  
After PRWORA passed, the Texas Legislature amended the Texas Family Code 
in 1997 to give the Texas child support enforcement office the authority to enter into 
                                        
14 U.S. Department of State, International Child Support Enforcement Abroad. (Retrieved 29 
September 2003.) Available from: http://travel.state.gov/child_support.html#agreements 
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reciprocal arrangements, finally erasing all doubt as to whether or not state law permits 
the negotiations Mr. Caswell has been pursuing for years.15 
 
The Federal Foreign Reciprocal Status Process  
The federal Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) acknowledges that the 
states were the first to develop a working system for handling cases with similar legal 
systems. But according to OCSE, “the consistency and effectiveness of procedures and 
the extension of the arrangements to other countries presented serious problems for the 
states and for the other countries involved or to become involved.” Therefore, Congress 
authorized the U.S. Departments of State and Health and Human Services to work 
together to negotiate bilateral support enforcement agreements. “Under this legislation, 
the federal government is developing a unitary, national system tha t will help ensure that 
parents cannot evade their support obligations by leaving the United States or by coming 
to the United States.”16 
Steven Grant of the OCSE says that state arrangements on the basis of comity 
work well, but might not be sufficient to handle messy cases or unforeseen 
complications. The FRC status gives uniform coverage to all the many U.S. jurisdictions 
and cannot be revoked unilaterally, he explains.17 
To earn the reciprocal status from the U.S. federal government, another country 
is required to have an office serving as a central point of contact for child support 
actions. The foreign nation must enforce the child support obligation and send the 
payment to the requesting nation, whether there is an existing order or not; if no order 
exists, the nation must obtain an equivalent; the country will use its own laws and legal 
procedures to enforce a foreign order; and the nation will assist in determining paternity 
and will enforce orders concerning children born out of wedlock as well as in wedlock.  
                                        
15 Texas Family Code Section 231.2(d)(1)(A) (1997).  
16 The United States and International Child Support Enforcement: Where We Were; How We 
Got Here; and Where We Are Going. (Washington, D.C.:U.S. Central Authority for International 
Child Support, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, June 2000): 4. 
17 Personal interview with Steven Grant, Office of Child Support Enforcement, U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services in Washington, D.C., 7 November 2000. 
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The federal government wants other nations to ensure that U.S. citizens will not 
be charged for court costs in another nation. Cases of a foreign origin are processed in 
the United States at no cost to the applicant. But many countries often have a means test 
for legal aid, which U.S. citizens fail because of higher incomes. The U.S. federal 
government’s desire for free court costs has been a barrier to the successful resolution of 
negotiations with countries such as Mexico and France. 
In theory, the Federal Reciprocating Country status should make it easier for U.S. 
states to communicate effectively with the designated nations. The reciprocal status 
allows a U.S. state to treat a foreign nation as if it were another U.S. state, for the 
purposes of child support enforcement. Federal agreements stipulate the forms and 
protocols to be followed.  
In practice, the reciprocal status declaration is extremely brief – a paragraph on a 
piece of paper signed by the Secretary of State and a corresponding foreign official. No 
practical directions or guidelines are given on how to pursue a foreign child support 
case.  
  
State/Federal/International Issues 
   The Texas-U.S. axis (national causes): was the problem Texas sought to address 
under state or federal jurisdiction? What was the corresponding federal response: did the 
federal government support the mechanism, ignore it, or move to restrict the 
mechanism? 
   The problem Texas officials sought to address was nonpayment of child support, 
traditionally a state-level issue, but enforcing court-ordered child support payments is 
now a goal shared by both the federal government and the states. The states were the 
first to recognize that more and more child support cases involved individuals residing in 
foreign nations, and the first to establish a rationale for states to handle those cases 
without inciting a legal challenge. The federal government has begun to exercise its own 
power to make international reciprocal arrangements, but the states are still free to 
negotia te with foreign nations with which the federal government has yet to make an 
arrangement. 
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By the mid-1990s, the federal government knew that Texas was seeking an 
international cooperative mechanism for child support enforcement. By that point, the 
U.S. Office of Child Support Enforcement, along with the private National Child 
Support Enforcement Association, was helping to fund Mr. Caswell’s international 
travel, and he was acting as a consultant to OCSE.  
The relationship between the federal government and the state on this issue is 
complicated. With respect to domestic cases, the federal role has been to act to 
harmonize procedures across the states so that interstate cases can be handled more 
easily. Technically the 1968 federal child support legislation (RURESA) put in place a 
mechanism for states to confer with foreign nations with substantially similar legal 
procedures, but Texas officials were still uncertain as to whether or not they could act 
without violating federal or state law, and lacked the resources to determine which 
nations had substantially similar legal processes. But in the early 1990s, Mr. Caswell 
developed the concept of comity as an appropriate basis for states to work international 
cases with reciprocating nations. Then in 1996, after many states were already 
negotiating their own arrangements, Congress authorized the states to negotiate in the 
absence of federal action.  
Even though the states now have clarity that they can legally pursue international 
child support arrangements, all is not harmonious between the states and the federal 
government.  
The federal government will grant reciprocal status only to nations that meet all 
the federal requirements for total reciprocity, including no-cost legal services to all U.S. 
applicants. 
Mr. Caswell disagrees with the federal approach. The federal viewpoint, 
according to Mr. Caswell, is to not reciprocate with nations that will not cooperate 
according to the U.S. standard. Mr. Caswell is willing to work with another nation on the 
basis of comity rather than reciprocity. Comity exists when the two entities (Texas and 
the foreign nation) recognize each other’s court orders on the basis of friendship, 
knowing that the two entities are working to provide services to one another. Due legal 
process is followed according to each nation’s basic ideas of fairness and justice.   
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Mr. Caswell sees two separate issues: will the foreign agency reciprocate is one 
issue. Is the child being helped, is the more important issue. He envisions that even 
nations with differing legal systems could cooperate on child support enforcement on the 
basis of comity or friendship, even when a more formal reciprocal arrangement may be 
unobtainable.  
Before the PRWORA legislation, Mr. Caswell had some questions about the 
constitutionality of the states making their own arrangements. But now that states have 
congressional permission to do so, he would prefer to see the states make their 
arrangements without preemption by federal agreements. Overall, the federal reciprocity 
agreements have no positive effect, he says.  
Mr. Caswell’s complaints about the federal government’s priorities seem to be 
validated by an anecdote about the thoroughness of federal efforts. After U.S. officials 
granted reciprocal status to Poland, OCSE called Mr. Caswell, asking him where to send 
child support payments so the custodial parent in Poland would receive it. Federal 
officials did not know this crucial information about how to get the money to Poland, 
even though the U.S. federal government negotiated an agreement with Poland. Needless 
to say, Mr. Caswell knew where to send the money. In Washington, Mr. Grant of OCSE 
says the agreements are meant to be lasting, so no phone numbers are included in the 
text – the reason why the Washington office did not know where to send the money. 
Tom Laramey, who worked with the Texas OAG from 1983-1993, does not think 
too highly of the federal government’s role in social services. The money and the rules 
come from the federal level, he says, but the responsibility for implementation is at the 
state level. “They (federal officials) want to control it all, but they don’t want the 
responsibility,” says Mr. Laramey. “Federalism is the perfect system for it. If it goes 
wrong, the state and locals get the blame.”18 
Mr. Laramey wonders why in 1983, he was spending state agency funds trying to 
figure out whether or not Mexico’s legal system was substantially similar to the U.S. 
legal system. “Why wasn’t Department of State out there working out how Mexican law 
                                        
18 Personal interview with Tom Laramey in Austin, Texas, 11 August 2000. 
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was similar?” he asks. “(Department of) State could have figured it out, that Mexico 
does or does not have similar laws.”  
Ms. Burke, who worked at OAG after Mr. Laramey did, concurs. “The states had 
to go out on their own and do this because Department of State never did (anything),” 
she says. 
Today, federal officials acknowledge that the current federal approach builds on 
the framework established by the states. Stephen Grant of the OCSE says Mr. Caswell’s 
role in moving the United States forward on international child support issues has been 
crucial. He refers to Mr. Caswell as a “partner” in creating the forms the federal office 
now uses. He says there is “no tension” between the states and the federal government, 
and acknowledges that states do some things better than the federal government do, such 
as locating negligent parents.19  
But the federal involvement in negotiations is justified, Mr. Grant says, because a 
federal agreement will prevent defense attorneys in other nations from challenging the 
legitimacy of a state attorney general handling a case in a foreign court. Also, states 
might not always be aware of the larger issues going on between the United States and 
other countries. For example, the United States and other nations have sometimes 
reached an impasse in negotiations because of unresolved cases of parental kidnappings 
and thornier custody issues. 
For example, for some time, the U.S. DOS would not negotiate with Sweden 
because of a case involving charges of parental kidnapping. Mr. Caswell says DOS did 
not want him to negotiate with Sweden – but Texas now has a completed arrangement 
for child support with Sweden. Apparently the federal government changed their 
position on the prohibition on negotiations with Sweden after Mr. Caswell lobbied. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                        
19 Grant interview. 
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  The Texas-Mexico axis (state causes): How was the venue created? Did Texas’ 
interest in and method of contact with Mexico differ from the U.S. government’s 
relations with Mexico?  
Texas’ approach differs from the federal approach. Texas, as well as other U.S. 
states, is willing to work another nation’s cases on the basis of comity, or friendship, 
while the federal government wants to ensure a more formal standard of reciprocity. The 
federal government also insists that other nations adopt U.S. standards on two points: 
paternity and court costs. 
Federal negotiations with Mexico have failed on these two points. Mexican law 
requires a child’s mother to be present to establish paternity. A U.S. court can order a 
blood test for a DNA match for paternity, and neither parent needs to be in court. 
Mr. Caswell says that in 90 percent of international cases, parentage is already 
established, so a dispute involving ten percent of cases prevents an agreement that would 
benefit the other 90 percent. He also says the federal government is not successfully 
negotiating with the nations with which Texas has the most cases, such as Germany and 
Mexico. He has complained that the federal negotiators do not give other nations 
sufficient notice of the arrival of U.S. federal negotiators, and he suggests that the 
federal negotiators do not always follow the protocols of the other nation. 20 
The director of the Mexican child support enforcement office in the Mexican 
State Department confirms Mr. Caswell’s complaint. Attorney Rosa Isela Guerrero of 
the Mexican Department of State (SRE) says that Mexico requires a formal petition to 
begin negotiations with the U.S. government on the issue, but as of 2002, had yet to 
receive a formal petition despite the fact that U.S. negotiators had visited their office. 
Meanwhile, the Mexican office has completed arrangements with all but two U.S. 
states.21 
At the state level, relations between Texas and Mexico are progressing. Although 
child support enforcement matters are handled through the Mexican federal government, 
                                        
20 Caswell (1998): 544. 
21 Personal interview in Mexico City with Rosa Isela Guerrero of the Oficina de Derecho de 
Familia, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 30 October 2002. As of 2002, Mexico has 
arrangements with all U.S. states but Georgia and Florida. 
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Mr. Caswell obtained written authority from the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Relations 
that the Mexican states can communicate directly with the U.S. border states on other 
family law matters. Mexicans call it “reciprocal arrangements.”  The Texans call it 
“arrangements.” The OAG has also developed a Texas-Mexico cooperative program 
called “Niños Primeros,” or “Children First.” The training conference brings together 
Texas and Mexican officials involved in family issues. 
Texas’ arrangements with Mexico is not a binding international agreement but a 
“good faith policy arrangement made within the laws of both countries,” Mr. Caswell 
says. Each party uses its own laws and procedures to help a child in another country and 
to recover whatever support is recoverable. 
 
  The U.S.–Mexico axis (international causes): what were the international political 
and economic conditions that contributed to or prevented the state’s effort to reach 
across the Rio Grande?   
The international political and economic conditions that pressed the state into 
action were the increasing numbers of international child support cases. “The border is 
so artificial,” says Cecilia Burke, formerly Mr. Caswell’s coworker at the Texas Office 
of the Attorney General. “People freely go back and forth, are in business together, have 
friends, have sex, and so on.”22  
Most of the child support cases between Texas and Mexico involve married 
couples who have separated; the father is in the United States working, the mother is in 
Mexico, and he is not sending child support back home. There are a few cases of U.S. 
citizens living in Mexico and refusing to pay support to the custodial parent in the 
United States. Sometimes Mexican men come to Texas to work and start new families. 
The Mexican consuls in Texas try to encourage these men to remember their obligations 
to their families still in Mexico. The consuls are aware of the patterns that migrants will 
follow – how individuals from certain parts of Mexico will settle in certain areas of 
Texas – so the consuls are able to assist in locating delinquent parents. 
                                        
22 Burke interview. 
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The main contentious issue between the two nations is the differing legal systems 
and practices – which is still an issue at the federal level, preventing the conclusion of 
negotiations on the reciprocal status agreement, even while the states are able to 
continue to process cases with Mexico on the basis of comity. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
Many concerns converge in this area. Family law is traditionally a state- level 
responsibility. But domestic social changes led to a need to standardize procedures 
across the nation, and the federal role increased with passage of the IV-D Social Security 
legislation in 1974. The federal government has used its constitutional authorization to 
regulate commerce to justify its movement into child support enforcement. In the 
ensuing years, the number of single-parent families within U.S. borders increased, and 
the increased travel associated with globalization raised the numbers of international 
cases.  
Texas struggled to find a way to legally work international cases. Although other 
agencies were already developing capacities to act informally in other policy areas, the 
fact that child support cases would be heard in foreign courts meant the OAG had to 
have a sound legal basis for pursuing cases overseas. Eventually Mr. Caswell developed 
the argument that comity, a concept historically a part of international commercial law, 
was a basis for states to work international cases without constitutional infractions. As it 
turns out, the federal government had already put the framework for states to confer with 
other nations in place but had not communicated to the states that they were wholly 
permitted to develop relations directly with other nations – or which nations had 
substantially similar legal systems to the U.S. system – until 1996, with the passage of 
the PRWORA legislation. A document tracing the history of international child support 
enforcement, issued by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services in 2000, 
explains that even though the U.S. Constitution prohibits states from entering into 
treaties with foreign nations, “the consent of Congress is not required for interstate 
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agreements that fall outside the scope of the Compact Clause.”23 But this apparently was 
not clear to Texas officials at the time they were struggling to find a way to respond to 
the increasing number of international cases. 
When compared to the other case studies in this dissertation, child support goes 
in a different direction. In the areas of relations, trade, and criminal justice, the states can 
be thought of as moving into areas of federal responsibility as they create international 
mechanisms to confer directly with other nations, in effect forming their own foreign 
relations. But in child support, Congress has federalized family law policy, even while 
states were trying to find a way to handle growing numbers of international cases. Then 
in 1996, Congress authorized the federal agencies to negotiate Foreign Reciprocating 
Status with other nations, and any successfully-negotiated federal agreements will 
eventually preempt state arrangements.  
This case is consistent with the others in that the autonomy of the states to 
innovate policy leads to the creation of international arrangements. This case also shows 
the lack of clear communication between the federal government and the states as to 
what role they could play in international affairs. Not until after states had developed 
their own means of handling international cases did the federal government authorize the 
states to do so.  
This case differs from the others in that more federal funding is involved in this 
policy area than in the others. Whereas very little federal funding is involved in all three 
of the previous case-study areas, the states receive matching federal funds for providing 
Title IV-D services such as establishing paternity. 
The short-term goals of each level of government in this area are the same – both 
want to ensure that child support payments get to the child. But the strategies differ. 
While the states are satisfied with working with another nation on the basis of comity, 
the federal government prefers the more formal status of reciprocity, even though, as 
Texas officials argue, more children are being served now through state agreements on 
the less-formal basis of comity.  
                                        
23 The United States and International Child Support Enforcement, p. 3.  
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Because the short-term goals are the same, the federal government allows states 
the freedom to pursue international cases, thereby providing a valuable service to U.S. 
families. But the long-term goal is that the federal reciprocal status agreements will 
preempt the state-generated agreements, provided the federal government can persuade 
more nations to accept its terms.  
At first glance, the child support case indicates that when policy areas become 
internationalized, ultimately, the federal government is likely to assert control even in 
traditional areas of state regulation. Congress is authorized to regulate such activity 
either on the basis of regulating international commerce or supremacy in foreign affairs. 
However, the presence of federal funding in this area complicates comparison to 
the other issue-areas somewhat. It may be that since the federal government helps to 
fund the states, there may be a stronger tendency to preempt. Also, because single-parent 
families are pervasive throughout the nation, this area of policy benefits from 
standardized procedures, which has led to a federal apparatus for handling domestic 
cases across the states, than do areas with regional variations such as trade and criminal 
justice. 
But even though the child support policy area begins with a different dynamic 
from the other three case-study chapters, the developments in this field indicate that as 
globalization continues to change the nature of domestic policy, the federal government 
will reassert federal control where it can, even though the states are willing to work from 
a less formal basis and therefore are arguably more effective in reaching sustainable 
arrangements with other nations.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
It is difficult to analyze or even notice change while in the midst of it. It is a joke 
among graduate students to conclude a project by claiming “more research is needed.” 
But if that truism fits anywhere, it fits in this developing area of how U.S. states are 
developing international capacities and how intergovernmental relations are affected. 
The states are vital partners in U.S. federalism, but the federal government is 
supreme in the practice and conduct of foreign affairs. The legal restrictions on states 
have contributed to a time-honored concept of states as having no capabilities or even 
interests in foreign affairs. But globalization has changed the nature of domestic policy, 
bringing international causes and effects to bear on domestic policies. Despite the lack of 
formal authority to operate in the international arena, the states have responded by 
developing relations directly with foreign governments.  
According to the prevailing notion of states as powerless in foreign relations, one 
would expect the federal government to exercise its supremacy and restrict the states’ 
growing international role. But this has not necessarily been the outcome. The question 
then becomes, why have states developed international roles, and when does the federal 
government restrict them? 
Although states have been developing their international capabilities for several 
decades now, there is surprisingly little research on this issue of state freedom and 
federal restriction. By examining Texas-Mexico relations as they developed over time 
and across a range of policy issues, a clearer picture emerges of the general conditions 
under which states may pursue international roles and when the federal government will 
move to restrict one state, and by extension, all the states from international pursuits.  
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While each state responds to globalization in unique ways, the states share a 
legally subordinate position to the federal government in foreign affairs. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to assume that if any of the federal branches restric t a single state from 
expanding into an international role, it is likely all states will be subject to the same 
federal restrictions. So it is logical to hypothesize that the observations from the Texas 
case indicate the general conditions under which all states may either pursue an 
international role or be restricted from doing so. 
In the Texas case, the state has been most free to develop its international role 
when 1) the state acts within its traditional areas of authority, such as economic 
development and criminal justice, and can exploit the lack of definition as to the role a 
state may play in foreign relations and thus pursue its own goals; and 2) when federal 
officials view the state’s action as a beneficial resource in achieving mutual policy goals. 
Looking at the Texas case in conjunction with past Supreme Court decisions 
limiting the states shows that the states are most likely to be restricted in their 
international roles when 1) a state’s actions offends a politically significant complainant 
capable of challenging the state; and 2) when the federal government demands the states 
adopt standardized policies and procedures nationwide.  
The Texas-Mexico case indicates that as domestic and foreign policy have 
intertwined, states are still able to fulfill their traditional roles as policy innovators, 
policy implementers, and essential governing resources. 
A significant finding of this research is that although the historical basis for 
excluding states from foreign affairs has been the fear that internationally-active states 
would threaten the national interest, this concern does not emerge as a basis for 
restricting states today in these policy areas. 
This concluding chapter looks at the lessons of each policy area of the Texas case, 
then takes a closer look at the permissive and restrictive conditions. 
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What the Texas-Mexico Case Indicates: The Four Issue -Areas 
Trade:  
The roles the two levels of government play are as follows: the federal 
government is responsible for regulating U.S. trade and tariff policies and negotiating 
international trade agreements. But the states have the authority to develop, fund, and 
implement their own economic development policies. Increasingly, local economic goals 
are met through participation in international trade. The two partners in federalism share 
the goals of a healthy economy, but without the efforts of the states, national economic 
goals could not be met. 
There is intense electoral pressure on subnational governments, as well as the 
federal government, to foster economic development. All levels of government respond 
to pressure from the business sector, which holds a privileged position in U.S. politics 
because of the government’s need to keep voters employed and maintain a viable tax 
base.  
Because globalization has so changed the domestic economy, the states’ foreign 
relations begin with trade. Apparently, subnational governments were the first to realize 
that global economic change demanded new domestic economic strategies. Competing 
against one another to develop international trade promotion mechanisms, states began 
opening trade offices and supporting exports as far back as 1954, accelerating in the 
1970s and 1980s. It appears that states willingly funded these initiatives on their own. As 
domestic policy has been changed by international economics, the states’ traditional role 
as policy innovators, driven by intrastate competition, has continued.  
Why has the federal government not moved to restrict the states from developing 
relations directly with foreign nations in trade? One reason is that the states are acting 
within their jurisdiction. And, the states and the federal government share the same 
goals. The states are the means by which federal economic goals are met. To restrict the 
states from direct foreign relations for economic development purposes is not in the 
federal government’s interest. Congress has stated that nonbinding trade arrangements 
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between states and other nations are permissible as long as the states are not motivated 
by a desire to supercede federal policy. 1  
However, when a state diverges from a promotional role and behaves in a way that 
injures a party capable of mounting a significant political challenge, federal restriction 
may follow. This was the case when a free trade group challenged the law passed by the 
state of Massachusetts, prohibiting the state from purchasing goods or services from 
businesses with a presence in Burma (Myanmar). Because Congress later adopted its 
own sanctions against Burma, the U.S. Supreme Court preempted the Massachusetts law 
on the grounds of federal supremacy in foreign affairs.  
However, the goal of most state-level foreign mechanisms is to expand trade; the 
Massachusetts law was seen by international businesses as a restriction on commerce. 
The lesson for states is that if their involvement in international trade is limited to trade 
promotion, unlikely to offend a significant political interest, their efforts will likely go 
unchallenged and thus unrestricted. This is true even though international trade policies 
have highly political effects. Winners and losers in international economics are 
determined by decisions made at the federal level, thus reducing the likelihood that 
states will be held responsible for the gripes of sectors disadvantaged by changes in 
international trade policies. 
But there are other repercussions from the growing role of states in international 
trade that portend future intergovernmental conflict. The irony of this policy-area is that 
by responding to the pressures of a changing global economy, states furthered and 
deepened the interconnections between the United States and other nations. The increase 
in international interdependence has led to pressure for greater regulation of trade by the 
federal level. Through the WTO and NAFTA, the U.S. federal government has extended 
its reach into areas of regulatory authority where the states are traditionally sovereign. If 
the United States enters into more trade agreements in the future, the pressure will 
intensify for the United States to move to a single harmonious standard, rather than 50 
state standards, in regulating commercial goods and services. In the future, states may be 
asked to yield areas of regulatory authority in favor of a single international standard. 
                                        
1 See Chapter Two, p. 61. 
 287
By studying the role of states in trade policy, then, two conditions in which the 
federal government might restrict the states are revealed: 1) following the objections of a 
politically significant complainant; and 2) when the federal government desires a move 
to a single national standard for commercial regulation governed by international 
treaties. 
 
 
Criminal Justice:  
All levels of law enforcement share the common goal of preserving the public 
safety. As U.S. society has become more internationalized, the nature of domestic law 
enforcement has changed. State and local law enforcement have had to learn to handle 
domestic crimes that involve foreign citizens. 
At first glance, it appears as though the federal government has not moved to 
prevent the states from developing an international criminal justice role. But existing 
international treaties set the parameters in which state and local law enforcement are 
supposed to operate; however, these restrictions are not consistently honored by 
subnational law enforcement. In theory, treaties should act as a restriction on states by 
providing a standard set of internationally-negotiated procedures to follow. Honoring 
treaties is supposed to preserve good relations with other nations, benefiting the nation 
as a whole. But subnational law enforcement tends to focus on the immediate goals of 
solving the case at hand, and sometimes sees treaty requirements as barriers to solving a 
case. 
Thus attitudes at the federal level towards the development of a state and local 
role in international criminal justice are mixed. States have the authority to pursue their 
own cases without federal involvement, and the volume of cases state and local law 
enforcement handle is vast. Even if the federal government wanted to handle all cases 
involving foreign citizens, a huge allocation of federal resources would be required, and 
would prove politically and bureaucratically unfeasible. The federal government 
recognizes the nation as a whole benefits when state and local law enforcement pursue 
local cases that involve international actors, but federal officials are uneasy given the 
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omnipresent risk of a serious diplomatic mistake that could damage U.S. foreign 
relations overall. 
By looking at the Texas case, it is apparent that the federal government has not 
made comprehensive efforts to prevent the states from relying on their own international 
contacts in fugitive recovery. But neither has it communicated to state and local officials 
that seeking a deportation of a U.S. citizen is not necessarily going to cause a problem. 
Texas officials still feel that contacting foreign authorities for help with a fugitive is a 
“back-door” process that would meet with federal disapproval, despite the fact that 
federal agencies have encouraged other nations to deport U.S. citizens who are fugitives 
from federal law. 
This lack of communication between the federal government and the states over 
what type of international role the states may take is surprising, given the acknowledged 
need to increase intergovernmental cooperation to combat terrorism. How much more 
could the states accomplish, if there were more clarity on what their international law 
enforcement role could be?  
And yet, it is not in Washington’s interest to encourage the states to be 
internationally active. Criminal justice is a sensitive area, and there is always the 
possibility a subnational official will behave in a way that offends a foreign nation. 
Federal officials arguably use ambiguity as a tacit means of discouraging the states from 
expanding their international criminal justice roles, in hopes of minimizing the 
possibility of international incidents. The lack of clarity surrounding these issues works 
to the advantage of the federal government, by acting as a brake on states. At the same 
time, lack of clear rules acts to the advantage of the states, giving them room to 
maneuver. 
What of the future of this area? In the long term, federal policy goals could come 
to differ from local goals depending on the global security climate. Currently, fighting 
terrorism involves both military and law enforcement strategies. These strategies may 
shift, depending on how international developments unfold. A change in the 
international security climate or a change in federal strategy could change the role of 
domestic law enforcement and increase the levels of conflict in intergovernmental 
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relations. As state and local law enforcement are asked to play a larger role in meeting 
national security goals, how resources are distributed between national and local 
responsibilities could become a larger point of contention. 
If more international law enforcement treaties are negotiated in the future, state 
and local law enforcement may have to conduct investigations according to international 
standards. Technological developments may demand new forms of intergovernmental 
cooperation according to a single international standard. International police bodies such 
as Interpol may become more influential in domestic law enforcement. Whether future 
treaties are effective in guiding the behavior of state and local law enforcement will 
depend on how well federal officials communicate with state and local law enforcement 
the value of its long-term goals. The only other option to ensure state and local 
compliance would be to increase the federal resources given to oversight or management 
of cases involving foreign nationals, both exceedingly unlikely developments due to the 
sheer number of cases. 
 
 
Relations:  
The federal government alone has legal authority to confer with foreign nations; 
the states have none. No policy arrangements emanating from the state level rise to the 
level of binding law; therefore all state- foreign relations are nonbinding, no matter how 
regular or institutionalized they may be.  
There is a perpetual lack of definition on which level of government is 
responsible for U.S.-Mexican border development. But for purposes of analysis, the 
assumption is that the state and federal levels share goals of harmonious relations with 
Mexico, free and open trade, progress in environmental management, and reliable 
security. The desire for policy coordination along the U.S.-Mexican border (and the U.S-
Canadian border as well) is stronger at the subnational level than at the federal level, 
although even state-level interest in policy along the Southern border is historically 
spotty. 
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In developing regional policy-coordinating mechanisms, the states were acting in 
their traditional roles as innovators of policy designed to meet local needs. The 
conferences also lobby the federal government to pass legislation favorable to the 
region’s interest, an acceptable political practice in which the states may engage. The 
difference in these cases is that states were expanding their traditional domestic roles to 
include foreign state actors in previously unprecedented international intergovernmental 
mechanisms. 
The constitutional limits on the states’ role in foreign affairs contribute to a lack 
of clarity on exactly how far the states can develop relations with bordering states. But 
the lack of a formal role for the states did not prevent the states from meeting and 
discussing matters of federal jurisdiction. The two regional mechanisms studied here 
developed without serious federal objections, indicating each could be more assertive 
than they are today – after all, the region does not lack challenges to address. All the 
same, state officials seem to limit themselves in part because of the legal ambiguities 
surrounding the role of states in the foreign affairs of each nation. 
Ambiguity works to the federal government’s advantage by causing the state 
leaders to voluntarily water down the strength of the their policy recommendations to the 
federal government. But ambiguity could work to the states’ advantage as well, giving 
state officials room to push more aggressively for specific federal policies before 
meeting federal resistance.  
But without leadership willing to test the limits of the legal and political grey 
areas in international intergovernmental relations, the Border Governors’ Conference 
and the Border States Attorneys General Conference will continue to meet and even be 
effective in lobbying, but on a limited range of largely non-controversial policies.  
In the long term, if the population along the border continues to grow, the 
challenges of economic development, social policy, and resource management are likely 
to intensify. If so, the need for policy definition and coordination will only increase.  
Theoretically, grassroots citizens’ groups and environmental management 
organizations could step in to what appears to be a chronic leadership vacuum. If these 
groups were able to persuade the border state officials’ groups that the scope of state-
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level involvement in border intermestic relations is still untested, perhaps these two 
mechanisms could be encouraged to increase their influence. After all, organizing 
criticism of ineffective federal policies is a far cry from attempting to supercede federal 
prerogatives.  
This research indicates that these organizations could expand their activities as 
long as their motives were not to supercede federal policy and their actions produced no 
complaints from a significant political group with the influence to mount a challenge, 
both unlikely occurrences in the area of border intergovernmental relations. The states, 
through asserting their jurisdiction over domestic policy along the border, in an area of 
political and legal ambiguity, have an opportunity to define their own roles, if they but 
take it.  
 
 
Child Support:  
Family law is the traditional purview of the states. By moving into international 
child support enforcement, Texas was fulfilling its traditional state role as an innovator 
of policy, but in an area of exceeding legal ambiguity. Texas officials grounded the 
expansion of the state’s authority in family law on an arguably legitimate basis for state 
action, citing the absence of federal action in this area of family law, as it became 
internationalized. 
But as the numbers of single-parent families has grown, the federal government 
first moved into domestic child support enforcement, on the basis of regulating interstate 
commerce. Congress has created a nationwide enforcement mechanism by standardizing 
policies and procedures the states must follow in order to receive federal welfare funds. 
In international child support enforcement, the federal government seeks the 
standardization of policies and procedures between the United States and other nations. 
Even though the federal government has authorized the states to pursue international 
child support arrangements in the absence of federal action, eventually the states will be 
preempted by binding international agreements negotiated by the federal government 
and individual nations. 
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The states and the federal government certainly share the policy goals of getting 
child support checks to children in need. But as the federal government reaches 
international child support enforcement agreements, states will then have to comply with 
uniform federal enforcement policies and procedures, and any state-level arrangements 
will be preempted. 
The federal agencies involved in child support issues have adapted the model 
Texas innovated for its own child support negotiations with other nations, showing that 
even when domestic policy becomes internationalized, the states continue to act as a 
source of policy inspiration for the federal government.  
An unexpected feature of the federal government’s involvement in international 
child support cases is intergovernmental conflict in two directions: domestically, the 
Texas official in charge of international child support feels the federal government is 
inept in negotiating federal agreements; and internationally, the federal government is in 
conflict with some foreign nations over the terms of the agreements. The federal 
government’s insistence on reciprocity rather than comity and free court costs for U.S. 
citizens are proving to be sticking points with nations such as Mexico, one of the top two 
countries involved in Texas’ international child support cases. Washington has 
negotiated only eight reciprocal agreements in almost as many years.  
The child support case shows the federal government recognizes the value of 
allowing states an international role to pursue shared policy goals; this is evidenced by 
Congress’ declaration that states may make their own arrangements. But this case also 
shows the federal government will preempt even the states’ traditional regulatory 
authority in domestic politics when the federal government sees a need for uniform 
policies and practices, indicating the federal government would also preempt a state 
international role under the same conditions.  
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CONDITIONS 
Although the Texas-Mexico case is the focus of this dissertation’s research, the 
observations drawn from this case are applicable in general to the other U.S. states. The 
policy areas in which Texas is active in pursuing relations with Mexico are also areas in 
which other states are internationally active. Although each U.S. state experiences and 
responds to globalization in unique ways, the extent to which the states may develop 
their international role is contingent upon the permissiveness of the federal government. 
Because Texas has been developing its international relations with Mexico over a longer 
span of time and over a range of issues, examining this case offers many opportunities to 
observe the federal response. Because all the states share a subordinate relationship to 
the federal government, the degree to which Texas has been permitted or restricted in 
developing its international role indicates the general conditions under which other states 
are granted freedom or are limited by the federal government. 
Evaluating these four policy areas suggests there are conditions under which 
states are most likely to be permitted to develop an international role, and conditions 
under which the federal government will assert its supremacy in foreign affairs in ways 
that eventually affect all the states. 
 
Permissive Conditions 
States seem to be most free to develop an international role under the following 
conditions: 
 
Legal Ambiguity 
Because states are constitutionally prohibited from operating in foreign affairs, 
there is still a lack of definition as to how far the states’ evolving international roles may 
develop. In theory, states can use this ambiguity to their advantage, however, by 
expanding their international roles up until the point they offend a significant political 
interest.  
In the case of border relations, Southwestern state officials took advantage of the 
legally and politically ambiguous arena of border relations by cultivating international 
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intergovernmental relations with their Mexican counterparts. Given the lack of federal 
opposition to the creation of international forums for state officials, the states could 
arguably be more aggressive in pursuing policies that benefit states on both sides of the 
border.  
In criminal justice, states have the authority to pursue their own cases, but there 
is a marked lack of clarity on exactly how far they can go when these cases involve 
foreign actors. Internationa l treaties govern international criminal justice issues, and are 
supposed to restrict state and local agents. However, subnational officials are routinely 
able to operate outside the bounds of the treaties, even though such behavior may imperil 
U.S. foreign relations as a whole. In this case, the ambiguity is a permissive condition, 
strengthened by the lack of control the federal government currently exercises over the 
multitudes of subnational law enforcement officials.   
 
 
Common Goals 
In all of these policy areas, the states and the federal government share common 
goals, even when their stakes in those goals differ. The lower levels of government have 
a far greater stake in local issues and  outcomes. As states are legally able to fund their 
own initiatives, states can innovate policies without waiting for either federal direction 
or funding. State officials interviewed for this project did not expect ever to be limited 
by the federal government, nor did they feel it was necessary to ask federal permission to 
contact foreign actors directly. 
Although shared goals are important factors in maintaining intergovernmental 
harmony, the developments in these areas fall short of cooperative federalism because of 
the lack of mutual planning between the levels of government. The continued lack of 
clarity surrounding the extent to which the states may develop their international roles 
arguably reduces the effectiveness of policy at all levels. In the Texas case, the state is 
surprisingly uncoordinated from agency to agency; even though several different 
agencies may be cultivating relations with the same foreign government, they do not 
necessarily confer with one another on goals and strategies.  
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In the future, the possibility exists that as globalization continues to integrate 
nations, the international pressure for an harmonious standard in many policy areas will 
move the United States towards coercive federalism.  If the United States continues to 
pursue additional international agreements, it is likely the federal government will 
demand the states yield fifty different state standards, in areas like sanitary standards and 
transportation of goods, to a single international standard, negotiated by the U.S. Trade 
Representative and foreign trade ministers.  
Thus while common goals are important in establishing conditions favorable to 
the states, common goals are sometimes not enough to stave off preemption, if federal 
officials see a need for policy uniformity.  
 
 
Restrictive Conditions  
The federal government is most likely to restrict the states from developing an 
international role in the following conditions: 
 
A Significant Complainant  
The role of a complainant is of huge significance in determining the political 
practice of U.S. federalism; in the United States, actors act until they are stopped by a 
significant enough force. The practice of federalism in this era of intermestic policy 
reinforces this truism about U.S. federalism and the legalistic U.S. culture. 
At the moment, multinational corporations have more influence on the 
development of international trade policies than do the states. When Massachusetts 
passed a law changing its own procurement policies to prohibit the purchase of goods 
and services from corporations operating in Burma, a complainant arose, offended that 
the state sought to limit economic activity. The result of the challenge was a unanimous 
Supreme Court decision preempting the state law. 
In the future, it is possible that other traditional state and local government 
practices could be restricted by the federal government in order to meet national trade 
policy goals. If other nations successfully argue that U.S. state economic development 
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practices, such as subsidizing local businesses or awarding procurement contracts to 
minority businesses, constitute unfair treatment or restrictive trade practices, these areas 
of state authority may be preempted by federal action. 
In criminal justice, other nations continually complain about U.S. criminal justice 
practices they perceive as unjust, such as the use of the death penalty, currently with no 
political effect. But it is not inconceivable that in the future – admittedly the distant 
future – international pressure on the federal government could become significant 
enough to lead to the abolishment of the death penalty in the United States. Strange to 
think, yes, but then, who ever thought U.S. state courts would be enforcing child support 
orders issued in Poland?  
Border relations and child support are unlikely areas to generate a significant 
complainant. Because of the mysteriously low political priority placed on the border, the 
conferences of border state officials are unlikely to increase in influence to the point of 
offending the federal government. In child support, the goal of federally-negotiated 
enforcement agreements is to prevent defendants in foreign courts from objecting to the 
long arm of a U.S. state reaching into another nation’s legal procedures. Federally-
negotiated international child support enforcement agreements are intended to obviate 
such complaints. 
 
A Single Policy Standard 
Two of the four cases show that when the federal government argues the need for 
a single national standard or procedure, preemption will likely follow. The trade and 
international child support enforcement cases show that even given common goals, the 
federal government will preempt on the basis of the desirability of policy uniformity.  
If globalization continues to bring international causes and effects on domestic 
policy, the likelihood of intergovernmental conflict will only increase, particularly if the 
federal government negotiates future treaties regulating trade and investment according 
to a single international standard. If so, the two levels of government will find their 
policy goals diverging, as states find they want to maintain their regulatory authority, but 
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the pressure for an international standard leads the federal government to preempt state 
laws. 
The same pressures for standardized practices in law enforcement and criminal 
justice could develop, and given the problems today of keeping state and local law 
enforcement in line with international treaty obligations, more federal oversight may 
follow. Or, the federal government could levy some kind of political penalties for treaty 
infractions committed by state and local law enforcement.  
The move to a single policy standard raises the most serious questions for the 
future of democracy in the United States. The language of this dissertation has 
emphasized how domestic policy has taken on international aspects. But reversing this 
concept – instead thinking how foreign affairs has expanded to cover an endless range of 
domestic policies – changes the focus and implications, what Huntington calls the 
“domesticization” of foreign policy. 2 As Barry Friedman writes, “If the national 
government’s power in foreign affairs is great, and the area that can be called foreign 
affairs is endlessly expansive, then state autonomy is subject to serious compacting.”3  
If globalization continues to transform both internationa l and domestic politics, 
the questions this dissertation addresses need to be considered seriously by policymakers 
at all levels of U.S. government.  
 
 
The Link Between Governance and Foreign Policy Activism 
In recent years, the only significant challenge to the states’ involvement in 
international politics was against Massachusetts, when the state refused to grant state 
contracts to businesses with a presence in Burma. Yet Crosby v. NFTC is the anomaly in 
several decades of increasing state- level international involvement, in that it generated a 
significant opponent in the form of the National Foreign Trade Council, who objected 
that the effect of the state law would be a restriction on economic activity.  
                                        
2 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Erosion of National Interests,” Foreign Affairs 76 
(September/October 1997): 29. 
3 Barry Friedman, “Federalism’s Future in the Global Village,” Vanderbilt Law Review 47 
(October 1994): 1471. 
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While the significant lesson of Crosby is that the federal government may restrict 
the states following an objection of a politically significant complainant, the case is also 
one of foreign policy activism, as opposed to governance like the other areas studied 
here. Massachusetts’ intent was to influence events in another country – arguably a 
foreign policy objective. Even though Congress later passed its own sanctions with the 
same intent – indicating common goals with respect to events in Burma – the federal law 
preempted the state law, on the grounds that the state had overstepped its authority and 
impinged on federal supremacy in foreign affairs. 
While Crosby shows that states can be restricted when their activities offend a 
significant complainant, the case begs the question of when states might move from 
establishing foreign relations for purposes of governance into the realm of foreign policy 
activism. 4  
While the research presented in this document may be of interest to state officials 
who want to know how much leeway they have in developing overseas contacts, federal 
officials might be more interested in knowing whether or not a state will move from 
establishing foreign links for governance to foreign policy activism. This should be of 
special interest to federal officials, given that states are now more willing to express their 
dissatisfaction with federal policies, and states are likely to be increasingly affected by 
any future international treaties. 
The shortcoming of the Texas case is that it does not reveal whether there is a 
link; in Texas’ case, a rich experience in expanded governance has not led to foreign 
policy activism. True, several cities in Texas declared themselves to be “safe havens” for 
Central American refugees in the 1980s, objected to nuclear weapons development, and 
opposed apartheid government in South Africa. But as of October 2003, only one of the 
167 or so local governments nationwide opposing the Patriot Act is in Texas: Sunset 
Valley, a subdivision of Austin, population 365. 
                                        
4 Readers may recall that Chapter Two discussed the foreign policy activism of the states; of 
which, the Massachusetts Burma law is the only to generate a significant complainant and be 
struck down by the Court. 
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Texas has not been one to disturb the waters by opposing federal foreign policy. 
Why would Texas be a leader in international ties for purposes of governance but not in 
foreign policy activism? 
One might expect Texas to be activist, given the Lone Star State is famous for its 
independence and prides itself on its history as a sovereign republic. Texas certainly 
exhibits attitudes Ivo Duchacek would term “opposition to bigness and distance” that 
subnational governments use to justify the development of direct foreign relations.5  
But there are other reasons why Texas would not be activist, not the least of 
which is that the current U.S. president was previously twice elected Texas governor. In 
addition to the state’s independent-mindedness, characteristic of the U.S. West, Texas 
also has a conservative Southern culture; in the past ten years the state’s electoral base 
has become more Republican. Texas has a patriotism born of a sizeable military 
presence and an influential defense industry, and the significant role of business, 
particularly the oil industry, in state politics mirrors the important role business plays in 
national politics. So despite the rhetoric that Texas is an independent state that doesn’t 
cotton to orders from a distant federal government, in reality Texas is a pro-business 
state, and business is not a source of opposition to U.S. foreign policy, but a driving 
force, as the sectionalism literature shows so well.  
 
 
Program of Future Research 
The fact that no existing model applies to this area provides an exciting 
opportunity for thinking about the study of international politics in a radical new way. 
Models that focus on central-government-to-central government relations have obscured 
important activities taking place outside of the limited focus of traditional theory in both 
International Relations and federalism. Shifting the emphasis from studying levels of 
government to studying governance could open up new vistas of understanding how 
interests and capabilities coalesce and fragment around specific issues rather than at a 
                                        
5 Ivo Duchacek,  “The International Dimension of Subnational Self-Government,” Publius:The 
Journal of Federalism 14 (Fall 1984): 16. 
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given level of government. This can allow the researcher to see the significant patterns 
of activity, the alliances and antagonisms that develop around issues, which a single- lens 
focus obscures. It may be helpful to think about how jurisdiction is determined by issue-
area rather than by level of government.  
The emphasis of this project is on states because they are one of the two 
components of federalism; but were I starting this project with what I know now, the 
study would be more open to local governments in order to show the complete picture of 
how different levels of government intersect in areas of domestic policy that are now 
internationalized. 
The ways in which each state responds to globalization is shaped by a state’s 
internal politics, resources, and culture. While globalization may open the door for all 
states to initiate international roles, each state will respond in unique ways. Explaining 
each state’s specific response to globalization requires exploring other factors peculiar to 
each state’s internal politics. For example, in the Texas case, Gov. Bill Clements’ 
experience in both the state’s oil industry and in the U.S. Department of Defense may 
have contributed to his willingness to reach out to the Mexican governors. His warm 
personal relations with the President of Mexico facilitated the establishment of the 
Border Governors’ Conference.  
While personal relationships and leadership played a significant role in how 
Texas’ international role developed, without further state-by-state research, it is not 
possible to draw conclusions as to the significance of gubernatorial leadership for state-
international mechanisms in general. Factors other than leadership could be more 
influential in other states, such as bureaucratic initiative, demographics, or the influence 
of particular pressure groups. An interesting research project could consider which 
internal state factors across many states led to state- foreign initiatives, and the specific 
ways Washington responded to which state- level causes. A project of this sort could help 
to update the federalism literature which has yet to fully consider the effect of 
globalization on U.S. intergovernmental relations. 
Future research could also raise normative questions about the link between 
governance and legitimacy, and how subnational governments’ willingness to venture 
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into global affairs may or may not increase the effectiveness of government, thereby 
serving to legitimize U.S. government overall. If this could be proven, then the need for 
more policy coordination among levels of government would be shown to be of utmost 
importance. Understanding how levels of government interact in internationalized policy 
areas then becomes crucial to achieving good governance.  
Another research question to pursue, related to the goal of good governance, 
would be to see whether in the era of intermestic policy, states enact more democratic 
policy or if they are captured by the same interests as the federal government, and how 
the influence of interest groups changes – or not – if globalization intensifies. Valuable 
research could be done on how political interests determine how quickly and in what 
areas the U.S. government moves to adopt international commercial standards, and how 
this affects the practice of U.S. democracy.  
John Kincaid suggests future research when he writes,  
Implicit in the fear that constituent diplomacy threatens the nation-
state is the assumption that sovereign nation-states ought not to be 
challenged in foreign policy by competition from their constituent 
governments. This in turn must rest on the assumption that nation-states 
are the only legitimate and competent representatives of the people who 
live within their territorial domains, and that national elites represent a 
unified national interest…these assumptions require both normative and 
empirical examination. 6 
 
Whether or not there is a link between the increase in presidential power in trade 
negotiations and the rise of states forging their own international trade relations has yet 
to be thoroughly examined, but arguably, a stronger presidential role in trade relations 
reduces the influence of states by reducing the input of their congressional 
representatives. This possible link merits further study. 
 
 
                                        
6 John Kincaid, “Constituent Diplomacy in Federal Polities and the Nation-state: Conflict and 
Cooperation,” in Federalism and International Relations: The Role of Subnational Units. Hans J. 
Michelmann and Panayotis Soldatos , eds.( Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990): 55.  
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A Future of Increased Conflict 
This dissertation research suggests that even mutual policy goals do not 
necessarily ensure the freedom of the states. This project has argued that throughout the 
course of this nation’s history, both the states and the federal government pursued 
economic development goals, largely in harmony. But if the United States continues to 
integrate itself further into the world economy and initiates more international treaties, 
the states may find themselves facing further restrictions on their traditional areas of 
regulatory authority such as criminal justice, agricultural production, transportation of 
goods, and so forth. If the federal government’s goals shift from support of short-term 
economic development to the long-term goal of creating a global market, the potential 
for conflict among the levels of government may increase. 
A move towards coercive federalism may be tempered by the fact that the federal 
government needs to maintain good relations with the states. The federal government is 
either incapable of or unwilling to handle all domestic- level developments that involve 
foreign actors. Arguably, when states develop international roles for the purpose of 
meeting domestic governing goals, the nation is benefited more than it is harmed. The 
fears that internationally-active states would undermine the nation as a whole have come 
to naught; this research shows that in today’s policy environment, the cherished notion 
that internationally-active states will damage the national interest does not carry the 
weight it did in the past.  
If globalization proceeds, the risk of intergovernmental conflict arising out of 
changes in domestic policy will need to be well-managed. The current lack of clarity on 
how far the states may go in pursuing an international role indicates there is much room 
for improvement in managing the domestic changes brought about by globalization. This 
is the responsibility of the federal government.  
If current conditions persist, the merging of two state- level trends can be foreseen 
which will produce conflict: the tendency of states to assert themselves in international 
commerce and to be more vocal in opposing federal foreign policy will at some point 
converge with growing concerns about international labor and environmental standards. 
If subnational governments continue to see manufacturing sectors suffer from the effects 
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of cheaper imports, a grass-roots movement could develop to pressure the U.S. federal 
government to develop a trade policy that demands other nations improve their labor and 
environmental standards. 
Intergovernmental conflict between the federal government and the states is 
exactly what the Supreme Court case law in the past tried to prevent: the perception 
outside of U.S. borders that disunity and disharmony reign within U.S. borders. Such a 
perception would not serve the interests of U.S. national security, providing cracks 
through which both internal and external threats may slither. While the states arguably 
place a higher interest in economic goals over security, the states have still been willing 
partners in fighting to achieve U.S. security goals. The degree of intergovernmental 
conflict that will accompany fighting the war on terrorism depends on how well the 
federal government communicates to state and local actors what their roles in this 
dynamic policy environment may be. 
 The states are partners in the federal system. But as domestic policy and foreign 
policy have intertwined, it is no longer possible to hold a concept of states as lacking in 
capabilities or interests in international politics. If the global economy continues to 
change apace, relations between these partners in federalism will continue to transform. 
The federal government needs to ensure that democratic legitimacy is not compromised 
in the process, or governance in the United States will be imperiled. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
 
Federalism is a “pluralistic democracy in which two sets of governments, neither 
being fully at the mercy of the other, legislate and administer within their separate yet 
interlocked jurisdictions.”1 Although local governments are a part of the governing 
structure, the two constitutional partners in the United States are the federal government 
and the states. Although the local role is often included in this research, the focus 
remains state- level developments and the federal response. 
 
Foreign policy comprises those policy responses, instruments, and processes that 
take place at the federal level and serve to further U.S. goals abroad. Only the federal 
government can legally create policy that is binding in international law. No matter how 
much international goodwill individual states or cities may generate with foreign 
entities, states are legally incapable of creating binding international agreements. For this 
reason, I do not call any state action “foreign policy,” but refer to the action of the states 
as foreign affairs, foreign relations, or international intergovernmental relations. 
 
The term globalization is overused and under-defined. But that term more than 
any other describes in general the phenomenon explored in more detail in chapter 3, that 
of the rapid global economic integration that developed after World War II. The focus 
here is on economic globalization (as opposed to social or cultural globalization) as a 
force driving the internationalization of domestic policy and the development of 
international intergovernmental relations.  
 
 
                                        
1 Ivo D. Duchacek, “Perforated Sovereignties: Towards a Typology of New Actors in 
International Relations,” in Federalism and International Relations: The Role of Subnational Units. 
Hans J. Michelmann and Panayotis Soldatos, eds. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990, p. 3.  
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Governance is the process of managing public concerns in order to meet 
constitutionally mandated goals of maintaining a prosperous and safe society. 
 
International intergovernmental relations are the establishment of regular 
communication between state- level actors in the United States and state or federal- level 
actors in another nation. The degree of formality of these relations may span a 
continuum from informal – characterized by infrequent but regular phone contact – to 
the creation of a venue for regular in-person meetings  
 
Internationalization of policy occurs when a domestic policy development 
includes an international cause or effect, which in order to be managed effectively, 
requires contact or cooperation with foreign actors and leads to the development of 
regular international intergovernmental relations. 
 
States, in the lexicon of International Relations, refer to central governments. But 
in this document, “states” means the U.S. states as distinguished from the federal 
government. 
 
Subnational governments are state and local governments. U.S. cities are also 
establishing themselves as international actors, for many of the same reasons as states. 
But because the state is the crucial partner to the federal government in U.S. federalism, 
the state is the unit of analysis emphasized by this project. Subnational governments are 
also referred to as state and local governments and non-central governments. 
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